Special Tax Zones and EU Law. Towards a New Model for Social Cohesion Policies by Cipollini, C.
PDF hosted at the Radboud Repository of the Radboud University
Nijmegen
 
 
 
 
The following full text is a publisher's version.
 
 
For additional information about this publication click this link.
http://hdl.handle.net/2066/207743
 
 
 
Please be advised that this information was generated on 2020-09-10 and may be subject to
change.
S
pecial T
ax Z
ones and E
U
 L
aw
 
C
laudio C
ipollini 
a
Special Tax Zones 
and EU Law
Towards a New Model for Social Cohesion Policies
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Special Tax Zones (STZs) do not have a clear identity in the context of 
European tax law, since they cover a multitude of situations characterized by 
different denominations and different purposes.
Despite the lack of a systematic framework, STZs can still represent an 
important line of action in the context of the EU cohesion policy; the future 
success of the EU, in fact, is strictly conditional upon the adoption of the 
proper measures to reduce the disparities between high-income and low-
income areas of the Union, including the use of territorial tax advantages at 
the sub-State level.
On these premises, the first objective of the present study is to define a new 
approach to the topic with the development of a general legal theory of STZs 
in the context of European tax law, with the identification of a comprehensive 
concept and a set of implementing models on the ground of the experience of 
the Member States.
Thanks to the support of a new theoretical framework, the study then outlines 
the basics of a new implementing model of STZs – the “Social Cohesion 
Zone” – characterized by the introduction of tax advantages in the form of 
social tax incentives. In this regard, the original findings presented in this work 
give evidence of a space left for autonomous initiatives of the Members States, 
opening a new room for the development of social cohesion policies targeted 
to the most disadvantaged areas of the Union.
At the end of this study, the phenomenon of STZs assumes a new outlook in 
the context of European tax law with a sensible improvement of the systematic 
perspective and a consistent theoretical support for future initiatives at the EU 
and Member State level.
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Key premises 
The impact of the last economic crisis in Europe has brought severe 
consequences in most Member States on all levels of the economy, especially 
for those territories affected by previous development delays.  
Within these areas, made more vulnerable by their remoteness and distance, the 
negative effects have resulted in industrial stagnation and job losses, causing the 
increase of unprecedented social issues. 
Nowadays, EU institutions are called upon to provide concrete answers for 
these situations, through the design and the implementation of effective tax 
policies in accordance with the fundamental principles of the EU legal 
framework. 
In this context, the starting idea of the present study is that, among the various 
solutions available, Special Tax Zones (hereinafter also called STZs) can 
represent a useful instrument for delivering growth and mitigating the state of 
economic and social emergency of the most disadvantaged areas of the Union1. 
From a classic perspective, STZs can be identified with a phenomenon 
belonging to the field of customs law, characterized by the presence of an area 
of land where the host country’s standard customs regimes for import and 
export are replaced by more liberal rules with the objective of increasing 
international trade2. 
As long as this is the case, such measures are exclusively related to indirect 
taxation with the establishment of a zone where goods can be stored for a 
prolonged period without the application of custom duties or other indirect 
taxes. 
Nevertheless, most recent examples of STZs often offer a broader set of 
incentives than just customs arrangements, including benefits on income tax3. 
On these bases, the term “Special Tax Zones” can be used – in a first 
approximation – to encompass under its “umbrella” all the areas of land where 
1 In this sense, see, ex multis, UNITED NATIONS – ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMISSION FOR 
ASIA AND PACIFIC, Commercial development of regional ports as logistic centres, United 
Nations Publications, New York, 2002. 
2 W. DE JONG, Establishing free zones for regional development, Library of the European 
Parliament, 2013, available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/bibliotheque/briefin-
g/2013/130481/LDM_BRI(2013)130481-_REVEN.pdf   
3 E.g. Madeira Free Trade Zone in Portugal and Urban Tax-Free Zones in France and in 
Italy. 
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some territorial tax advantages are granted on direct and/or indirect taxation. 
Regardless of the type of tax benefits granted by the hosting country, today 
STZs are common all over the world and, during the last three decades, their 
presence has multiplied, especially in the US and in many developing 
countries4. 
In recent years, even countries within the EU have submitted, with increasing 
intensity, inquires to the Commission aimed at obtaining authorizations for the 
establishment of new zones with special tax regimes also related to direct 
taxation; the main reason under such initiatives is generally associated to the 
economic idea that the introduction of a level of taxation lower than the one 
generally applied elsewhere should positively influence, in a more or less 
relevant way, the choice of location of business activities5. In this direction, the 
stated goal is to create favourable conditions for enterprises and foreign 
investors, starting a process of economic recovery of those areas that are 
seriously affected by matters of falling incomes and unemployment.  
On these premises, most Member States recently demonstrate a concrete 
interest towards the theme of STZs, developing some serious initiatives for 
promoting the same instrument in a set of new strategies for improving the 
employment rate of the most disadvantaged areas of their national territory6. 
Nonetheless, STZs have not yet found a systematic framework in the EU legal 
system; for instance, for what regards the influence of State aid rules and the 
free movement of persons, these zones are still living moments of great 
uncertainty. 
Moreover, the notion of STZs is still little investigated since it is generally 
confined to the few experts who deal with customs matters and international 
tax planning; academic studies on this phenomenon are rare and they usually 
focus their attention on the economic aspects related to the establishment of a 
zone, without serious attempts of outlining a legal theory on the topic7. 
                                                             
4 In 1970, only a few countries are equipped with such zones, but already in 1996 the 
Organization for Economic and Cooperative Development (OECD) estimates about 
500 industrial Free Zones located in 73 countries, while the international list drawn up in 
1997 by the World Economic Processing Zones Association considers more than 800 
Export Processing Zones and Commercial Zones throughout the world. 
5 For an evaluation of the advantages related to the establishment of a STZ see UNITED 
NATIONS – ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMISSION FOR ASIA AND PACIFIC, op. cit., United 
Nations Publications, New York, 2002. 
6 See M. INGROSSO, O. NOCERINO, F. ROCCATAGLIATA, C. SACCHETTO, Le Zone Franche, 
Chamber of Commerce of Naples, Naples, 1998, p. 3. 
7 The lack of interest on such phenomenon is also linked to the difficulties in defining the 
border between tax law and customs law. In fact, tax law scholars traditionally confine 
topics dealing with customs outside the perimeter of tax law studies, assuming that such 
themes have to be developed and classified under a different area of practice (i.e. customs 
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Therefore, the existing literature on STZs generally describes a set of very 
technical rules about custom administrative procedures, while there is no trace 
of a systematic approach able to define a comprehensive theory of STZs from a 
legal perspective. 
Given the above, the approach of the present study is first addressed to explore 
the legal framework and the factual experience of STZs in the EU, with the 
objective of working out a comprehensive theory on the topic in the field of 
European tax law. 
After the definition of the theoretical background, the second part of the 
research is carried out through a dynamic perspective, with the definition of a 
new implementing model of STZs for the development of social cohesion 
policies; in this direction, the declared objective requires important efforts, as it 
is necessary to face some critical issues of EU law, such as those dealing with the 
outer limits of negative integration set by State aid rules and fundamental 
freedoms.  
At the end of the dissertation, STZs are thus presented under a new light both 
for what concerns their theoretical understanding and the possibility of their 
practical implementation. 
In the first case, in fact, STZs are finally identified as an institute belonging to 
European tax law, thus providing an innovative reading-key and the proper 
conceptual categories to deeply understand the factual experience from a legal 
point of view. In the second case, the research gives evidence of the possibility 
of a practical implementation of the same instrument through the development 
of a new model in the context of social cohesion policies, approaching the issues 
related to its compatibility with the variables of EU law. 
On the ground of the above premises – and before starting the review of the 
relevant material – the present chapter introduces the topic, outlining, among 
others, not only the background and the context, but also the research questions 
and the methodology adopted in this study. 
1.2 Research background and context 
The introduction of a thesis usually starts from the research background and 
the description of the “state of art” of the topic, with an essential overview of 
the legal dimension, including references to the relevant literature. 
In this case, the content of Chapter 2 is specifically dedicated to that scope, with 
a comprehensive review of the relevant literature; thus, the present paragraph – 
in order to avoid useless duplications – is limited to the historical perspective of 
                                                                                                                                               
law). As a predictable consequence of the aforementioned approach, STZs still do not 
find a systematic framework within the tax law area and no sufficient studies have been 
made on the topic. 
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the phenomenon, with a focus exclusively set on the origin and the first 
developments of STZs within the EU. 
1.2.1 Origin of the phenomenon 
The background of STZs is historically related to a system of special rules 
authorized by the hosting country concerning goods and assets, commercial 
and industrial activities or transactions made within these territories.  
The origin of such zones is closely linked to the need of creating free trade 
areas, where goods can be stored, handled, and processed without the 
enforcement of rights, duties, and all the other tax measures normally 
applicable8.  
Some authors identify the origins of STZs between the 9th century BC and 8th 
century BC because of the market development arising from the frequent 
religious fairs9.  
Other authors choose to place the origin of STZs a few centuries later, during 
the Greek Hellenistic period, as part of a system of facilities and tax exemptions 
that allow to permanently suspend not only indirect taxes on the religious 
sacrifices and sales, but also customs duties on imports and exports10.  
Some historical studies identify the “Port-Ateleia” on the Greek island of Delos 
as a symbol of the first presence of the same assumptions that characterize 
these territories nowadays11.  
Moreover, the so called “portus immunes” of the Roman period - whose 
existence is confirmed in the work “Iugurta” by Sallust - are recognized as the 
immediate antecedents of STZs12, as well as the “Free Ports” of the late 
Middle Ages13.  
However, from a more contemporary and pragmatic perspective, the focus on 
the topic should be moved to the end of the Second World War, considering the 
                                                             
8 See M. INGROSSO, O. NOCERINO, F. ROCCATAGLIATA, C. SACCHETTO, op. cit., Chamber of 
Commerce of Naples, Naples, 1998, pp. 5-9. 
9 S. FINARDI, E. MORONI, Stati d’eccezione, Zone e Porti Franchi nell’economia–mondo, 
FrancoAngeli, Milan, 2001, p. 15; N.K. RAUH, The sacred bonds of commerce: religion, 
economy, and trade society at Hellenistic Roman Delos, 166-87 B.C., J.C. Gieben, 
Amsterdam, 1993. 
10 L. CASSON, The Grain Trade of the Hellenistic World, in Ancient Trade and Society, Wayne 
State Un. Press, Detroit, 1984, p. 76. 
11 G. REGER, Regionalism and change in the economy of independent Delos, 314-167 B.C., Un. of 
California Press, Berkeley, 1994. 
12 See L. DE LIGT, Fairs and markets in the Roman Empire. Economic and social aspects of 
periodic trade in a pre-industrial society, J.C. Gieben, Amsterdam, 1993, p. 45. 
13 W. DIAMOND, D. DIAMOND, Tax-Free Trade Zones of the world, M. Bender, New York, 
1990; T.H. LLOYD, England and the German Hanse, 1157-1611: a study of their trade and 
commercial diplomacy, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1991. 
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new political and economic framework marked by the primary role of emerging 
countries.  
In that period, in fact, Free Ports become important reference points for new 
economic initiatives and a crucial tool in international competition as well.  
After the Second World War, Germany and Ireland are the first countries - 
within the territory of the EU - that establish Free Ports and Industrial Zones, 
such as the best-known cases of the city of Hamburg and the area of Shannon. 
In any case, despite the fact that there is not an unanimously recognized 
“birthday” of STZs, every kind of contemporary study on the phenomenon 
should properly start from the end of the Second World War, considering the 
fact that any attempt to examine previous experiences is relevant only from an 
historical point of view. 
In recent decades, STZs have answered to the needs of international businesses, 
as industrial countries have realized that they need to maintain their market 
positions and to expand production and sales structures beyond national 
borders.  
In other words, such areas become the vehicles by which many countries 
maintain their market position unchanged on the bases of a new policy of 
minimizing production costs and eliminating any waste14.  
Furthermore, the same zones have been recently used to pursue other 
objectives, such as those related to the development delays of the most 
disadvantaged areas and the social issues linked to job losses and increasing 
poverty. 
Therefore, in recent history, these areas have been often considered as the key 
tool to manage tax policies aimed not only to favour international competition, 
but also to create new jobs and to improve the living conditions in the 
disadvantaged areas affected by serious underdevelopment. 
1.2.2 Development in the EU context 
1.2.2.1 STZs and indirect taxation 
The historical background of STZs within the EU is characterized by a series of 
initiatives in the form of directives and regulations essentially aimed at 
harmonizing national provisions concerning indirect taxation, considering the 
difficulties in pursuing objectives of harmonization in the field of direct 
taxation15. 
                                                             
14 G. VIMERCATI, Le zone franche industriali nei paesi emergenti. Il sud est asiatico, FrancoAngeli, 
Milan 1985. 
15 For some considerations on the initiatives on direct taxation see M. LANG, P. PISTONE, J. 
SCHUCH, C. STARINGER, Introduction to European Tax Law: Direct Taxation, Spiramus 
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Throughout the last decades, in fact, the positive integration of EU law has 
approached the topic of STZs only for what regards the so called “Free Zones” 
(hereinafter named also “FZs”) – characterized by the exclusive presence of tax 
benefits on indirect taxation - streamlining the related legal framework through 
a path parallel to the abolition of customs duties between Member States and to 
the creation of a customs union.  
In other terms, the historical development of STZs in the context of EU law 
generally influences the regulation of the aspect of FZs related to customs 
duties, VAT and excises, on the ground of the fact that Member States have 
conferred to the Union the exclusive legislative power only in the field of 
indirect taxation and not in the area of direct taxation. 
On these premises, the notion of FZs evolves over time from the creation of the 
European Community to the present day, considering that, at the time of its 
founding, there are zones similar to the current concept of FZs only within the 
Italian and German territory16. 
In a first period, the approval of Directive 69/75/EEC17 establishes the 
requirement of harmonization between the Member States’ rules regarding 
customs laws and provides a first legal definition of Free Zones, considered as 
large areas of land - including cities and villages - that enjoy tax benefits in 
consideration of their historical, economic, and social background. 
The Directive represents the legal basis of FZs, containing rules governing not 
only their functioning but also their establishment18. Under Article 10, for 
instance, every new zone set up with national provisions and in accordance 
with the principles laid down by the Directive must be notified to the 
Commission. This notification does not constitute a mere formal act, but a tool 
that can enable the Commission to verify the full compliance of the provisions 
enacted by the Member State with the same Directive.  
                                                                                                                                               
Press, 3rd edition, Wien, 2013, p. 24. 
16 At that time of the European Community founding, Belgium, France and Luxembourg 
have no zones, while the Netherlands has only warehouses. 
17 Council Directive 69/75/EEC of 4 March 1969 on the harmonization of provisions laid 
down by law, regulation or administrative action relating to free zones, O.J. 1969, L 58, 
pp. 11-13. 
18 The Directive governs the entrance into the Free Zones of goods of any kind, whatever 
their number, their country of origin, consignment or destination (Article 2); the loading, 
unloading, trans-shipment and storage, the usual forms of handling and operations of 
destruction (Article 3); the placing on the consumption and use of goods (Article 4); the 
different treatments that can be used for the same goods (Article 5); the length of time 
during which goods may remain in Free Zones (Article 6); the divestment thereof (Article 
7); the levying of customs duties, taxes having equivalent effect and agricultural levies at 
the time of release for consumption (Article 8). 
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Later, Regulation (EEC) No. 2504/8819, based on Article 113 of the EEC 
Treaty, emphasizes the promotional aspect of FZs for EU trade policy and the 
important role that such zones play in the redistribution of goods, not only 
outside, but also inside the perimeter of the Community. 
Moreover, the Regulation establishes that Member States may designate parts 
of the customs territory of the Community as Free Zones20, establishing the 
area covered by each FZ and ensuring that these areas are enclosed with entry 
and exit points under the customs supervision (Article 2). 
Therefore, in accordance with Regulation (EEC) No. 2504/88, FZs are 
characterized by the fact that the goods here found are considered, for the 
purposes of customs duties, as if they were not within the customs territory of 
the Community.  
Later, in 1992, EU institutions put together in a single text - the so-called 
“Community Customs Code” (hereinafter also CCC)21 – all the provisions of 
customs law issued during a period of twenty-five years and mainly scattered in 
a multitude of regulations and directives.  
The CCC brings back the multiple terms used by Member States to only two 
concise definitions - Free Zones and free warehouses - and provides the 
publication by the Commission of a list of the FZs operating and existing 
within the territory of the Community22. Furthermore, in addition to storage 
operations, the CCC authorizes to conduct any activity in a Free Zone of 
industrial nature (for example, the production or processing of goods) or 
commercial nature (for example, purchase or sale of goods or services as 
banking and insurance)23.  
The last step of the harmonization process coincides with the new Union 
Customs Code (hereinafter also UCC), approved by Regulation (EU) No. 
952/201324 that today represents one of the main legal acts dealing with the 
                                                             
19 Council Regulation (EEC) No. 2504/88 of 25 July 1988 on free zones and free 
warehouses, O.J. 1988, L 225, pp. 8-13. 
20 For further information on warehouses and their characteristics, see B. J.M. TERRA, P. J. 
WATTEL, European Tax Law, Sixth Edition, Kluwer Law International, Alphen aan den 
Rijn, 2012, pp. 298 et seq. 
21 Council Regulation (EEC) No. 2913/92 of 12 October 1992 establishing the 
Community Customs Code, O.J. 1992, L 302, pp. 1-50. 
22 Communication from the Commission of 23 February 2002 publishing the list of free 
zones in existence and in operation in the Community, O.J. 2002, C 50, pp. 16-18 (last 
update 17 November 2017). 
23 According to Article 172 of the Community Customs Code, for customs purposes it is 
sufficient that the exercise of these activities is first notified to the competent authorities. 
24 Regulation (EU) No. 952/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 
October 2013 laying down the Union Customs Code, O.J. 2013, L. 269, pp. 1-101. The 
Union Customs Code (UCC) has entered into force on 30 October 2013 repealing 
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present topic in the context of EU law; its content is deeply analyzed in Chapter 
3 which is entirely dedicated to the review of the EU law framework of STZs. 
1.2.2.2 STZs and direct taxation 
As far as direct taxation is concerned, the historical background of the Union 
gives evidence of many examples that differ from the Free Zone regulated by 
the UCC, with the presence of a broader set of incentives also related to income 
tax; this clearly means that the past of STZs has not an exclusive value for 
customs purposes, considering that many areas have been characterized by a set 
of norms affecting direct taxation. 
The Madeira International Business Centre25, or the situations of “Urban Tax-
Free Zones” in France26 and in Italy27 represent clear examples of tax schemes 
where some benefits have also been granted on direct taxation. 
As long as this is the case, the historical development of the phenomenon of 
STZs in the Union involves some crucial points of analysis concerning the 
influence of EU law on direct taxation, especially for what regards the evolution 
in the interpretation of State aid rules and fundamental freedoms. 
The basic assumption, in fact, deals with the fact that these types of zones, as 
they include benefits on direct taxation, may distort competition since some 
enterprises can take advantages while some others not. 
In this regard, the historical development of EU law with reference to STZs 
finds one of its most important key elements in the progressive evolution of the 
case law of the ECJ and in some documents issued by the Commission, whose 
interpretation of State aid rules and fundamental freedoms has contributed 
significantly to the definition of the current legal framework. Among the most 
relevant material, it is important to mention a first group of decisions where the 
ECJ develops its position about the extent of selectivity, being this one of the 
requirements for the recognition of State aid under the provision of Article 107 
TFEU28, with the aim to clearly distinguish the situations in which the tax 
advantages granted lead to a distortion of competition. Beside such decisions, 
there is a second group of cases where the ECJ pays attention to the 
interpretation of the exceptions provided under Article 107(3) TFEU, 
developing some ideas about the limits through which territorial tax advantages 
– as those provided within STZs - may be granted to a limited area of land 
                                                                                                                                               
Regulation (EC) No. 450/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 
April 2008 laying down the Community Customs Code, O.J. 2008, L 145, pp. 1-64. 
25 See infra paragraph 4.2.17.1. 
26 See infra paragraph 4.2.7.2. 
27 See infra paragraph 4.2.11.2. 
28 Consolidate version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, O.J. 2012, 
C 326, pp. 47-390. 
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without representing an infringement of State aid rules.  Moreover, other 
decisions of the ECJ approach the principle of tax non-discrimination, 
analysing its related issues with specific references to the phenomenon of 
STZs. 
Finally, the historical background of STZs and direct taxation is also 
characterized by the content of the Code of Conduct for Business Taxation 
adopted by the ECOFIN Council on 1 December 199729. 
In all the above sources, it is possible to identify an historical evolution where 
the EU institutions progressively open a room for studying the implementation 
of territorial tax benefits on direct taxation; the “state of art” of the topic is fully 
investigated under Chapter 3 where a comprehensive review of the EU law 
regarding STZs is carried out, including the relevant case law of the ECJ. 
1.2.3  Proponents and critics 
Today, EU institutions point out the need to promote the growth of 
competitiveness of regional areas where the standard of living is abnormally 
low or where there are severe forms of unemployment, searching for tax 
policies able to facilitate the development of certain regions in decline.  
In this context, many studies identify STZs as a valuable tool to carry out 
regional development policies30 as they can be used – for example - to fight 
against undeclared illegal labor31, concretely reducing many fees and charges 
which affect companies and workers.  
There are many proponents of the benefits associated with the establishment of 
STZs who highlight the positive aspects from an economic and political 
perspective32; according to them, STZs can lead to important benefits such as 
the increase of employment - especially in underdeveloped areas -, the 
improvement of skills of the local workforce and the creation of new 
technologies33 to attract foreign capital or to stimulate local capacity.  
In this sense, the main objective of such zones moves around the economic idea 
                                                             
29 Conclusions of the ECOFIN Council Meeting on 1 December 1997 concerning taxation 
policy – Resolution of the Council and the Representatives of the Governments of the 
Member States, meeting within the Council of 1 December 1997 on conduct for 
business taxation, O.J. 1998, C 2, pp. 1-6. 
30 For an analysis of EU competition policies see also F.G. WISHLADE, Regional state aid and 
competition policy in the European Union, Kluwer Law International, The Hague, 2003. 
31 M. INGROSSO, O. NOCERINO, F. ROCCATAGLIATA, C. SACCHETTO, op. cit., Chamber of 
Commerce of Naples, Naples, 1998, p. 40. 
32 G.F. DALLA COSTA, S. NARDO, M. MENINI, Le zone franche nella globalizzazione. 
Definizioni, tipologie, percorsi di sviluppo, CLEUP SC, Padova, 2006, pp. 57 et seq. 
33 See M. FURLOTTI, Le zone franche industriali in una prospettiva di cooperazione tra Europa e 
America Latina, in Economia e politica industriale, 1986, No. 52, p. 237. 
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of stimulating a healthy self-propelling regional development34, with the 
creation of new structures and the enhancement of work capacity. 
In addition, multinational companies often believe that the interposition of 
goods in STZs – especially those established in the form of FZs regulated by 
UCC - allow them to reduce the financial burdens and to increase their cash 
flow by the suspension of taxation35.  
According to the same proponents, the activities in STZs usually play a 
strategic role in the international supply and distribution chains based on the 
principle of dividing processes, taking advantage from the recent development 
in the information technology and transportation fields; in this regard, the main 
products manufactured in STZs are related to industrial sectors – like the textile 
or the electronic industry - that can produce goods for international markets 
thanks to relatively unskilled labor force. At the same time, it is worth to 
mention the recent establishment in such areas of new types of economic 
activities based on the use of a more qualified labor force36, such as in the areas 
of high tech and finance.  
Thus, nowadays in Europe, it is possible to identify a broader framework of 
different activities attracted by the possibility of using such zones as an 
opportunity to minimize taxes and to improve their volume of trade. 
However, despite any other positive assessment of the phenomenon, these 
zones are frequently criticized as regimes only able to involve protectionist 
measures37.  
It is a topic that, among others, has a lot of credibility with the EU authorities, 
which do not usually favour the establishment of new zones with benefits on 
direct taxation.  
According to the critics, in fact, tax distortions can affect the free movement of 
persons, especially when the tax scheme includes benefits related to direct 
taxation; thus, in such cases, the impediments to the establishment of STZs are 
generally related to the need of ensuring the full satisfaction of the fundamental 
freedoms within the internal market.  
 
                                                             
34 See S. BORGHI, Il ruolo delle zone franche industriali nel dialogo nord-sud: il sud-est asiatico, in 
Economia e Politica industriale, 1985, No. 47, pp. 267 et seq. 
35 For a list of such advantages see O. CHAPMAN, Les zones franches dans le monde et aux Etats-
Unis, in Problemes economiques, 1986, p. 28. For an interesting economic study see also 
W.R. MC DANIEL, E.W. KOSSACK, The financial benefits of users of foreign-trade zones, in 
Columbia Journal of World Business, 1983, pp. 33 et seq. 
36 M. FURLOTTI, op. cit., in Economia e politica industriale, 1986, No. 52, p. 243. 
37 See, for instance, D. SPINANGER, Objectives and impact of economic activity zones – Some 
evidence from Asia, in Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv, 1984, Vol. 120, No. 1, pp. 64 et seq. 
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1.3 Statement of the problem 
The background of STZs highlights some relevant gaps in the knowledge, 
drawing the attention to a series of critical elements that constitute the starting 
point of the present research. 
A first review of the existing literature reveals a general lack of scientific 
understanding of the phenomenon within the field of tax law; in fact, the most 
important papers dealing with the theme of STZs represent the results of 
studies carried out in the field of economics or customs aimed at analyzing the 
effects on business activities and trade38. 
In this sense, even if some authors make important efforts for determining the 
reasons for the establishment of such zones39, the approach used is exclusively 
analytical with a focus set on a mere description of the rules governing a specific 
zone, without properly considering the related legal framework in the light of a 
systematic view. 
The result is that, in the context of law studies, there is no evidence of serious 
attempts aimed at working out a general theory of STZs, not even by the 
doctrine active in the field of tax law. In this regard, in fact, the perspective used 
is essentially based on the description of administrative procedures related to 
the import/export process, while it is not possible to identify a clear analysis 
carried out in the light of the main principles of tax law; in particular, the 
existing literature does not provide a serious approach for deeply 
understanding the structural and functional variables related to direct and 
indirect taxation. 
Among the main evidences, it is interesting to observe that even the 
terminology used is the expression of a framework where the tax law variables 
are poorly understood and investigated; previous studies, in fact, usually 
identify the same phenomenon using the term “Free Trade Zones”, with 
various sub-categories defined on the basis of the different kinds of benefits 
granted by the host country. 
In this context, many types of zones are mentioned, all characterized by blurred 
                                                             
38 For instance, see G.W. MENG, Evolutionary model of free economic zones – Different 
Generations and structural features, in Chinese Geographical Science, 2005, Vol. 15, pp. 103-
112; I. SOARE, D. NECHITA, Free zones development in Romania – Premises, determining 
factors and perspective, in Economics and Applied Informatics, 2010, No. 1, pp. 117-124. 
39 For example, see C. XIANGMING, The evolution of free economic zones and the recent 
development of cross-national growth zones, in International Journal of Urban and Regional 
Research, 1995, Vol. 19, No. 4, pp. 593-621; H.C. SCHULZE, Free trade zones at the 
beginning of the 21st century, in The comparative and international law journal of Southern 
Africa, 2002, Vol. 35; W.N. CHANG, D.M. RADULESCU, Types of tax concessions for 
attracting foreign direct investment in free economic zones, in CESifo Working Paper Series, 
2004, No. 1175, available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=5- 34707 
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definitional boundaries, such as Commercial Free Zones, Enterprise Zones, 
Export Processing Zones40, Industrial Free Zones, Special Economic Zones, 
Free Ports, etc.41. 
In all the cases, the multitude of wording used focuses the attention on the 
economic characteristics of each zone, putting in evidence the main aspects 
related to commercial and industrial dynamics, without providing any specific 
reference for what concerns the variables of tax law. 
Then, there is no evidence of a comprehensive definition of STZs able to 
encompass all the different situations where a set of territorial tax incentives is 
granted to a limited area of the hosting State; at the same time, the previous 
studies do not explore the implementing models nor the key-elements that 
characterize the concept of STZs.  
Furthermore, the coordination between the phenomenon of STZs and EU law 
is not properly investigated, especially as far as direct taxation is concerned. In 
this regard, the influence of State aid rules and of free movement of persons is 
usually explored under a case-by-case analysis on the ground of the decisions 
issued by the ECJ and the main documents enacted by the Commission; 
therefore, there is no evidence of a systematic approach for the evaluation of 
territorial tax incentives under the parameters of EU law. 
In summary, the topic of STZs is characterized by the substantial absence of 
systematic efforts within the tax law literature and, therefore, the first gap of 
knowledge can be identified in the lack of a general theory of STZs in the 
context of tax law studies. 
The second gap in the knowledge deals with the lack of an implementing model 
of STZs based on tax incentives of a social character in the area of direct 
taxation; this study, in fact, starts from the presumption that the existing STZs 
are not able to face the economic issues of the most disadvantages areas of the 
Union, with the consequent assumption that a new model of STZs is necessary 
at the current stage of European integration. 
In this regard, the experience of the Member States does not offer examples of 
tax schemes specifically designed for the development of social cohesion 
policies, especially when the issues of the most disadvantaged areas of the 
                                                             
40 R.L. BOLIN, The global network of export processing zones, in Journal of the Flagstaff Institute, 
1998, Vol. 22, p. 15; A. BASILE, D. GERMIDIS, Investing in free export processing zones, 
OECD Development Centre, Paris, 1984, p. 20; UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON 
TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT, Export Processing Zones: Role of Foreign direct investment and 
development impact, UNCTAD Secretariat Report, United Nations Publications, Geneva, 
1993, p. 5. 
41 UNITED NATIONS: CENTRE ON TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS, The challenge of free 
economic zones in central and eastern Europe, United Nations Publications, New York, 
1991; UNITED NATIONS – ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMISSION FOR ASIA AND PACIFIC, 
op. cit., United Nations Publications, New York, 2002. 
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Union are considered. 
In particular, it is not clear whether or not there is still a space left for Member 
States in consideration of the strict limits set by EU law and the discretionality 
of the EU institutions in the interpretation of the relevant provisions. 
Consequently, Member States refrain to assume relevant initiatives in the field, 
facing many difficulties in setting up a consistent social cohesion policy in 
favour of the low-income individuals which reside in the most disadvantaged 
territories. 
1.4 Research questions 
As seen above, the phenomenon of STZs has not yet found a final and 
comprehensive explanation in the context of European tax law; in fact, there are 
still some unresolved issues concerning, for example, the presence of multiple 
types of STZs characterized by blurred definitional boundaries. 
On these premises, it is necessary to approach the topic from a systematic point 
of view with an investigation addressed to the development of a general legal 
theory and to the identification of a common reading key for the various 
experiences of territorial tax incentives in the Member States. 
Therefore, considering the statement of the problem in the above terms, the 
first research question in this study can be outlined as follows: 
 
Research question No. 1  
In the context of European tax law, is it possible to develop a general legal theory of 
STZs able to explain the different experiences of territorial tax incentives in the 
Member States?   
 
This research question is first aimed at identifying the different sides of the 
concept of STZs starting from the review and the analysis of the relevant 
resources, including the literature on the topic, the EU law framework for direct 
and indirect taxation, and the factual experience of the Member States. The 
development of a general legal theory also involves the formulation of a 
comprehensive definition of STZs able to encompass all the relevant situations 
identified in the Member States, both for what regards the areas characterized 
by tax benefits on direct taxation and the other areas with tax benefits limited to 
indirect taxation. As the last step, the general legal theory includes the 
identification of the implementing models as resulting from the analysis of the 
factual experience of the Member States. 
The second research question is defined under a dynamic perspective in 
relation to the variables of EU law and is formulated in the following terms: 
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Research question No. 2  
Is it possible to identify a new implementing model of STZs within the EU law 
framework addressed to the development of social cohesion policies for the most 
disadvantaged areas of the Union? 
 
In this case, the research question is aimed at promoting an approach to EU law 
able to support not only the growth of the internal market, but also the 
harmonious development of welfare and social cohesion in each Member State, 
especially for what regards the initiatives targeted to the development of the 
most disadvantaged areas. 
For this objective, the study investigates the variables of EU law and verifies the 
space left for the autonomous initiatives of the Member States; the priority, in 
fact, is to identify a line of action for the introduction of tax measures, in 
compliance with EU law, addressed to the low-income groups of individuals 
which reside in the underdeveloped regions of the Union. 
Therefore, to answer the second research question, the following sub-questions 
are formulated:  
 
2.1 Can a tax measure of a social character addressed to a limited area of a 
Member State be considered compatible with the internal market and be 
exempt from the notification obligation under State aid rules? 
2.2 Can a tax measure of a social character addressed to a limited area of a 
Member State, including conditions also based on the residence of the actors 
involved, be considered compatible with the free movement of persons? 
2.3 Can a tax measure of a social character addressed to a limited area of a 
Member State be considered acceptable under the criteria of the Code of 
Conduct for business taxation?  
 
The above research sub-questions, which respectively deal with the variables of 
State aid rules, free movement of persons and harmful tax competition, define 
the path to be followed to verify the space left for the development of social 
cohesion policies through the establishment of STZs in the most disadvantaged 
areas of the Union. 
1.5 Methodology 
In general terms, the methodological approach is set under the track of a 
qualitative research, involving the review and the conceptual analysis of the 
relevant materials according to the fundamentals of traditional legal analysis. 
The first part of the research is descriptive and is aimed at providing a 
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comprehensive overview on the state of art of the topic.  
In this direction, the research first describes the relevant literature, with a focus 
on the different definitions and classifications of STZs, extending the review to 
the aspects associated to the objectives of a social character, such as the 
concepts of social tax incentives, social enterprises, and social services of 
general interest. 
Then, the review of the EU law framework is carried out through the study of 
the sources of primary and secondary law, including a case-based research 
focused not only on the most relevant decisions issued by the ECJ in the last 
years, but also on the documents enacted by the Commission dealing with the 
topics of territorial tax incentives and social services of general interest.  
Furthermore, the first stage of the research process includes the review of the 
factual experience of the Member States, with a deep analysis of the relevant law 
texts in the national legal orders; the same review is carried out by the 
description of the specific features of each STZ, with a comprehensive overview 
on the tax benefits granted on direct and indirect taxation. Here, the focus is also 
set on the identification of the tax schemes already approved by the Commission 
as not constituting State aid, with the aim to develop a clear description of what 
is allowed and what is not allowed in the eyes of EU institutions. 
In this regard, it is important to note that, during the research process, it has 
been necessary to periodically check recent changes and to update the relevant 
sources, especially for what regards the legislation in force in each Member 
State; the tax schemes reviewed under the experience of the Member States, in 
fact, are often subject to strict expiring terms according to the authorization 
issued by the Commission, with the definition of an unstable framework, which 
requires a careful and continuous review of the last updates.  
The second part of the research is based on the conceptual analysis of the data 
collected under the first part of the study. The research questions are here 
developed through the method of the traditional legal analysis, focusing on the 
aspects specifically related to the area of European tax law.  
In particular, for what regards the first research question, the literature on the 
topic, the EU law framework for direct and indirect taxation, and the factual 
experience of the Member States represent the fields of analysis for the 
identification of a set of common features and for the definition of a reading key 
of the phenomenon. 
For the second research question, the methodology first involves the outline of 
the design of the new model in ideal terms, according to the general legal theory 
developed under the first research question. Therefore, in a first stage, the 
research will set the design of the new model regardless of the variables of EU 
law, merely focusing on the best solutions for the development of social 
cohesion policies addressed to the most disadvantaged areas of the Union; this 
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process will assume that a new model of STZs is necessary, starting from the 
presumption that the existing models of STZs are not able to tackle the 
economic issues of certain underdeveloped areas of the Union. 
Only in a second stage the variables of EU law will be considered, testing their 
relationship with the design of the model as resulting from the first stage; in this 
regard, State aid rules, the free movement of persons and harmful tax 
competition will represent the fundamental variables to be considered. 
At the end of this process of analysis, the eventual space left for the auto-
nomous initiatives of the Member States will be measured; accordingly, the 
research will finally outline the results in order to verify the possibility of a new 
model in compliance with the EU law framework. 
1.6 Research motivation and scope of the study 
Research in this area can lead to a deeper understanding of STZs in the context 
of European tax law, through the development of a general legal theory able to 
give evidence of the different sides of the phenomenon. 
The lack of a systematic framework in the current literature, as well as the 
multitude of denominations used by the operators, point out the need to develop 
a theoretical approach to STZs, with a comprehensive concept, a uniform 
definition, and a set of implementing models as resulting from the analysis of the 
factual experience. 
The importance of the research is also related to the growing need of new 
useful instruments to tackle the issues of the low-income areas of the Union. 
In this sense, it is necessary to carry out the proper initiatives for those 
territories affected by previous development delays, where the last economic 
crisis has produced the worst effects in terms of industrial stagnation and job 
losses. 
In this context, some studies already stress the fact that STZs can represent a 
useful tool for delivering growth and mitigating the state of economic and 
social emergency in several disadvantaged regions, considering them as an 
affordable instrument to reduce the gap in the economic development between 
rich and poor regions of the EU. 
Therefore, the research motivation relies on the need of creating a solid 
theoretical base for an instrument – such as STZs – whose implementation can 
constitute an important line of action in the context of social cohesion policies 
addressed to the development of the low-income areas of the Union. In this 
sense, the urgency of a better understanding of the present phenomenon is 
strictly connected with the idea of developing the EU as a political union, 
providing concrete responses against the growing skepticism towards the 
Union. 
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One more argument for promoting research in this field is based on the need to 
limit the continuous growth of the population in the most developed areas of 
the EU. 
During the last years, in fact, many people coming from the poorest regions of 
the EU have moved to the richest areas of other Member States on the ground 
of the free movement of workers granted by EU law. 
Consequently, hosting countries are now experiencing new difficulties in 
consideration of the limited resources of their public infrastructures (such as 
hospitals and transportations) and the practical impossibility of managing their 
welfare in case of new arrivals of people from other parts of the Union. 
In this regard, the importance of STZs is connected to the possibility of 
effective measures which could favour a change in behavior, limiting the 
significant movement of entire generations of people from the low-income to 
the high-income areas of the Union.  
The challenging route here described first requires serious attempts aimed at 
the full understanding of STZs, with the definition of solid theoretical bases for 
a new model suitable for such a purpose. 
In summary, the main motivation of the present research is strictly connected 
to the idea that the future success of the EU depends on the capability of 
establishing a new balance between rich and poor regions, providing new 
instruments – such as STZs - that could give response to the serious need of 
equal opportunities coming from an increasing number of citizens. 
On these bases, the scope of the present study consists not only in the 
development of a general legal theory in the context of European tax law, but 
also in the promotion of a new implementing model of STZs addressed to 
social cohesion policies for the most disadvantaged areas of the Union. As 
already said, in fact, the starting presumption of this thesis is that the existing 
models of STZs are not able to face the economic hardships of certain 
underdeveloped areas of the Union, with the consequent assumption that a new 
model of STZs is now necessary for supporting effective initiatives.  
1.7 Originality of the study 
Over the past few years, some studies and projects on the topic of STZs have 
emerged. In 2015, an important step has been made by an international group 
of legal scholars, who have undertaken a research project on STZs with the aim 
of obtaining a structured view on their tax incentives, providing recommend-
ations on best practices42. 
                                                             
42 The International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation (IBFD), which is based in Amsterdam 
(The Netherlands), is the organization that provides the scope, framework and control of 
this research project aimed “to obtain a structured view on selected STZs, their tax incentives 
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Within this project, researchers from different EU and non-EU countries have 
been keynote speakers on specific subjects in the context of three seminars held 
in Vigo (2016)43, Rotterdam (2017)44 and Lodz (2018)45, increasing the 
awareness of the need to deal with problems arising out of the comparative 
perspective. 
The present study takes a different route, focusing on the perspective of 
European tax law and on the possibility of STZs in the light of the variables of 
State aid rules, free movement of persons and harmful tax competition in the 
EU context. Consequently, international tax treaties or WTO documents – 
which are the main fields of practice where the mentioned group of researchers 
have conducted its study – are not considered for the extent of the present 
work. 
Furthermore, while the research project above mentioned – as most of the 
previous studies – approaches the general concept of STZs assuming elements 
that belong to the world of economics, in this case the theorization of the same 
concept is exclusively developed on the ground of the principles of tax law – 
such as those related to the substance of territorial tax incentives - without the 
influence of an economic analysis. In this regard, for example, the investigation 
carried out in the present study regarding the structural and the functional 
dimension of STZs does not find any precedent in the previous works where, 
on the contrary, the definition of the topic is based on a mere case-based 
analysis without any further effort aimed to the development of new conceptual 
categories. 
Moreover, the originality of the present study relies on the attempt made to 
work out in Chapter 6 a new model of STZs for the development of social 
cohesion policies based on the introduction of territorial tax incentives. In this 
case, in fact, differently from other studies, the perspective is not merely based 
on the description of the law as it is, but a further step is made with the 
promotion of a new track for a solution able to respond to the growing needs of 
cohesion among the various parts of the Union. 
Finally, the present study is original because it pursues the objective of 
overcoming the multitude of different figures recognized in the experience of 
                                                                                                                                               
and practices, their acceptability, possibly classify the zones, and provide recommendations on 
the practices and tax issues for the STZ residence countries as well as for multinational 
enterprises, the OECD and the European Union” (more information available at 
https://www.ibfd.org/Academic/Academic-Research). 
43 The first International Tax Seminar on Special Tax Zones has been hosted by the Vigo 
Free Trade Zone and the University of Vigo in April 2016. 
44 The second International Tax Seminar on Special Tax Zones has been hosted by the 
Erasmus School of Law in Rotterdam (Erasmus University) on 11 April 2017. 
45 The third International Tax Seminar on Special Tax Zones has been hosted by the Faculty 
of Law and Administration of the University of Lodz (Poland) on 12 April 2018. 
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the operators – such as Enterprise Zones, Special Economic Zones, Free Trade 
Zones etc. – setting out a comprehensive definition and concept able to work as 
an “umbrella” under which to identify a series of implementing models, both 
for what concerns tax benefits on direct and on indirect taxation. 
In summary, the statements of the problem identified on the ground of the 
present research do not find any relevant investigation in the context of the 
previous studies on the topic; the lack of a general legal theory of STZs, 
together with the absence of an investigation around the limits set by EU law 
for this phenomenon, represent serious elements able to highlight the 
originality of the present study and to justify the efforts made in the various 
stages of the research.  
1.8 Limits of the study 
The limits of the present study can be defined on the ground of four different 
profiles involving the essential coordinates within which the research process is 
carried out. 
The first limit deals with the scientific field where the general legal theory of 
STZs is developed; in this case, in fact, the approach exclusively focuses on the 
area of tax law, while the perspective of other fields of knowledge, such as 
economics or customs, remains outside the limits of this study.  In this regard, 
the approach here adopted considers not only indirect taxation but also direct 
taxation, providing the analysis of the broadest spectrum of taxes, with the aim 
of defining a comprehensive framework. 
The second limit regards the sources of law reviewed and analyzed during the 
research process; in this case, in fact, the topic of STZs is explored with 
exclusive reference to EU law, on one part, and national legislation of the 
Member States, on the other. This means that any variable deriving from other 
sources, such as international tax treaties or WTO commercial policies, does 
not find a space in the context of the present study. 
The third limit is related to the recipients of the tax measures considered under 
the scope of the present research. In this regard, in fact, this study will 
exclusively cover business taxation, focusing on the tax measures granted in 
favour of enterprises, namely all the entities engaged in an economic activity, 
irrespective of their legal form, according to the definition set by Article 1 of 
Commission recommendation of 6 May 200346; consequently, the tax 
incentives which are directly granted in favour of individuals not-carrying out 
an economic activity will remain outside the horizon of this research. 
                                                             
46 Commission Recommendation of 6 May 2003 concerning the definition of micro, small 
and medium-sized enterprises, O.J. L 124, 2003, pp. 36-41. 
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The forth and last limit is linked to the definition of the geographical territory 
within which the analysis of the factual experience of STZs is carried out. The 
research, in fact, only considers the territory within which EU law fully applies, 
on the ground of the objective of the research which is focused on the area of 
European tax law. 
Consequently, the geographical limit is here set according to the provision of 
Article 52 of the Treaty on the European Union (TEU)47 that identifies the 
territory of the EU law application with the boundaries of the Member States48. 
Nevertheless, it is necessary to clarify this point with reference to the situation 
of those Member States which include overseas regions and territories enjoying 
special legal statuses for what regards the EU law application49. 
A first group of territories, the so-called “Outermost Regions” (ORs), covers 
nine specific regions, namely Guadeloupe, French Guiana, Martinique, 
Réunion, Mayotte50, Saint-Martin, the Azores, Madeira and the Canary Islands 
in accordance with Article 349 TFEU. 
The ORs are part of the EU, and therefore are subject to the EU Treaties and 
secondary Union legislation, since Article 355(1) TFEU indicates that 
“common” EU Law is applicable in such territories, without prejudice to Article 
349 TFEU51. 
The second group of territories are the Overseas Countries and Territories 
                                                             
47 Consolidate version of the Treaty on European Union, O.J. 2012, C 236, pp. 13-390. 
48 According to Article 52 TEU “The Treaties shall apply to the Kingdom of Belgium, the 
Republic of Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, the Kingdom of Denmark, the Federal Republic of 
Germany, the Republic of Estonia, Ireland, the Hellenic Republic, the Kingdom of Spain, the 
French Republic, the Italian Republic, the Republic of Cyprus, the Republic of Latvia, the 
Republic of Lithuania, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, the Republic of Hungary, the 
Republic of Malta, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, the Republic of Austria, the Republic of 
Poland, the Portuguese Republic, Romania, the Republic of Slovenia, the Slovak Republic, the 
Republic of Finland, the Kingdom of Sweden and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland”. Furthermore, since 1 January 2013 the TEU also applies to Croatia, as 
stated by the Treaty concerning the accession of the Republic of Croatia to the European 
Union, O.J. 2012, L 112, p. 10-20. 
49 J. ZILLER, Outermost Regions, Overseas Countries and Territories and Others after the Entry 
into Force of the Lisbon Treaty, in EU law of the Overseas, Outermost Regions, Associated 
Overseas Countries and Territories, Territories Sui Generis, D. Kochenov (ed.), Wolters 
Kluwer, The Hague, 2011, p. 78.   
50 By Council Decision 2012/419/EU of 11 July 2012 (O.J. 2012, L 204, p. 131), the 
European Council has amended the status of Mayotte with regard to the Union with 
effect from 1 January 2014. Therefore, from that date Mayotte has ceased to be an 
overseas territory to become an outermost region within the meaning of Articles 349 and 
355(1) TFEU. 
51 D.KOCHENOV, Introducing EU law of the Overseas, in EU law of the Overseas, Outermost 
Regions, Associated Overseas Countries and Territories, Territories Sui Generis, D. Kochenov 
(ed), Wolters Kluwer, The Hague, 2011, pp. 3-69.  
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(OCTs)52, which covers countries and territories situated outside mainland 
Europe with constitutional ties with several EU Member States. These 
territories are not part of the EU and are not subject to EU law53, but are only 
subject to special association agreements54. 
The third group includes several territories of the Member States55 where the 
degree of implementation of EU law varies from a full non-application56 to a 
significant inclusion into the scope of the EU acquis57. 
In this context, the objectives of the present research require to exclude from 
the analysis all the cases in which EU law is not fully applied. Consequently, 
while the ORs territories are entirely analyzed under this study, the OCTs are 
not considered because EU law does not fully apply therein. Furthermore, 
regarding the third group, the scope of the research exclusively covers the 
situations of the Aland Islands and Gibraltar since they represent the only 
                                                             
52 The extensive list of the OCTs is provided by Annex II to the TFEU. Currently, there are 
25 British, Danish, Dutch and French countries and territories, associated to the EU. 
Until the end of 2011, the French overseas community of Saint-Barthélemy has also been 
an outermost region of the European Union. However, given its remoteness from 
metropolitan France, specific legal status, close economic relations with partners in the 
Americas and focus on tourism, France has asked for the status of Saint-Barthélemy to be 
changed, making it one of the EU overseas countries and territories (OCTs). That change 
has come into force on 1 January 2012. 
53 Case C-148/77 Hansen v Hauptzollamt Flensburg, [1978] ECR 01787.   
54 Taking into consideration these negative characteristics, as well as the fact that these 
countries and territories are constitutionally related to EU Member States, Article 355(2) 
TFEU provides that, with regard to the OCTs, special agreements for association set out 
in Part Four shall apply. 
55 D. KOCHENOV, The Application of EU Law in the EU's Overseas Regions, Countries and 
Territories After the Entry Into Force of the Treaty of Lisbon, in Journal of International Law 
and Practice, 2012, Vol. 20, pp. 669-743. 
56 E.g. Færoe Islands. In detail, according to Article 355 TFEU “a) the Treaties shall not apply 
to the Faeroe Islands; (b) the Treaties shall not apply to the United Kingdom Sovereign Base 
Areas of Akrotiri and Dhekelia in Cyprus except to the extent necessary to ensure the 
implementation of the arrangements set out in the Protocol on the Sovereign Base Areas of the 
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland in Cyprus annexed to the Act 
concerning the conditions of accession of the Czech Republic, the Republic of Estonia, the 
Republic of Cyprus, the Republic of Latvia, the Republic of Lithuania, the Republic of Hungary, 
the Republic of Malta, the Republic of Poland, the Republic of Slovenia and the Slovak Republic 
to the European Union and in accordance with the terms of that Protocol; c) the Treaties shall 
apply to the Channel Islands and the Isle of Man only to the extent necessary to ensure the 
implementation of the arrangements for those islands set out in the Treaty concerning the 
accession of new Member States to the European Economic Community and to the European 
Atomic Energy Community signed on 22 January 1972”. 
57 E.g. Aland Island (Article 355 TFEU) and Gibraltar (Annexed declarations, No. 55, 
TFEU). 
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territories in which EU law applies pursuant to Article 355 TFEU. 
In this regard, it is also important to observe that the geographical perimeter of 
the present research also includes the so-called “Extra-Territorial Zones” that 
do not belong to the Customs Union territory58. 
In fact, unless such zones are considered outside the customs line as set by the 
Union Customs Code, they are part of the political territory of the Member 
States within which EU law is fully applied. 
1.9 Definitions 
The study of STZs faces a first obstacle represented by a plurality of collimating 
and undefined terminologies59. 
For example, the economical literature uses to identify such phenomenon with 
the general term of “Free Trade Zone”, distinguishing various type of zones 
according to the different economic benefits granted by the host country. 
In this context, it is necessary to deal with different denominations like 
Commercial Free Zones, Enterprise Zones, Export Processing Zones, Industrial 
Free Zones, Special Economic Zones, Free Ports, etc. 60. 
Such terms reflect not only the various characteristics of every zone, but also 
the particular perspectives of the field of knowledge in which the study is 
carried out. 
In this sense, it is clear that the terminology used by economic authors differs a 
lot from the one used within legal studies. 
Consequently, the difficulty of framing the issue is enhanced by the fact that 
such terms are often used to indicate favoured regimes not only related to 
customs arrangements, but also to different kinds of tax reliefs in the area of 
direct taxation.   
In any case, all the terms above mentioned result inappropriately for the 
purpose of the present research because most of them just focus their meaning 
on the economic peculiarities of every type of zone. 
Given the above, the term “Special Tax Zones” represents the most favourable 
option to be adopted in the context of the present study; this choice, in fact, 
results coherent with the idea of developing a comprehensive concept within 
                                                             
58 E.g. the Island of Helgoland and the territory of Büsingen (Germany), Ceuta and Melilla 
(Spain), Livigno and Campione d'Italia (Italy). See Article 4(1) of the UCC. 
59 G.F. DALLA COSTA, S. NARDO, M. MENINI, op. cit., CLEUP SC, Padova, 2006, pp. 7 et seq. 
60 See S. FINARDI, E. MORONI, op. cit., Franco Angeli, Milan, 2001, p. 60, according to which 
the use of a term rather than another in reference to the various experiences of zone 
depends on three elements: a) the name provided by the area; b) the prevailing character 
of the activity present within; c) terms prevailing used in the country where that area is 
located. 
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the tax law field. In other words, with the term “Special Tax Zones” it is 
possible to clearly underline the scope of the present study, highlighting the 
“legal side” of the topic and evocating the idea of an institute belonging to the 
area of tax law. 
1.10 Outline of the thesis 
This introduction in Chapter 1 sets out the study’s background and context, the 
statement of the problem, its research questions, the methodology applied and 
other features of the study, including scope, limitations, and definitions. The 
overall structure of the thesis consists of eight chapters, including this 
introduction. 
Chapter 2 deals with the legal dimension of STZs on the ground of the existing 
literature with the outline of the state of knowledge of the phenomenon among 
the scholars. 
Chapter 3 is focused on the description of the EU law framework of STZs, 
involving not only the EU treaties provisions and the EU secondary legislation, 
but also the case law of the ECJ and various documents issued by the 
Commission in the context of soft law. Here, the EU law framework is 
reviewed under the variables of State aid law, internal market law and harmful 
tax competition. 
Chapter 4 is dedicated to the review of the factual experience of the Member 
States, with the identification of the various examples of STZs and the 
description of the tax regimes available. 
In Chapter 5, the study approaches the research question No. 1 through the 
analysis of the EU law variables, with the development of a general legal theory 
of STZs, including a comprehensive concept, a definition, and the identification 
of a set of implementing models as resulting from the experience of the 
Member States. 
Chapter 6, which is focused on research question No. 2, outlines the basics of a 
new implementing model of STZs – the “Social Cohesion Zone” – 
characterized by the presence of tax advantages in the form of social tax 
incentives. Also in this case, the process of analysis covers each of the EU law 
variables starting from an ideal design of STZs addressed to the development of 
social cohesion policies for the most disadvantaged areas of the Union. 
Chapter 7 is dedicated to the discussion of the results achieved with a 
comparison between the new model of STZs and the other implementing 
models identified under the general legal theory of STZs; the same chapter 
includes some considerations on the idea of the Social Cohesion Zone as an 
innovative instrument for the EU cohesion policy, on the issues related to 
protectionism and proportionality (with the introduction of the concept of 
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“fiscal residue”), and on the substantial and procedural aspects in the 
implementation of the Social Cohesion Zone Model in the EU context. 
Finally, in Chapter 8, the conclusions and the recommendations are presented, 
with overall insights about the results achieved with reference to the research 
questions. 
The cases and all the references contained in this thesis are updated as of 1 
January 2019. 
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CHAPTER 2 
THE LEGAL DIMENSION OF SPECIAL TAX ZONES 
2.1 Introduction 
The objective of the present chapter is to explore the legal dimension of Special 
Tax Zones on the ground of the existing studies and, at the same time, to define 
the starting point for the analysis of the research questions. 
The review of the literature on the topic, in fact, offers a fundamental 
opportunity to identify the state of knowledge of STZs with the outline of their 
basic framework in the context of legal studies. 
In these paragraphs, STZs will be scrutinized considering the work done by the 
scholars active in the field: the review will approach the definitions and the 
classifications, including a comparison with similar figures recognizable in the 
factual experience. 
Furthermore, the legal literature on tax incentives will assume a fundamental 
relevance, especially for what regards the relation between the concept of 
STZs, on one part, and the concept of territorial tax advantages, on the other, in 
order to identify an autonomous framework within the system of tax law. 
Finally, the legal dimension will be enriched through the valorization of the 
functional aspects which are able to drive the initiatives for the establishment of 
such zones. In this sense, the present chapter will also explore the objectives of 
social character linked to the introduction of tax incentives in the context of 
STZs, with a review of the existing literature dealing with “social tax incentives” 
and “social enterprises”.  
In this way, the literature review will be addressed to the analysis of the research 
questions; the focus, in fact, will first be set on the contributions on general 
issues (definitions, classifications, etc.) for the scope of the first research 
question, which is related to the development of a general legal theory of STZs; 
then, the review will be extended to the literature on the tax incentives of a 
social character in order to explore the background of the second research 
question concerning the development of a new implementing model for social 
cohesion policies. 
2.2 Definitions 
The literature dealing with STZs is evidently influenced by the characteristics of 
each legal system and by the use of different denominations at a national level 
to define the same phenomenon. 
The United Nations, in a study of 1991 entitled “The Challenge of Free 
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Economic Zone” 61, identify 23 different definitions of STZs according to the 
nature of the economic objectives pursued or the type of activity allowed in 
each jurisdiction. 
The same study underlines the fact that these denominations often have strong 
equivalence, overlapping with each other; in other words, these areas, while 
presenting some differences in relation to the nature of the economic objectives 
pursued or to the type of business allowed therein, generally comply to a 
uniform standard model62.  
On the ground of these findings, Finardi and Moroni conclude in the sense that 
the use of a specific denomination generally depends on three elements: a) the 
name provided by local public authorities; b) the prevailing character of the 
activities carried out therein; c) the wording prevailingly used in the country 
where the zone is located63. In other words, the choice of a specific 
denomination does not usually assume any substantial legal relevance, being 
neutral from a systematic point of view. 
Given the above, it is now necessary to review the multitude of attempts made 
by the scholars to provide some definitions of the present phenomenon. 
The analysis will start from the case of “Special Tax Zones” – since these are 
assumed as a comprehensive macro-category for the purposes of the present 
study - and will then be shifted to the most common denominations used in the 
international context and in the literature active in the field, such as Free Zones, 
Free Trade Zones, Free Ports, Special Economic Zones and Export Processing 
Zones. 
2.2.1 The definition of Special Tax Zones 
In the context of the present study, the term “Special Tax Zones” is associated 
to the idea of a comprehensive notion able to encompass all the geographic 
areas characterized by the presence of territorial tax benefits in favour of 
entities based therein. 
The term, in fact, can be associated to the most common situations, including 
not only the “tax free zone” within which there is no taxation64, but also other 
zones with a “special” regime, namely a more favourable regime of taxation 
than the one generally applied in the rest of the State65, such as in the case of 
                                                             
61 U.N. CENTRE ON TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS, The challenge of Free Economic Zones, 
United Nations, New York, 1991, p. 3. 
62 Ibid. 
63 S. FINARDI, E. MORONI, op. cit., FrancoAngeli, 2001, Milan, p. 60. 
64 E.g. the Free Zones established under the EU customs legislation where no custom duties 
and other charges are applied. 
65 E.g. the Canary Islands Economic and Fiscal Regime (REF) characterized by the presence 
of a lower taxation (see infra paragraph 4.2.20.2). 
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partial exemptions or more favouring treatments characterized by the presence 
of deductions, reductions, or tax credits. 
On these premises, by the term “Special Tax Zones” it is possible to easily trace 
the boundaries of a general macro-category able to include different 
implementing models of territorial tax benefits in the most comprehensive form. 
Among the classic approaches to the topic, it is important to note that the use of 
the term “Special Tax Zones” is rare66, while previous studies, in most of the 
cases, merely underline the presence of a multitude of relevant situations 
characterized by different and more specific denominations, such as “Free 
Zones”, “Free Trade Zones” or “Free Ports”, without the outline of a valuable 
definition for a comprehensive macro-category. 
Only recently, it is possible to find out some occasional examples of studies 
where the term “Special Tax Zones” is scientifically used to identify the same 
phenomenon in the most comprehensive form. 
In 2015, an important step has been made by an international group of legal 
scholars, who undertake a research project on STZs with the aim of obtaining a 
structured view on their tax incentives and practices67. In the context of the 
mentioned project, Laukkanen identifies “Special Tax Zones” as “areas where tax 
regulations are more beneficial than in the generally applicable tax system of the 
surrounding jurisdiction or country”68. This definition can include various 
situations and is relevant because it focuses on the tax variable of the zone 
regime. 
Furthermore, in a recent paper published in 2017 by the University of 
Michigan Law School, Avi-Yonah and Vallespinos define a “Special Tax Zone” 
as a “preferential tax regime that is ring-fenced”, specifying that “a preferential tax 
regime is “ring fenced” when the sponsoring country effectively protects its domestic 
economy from the harmful effects of its own tax breaks”69. 
2.2.2 Other definitions 
Apart from the examples of the previous paragraph, the existing literature does 
not offer more valuable definitions of the term “Special Tax Zones”.  
                                                             
66 See the EU Parliamentary written question E-3120/07 of 21 June 2007 (O.J. 2008, C 45, 
pp. 1–226) where the same terminology is used. Outside Europe, in 2001 the Australian 
Tax Office (ATO) classified King Island and Furneaux Island as a “Special Tax Zone”, 
qualifying its residents for a higher tax rebate. 
67 See supra note No. 42. 
68 A. LAUKKANEN, The development aspects of Special Tax Zones, in Bulletin for International 
Taxation, 2016, Vol. 70, No. 3, pp. 152-162. 
69 R.S. AVI-YONAH, M. VALLESPINOS, Special Tax Zones and the WTO, University of 
Michigan Public Law Research Paper No. 545, 2017, available at https://ssrn.com 
/abstract=2928644  
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Otherwise, more interesting definitions can only be found moving the focus to 
other denominations which are often recognized in the factual experience at the 
international level. 
Among these denominations, the most common are “Free Zone”, “Free Trade 
Zone”, “Free Port”, “Special Economic Zone” and “Export Processing Zone”, 
given that they are not only widely spread all over the world under general 
schemes introduced by national legislators, but also frequently reviewed by the 
literature on this topic. 
For this reason, it is necessary to complete the present review referring to the 
definitions which are provided for each of these different denominations. 
2.2.2.1 Free Zones 
Free Zones certainly represent the most common denomination recognizable 
in the international experience, especially within the field of customs where 
they are considered as a standard for benefits granted in the area of indirect 
taxation. 
In the EU context, for example, an interesting definition has been provided 
under Article 1(2) of Directive 69/75/EEC70 according to which Free Zone 
means “whatever the expression used in Member States, any territorial enclave 
established by the competent authorities of Member States in order that goods therein 
may be considered as being outside the customs territory of the Community for the 
purposes of applying customs duties, agricultural levies, quantitative restrictions or 
any charges or measures having equivalent effect”. 
In the International Convention on the simplification and harmonization of 
customs systems, signed in Kyoto on 18 May 1973, the definition of Free Zone 
is developed from a broader perspective in the following terms: a part of the 
territory of a State where any good introduced is regarded as being outside the 
customs territory with reference to the customs duties and is not subject to the 
usual controls of the customs authorities71. 
Moreover, Mercosur – the organization of the internal market of Argentina, 
Brazil, Uruguay and Paraguay - provides for two different terms: “Areas 
Aduaneras Especiales” (AAE) and “Zonas Francas”, which are both characterized 
by being an enclave inside the customs territory of a country where different 
rules apply with respect to the general customs regime72. 
In the experience of the Member States, Bulgaria and France offer other 
interesting definitions; in the first case, a Free Zone is defined as “a delimited 
                                                             
70 Council Directive 69/75/EEC of 4 March 1969 on harmonization of legal action, 
regulatory and administrative arrangements for the free zones regimes, no longer in 
force, O.J. 1969, L 58, pp. 11-13. 
71 See S. FINARDI, E. MORONI, op. cit., FrancoAngeli, Milan, 2001, p. 60. 
72 See S. FINARDI, E. MORONI, op. cit., FrancoAngeli, Milan, 2001, p. 62. 
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part of the territory of the People’s Republic of Bulgaria, where the pursued economic 
activities shall be exempted from taxation with custom duties”73, while in the case of 
France, Article 286 of the French Customs Code states that a Free Zone 
corresponds to any territorial enclave established for the purpose of making the 
goods in the customs territory considered as not being in the customs territory 
for the purposes of customs duties, taxes or other quantitative restrictions. 
Among the scholars, Udina and Conetti (1994) define a Free Zone as an area 
where “foreign goods are stored, handled and processed, excluded from the custom 
territory of a State or, exceptionally, of two neighboring States and at whose outer 
limits customs duties (on imported goods) are not collected … in order to mostly 
promote international trade and sometimes the industrial and agricultural 
development of these spaces and indirectly of those surrounding”74. 
Other authors consider a Free Zone as a well-defined area, access to which is 
controlled by tax and customs authorities, and where foreign goods of all 
origins and nature may be introduced and re-exported without being subject to 
customs duties or import restrictions75, or as an area where the application of 
customs laws and other related regulations - that the state or other institutions 
apply elsewhere to businesses and workers - are suspended76. 
Moreover, some scholars try to cover very heterogeneous situations, 
identifying the Free Zone as a geographically or administratively limited area 
within which the commercial and / or industrial activities benefit from a special 
treatment in tax matters77. 
For example, Wall emphasizes the derogation from the system of common 
rules of the national territory and defines the Free Zone as “an area in which 
domestic policies are not in place and, as a result, foreign companies are induced to 
profitably invest on the basis of comparative advantages of the country”78. 
In the same direction, one more definition is provided in a paper of Ana T. 
Romero according to which a Free Zone is considered a well-defined 
geographical area or an area where manufactured goods are produced only for 
the exportation or a service area deployed in any part of the country, that 
benefits from special investment incentives or from promotion of investment 
incentives such as exemption from payment of customs duties and privileged 
                                                             
73 Article 3 of Decree of 14 July 1987, No. 2242, O.J. of Bulgaria No. 55 of 17 July 1987. 
74 See M. UDINA, G. CONETTI, Zone Franche, in Enc. Giuridica Treccani, Rome, 1994. 
75 P. LOROT, T. SCWOB, Les Zones franches dans le monde, in La Documentation francaise, 1987, 
pp. 11 et seq. 
76 K.W. SHATZ, D. SPINANGER, Zone Franche e prospettive nella Repubblica Federale di 
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tax and financial treatment79.  
On the ground of the above definitions, it is evident that the term “Free Zones” 
is mainly related to the establishment of an area where special benefits are 
granted for customs duties and other indirect taxes; nevertheless, at the same 
time, it is possible to conclude that the term is sometimes used in the literature 
as a synonymous of “Special Tax Zones” with a broader meaning able to 
encompass all the territorial situations where some forms of tax benefits are 
granted, including tax measures in the field of direct taxation. 
2.2.2.2 Free Trade Zones 
One more denomination widely spread in the international community is 
represented by the Free Trade Zone.  
In US literature, Lomax defines Free Trade Zones as areas with a specific 
definition in or near a port, which are considered external to the customs 
territory80. In this regard, it is also worth to remember the definition provided 
by the US legislator in the Foreign Trade Zone Act of 1934 according to which 
the Foreign Trade Zone is “a defined area, closed and controlled under the 
supervision of a special office of federal official, conducted by a company within a 
regime of public service, in or adjacent to a port customs, without any resident 
population, with facilities for loading and unloading, the storage of goods, for their 
rapprochement by land or water; an area where the goods can be taken, stored and 
subjected to certain specific handling. If re-exported to foreign locations, the goods 
may leave the zone without paying customs duties and without the intervention of the 
customs officers, except for certain conditions ...”81. 
A more recent definition is provided by Ingrosso, Nocerino, Roccatagliata and 
Sacchetto according to which Free Trade Zones are areas where transhipment, 
storage, and handling are carried out and where goods, introduced while 
waiting to be re-imported or imported, may be subjected to manipulation to 
improve their presentation or commercial quality82. 
By the review of the above sources, it is clear that Free Trade Zones are 
essentially related to customs operations with tax benefits granted on customs 
duties; in this sense, it is possible to conclude that they generally have a strong 
                                                             
79 A. T. ROMERO, ILO's World Labour Report of 1996, International Labour Organization 
(ILO), 1996. 
80 A.L. LOMAX, The Foreign Trade Zone, School of Business Administration, University of 
Oregon, Eugene (Oregon), 1947, p. 5. 
81 See A. ISAACS, International Trade Tariff and Commercial Policies, Richard D. Irwin Inc., 
Chicago (Illinois), 1948, pp. 753 et seq. 
82 M. INGROSSO, O. NOCERINO, F. ROCCATAGLIATA, C. SACCHETTO, op. cit., Chamber of 
Commerce of Naples, Naples, 1998, p. 12. 
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equivalence with the notion of Free Zones developed in the context of customs 
law. 
2.2.2.3 Free Ports 
Furthermore, it is interesting to remember the case of the “Free Port” to be 
intended as the set of port facilities (pool of water, dropped, docks, warehouses) 
which are outside the line of the custom border.  
One of the first definitions is given by MacElwee who defines the modern Free 
Port as “an area of a port separated from the national customs territory through a 
barrier. Ships can enter in this port, download, upload and leave without customs 
formalities. The goods are stored, repackaged, manufactured and re-exported without 
any customs formalities. Only when the goods pass through customs to reach 
consumers in the country they are subject to customs investigation and pay the tariff 
required. A Free Port is a duty-free area within the political boundaries of a nation”83. 
In more recent times, Finardi and Moroni define a Free Port or a Free Point as a 
port or a part of a port where some privileges are granted, especially for what 
concerns taxation, in order to stimulate commercial traffic for economic 
operators based within the boundaries of the port, as well as for those of third 
countries84. 
In definitive, the notion of Free Port seems to be more associated to 
geographical and operative aspects than to the identification of specific tax 
benefits; in this sense, in fact, the focus is set on the situation of a port and to a 
series of activities and operations allowed therein. 
2.2.2.4 Special Economic Zones 
The definition of Special Economic Zones (SEZs) is determined individually by 
each country. In the legislation of EU Member States, for example, it is worth to 
note that Poland offers a specific definition of Special Economic Zones, 
considered as a part of the Polish territory administered separately for the 
running of businesses, with tax exemptions involving direct taxation on 
preferential terms defined under the Act on Special Economic Zones of 20 
October 199485. 
Following a recent initiative, also Italian legislation offers its own definition of 
an SEZ intended as “a geographically delimited and clearly identified area, located 
                                                             
83 R. S. MAC ELWEE, Port Development, 1926, p. 381. See also R.S. THOMAN, Free ports and 
foreign-trade zones, Cornell Maritime Press, Cambridge, 1956. 
84 S. FINARDI, E. MORONI, op. cit., FrancoAngeli, 2001, Milan, p. 63. 
85 Article 2 of Act of 20 October 1994 on Special Economic Zones, O.J. of Poland No. 
123/1994, item 600. Special Economic Zones in Poland have been abolished from 30 
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within the borders of the State, also consisting of non-territorially adjacent areas 
provided that they present a functional economic link, and that include at least a port 
area […] For the business of economic and entrepreneurial activities, the companies 
already operational and those that will set up in the SEZ can benefit from special 
conditions, in relation to the incremental nature of investments and business 
development activities”86. 
According to Akinci and Crittle87, the SEZ typically includes: a geographically 
limited area (usually fenced), single management/administration, eligibility for 
benefits based upon the physical location within the zone, separate customs 
area (duty-free benefits) and streamlined procedures. 
In literature, Italian scholars try to use such a terminology in a broader sense to 
identify the main features of a macro-category encompassing all the different 
situations relevant under the present study88. In this sense, in fact, Finardi and 
Moroni define Special Economic Zones as areas or zones characterized by the 
presence of a regulation of the economic activities that differ, totally or in part, 
from the one of the hosting State, in particular for what concerns the regulation 
of international trade89. 
2.2.2.5 Export Processing Zones 
The last relevant example for the purposes of the present review is the one of 
“Export Processing Zones” (EPZs) which are widely spread in the world, 
especially in developing countries. 
Basile and Germidis define the Export Processing Zone as “an area that is 
administratively or geographically defined, which enjoys a special status that allows 
the free importation of instrumentation and different materials destined for the 
manufacture of goods for export. The special status usually implies favorable legal 
provisions and regulations generally related to taxation and which constitute 
incentives for foreign investment”90. 
In 1993, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD), in a work entitled "Export Processing Zones: Role of Foreign 
Direct Investment and Developmental Impact", defines the Export Processing 
                                                             
86 Article 4(2) Law Decree of 20 June 2017, No. 91, O.J. of Italy No. 141 of 20 June 2017. 
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Zones as “a well-defined geographical area that enjoys customs privileges and other 
incentives and in which primary activity is the manipulation of goods for export [...] a 
modern adaptation of free port or special economic zone”91. 
Warr summarizes the characteristics of a typical EPZ in four points: a) tax free 
import offer of raw materials and subsidies for the purchase of raw materials or 
semi-finished products available on the domestic market of the host country; b) 
granting of temporary exemption from taxation of income in favour of 
companies; c) offer to companies to reduce or cancel paperwork and customs, 
with a relative reduction in administrative costs and delays; possibility of setting 
up companies controlled entirely by foreign capital; possibility of total 
repatriation of profits; possibility of employing skilled labor and foreign 
management; possibility to avoid the process of preventive approvals for the 
importation of foreign instruments; possibility to use the import quotas 
assigned to the host country by certain commercial blocks such as the EU; d) 
offer to companies of generally lower rates than outside the EPZ for renting 
buildings and spaces and for the use of electricity92. 
One more definition is given by Bolin, according to which a EPZ is “a duty-free 
center for attracting and supporting foreign investment in export-oriented 
productions, through the careful provision of broad-spectrum services able to adapt to 
the constant change in production and distribution on a world scale”93. 
Because of the above definitions, it is evident that EPZs mainly assume a 
relevance in the context of import/export operations, being generally intended 
as a tool for companies involved in the international trade of goods. 
2.3 Classifications 
The multitude of denominations and definitions mentioned in the previous 
paragraphs contributes to outline a complex and differentiated framework 
which is influenced by the factual experience of each jurisdiction. 
Nonetheless, the legal background of the topic can also offer some interesting 
points of view for a classification of the various forms of STZs according to the 
specific rules involved and the tax benefits granted.  
The first attempt for a valuable classification has been made in the field of 
customs and dates back to the seventies, with a focus set on the typologies of 
economic operations authorized within each regime. 
                                                             
91 UNCTAD, Export Processing Zones: role of foreign direct investment and development 
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According to the International Convention of Kyoto of 1973, in fact, a 
distinction may be made in the context of customs between two broad 
categories of STZs, namely the “commercial free zones” and the “industrial free 
zones” 94. 
In commercial free zones, the permitted operations are generally limited to 
those necessary for the preservation of the goods and the usual forms of 
handling to improve their packaging or marketable quality or to prepare them 
for shipment, while processing or manufacturing operations are normally 
prohibited. In this case, goods admitted to a zone shall also be allowed to 
undergo operations necessary for the preservation and for the shipment, such 
as grouping of packages, sorting and grading, and repacking95. 
Differently, in industrial free zones, also processing and manufacturing 
operations are permitted, with the increase of the value of goods in the context 
of the authorized process96. 
In more recent times, Ingrosso, Nocerino, Roccatagliata and Sacchetto have 
approached the classification issue from a different point of view, with the 
development of a categorization system which is more focused on the legal 
perspective. 
These authors analyze STZs, grouping them into two broad categories: the so-
called “classic free zones”, on one part, and the “free zones of exception”, on the 
other97. 
The first category essentially includes situations characterized by the presence 
of tax advantages on customs duties and sometimes on other indirect taxes. In 
this sense, Free Zones, Free Trade Zones, Export Processing Zones, Free Ports, 
are evident examples of “classic free zones”, corresponding to areas where 
goods, which are introduced therein, enjoy an exemption from customs duties 
regardless of the length of their stay. Furthermore, in the same areas, if goods 
are processed or assembled, they can be re-exported without any tax burden; 
this basically means that, until the goods are stored within these areas, all the 
operations of transshipment, embarkation, storage, handling can be carried out 
without any restriction of a customs nature, while the payment of customs 
duties becomes due only when the goods are eventually introduced in the 
customs territory of the hosting State98.  
Otherwise, in the “free zones of exception” other types of tax advantages may 
                                                             
94 WORLD CUSTOMS ORGANIZATION, International Convention on the Simplification and 
Harmonization of Customs Procedures, Kyoto, 18 May, 1973, Annex F.1 
95 Ibid. 
96 Ibid. 
97 M. INGROSSO, O. NOCERINO, F. ROCCATAGLIATA, C. SACCHETTO, op. cit., Chamber of 
Commerce of Naples, Naples, 1998, p. 11-12. 
98 Ibid. 
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be granted, dealing also with direct taxation. In particular, such areas are 
associated not only to import and export operations, but also to commercial 
and productive activities, stimulating the development of foreign industrial 
facilities through the introduction of advantages on direct taxation and the 
subsequent reduction of the overall tax burden on companies and individual 
entrepreneurs99. 
This classification of STZs, which distinguishes between “classic free zones”, 
on one part, and “free zones of exception”, on the other, represents still today a 
fundamental point of reference within the literature on the topic, being able to 
highlight some of the substantial aspects which are relevant from the tax law 
perspective. In this sense, in fact, the same classification finally results in a 
distinction between areas where benefits are only granted for indirect taxes and 
areas where tax benefits also involve the field of direct taxation. 
2.4  STZs and other figures 
The legal dimension of STZs also entails the identification of the boundaries 
between the present phenomenon and other similar figures, such as tax havens, 
customs warehouses, duty-free shops and subsidies. 
In the factual experience, in fact, such terminology is often used in an undefined 
way, without the proper understanding of the limits of the various concepts. 
Nevertheless, thanks to a careful review of the main literature on the topic, it is 
still possible to trace a line of division between STZs and such similar figures. 
2.4.1 Tax havens 
A tax haven is generally defined as a low-tax independent jurisdiction with a 
goal of attracting capital, or simply a jurisdiction that has low or non-existent 
taxes. According to Gravelle, tax havens are limited to those countries that also 
have such other characteristics as the lack of transparency, bank secrecy, the 
lack of information sharing, and requiring little or no economic activity for an 
entity to obtain a legal status100. 
In this case, the tax legislation is especially designed to attract the formation of 
branches and subsidiaries of parent companies based in heavily-taxed industrial 
countries101. 
Given the above, it is clear that tax havens cannot be classified as STZs for the 
following reasons. 
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First, tax havens are independent jurisdictions, always corresponding to a 
territory of full sovereignty, while, in the case of STZs, the area concerned is a 
limited part of a hosting country where a more favourable tax regime applies 
compared to the standard one applied in the rest of the same hosting country. 
Second, tax havens are generally characterized by the lack of exchange of 
information, thus representing tools for tax evasion with a scope that is 
different from the aims set under the establishment of STZs. 
Therefore, the present research is strictly focused on the topic of STZs, while 
the different figure of tax havens is excluded from the field of investigation. 
2.4.2 Customs Warehouses 
Customs warehousing is a procedure under the Union Customs Code that 
allows storage in a customs warehouse of: (i) non-Union goods, without such 
goods being subject to import duties or commercial policy measures or (ii) 
Union goods, where EU legislation governing specific fields provides that their 
being placed in a customs warehouse shall attract the application of measures 
normally attached to the export of such goods102.  
The resulting framework determines that customs warehouses (public or 
private) are specially designated locations – a building or other secured area - 
authorized by the customs authority and under its control where goods may be 
stored or manipulated without the payment of duties or other indirect taxes103. 
Thus, the difference between STZs, on one part, and customs warehouses, on 
the other, is essentially based on two specific elements. First, it is necessary to 
put in evidence the different geographical delimitation of the area that, in case 
of customs warehouses, remains limited to a building, a shed, or an enclosure of 
a minimum surface104. Second, customs warehouses are a figure exclusively 
related to customs and, thus, they only deal with indirect taxation. 
Differently, STZs are always areas of land of important dimensions and often 
offer a broader and more complex set of tax benefits also related to direct 
taxation. 
2.4.3 Duty-free shops 
Duty-free shops are exempt from the payment of certain indirect taxes and 
duties, provided that the goods are sold to travelers with a final destination out 
                                                             
102 See Article 240 of Council Regulation (EU) No. 952/2013 of 9 October 2013 laying 
down the Union Customs Code (UCC), O.J. 2013, L. 269, pp. 1-101. 
103 See Article 240(2) UCC. 
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of the hosting State. 
The list of products that can be sold duty-free varies by jurisdiction, as well as 
how they can be sold and the process of calculating the duty to be refunded. 
Duty free-shops are usually based in the international zone of airports, sea 
ports, and train stations, while, more rarely, they can be found on the roadway 
beside the entry or exit points of the national border105. 
Within the EU context, these shops have been abolished for intra-EU travelers 
in 1999106, but they are retained for travelers whose final destination is outside 
the EU. 
It is evident that such figure does not correspond to the instrument of STZs, 
considering its different design by the structural and functional point of view. A 
duty-free shop, in fact, is always identified with one or more business entities 
aimed at the selling of goods to final consumers with tax incentives limited to 
indirect taxation; differently, STZs are limited areas of land of a certain 
dimension established for promoting a well-defined tax policy, which offer a 
broader and more complex set of tax incentives on direct and/or on indirect 
taxation for enterprises based therein. 
2.4.4 Subsidies 
In this context, it is also important to explore the relation between the concept 
of STZs and the concept of subsidies. 
In general, an advantage able to improve the economic and financial situation of 
the recipient may assume the form of a positive aid or a negative aid. 
Positive aid includes direct payments, state guarantees and other positive 
financial measures of any kind. 
Negative aid, also defined as “fiscal aid”, assumes the form of tax advantages 
with the reduction of the tax burden normally payable by the beneficiary under 
the relevant standard tax legislation107. 
Within this conceptual framework, subsidies represent an example of positive 
aid, as they consist of financial grants reserved to enterprises, provided that 
certain conditions are fulfilled108. 
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Differently, in the case of STZs, the advantages provided always assume the 
form of negative aid, considering that they correspond to tax benefits in a 
technical sense, with the reduction of the tax burden through various 
mechanisms, such as deductions, tax credits, tax rebates, tax deferrals, etc. 
On these premises, it is evident that the distinction usually made between 
positive and negative aid offers an interesting point of view to trace and 
separate the boundaries of the conceptual categories of STZs and subsidies. 
Nevertheless, it is not possible to conclude that subsidies are completely 
irrelevant for the topic of STZs. The theme of subsidies, in fact, might assume a 
relevance for the purposes of the present research as far as the corresponding 
amount would be exempted from income tax according to a specific provision; 
in such a case, the tax measure would exclude the amount of subsidies from the 
calculation of the taxable base for income tax, determining a more favourable 
tax treatment for the recipient of the same subsidies.  
In summary, it is correct to assume that subsidies are not tax advantages in a 
strict sense and, therefore, they do not directly involve STZs which are always 
characterized by the provision of a certain benefit in the form of a negative aid, 
with the reduction of the standard tax burden. Nonetheless, at the same time, it 
is not possible to completely exclude the theme of subsidies from the field of 
the present investigation, considering that they might assume, at least 
indirectly, a relevance for the determination of the taxable base within the tax 
scheme introduced in a STZ. 
2.5 STZs in the system of tax law  
The previous studies on the topic are not limited to the mere provision of a 
series of definitions or the outline of a general classification of STZs. 
By the review of the main literature, in fact, it is also possible to recognize some 
more steps done for a deeper comprehension of the phenomenon from the 
legal point of view. 
In this sense, Ingrosso, Nocerino, Roccatagliata and Sacchetto, driven by the 
aim of evaluating such zones under the tax law perspective, set the focus of their 
analysis on the effects deriving from the introduction of more favourable 
                                                                                                                                               
industry or a business in a particular economic sector. Nevertheless, it is important to 
note that, in many other studies, the term “subsidy” is used in a broader sense to cover not 
only financial grants from public resources, but also tax concessions granted in form of 
subsidization. For these considerations see WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, World Trade 
Report 2006, pp. 47 et seq., available at https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/anrep-
_e/wtr06-2b_e.pdf 
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provisions, identifying the core of the phenomenon of STZs in the legal 
category of “tax advantages”109. 
Following this path, in fact, it seems possible to set the topic in the context of 
tax law studies, with a systematic approach able to highlight the substance of 
STZs from the legal point of view. 
This step is fundamental to set the basics for an autonomous life of STZs within 
the world of legal studies and to identify their placement with reference to the 
summa divisio between the general part and the specific part of tax law. 
From a comparative perspective, in fact, tax law is generally accepted in each 
jurisdiction as an independent branch of law structured according to the level of 
concretization of tax law norms; in this sense, the discipline is usually divided 
into a general part, on one hand, concerning institutional lines of the national 
tax system, including constitutional principles and the implementation of tax 
law, and a specific part, on the other hand, regarding the rules relevant under 
the various typologies of taxes110. 
The general part of tax law is made up of general information about tax law and 
its object, norms and relationships. It includes legal norms concerning the tax 
system in general, such as the assessment and the collection of taxes, the 
structure of tax administrators and their rights and obligations, forms, 
procedures, methods of tax control, penalties and litigation. 
Differently, the specific part of tax law contains the substantive and procedural 
rules of the various typologies of taxes which are split between many different 
legal sources. 
Given the above, from a systematic point of view and according to the 
approach of the scholars, it is possible to place the phenomenon of STZs within 
the general part of tax law. It is evident, in fact, that the main features of STZs 
can be reviewed only according to a level of concretization that usually 
corresponds to the approach of the general part of tax law; in this regard, in 
fact, STZs concern the tax system in general, involving the study of a general 
instrument and not the analysis of a set of norms enacted for the regulation of a 
specific tax.  
Within the general part of tax law, Ingrosso, Nocerino, Roccatagliata and 
Sacchetto usually place STZs under the topic of tax advantages, as they 
represent one of the various instruments for introducing a set of favouring 
norms aimed to the achievement of objectives of economic or social policy111. 
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In this regard, in fact, the phenomenon of tax advantages is characterized by a 
certain level of autonomy from the point of view of the functional analysis, 
considering that it includes a real sub-system of norms through which each 
State is intended to implement the values and principles of the Constitution and 
realize the goals and objectives marked and protected therein.  
It follows that tax advantages are not used as a tool for the achievement of 
revenue targets, but they are related to objectives of an extra fiscal nature (i.e. 
economic and social policies). In other words, beside tax norms appointed to 
solve the problem of securing the withdrawal, there are other norms pursuing 
further goals of social and economic nature. On the same bases, it is thus 
possible to identify a series of logical connections between the promotional 
principles and constitutional values of a State, on one hand, and the tax norms 
issued by the same State for achieving the related goals, on the other hand112. 
In this context, even STZs can represent an expression of the same sub-system 
of norms related to the phenomenon of tax advantages in general, considering 
their strict focus on the dialectic between the values directly belonging to the 
system of tax law (e.g. the ability to pay) and other general values protected by 
different rules and constitutional principles (e.g. social protection for the most 
disadvantaged people). 
At the same time, STZs assume a specific position within that sub-system of tax 
advantages on the ground of the fact that, in this case, tax benefits are granted 
by a State through an instrument which is always characterized by an essential 
territorial dimension. 
In this regard, STZs generally consist of a package of tax benefits granted to a 
limited area of the hosting State, while all the other types of tax advantages are 
generally granted on the basis of objective and/or subjective elements that do 
not involve a territorial dimension; according to Dagnino, in fact, within the 
field of tax advantages and its sub-system of norms, it is possible to identify not 
only the category of territorial tax benefits – corresponding to the theoretical 
concept of STZs developed in the present research – but also the categories of 
objective tax benefits and subjective tax benefits113. Objective tax benefits are 
identified any time the favouring treatment is provided with reference to a 
specific event or a material fact114, while subjective tax benefits are those for 
which the preferential treatment is linked to the personal condition of the 
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taxpayer115. Nevertheless, such categorization should not be strictly intended 
since the factual experience offers various examples of territorial tax benefits 
where the territorial element is associated with additional requirements 
involving the material facts and/or the subjective condition of the taxpayer116. 
In summary, on the ground of the literature review, STZs can be placed in the 
general part of tax law and, more precisely, in the area dealing with the sub-
system of norms which regulate the phenomenon of tax advantages. 
Here, STZs assume an autonomous position besides the categories of objective 
and subjective tax benefits, considering the presence of tax policy goals that are 
always pursued on a territorial basis. 
In other words, within the same sub-system of norms, the territorial dimension 
is able to distinguish the concept of STZs from other types of tax advantages 
(i.e. objective tax advantages and subjective tax advantages), highlighting its 
main features from the systematic point of view and identifying its placement in 
the context of tax law.  
2.6 STZs and objectives of a social character 
2.6.1 General aspects 
As already seen, the phenomenon of STZs can be framed setting a strong 
parallelism with the category of “tax advantages”, giving evidence of various 
substantial aspects under the tax law perspective. 
In this direction, the understanding of STZs also requires an investigation on 
the different aims pursued by the governments through the introduction of tax 
advantages, with an approach more focused on the functional aspects and on 
the objectives of extra-fiscal nature which evidently differ from the mere 
collection of public revenue. 
Among these objectives, the social character of a tax measure introduced in a 
STZ certainly assumes a fundamental role for the purposes of the present 
study; in fact, as the second research question is related to the possibility of a 
new model of STZs for the development of social cohesion policies, the 
research process must first be oriented to an investigation on the main results 
of the literature dealing with the social character of a tax measure. 
                                                             
115 For instance, a tax benefit reserved to specific categories of beneficiaries (e.g. agricultural 
enterprises) without any requirement for what concerns the performance of specific 
activities. 
116 That is the case of tax benefits reserved to entrepreneurs investing in R&D activities, 
where both the subjective and the objective requirements are provided by law. In this 
sense, see A. DAGNINO, op. cit., CEDAM, Padova, 2008, p. 40. 
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On these bases, the literature review, from now onwards, must be driven by the 
substance of the same research question and the associated aspects, with the 
description of the studies on the so-called “hidden welfare” and the outline of 
the views of the scholars related to the introduction of tax incentives of a social 
character. 
From this perspective, Traversa offers the possibility of tracing the perimeter of 
the category of “social tax incentives” – also defined as “not-income related tax 
incentives” - within which the introduction of favouring norms is aimed at 
achieving objectives of social policy and is targeted to groups of individuals 
needing more social protection117. 
These benefits represent a common tool for the development of welfare, such 
as in the case of tax incentives aimed at solving the issues of unemployment, 
with the consequent introduction of deductions, exemptions or reduced tax 
rates118. 
Given the above, it is now necessary to review the literature focused on the 
study of social tax incentives and social enterprises, outlining the general 
framework where the second research question can be developed. 
2.6.2 The concept of  “social tax incentives”  
The theory of the “hidden welfare state”119 represents the main background in 
literature able to offer some instruments to explore the possible introduction of 
tax incentives of a social character in the context of STZs. 
In this sense, in fact, the same theory is useful to define what a social policy 
entails and, at the same time, to provide a content for the notion of social tax 
incentives. 
In the US, the idea of tax incentives of a social character is associated to the 
concept of tax expenditures with social welfare objectives, such as those for 
income security, health-care, employment and training, housing, social services, 
education and veterans’ benefits. 
These studies start from the idea that the social policies pursued by a State may 
be achieved not only thanks to the so-called “visible welfare state” (the state 
providing social security benefits), but also through the “hidden welfare 
                                                             
117 E. TRAVERSA, Tax Incentives and Territoriality within the European Union: Balancing the 
Internal Market with the Tax Sovereignty of Member States, in World Tax Journal, 2014, p. 
339. 
118 EUROPEAN COMMISSION – EMPLOYMENT SOCIAL AFFAIRS AND INCLUSION, The relationship 
between social security coordination and tax law, Analytical report 2014, European 
Commission Publications, 2014, p. 17.  
119 See C. HOWARD, The Hidden Welfare State: Tax Expenditure and Social Policy in the United 
States, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1997. 
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state”120 whose main scope is to compensate the taxpayer for losses, reduced 
income or extra costs, thanks to the introduction of new tax benefits. 
Among the most relevant studies, Howard focuses on the connection between 
the category of social tax incentives and the concept of the “hidden welfare 
state”121. According to the author, in fact, such incentives are considered to be 
equivalent to direct expenditures programs and can be viewed as alternative 
ways of accomplishing similar policy objectives122. Therefore, tax expenditures 
constitute a system of “fiscal welfare” that is conceptually distinct from the 
social welfare system of direct public spending and the occupational welfare 
system of fringe benefits123; in this sense, tax expenditures constitute “the third 
and often neglected method” of providing welfare benefits, along with transfer 
payments and in-kind services124. 
On these premises, Howard suggests a path directed to achieve a rewarding 
definition of the notion of “social policy” – which is evidently instrumental to 
better identify the category of “social tax incentives” - setting out a double step 
process for the recognition of the perimeter of the same concept125. 
The first step deals with the identification of the substantial beneficiaries of the 
tax incentives. According to the author, in fact, social policy programs – such as 
those that guarantee a minimum standard of living and protect citizens against 
losses of income beyond their control, especially losses caused by retirement, 
sickness, disability, or unemployment - are not only targeted to the poor class, 
but also to the middle class, considering that most of the tax expenditures 
benefit individuals whose income is above the poverty line126. 
The second step involves the identification of social welfare as the primary 
objective of the policy program, taking as point of reference a specific list of 
government functions. In this regard, certain government functions must be 
                                                             
120 J. P. OWENS, Tax expenditures and direct expenditures as instruments of social policy, Sijbren 
Cnossen, ed., Comparative Tax Studies, Amsterdam, 1983, p. 171. See also C. HOWARD, 
op. cit., Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1997; B. GREVE, The hidden welfare state, tax 
expenditure and social policy, in Scandinavian Journal of Social Welfare, 1994, p. 206. 
121 C. HOWARD, op. cit., Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1997, p. 3. 
122 US CONGRESS – JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, Estimates of Federal Tax Expenditures 
for Fiscal Years 1992-1996, Government Printing Office, Washington D.C.,1991, p. 3. 
123 R. TITMUSS, Essays on the Welfare State, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1959, pp. 17-
30. 
124 P. FLORA, A. HEIDENHEIMER, The historical core and changing boundaries of the Welfare 
State, in P. FLORA, A. HEIDENHEIMER, The development of Welfare States in Europe and 
America, Transaction Bookis, New Brunswick, 1981, p. 26. 
125 C. HOWARD, op. cit., Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1997, pp. 18 et seq. 
126 Ibid. For a similar approach see T.R. MARMOR, J.L. MARSHAW, P.L. HARVEY, America’s 
Misunderstood Welfare State, Basic Books, New York, 1990; F.C. PAMPEL, J.B. 
WILLIAMSON, Age, Class, Politics, and the Welfare State, Cambridge, University Press, 
Cambridge, 1989. 
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immediately excluded from the concept of social tax incentives since they 
pursue objectives not related with the management of social policy programs 
(e.g. national defense, energy, commerce, and transportation127). Differently, 
there are other government functions that certainly belong to the social welfare 
domain, such as income security, health, housing, education, employment, 
training, social services, and veterans’ programs.  
Academic studies generally accept this framework and sometimes distinguish 
between functions at the core and the periphery128. Core functions usually 
include income security, health, employment and job training. Housing, social 
services, education and veterans’ programs usually occupy the periphery.  
On the ground of the above ideas, the Joint Committee on Taxation of the US 
Congress has realized a comprehensive list of tax expenditures with social 
welfare objectives, where tax benefits are grouped using the traditional 
categories of income security, health, employment and training, housing, 
education, social services, and veterans’ benefits and services129. 
According to Howard, the same list represents a fundamental point of 
reference for setting the limits of the concept of “social policy”; in this regard, in 
fact, it is possible to conclude that the category of social tax incentives, as an 
instrument of social policy, includes all the tax benefits that are not only 
targeted to individuals belonging to the poor and middle class (as substantial 
beneficiaries), but also defined in the context of one or more of the functions 
mentioned in the same list of tax expenditures130. 
In summary, the review of the above literature offers the possibility to define 
the boundaries of the category of social tax incentives on the basis of two 
different conditions: first, there is the need of limiting the benefits to individuals 
belonging to the low and middle-income class; second, it is always necessary to 
set the tax measure within a well-defined government function, with a 
transparent and clear definition of the scope of the tax benefits. 
In conclusion, the category of social tax incentives, as defined thanks to the 
                                                             
127 Nevertheless, under certain circumstances, also public transportation could be included 
in a policy program with social welfare as the primary objective. In some cases, in fact, 
government functions, such as education and other social services, require the possibility 
for disadvantaged categories of individuals to use the public transportation network at a 
reduced fare.  
128 P. FLORA, A. HEIDENHEIMER, op. cit., in P. FLORA, A. HEIDENHEIMER, The development of 
Welfare States in Europe and America, Transaction Bookis, New Brunswick, 1981, pp. 17-
34. 
129 US CONGRESS – JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, op. cit., Government Printing Office, 
Washington D.C., 1991; US CONGRESS – OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET (OMB), 
Analytical perspectives, budget of the United States government, Fiscal year 1996, Government 
Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1995. 
130 C. HOWARD, op. cit., Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1997, pp. 18 et seq. 
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support of the above literature, can assume a fundamental relevance in the 
context of STZs, highlighting the functional perspective of the related tax 
measures. 
2.6.3 The role of social enterprises 
Social tax incentives have been defined through a set of fundamental 
coordinates including the income of the individuals towards which the same 
measure is targeted, on one part, and the specific government functions 
developed through the tax measure, on the other. 
In this sense, employment, training, housing, income security and education 
represent the main examples of the government functions involved by the 
introduction of social tax incentives, while the improvement of the living 
conditions of the individuals belonging to the low and the middle-income class - 
and not carrying out a business activity - is the ultimate target of such initiatives. 
In this framework, social tax incentives may be granted in various forms which 
are not limited to the direct provision of tax advantages in favour of the targeted 
individuals, but also include the introduction of a differentiated tax treatment in 
favour of third entities carrying out, even occasionally, activities of a social 
character. 
While in the first case the tax liability of the individuals belonging to the low 
and middle income class is lowered through the introduction of a tax exemption 
or a tax rate reduction which is directly applied to their income, in the second 
case, otherwise, the advantages are granted in favour of entities which are active 
in the social field, such as charities or non-profit organizations. Therefore, in 
the latter situations, the government function is concretely pursued in 
consideration of the indirect effects of the same tax measures, with a focus on 
the link between the behavior of the third entities directly interested by the 
more favourable tax treatment and the corresponding effects on the 
disadvantaged groups of individuals which are the ultimate target of such 
initiatives. 
In other words, third entities may become the vehicle through which a social 
objective is concretely achieved in favour of the targeted individuals; in this 
sense, in fact, the targeted individuals, even if they are not directly interested by 
these tax measures, can benefit from the strongest position acquired by the 
third entities which are involved in activities of a social character, for example 
through more job positions in the local market or through a wider set of social 
services available. 
On these premises, it is then possible to identify situations where enterprises are 
used as a filter between public finance and groups of individuals who require 
more protection, being a sort of vehicle through which the State may improve 
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the living conditions of specific categories of disadvantaged individuals; 
therefore, enterprises are used as a selective tool for the identification of the 
substantial beneficiaries of such measures, according to a set of requirements 
provided by law. 
In this context, the phenomenon of social enterprises can assume a 
fundamental relevance for the purposes of the present study, opening a new 
room for the development of social cohesion policies through the instrument of 
STZs. 
Therefore, it is necessary to offer a brief overview of the main literature on the 
topic, with a focus set on the views of the scholars on the possible relationship 
between social enterprises and social tax incentives 
According to Barrett and Veal, the concept of social enterprise is notoriously 
difficult to categorically define, given the many goals of the different entities 
operating in the field, and the diverse contexts in which the term is used across 
jurisdictions131. 
In a report which dates back to 1999, the OECD underlines the fact that there is 
no universal, commonly accepted definition of social enterprises as the concept 
has not yet been widely institutionalized, thus stressing the difficulty of giving a 
legal definition132. However, while the forms of social enterprises are highly 
diverse – as they arise spontaneously within civil society in response to current 
changes to the welfare – they all have a similar practical implementation and 
ethical approach. In this sense, since the concept of social enterprise does not 
correspond to a precise legal form, definitions tend to describe the functions of 
social enterprises; the functional approach, in fact, seems to be an appropriate 
analytical tool, given the wide variety of legal forms in the different countries 
covered by the concept. 
On the ground of the above considerations, the OECD concludes that, in any 
case, the expression “social enterprise” can refer to “any private activity 
conducted in the public interest, organized with an entrepreneurial strategy but whose 
main purpose is not the maximization of profit but the attainment of certain 
economic and social goals, and which has a capacity for bringing innovative solutions 
to the problems of social exclusion and unemployment”133. 
More recently, Defourny and Nyssen define social enterprises as “not-for-profit 
organizations providing goods or services directly related to their explicit aim of 
benefiting the community […] They rely on a dynamic involving various types of 
stakeholders in their governing bodies”134. 
                                                             
131 J. BARRETT, J. VEAL, Social Enterprise: Some Tax Policy Considerations, in Journal of the 
Australasian Tax Teachers Association, 2013, p. 154. 
132 OECD, Social Enterprises, OECD publications, Paris, 1999, p. 9. 
133 Ibid. 
134 J. DEFOURNY, M. NYSSENS, Social enterprise in Europe: recent trends and developments, in 
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Social enterprises may be active in a wide spectrum of activities, as the “social 
purpose” may refer to many different fields. Nowadays, “Work Integration 
Social Enterprises” (WISE) represent the dominant form of social enterprises 
whose main objective is to help low qualified unemployed people135.  In several 
countries, the development of specific public schemes targeted to this type of 
social enterprises has even led to associate the concept of social enterprise with 
employment creation initiatives136. 
WISE activities are widespread throughout the EU with strongly identifiable 
organizational forms such as Italy’s “type B” or “working integration” social 
cooperatives, French enterprises for the reintegration of economic activity, 
Finnish social enterprises and Poland’s social cooperatives137.   
Beyond work integration itself, several social enterprises are to be found across 
the full spectrum of social welfare services (long term care for the elderly and 
for people with disabilities; early education and childcare; employment and 
training services; social housing; social integration of disadvantaged individuals 
such as ex-offenders, migrants, drug addicts, etc.; health care and medical 
services)138.  
In any case, the most visible efforts in the study of the relation between social 
enterprises and social tax incentives are due to the UK experience where 
scholars investigate the possibility and the legal issues related to the 
introduction of innovative tax schemes, such as in the case of social investment 
tax reliefs designed to encourage individuals to support social enterprises and 
to simplify the access to new sources of finance139. 
                                                                                                                                               
Social Enterprise Journal, 2008, p. 5. 
135 M. NYSSEN, Social Enterprise – At the crossroads of market, public policies and civil society, 
Routledge, London and New York, 2006. 
136 J. DEFOURNY, M. NYSSENS, op. cit., in Social Enterprise Journal, 2008, p. 8. 
137 EUROPEAN COMMISSION, A map of social enterprises and their eco-systems in Europe. 
Synthesis Report, European Commission Publications, 2014, p. 8. 
138 Further  common  situations  belonging to the same phenomenon are recognizable in the 
following areas:  land-based  industries  and  the  environment  (for  example,  agriculture,  
horticulture,  food processing,  environmental  services  and  environmental  protection)  
in  countries  like  the Czech  Republic,  Malta,  and  Romania;  serving  community  
interest  needs  in  countries  like  the  UK, Germany and the Netherlands (for example, 
housing, transportation, and energy) and  cultural, sport and  recreational  activities  (for  
example,  arts,  crafts,  music,  and  tourism)  in  Croatia, Estonia, Finland, Greece, 
Hungary, Malta and Sweden. Therefore, it is worth to note that the main activity fields of 
work integration and welfare service provision have been recently expanded to sectors of 
general interest other than welfare in a strict sense, such as the provision of educational, 
cultural, environmental and public utility services.  
139 A recent implementation of such tax schemes can be found in the UK legislation giving 
effect to social investment tax reliefs (SITR) corresponding to schedules 11 and 12 of the 
Finance Act 2014, amending the Income Act 2007. Pursuant to the SITR rules, 
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In particular, Heaney examines tax incentive schemes in the UK, focusing the 
analysis on the case of tax incentives for social enterprises investors. According 
to the author, tax incentives have a role to play in the promotion of investment 
flows, but the range of UK enterprise incentive schemes is ill-suited to the legal 
forms most commonly adopted by social enterprises. In this sense, in fact, tax 
reliefs are available for equity investment, but social entrepreneurs usually 
choose legal forms limited by guarantee, which do not allow equity issuance. 
The end result is that many social enterprises are shut off from potential 
sources of growth capital and are restricted to a grant-dependent/loan financing 
mentality140; in conclusion, according to Heaney, the specific legal form 
adopted by a social enterprise is crucial to its ability to benefit from different tax 
incentive schemes141.  
Also Carpenter and Keller Lauritzen make a reference to the possibility of tax 
incentives for social enterprise investors; according to them, in fact, national 
governments can relieve the tax burden of private investors (including even 
private citizens) investing in social enterprises142. In such cases, reliefs can be 
given on the amount invested or on interests and dividends earned through 
investments143. 
One more interesting document is represented by the report commissioned by 
the City of London Corporation and Big Society Capital in order to examine 
the case for providing tax incentives for wealthy individuals in case of social 
investments144.  In particular, the report aims at providing practical guidance on 
how the relief could be created by adapting existing structures. The intention of 
a tax relief would be to see greater social investments from wealthy individuals 
into distinctive schemes for public benefit; moreover, according to the same 
report, the implementation of such a scheme requires the establishment of a 
framework with the identification of the types of target organizations. For tax 
purposes, however, the same report underlines again the fact that it is always 
appropriate to focus on the legal form of a social enterprise, as this is the key 
                                                                                                                                               
individuals making an eligible investment can deduct 30% of the cost of their investment 
from their income tax due. The investment must be held for a minimum period of three 
years for the relief to be retained. 
140 V. HEANEY, Investing in Social Enterprise: the role of tax incentives, Centre for the Study of 
Financial Innovation (CSFI), London, 2010, p. 52. 
141 Ibid., p. 4. 
142 G. CARPENTER, J.R. KELLER LAURITZEN, Promoting social enterprise financing (Discussion 
paper), Danish Technological Institute, Centre for Policy and Business Analysis, 
Taastrup (Denmark), 2016, p. 9. 
143 Ibid., p. 10 
144 WORTHSTONE, WRAGGE & CO LLP, The Role of tax Incentives in Encouraging social 
Investment, City of London Economic Development, London, 2013. 
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factor for determining what type of capital can be raised145. 
Given the above, the literature on social enterprises offers an interesting 
perspective for the purposes of the present study; among the social tax 
incentives for STZs, in fact, the possibility should be explored of introducing 
tax advantages granted in favour of social enterprises based therein, with 
eligibility subject to the achievement of social impact targets.  
In other words, the review of the previous studies highlights a new room where 
social enterprises might be used as a strategic instrument in the context of 
STZs, namely as a powerful vehicle to grant tax incentives of a social character 
for improving the living conditions of the individuals which reside in the 
disadvantaged areas of the Union.  
2.7 Final remarks 
The review of the multitude of studies presented in this chapter offers the 
opportunity to trace a first framework of the legal dimension of STZs. 
As already seen, there are different views regarding not only the definitions, but 
also the denominations used to identify the phenomenon; it is clear, in fact, that 
the use of a specific denomination usually depends on the name provided by 
local public authorities and the wording which is prevalent in the country where 
the zone is located146. 
The distinction between “classic free zones”, on one part, and “free zones of 
exception”, on the other, represents still today a fundamental classification and 
a reference point for any legal approach to the topic, being the logical result of 
the essential distinction between the categories of indirect taxes and direct taxes 
in the context of tax law studies. 
At the same time, the recognition of STZs within the general phenomenon of 
tax advantages constitutes one more step for the definition of the legal 
dimension, providing an important contribution in the identification of the 
substantial nature of such zones. 
Nevertheless, it is evident that the various aspects regarding STZs have always 
been approached in a disorganic form, without the outline of a solid and 
comprehensive general legal theory. This phenomenon, in fact, is still little 
investigated from the systematic perspective, especially when the analysis is 
carried out within the area of tax law. 
Furthermore, as far as the focus is shifted to the possible introduction of tax 
incentives of a social character within the perimeter of a STZ, the previous 
studies present many weak points, considering that today it is still not possible 
to recognize important efforts addressed to the understanding of the 
                                                             
145 Ibid., p. 3. 
146 S. FINARDI, E. MORONI, op. cit., FrancoAngeli, 2001, Milan, p. 60. 
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relationship between STZs and social tax incentives.  
The work already done by the scholars, in fact, is limited to provide a general 
overview on social tax incentives, without the study of their possible 
implementations in the context of STZs.  
The issue is even more serious with respect to the fact that the same category of 
social tax incentives is only marginally investigated in literature and, apart from 
the studies made by Howard, there are no relevant efforts in the identification 
of clear examples of what social tax incentives really entail. 
In conclusion, previous studies are insufficient as they are not focused on the 
territorial dimension of social tax incentives and their possible implementation 
in the context of STZs; social enterprises and the related tax incentives, in fact, 
are analyzed only through a very general perspective which is not able to 
highlight the connections with the topic of STZs. 
In any case, on the ground of the above considerations, it is possible to lay down 
the track which will drive the next stages of the research process. 
First of all, it seems necessary to deepen – under the first research question - the 
legal substance of the phenomenon in order to trace the basics of a general legal 
theory, filling the systematic gap identified in the existing literature. 
Then, on the same basis, it is important to move the study towards the relation 
between STZs, social tax incentives and social enterprises, approaching the 
second research question outlined in the introduction of the present work; in 
this sense, in fact,  social enterprises, as far as they are based within the territory 
of a STZ, might become a fundamental vehicle to grant social tax incentives in 
favour of disadvantaged groups of individuals residing in the same zones.  
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CHAPTER 3 
THE EU LAW FRAMEWORK 
3.1 Introduction 
The EU law framework of STZs involves a complex set of different legal 
sources, including not only the provisions of the TFEU and the related case law, 
but also a multitude of regulations, directives, decisions and other soft law 
instruments adopted by the Commission. 
The objective of the present Chapter is to identify these sources and to define 
the coordinates at the EU level able to influence the phenomenon of STZs with 
the creation of a solid background for the analysis of the research questions.  
In this direction, the research process is targeted towards a careful review of the 
collected data, both for what regards the text of the provisions in force and the 
statements contained in the relevant case law; the focus is set on the legal 
variables that influence the phenomenon of STZs, outlining a comprehensive 
overview of the relevant EU legal framework. 
From the systematic point of view, the review is structured on the ground of the 
distinction between the three macro-areas of State aid law, internal market law 
and harmful tax competition.   
The selection of the material is driven by the object of the research questions; in 
this sense, the review is not limited to the phenomenon of territorial tax 
advantages in a strict sense, but it is also extended to the world of social tax 
incentives and social enterprises with particular reference to the so-called 
“social services of general interest” (hereinafter also SSGIs).  
The main scope is to explore a wider framework where the phenomenon of 
STZs can interact with the legal aspects related to the introduction of tax 
incentives of a social character at the sub-State level. By this approach, it is 
finally possible to set a bridge between STZs and tax incentives of a social 
character for the purposes of the research question No. 2 which is essentially 
focused on the development of a new model of STZs based on the introduction 
of tax incentives of a social character. 
Therefore, the first part of the analysis involves the aspects of State aid law with 
a description of the common framework of regional aid and SSGIs which is 
relevant for the phenomenon of STZs; the second part deals with internal 
market law and, in particular, with the issues deriving from the implementation 
of the fundamental freedoms both in the TFEU and in secondary law; finally, 
the third part is dedicated to the relation between STZs and the phenomenon 
of harmful tax competition with a focus on the content of the Code of Conduct 
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for Business Taxation and its specific measures147. 
3.2  STZs and State aid law 
State aid law assumes a fundamental role for the definition of the legal 
framework of STZs in the EU context. 
State aid provisions, in fact, ensure that domestic support for business entities, 
including negative aid in the form of tax advantages, does not distort 
competition with a negative effect on the trade between Member States; in 
other words, it is evident that such rules often interact with STZs, outlining a 
set of conditions which are relevant for the purposes of the present research. 
For this reason, the following paragraphs are dedicated to the discipline of State 
aid with particular reference to the phenomenon of regional aid, both for what 
regards the rules set by the TFEU, on one part, and the sources of secondary 
law, on the other, with a review of the main legal instruments adopted by the 
EU institutions. 
The same review also includes social services of general interest, opening a 
different perspective for the analysis of the research question No. 2, especially 
for what regards the relation between STZs and social cohesion policies; in this 
sense, the EU rules for social services of general interest represent a 
fundamental field of investigation to evaluate in which terms tax incentives of a 
social character may be designed in the context of a new model of STZs. 
3.2.1 Regional aid in the TFEU 
3.2.1.1 Notion of State aid under Art. 107(1) TFEU 
According to Article 107(1) TFEU a measure constitutes State aid if an 
economic advantage is granted by a transfer of State resources favouring 
certain undertakings, and if the aid has a potential effect on competition and 
trade between Member States.  
This principle is associated to the idea that goods, services and capital have to be 
freely exchanged between economic operators based within the EU territory, 
neutralizing the tax variable by the harmonization of rules affecting production 
and trade148. 
147 For an explanation regarding the status and the role of the Code of Conduct for Business 
Taxation see infra paragraph 3.4.2.1. 
148 For a comprehensive analysis of State aid rules see M. LANG, P. PISTONE, J. SCHUCH, C. 
STARINGER, op. cit, Spiramus Press, 3rd edition, Wien, 2013, p. 93 et seq.; B. J.M. TERRA, P. 
J. WATTEL, op. cit., Sixth Edition, Kluwer Law International, Alphen aan den Rijn, 2012, 
p. 242 et seq. For a specific analysis of the relation between State aid rules and tax 
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The Commission specifically focuses on the notion of State aid in its Notice of 
19 July 2016149, clarifying the different  qualifying  elements, namely:  the  
existence  of  an  undertaking,  the State origin of the measure, the granting of 
an advantage, the selectivity of the measure and its effect on competition and 
trade between Member States. 
 
(i) The existence of an undertaking 
State aid rules only apply when the measure is granted to an undertaking, either 
directly or indirectly150.  
According to the position held by the ECJ, undertakings are entities engaged  in  
an  economic  activity, regardless  of  their  legal  status  and  the  way  in  which  
they  are  financed 151. Thus, the  classification  of  a  particular entity  as  an  
undertaking  entirely  depends  on  the  nature  of  its  activities152; the ECJ, in 
fact, has consistently held that any activity consisting in offering goods and 
services on a market is an economic activity and that the existence of a market 
for certain services  depends  on  the  way  those  services  are  organized in  the  
Member  State  concerned.  Accordingly, the same  distinction  between  
economic  and  non-economic  activities  is based on the ground of  political 
choices and economic developments in a given Member State and, therefore, it 
is not possible to define an exhaustive list of economic or non-economic 
activities153. 
In this context, the mere fact that an undertaking might engage in an activity 
that has a social element does not prevent it from being considered as carrying 
on an economic activity154. In particular, whilst benefits granted by the State to 
employees are normally not regarded as State aid, payments made through 
public funds or tax exemptions for certain employees might have the result of 
                                                                                                                                               
benefits see C. FONTANA, Gli aiuti di Stato di natura fiscale, G. Giappichelli (ed.), Turin, 
2012. 
149 Commission notice on the notion of State aid as referred to in Article 107(1) TFEU, O.J. 
2016, C 262, pp. 1-50. For a comprehensive overview of the notion of State aid based on 
the Commission 2016 Notice see R. LUJA, Do State aid rules still allow European Union 
Member States to claim fiscal sovereignty?, in EC Tax Review, 2016, No. 5-6, pp. 312-324. 
150 Case T-52/12 Greece v Commission, [2014] ECRII-0000, paragraph 41.  
151 Case C-41/90 Klaus Höfner and Fritz Elser v Macrotron GmbH, [1991] ECR I-01979, 
paragraph 21. See also Case C-118/85 Commission v Italy, [1987] ECR 2599. 
152 Commission notice on the notion of State aid as referred to in Article 107(1) TFEU, O.J. 
2016, C 262, pp. 1-50, paragraph 7. 
153 Ibid., paragraph 15. 
154 Case T-81/07 KG Holding NV c Commission, [2009] ECR II-2411, paragraph 179. In this 
case, a subsidiary company, whose principal activity consisted in the provision of services 
of finding employment for jobseekers, integrating people living with disabilities into the 
labor market as well as general staff placement services, was regarded as being engaged in 
an economic activity. 
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reducing or substituting the employment costs and, thus, might be viewed as 
being an aid to the same undertaking155. 
 
(ii) The State origin  
The  imputability  of  the  measure to the State and the granting  of  an  
advantage  directly  or  indirectly through State resources are two separate and  
cumulative  conditions both referring to the public origin of the same 
measure156. 
For what regards imputability, the  measure  is  considered as imputable to  the  
State any time a  public  authority  grants  an  advantage  to  a  beneficiary,  even  
if  the  same public authority  enjoys  legal  autonomy  from  the State.  
According to the Commission, the  imputability to the  State  of  a  measure  
taken  by  a  public  undertaking  may  be  recognized from  a  set  of  indicators  
based on  the  circumstances  of  the  case  and  on the  context  in which  the  
measure  is taken157.  
Then, only  advantages  granted  directly  or  indirectly  through  State  resources  
can  constitute  State  aid  pursuant to Article 107(1) TFEU; in this sense, State  
resources  also include  resources  of  intra-State bodies and,  under  certain  
circumstances,  resources  of  private  bodies158. 
In this context, the transfer of State resources may take the form of a “positive 
aid”, such as in the case of direct grants, loans, guarantees, and direct 
investments in  the  capital  of  companies. 
Nevertheless, according to the Commission, the category of State aid includes 
not only grants and performance of a positive content, but also public measures 
reducing burdens on business in the form of “negative aid”159; thus, territorial 
tax benefits, resulting in a favourable treatment to beneficiaries, such as those 
granted in the case of a STZ, are generally considered as prohibited State aid – 
or better as prohibited regional aid - since they use to reduce the burdens on 
undertakings in various forms including, for example, a total or partial 
exemption, a tax credit, or a deferral160. 
                                                             
155 Case C-30/59, Steenkolenmijnen v High Authority, [1961] ECR 1, p. 29. 
156 Commission notice on the notion of State aid as referred to in Article 107(1) TFEU, O.J. 
2016, C 262, pp. 1-50, paragraph 38. 
157 Ibid., paragraph 42. 
158 Ibid., paragraph 48. 
159 Ibid., paragraph 51. In this sense, see also Case C-387/92 Banco de Credito Industrial SA, 
now Banco Exterior de Espana SA v Ayuntamiento de Valencia, [1994] ECR I-00877, in 
which the problem is investigated for the first time; see also Case C-328/99 Italian 
Republic and SIM 2 Multimedia S.p.A. v Commission of the European Communities, [2003] 
ECR I-04035; Case C-276/02 Spain c. Commission of the European Communities, [2004] 
ECR I-08091. 
160 C. BUCICCO, Compatibilità europea degli interventi a sostegno delle aree colpite da calamità 
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(iii) Advantage 
The Commission also specifies that an  advantage, within the meaning  of  
Article  107(1)  TFEU,  is any  economic  benefit  which  an undertaking  could  
not  have  obtained  under  normal  market  conditions161; in other words, an 
advantage is present any time the  financial  situation  of  an undertaking  is  
improved  as  a  result  of  State intervention on terms differing from normal 
market conditions. 
In  its  Communication,  the  Commission  refers  to  the  “market  economy  
operator”  test  as  the relevant  method  to  assess  whether  the State has 
granted an advantage to an undertaking by not acting  like  a  market  economy  
operator  with  regard  to  a  certain  transaction162. In  that  respect,  according 
to the Commission, it  is  not  relevant whether  the  intervention  is aimed at  
pursuing  public  policy objectives; in fact, only  the  effect  of  the  measure  on  
the  undertaking  is  relevant,  and  not  the  cause  or  the  objective  of  the  State 
intervention163. 
For the purposes of STZs, the advantage generally consists in a reduction of the 
tax burden in favour of the beneficiaries provided through the introduction of 
allowances, tax credits, exemptions, or a mere deferral of the tax burden. 
 
(iv) Selectivity 
To  fall  within  the  scope  of  Article  107(1) TFEU,  the measure must be 
specific or selective in the sense that it favours only “certain undertakings or the 
production of certain goods”. Hence, not  all  measures  which favour  economic  
operators  fall  under  the notion of aid, but only those which grant an advantage 
in a selective way to certain undertakings or categories of undertakings or to 
certain economic sectors164. According to the Commission, the  selectivity  of  
                                                                                                                                               
naturali, in M. BASILAVECCHIA - L. DEL FEDERICO – A. PACE – C. VERRIGNI,  Interventi 
finanziari e tributari per le aree colpite da calamità, tra norme interne e principi europei, 
Giappichelli (ed.), Turin, 2016, p. 154. For an interesting source deepening the State aid 
topic within the tax law field see W. SCHOEN, Taxation and State aid law in the European 
Union, in Internal market Law Review, Kluwer Law International, The Hague, 1999, Vol. 
36, No. 5, pp. 911-936; D. COLLIE, State aid in the European Union: the prohibition of 
subsidies in an integrated market, in International Journal of Industrial Organization, 2000, pp. 
867-884; D. BRAUTIGAM, O. FJELDSTAD, M. MOORE, Taxation and State-building in 
developing countries: capacity and consent, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2008; 
K. BACON, Differential Taxes, State aids and the Lunn Poly case, in European Competition 
Law Review, 1999, p. 384; P. NICOLAIDES, Fiscal State aid in the EU: The limits of tax 
autonomy, in World Competition, 2004, p. 365. 
161 Commission notice on the notion of State aid as referred to in Article 107(1) TFEU, O.J. 
2016, C 262, pp. 1-50, paragraph 66. 
162 Ibid., paragraph 75. 
163 Ibid., paragraph 67. 
164 Ibid., paragraph 117. 
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the  measures  should  normally  be  assessed  through  a  three-steps  analysis.  
First, the  reference  system must  be  identified focusing on a  consistent  set  of  
rules  that  generally  apply  to  all  undertakings  falling  within  its  scope . In  the  
case  of  taxes,  the  reference  system  is  based  on  such  elements  as  the  tax  
base,  the  taxable  persons,  the taxable event and the tax rates.  
Second,  it  should  be  determined  whether  a  given  measure constitutes a 
derogation from the reference system, with the introduction of a differentiated 
treatment between economic operators which are in a  comparable  factual  and  
legal  situation.   
Third, it is necessary to establish whether  such a derogation is justified by the 
nature or  the general scheme of  the  reference  system; in fact, if a derogation 
measure is  justified  by the  nature  or  the  general  scheme of  the  system,  it  
will  not  be  considered  selective  and  will  thus  fall  outside  the  scope  of  
Article  107(1)  TFEU165. 
The Commission also distinguishes between  material and  regional selectivity. 
The  material  selectivity usually implies that  the  measure  applies  only  to 
certain  undertakings or  certain  sectors  of  the  economy in a Member State166.  
In any case, in order to establish the material selectivity of a tax measure, it is 
not necessary to identify certain specific features that are characteristic of and 
common to the undertakings that are the recipients of the tax advantage; in 
other words, the same measure could be selective even if the tax benefits are not 
limited to a particular category of undertakings. According to the ECJ, in fact, 
the appropriate criterion to establish the selectivity of a general measure is 
merely whether the  recipient  undertakings are placed in  a  position  that  is  
more favourable than that of other undertakings which, in the light of the 
objective pursued by the general tax system concerned, are in a comparable 
factual and legal situation167. 
The regional selectivity – or territorial selectivity – generally refers to all 
measures that apply only to certain parts of the territory of a Member State. In 
this sense, in fact, tax measures which are implemented at a local level in the 
form of regional aid – such as in the case of STZs - are normally considered able 
to favour certain undertakings as long as the individual Member State's 
                                                             
165 Ibid., paragraph 128. 
166 Ibid., paragraph 120. 
167 In this sense, see Joined cases C-20/15 P and C-21/15 P Commission v World Duty Free 
Group SA, formerly Autogrill España SA, Banco Santander SA, Santusa Holding SL, [2016] 
ECR I-0000, paragraphs 77, 78, regarding the Spanish goodwill amortisation regime 
which has been considered as unlawful State aid by the Commission (on the assumption 
that the related provisions treated foreign transactions more favourably than domestic 
transactions without any objective reason). 
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territory is assumed as the reference system168. However, the reference system 
is not always identified with the entire territory of the Member State; as stated 
by the ECJ, in fact, measures with a regional or local scope of application may 
not be selective if certain requirements are fulfilled. 
In this regard, the Commission identifies three different scenarios. 
In  the  first  scenario, the  central  government  of a Member State unilaterally 
decides to apply a lower level of taxation within a defined geographical area; in 
such a case, it is evident that the related measures are territorial selective. 
The  second  scenario  corresponds  to  a form of symmetrical  devolution  of  
tax  powers  in  which  all  infra-State  authorities  at  a  particular  level  (e.g. 
regions)  of a  Member  State  have  the  same  autonomous  power to  establish  
the  applicable  tax  rate  within  their territory, independently of the central 
government. In this case, the measures adopted by the infra-State  authorities  
are  not  selective  since  it  is  impossible  to  determine  a normal tax rate 
capable of representing the reference framework.   
In  the  third  scenario, which corresponds to the  asymmetrical  devolution  of  
tax  powers, only  certain  regional  or  local authorities  can  adopt  tax  
measures  applicable  within  their  territory.  In  this  case,  the  assessment  of  
the selective  nature  of  the  measure  depends  on  whether  the  authority 
concerned is sufficiently autonomous from the central government of the 
Member State, namely when the criteria of the institutional, procedural and 
economic and financial autonomy are fulfilled169. If all of these criteria of 
autonomy are present, the  region  in  question,  not  the  Member  State,  
becomes  the only geographical reference framework for the assessment of the 
selectivity of a tax measure170. 
 
(v) Effect on trade and competition 
Within  the  meaning  of  Article  107(1) TFEU,  a measure  granted  by  the  
State  is  considered  to  distort  or  threaten  to  distort  competition  when  it  is  
liable  to improve the competitive position of the recipient compared to other 
undertakings with which it competes171.  
In particular,  a  distortion  of  competition  can be found  when  the  State  
grants  a  financial  advantage  to  an  undertaking  in  a  liberalized  sector where 
there is competition. Furthermore, public support to undertakings only 
constitutes State aid under Article 107(1) TFEU when it affects trade between 
                                                             
168 A. DAGNINO, op. cit., CEDAM, 2008, p. 146. 
169 For the review of the criteria of institutional, procedural and economic and financial 
autonomy see infra paragraph 3.2.1.5 (the Azores case). 
170 Commission notice on the notion of State aid as referred to in Article 107(1) TFEU, O.J. 
2016, C 262, pp. 1-50, paragraphs 142-144. 
171 Ibid., paragraph 187. 
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Member States. In this regard, it is not necessary to establish that the aid has an 
actual effect on trade  between  Member  States  but  only  whether  the  aid  is  
liable  to  affect  such  trade172. 
For example, the  relatively  small  amount of aid or the relatively small size  of  
the  undertaking  does  not  automatically exclude  the possibility  that trade 
between Member States might be affected. According to the Commission, in 
fact, a public subsidy granted to an  undertaking  which provides  only  local  or  
regional  services  and  does  not  provide  any services  outside  its State of 
origin may nonetheless have an effect on trade between Member States where 
undertakings from other Member States  could provide such services173. 
 
On these premises, it is evident that STZs may include prohibited State aid - in 
the form of regional aid - as far as Member States decide to introduce tax 
benefits targeted only to undertakings based therein, conferring a selective 
advantage with respect to other undertakings which are based out of the 
perimeter of such zones. 
In this sense, in fact, STZs may produce negative effects on competition and 
evolve into prohibited State aid; the general idea is that the disparity of taxes on 
commercial transactions and trade between Member States – and, thus, even 
territorial tax advantages in the form of regional aid - may potentially lead to 
distortions of competition in the EU internal market. Given the above, it is 
evident that also the tax benefits granted to the entities based in STZs must be 
deeply analyzed under State aid rules. 
3.2.1.2 Exemptions under Art. 107(3)(a) TFEU 
Beside the conditions set by Article 107(1) TFEU to consider a measure as a 
prohibited State aid, it is important to note that some exemptions to the same 
prohibition are identified for regional aid under Article 107(3) TFEU174.  
In particular, as far as the phenomenon of STZs is concerned, Article 107(3)(a) 
and (c) TFEU175 identifies two relevant categories of aid where the measure 
                                                             
172 Ibid., paragraph 190. 
173 Ibid., paragraph 192. 
174 Communication from the Commission - Guidelines on regional State aid for 2014-2020, 
O.J. 2013, C 209, pp. 1-45 (see infra paragraph 3.2.2.3). 
175 According to Article 107(3) TFEU “the following may be considered to be compatible with 
the internal market: (a) aid to promote the economic development of areas where the standard of 
living is abnormally low or where there is serious underemployment, and of the regions referred 
to in Article 349, in view of their structural, economic and social situation; (b) aid to promote the 
execution of an important project of common European interest or to remedy a serious 
disturbance in the economy of a Member State; (c) aid to facilitate the development of certain 
economic activities or of certain economic areas, where such aid does not adversely affect trading 
conditions to an extent contrary to the common interest; (d) aid to promote culture and heritage 
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may be declared compatible with the internal market after the assessment of the 
Commission. 
In this sense, Article 107(3)(a) TFEU provides that aid may be granted to 
promote the economic development of areas where the standard of living is 
abnormally low or where there is serious underemployment. This first category 
of aid concerns only those regions where the economic situation is extremely 
unfavourable in relation to the EU as a whole, so that the assessment of these 
factors must not be made with reference to the national average in the Member 
State concerned, but in relation to the EU level176. 
For the assessment of such aid, the Commission may take account of many 
different elements, such as the geographical remoteness of the region from the 
principal business centers and all the other factors which are able to increase 
the costs of transports and infrastructures. In this regard, the planned aid must 
be necessary for the development of less favoured areas since, otherwise, the 
same aid would not be compatible with the internal market. 
In any case, the relevance of such category of exempted aid for the 
phenomenon of STZs is evident; the related tax incentives, in fact, can be in 
principle designed according to the exemption of Article 107(3)(a) TFEU as 
long as the same area is affected by a serious underdevelopment in comparison 
to the EU average. 
3.2.1.3 Exemptions under Art. 107(3)(c) TFEU 
Article 107(3)(c) TFEU allows for the approval of aid to facilitate the 
development of certain economic activities or of certain economic areas.  
In relation to regional aid, this category of exemptions is wider in scope than 
that available under Article 107(3)(a) TFEU; in this second case, in fact, the 
development of certain areas is not restricted by the economic conditions 
necessary for the application of the first category of exemptions, allowing 
regional aid intended to favour the economic development of areas of a 
Member State which are disadvantaged in relation to the national average and 
not necessary with reference to the EU level.  
Such category of exempted aid is permissible only to the extent that it does not 
adversely affect trading conditions contrary to the common interest; 
accordingly, aid should be limited to the minimum necessary177. 
In this case, the Commission has the responsibility, under a system of prior 
                                                                                                                                               
conservation where such aid does not affect trading conditions and competition in the Union to 
an extent that is contrary to the common interest; (e) such other categories of aid as may be 
specified by decision of the Council on a proposal from the Commission”. 
176 Case C-248/84 Germany v Commission, [1987] ECR 4013, paragraph 19; Case C-310/99 
Italy v Commission, [2002] ECR I-2289, paragraph 77. 
177 Case T-349/03 Corsica Ferries France sas v  Commission, [2005] ECR II-2197, paragraph 317. 
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authorizations, to ensure that every Member State only conceives and designs 
aid measures useful to help companies in producing goods and services that 
would not otherwise be provided in the internal market, avoiding measures that 
distort competition. In this sense, the Commission, while moving within a large 
discretion to declare aid compatible, always needs to take account of the 
provisions of the treaties as interpreted by the ECJ178 and, thus, has to verify if 
such aid can be aimed to some other objectives set out by the treaties. 
3.2.1.4 The supervision of the Commission under Art. 108 TFEU 
The measures constituting State aid are covered by a system of prior 
authorization by the Commission according to Article 108 TFEU and to the 
procedural rules set by Regulation (EU) No. 2015/1589179. 
In particular, a measure constituting State aid must be notified to the 
Commission180, while Member States may not implement the same measure 
before a formal approval by the Commission (so-called “standstill clause”181). If 
the measure has been already implemented in violation of such procedural 
rules, the Commission, any time it considers the aid incompatible with the 
internal market, may decide that the Member State must amend or abolish it182; 
this suppression implies, in principle, that the Member State must recover the 
aid from the beneficiary or beneficiaries183. 
Therefore, the Commission assumes a fundamental role for any initiative 
aimed at the establishment of a STZ being able to influence and limiting the 
actions of the Member States on the ground of the procedural rules set by 
Regulation No. 2015/1589184.  
                                                             
178 Case C-42/02 Diana Elisabeth Lindman, [2003] ECR I-13519, in which the ECJ has 
decided that certain grounds may also justify indirect discrimination. See also the case 
Rewe-Zentral AG v Bundesmonopolverwaltung fur Branntwein by which the ECJ decides 
that the infringement of the fundamental freedoms may also be justified by general 
grounds of public interest (Case C-120/78 Rewe-Zentral AG v Bundesmonopolverwaltung 
für Branntwein, [1979] ECR 649). 
179 Council Regulation (EU) No. 2015/1589 of 13 July 2015 laying down detailed rules for 
the application of Article 108 TFEU, O.J. 2015, L 248, pp. 9–29. 
180 Ibid., Art. 2. 
181 Ibid., Art. 3. 
182 Ibid., Art. 22. 
183 Ibid., Art. 16. See also P. CRAIG, G. DE BÚRCA, EU Law: Text, Cases, and Materials, Sixt 
Edition, Oxford University Press, New York, 2015, pp. 1145 et seq. 
184 The procedural rules of Regulation (EU) No. 2015/1589, including the notification 
obligation, also apply in case of aid for the so-called “Social Services of General Interest” 
(SSGIs) granted according to the regime of exemption set by Article 106(2) TFEU (see 
infra paragraph 3.2.3). 
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In this sense, in fact, the establishment of STZs under the exempted categories 
of aid remains, in principle, subject to the supervision activity of the 
Commission and to a prior scrutiny which must be carried out before the 
implementation of the related measures. 
Nevertheless, according to Article 108(4) TFEU, the Commission may always 
adopt specific regulations when the Council, pursuant to Article 109 TFEU, has 
previously determined that some categrories of State aid may be exempted 
from the procedural rules above described, including the notification 
requirement. The issue will be further described infra in the section dedicated to 
the review of regional aid in the secondary law with particular reference to the 
content of the General Block Exemption Regulation185. 
3.2.1.5 ECJ case law 
The ECJ has a fundamental role in the interpretation of State aid rules with the 
development of a series of principles that are relevant for the purposes of the 
present study. 
Therefore, the focus must be set on the review of the ECJ case law, with a 
selection limited to the most significant cases where the Court directly 
intervenes on the topic of STZs, outlining the essential boundaries under which 
State aid rules shall be applied. 
As it will be shown below, there are some interesting cases where the Court 
investigates the extent of selectivity in the context of a STZ, being this one of 
the conditions for the recognition of prohibited State aid under the provision of 
Article 107 TFEU.  
In particular, the selectivity is sometimes analyzed as “territorial selectivity” (see 
Juntas Generales, Azores, UGT-Rioja, Gibraltar) with reference to common 
situations where tax benefits are granted to all the entities based in a limited 
area of the Member State, without a differential treatment according to the 
material features of such entities and their activities.  
In other cases, the selectivity is otherwise represented as “material selectivity” 
(Gibraltar and Sardinia), being this a further field of investigation where the 
Court points out the situations where the favouring tax treatment is reserved 
only to entities with some specific material features and not to all the entities 
based in the same zone, working out further criteria through which it is possible 
to detect the selective nature of the related measures. 
Beside such case law dealing with the subject of selectivity, both territorial or 
material, it is worth to remember one more case (Deufil) where the ECJ clarifies 
the perspective from which it is necessary to evaluate territorial tax incentives 
                                                             
185 See infra paragraph 3.2.2.1. 
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under State aid rules, setting the focus on the potential effects of the same 
measures and not on the original aims pursued. 
 
A. The Juntas Generales case 
In the Juntas Generales case (Administración General del Estado v Juntas Generales 
de Guipúzcoa and Diputación Foral de Guipúzcoa)186 the focus must be set on the 
Opinion delivered by Advocate General Saggio187, considering the absence of a 
final decision from the ECJ188.  
In his Opinion, Advocate General Saggio deeply analyzes the requirement of 
territorial selectivity in the context of State aid rules with an assessment 
formulated on a set of tax measures introduced by the Autonomous 
Community of the Spanish Basque Country. 
The case is relevant for the present research since the characteristics of the 
Basque Country clearly correspond to the legal dimension of a STZ; in this 
sense, in fact, the authorities of this territory have regulatory powers in the area 
of direct taxation with an autonomous system of income tax which differs from 
the standard one generally applied in the rest of Spain. 
In details, the Court is here asked to rule on the compatibility, among others, 
between State aid rules and the provincial laws – the so-called “normas forales” - 
adopted by three authorities belonging to the Autonomous Community of the 
Basque Country, containing urgent fiscal measures. These laws establish a 
series of fiscal advantages in relation to corporate and personal income tax and 
in favour of both legal persons and individuals based in this STZ, provided that 
some requirements are fulfilled.  
In this case, the Advocate General Saggio points out the difficulty of 
determining which circumstances, linked to the nature and scheme of the 
system, can justify the difference of treatment which arises from the Basque 
laws in respect of the national legislation in force. According to his opinion, in 
fact, the fiscal autonomy of the Basque Territories does not reflect any 
specificity of the territory in question – in terms of economic conditions such as 
level of employment, production costs, infrastructures, labor cost – which 
                                                             
186 Joined cases C-400/97, C-401/97 and C-402/97 Administración General del Estado v Juntas 
Generales de Guipúzcoa and Diputación Foral de Guipúzcoa, Juntas Generales d'Alava and 
Diputación Foral d'Alava and Juntas Generales de Vizcaya, [2000] ECR I-01073. 
187 Opinion of Advocate General Saggio delivered on 1 July 1999 in Joined cases C-400/97, 
C-401/97 and C-402/97 Administración General del Estado v Juntas Generales de Guipúzcoa 
and Diputación Foral de Guipúzcoa, Juntas Generales d'Alava and Diputación Foral d'Alava 
and Juntas Generales de Vizcaya, ibid. 
188 Since by letters of 8 February 2000, received at the Court Registry on 14 February 2000, 
the Tribunal Superior de Justicia del País Vasco informed the Court that, as a result of the 
discontinuance of the applicant in the cases in the main proceedings, it is withdrawing its 
requests of 30 July 1997 for preliminary rulings. 
62
THE EU LAW FRAMEWORK 
 
would require, indirectly, fiscal treatment different from that in force in the 
reference framework (in this case corresponding to the rest of the Spanish 
territory). In other words, the scheme which results from these provisions 
satisfies only the desire to favour investments in the Basque Territories and to 
improve the competitiveness of the companies. Therefore, the same scheme is 
characterized by the exceptional nature of the measures which derogates from 
the standard tax legislation, being thus not in compliance with Article 107 
TFEU189. 
In summary, in this case, the condition of territorial selectivity, with reference 
to the measures adopted in a STZ, is essentially associated to the circumstance 
that in the area concerned it is not possible to recognize any disadvantaged 
economic situation. In such cases, according to the Opinion of Advocate 
General Saggio, the tax measures cannot be justified and, thus, they have to be 
considered as territorial selective, representing an infringement of State aid 
rules.  
 
B. The Azores case 
More recently, the Court has changed the direction followed in the Juntas 
Generales case, opening the doors to a new flexible approach to territorial 
selectivity within the context of STZs and regional autonomy. In this sense, in 
fact, the Azores case (Portuguese Republic v. Commission190)  focuses on the 
analysis of situations in which an infra-State body, such as a region or a 
municipality, enjoys sufficient institutional, procedural and economic 
autonomy to be able to determine its own tax system, defining the political and 
economic environment in which undertakings operate. 
In the new context, the fulfillment of the conditions of institutional, procedural 
and financial autonomy is sufficient to exclude, in principle, the territorial 
selectivity of a tax measure.  
Azores are characterized by a favouring tax regime for the undertakings based 
therein compared to the standard tax regime applied at the national level in 
                                                             
189 Joined cases C-400/97, C-401/97 and C-402/97 Administración General del Estado v Juntas 
Generales de Guipúzcoa and Diputación Foral de Guipúzcoa, Juntas Generales d'Alava and 
Diputación Foral d'Alava and Juntas Generales de Vizcaya, [2000] ECR I-01073, paragraph 
38. 
190 Case C-88/03 Portugal v Commission, [2006] ECR I-7115. For a comprehensive analysis 
of the case see G. BIZIOLI, L’autonomia finanziaria e tributaria regionale, Giappichelli (ed.), 
Turin, 2012, pp.123-127; G. MELIS, La delega sul federalismo fiscale e la cosiddetta “fiscalità 
di vantaggio”: profili comunitari, in Rassegna Tributaria, 2009, No. 4, pp. 1003 et seq.; A. 
CARINCI, Autonomia impositiva degli enti sub-statali e divieto di aiuti di Stato, in Rassegna 
Tributaria, 2006, No. 5, pp. 1783 et seq.; v FICARI, Aiuti fiscali regionali, selettività e 
“insularità”: dalle Azzorre agli enti locali italiani, in Diritto e pratica tributaria internazionale, 
2007, pp. 319 et seq. 
63
CHAPTER 3 
 
Portugal. For these reasons, they can be considered as a STZ to be reviewed for 
the scope of the present study, being a limited territory where some specific tax 
advantages are granted in favour of enterprises. 
In this case, the Portuguese Republic seeks the annulment of Commission 
Decision 2003/442/EC191 on the part of a new tax scheme adapting the 
national tax system to the specific characteristics of the Autonomous Region of 
the Azores which concerns reductions in the rates of income tax. 
The case is interesting given the fact that the Court – unless the measure taken 
by the government of Azores has been finally considered as selective and not 
general - clearly identifies the conditions under which territorial tax advantages 
- such as those granted to STZs - do not have to be considered selective for the 
purposes of State aid rules192.  
The starting point of the analysis is the legislative measure adopted by the local 
government of the Azores Region193 through which the national tax system has 
been adapted to the region’s specific characteristics, including a section 
concerning reductions in the rates of income tax applied automatically to all 
economic operators.  
According to Portuguese authorities, such tax benefits, which consist in a 
reduction in the rates of income tax, are intended to allow undertakings in the 
Azores to overcome the structural handicaps resulting from their location in an 
insular region in the periphery of the Union.  
In order to determine the selective nature of the measure at issue, the ECJ 
examines whether, within the context of the same legal system, that measure 
constitutes an advantage for certain undertakings in comparison with others 
which are in a comparable legal and factual situation. Thus, the identification of 
the reference framework has a particular importance in this case, since the 
existence of an advantage may be established only when compared with 
standard taxation194. 
Here, for the first time, the Court states that the reference framework does not 
necessary correspond to the entire national territory of the Member State 
concerned. In fact, it is possible that an infra-State body enjoys a legal and 
factual status which makes it sufficiently autonomous in relation to the central 
government of a Member State, with the result that, by the measures it adopts, 
it is that body and not the central government which plays a fundamental role in 
                                                             
191 O.J. 2003, L 150, pp. 52–63. 
192 For a critical review of this approach see P. NICOLAIDES, Developments in Fiscal aid: new 
interpretations and new problems with the concept of selectivity, in European State Aid Law 
Quarterly, 2007, I, pp. 43 et seq. 
193 By Regional Legislative Decree of 20 January 1999, No. 2/99/A, as amended by Regional 
Legislative Decree of 30 December 1999, No. 33/99/A. 
194 Case C-88/03 Portugal v Commission, [2006] ECR I-7115, paragraph 56. 
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the definition of the political and economic environment in which undertakings 
operate. In such a case, it is the area in which the infra-State body exercises its 
powers, and not the country as a whole, that constitutes the relevant context for 
the assessment of whether a measure adopted by such a body favours certain 
undertakings in comparison with others in a comparable legal and factual 
situation195. 
In particular, according to the position of the ECJ, three conditions must be 
fulfilled in order to obtain the requirement of regional autonomy196 under 
which tax benefits introduced therein may not be considered as selective.  
First, from a constitutional point of view, the regional authority needs to have a 
separate political and administrative status from the national government 
(institutional autonomy). 
Second, the measure must be adopted with no central government authorized 
to directly affect the decision (procedural autonomy). 
Finally, the financial consequences of the beneficial treatment given to 
undertakings in the region must not be offset by aid or subsidies from other 
regions or from the central government (economic and financial autonomy).  
In conclusion, according to the above conditions, it is always necessary to verify 
if the region plays a key role in the definition of a “political and economic 
environment” not constrained by decisions taken by the general economic policy 
of the Member State197. 
In other words, the regional authority must assume the responsibility for the 
political and financial consequences of the tax reduction measures 
implemented.  
On these premises, the Court finally states that in this case the decision of the 
government of the Autonomous Region of the Azores to exercise its power to 
reduce the rates of national tax on revenue has not been adopted in accordance 
with all the conditions set out above. 
In this regard, the Court observes that, under the Constitution of the 
Portuguese Republic, the Azores form an autonomous region with its own 
political and administrative status and its own self-government institutions 
which have the power to exercise their own fiscal competence and adapt 
national fiscal provisions to regional specificities198. 
Nevertheless, as far as the condition of economic autonomy is concerned, it 
must be observed that, in the context of the adaptation of the national tax 
system to regional specificities, the constitutional principle of national 
solidarity is stated to mean that the central State contributes, with the 
                                                             
195 Ibid., paragraph 58. 
196 Ibid., paragraph 67. 
197 Ibid., paragraph 58. 
198 Ibid., paragraph 70. 
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autonomous regional authorities, to the achievement of economic development 
and the correction of inequalities deriving from insularity and to economic and 
social convergence with the rest of the national territory. Thus, the application 
of that principle of solidarity provided by the Portuguese Constitution gives 
rise to a duty incumbent on both the central and regional authorities to 
promote the correction of inequalities arising from insularity by reducing the 
local tax burden and by an obligation to ensure an appropriate level of public 
services and private activities. Therefore, although the reduction in tax revenue 
for the Azores region is clearly aimed to the correction of inequalities in 
economic development, such measure is in any event offset by a financing 
mechanism which is centrally managed in the form of budgetary transfers199. 
Accordingly, because of the lack of the third condition of economic and 
financial autonomy, the relevant legal framework for determining the 
selectivity of the tax measures adopted by the local government cannot be 
defined exclusively within the geographical limits of the Azores region. Given 
the above, the Court concludes that those measures must be assessed in relation 
to the whole of the Portuguese territory, in the context of which they appear to 
be selective. 
In conclusion, the Azores case represents a fundamental point of reference for 
understanding the approach of the EU institutions in the application of State 
aid rules to the phenomenon of STZs. In this sense, in fact, this case offers a 
comprehensive view from the ECJ concerning the requirement of selectivity, 
with the identification of the various conditions under which a territorial tax 
measure shall be scrutinized with respect to its reference framework.  
 
C. The UGT-Rioja case 
In the case Unión General de Trabajadores de La Rioja (UGT-Rioja) and Others v. 
Juntas Generales del Territorio Histórico de Vizcaya and Others200 the Court 
confirms the position previously held in Portuguese Republic v. Commission and 
specifies that the conditions of institutional autonomy, procedural autonomy 
and economic and financial autonomy are the only conditions which must be 
satisfied for the territory of an infra-State body in order to be the relevant 
framework for assessing the selective nature of a tax measure. 
In this case, the actions for annulment brought in the main proceedings concern 
a provision contained in the so-called “normas forales”of the Juntas Generales de 
Vizcaya (i.e. one of the three provinces forming part of the Autonomous 
Community of the Basque Country) which sets a corporate tax rate at 32,5% 
                                                             
199 Ibid., paragraph 75. 
200 Joined cases C-428/06 to C-434/06 Unión General de Trabajadores de La Rioja (UGT-
Rioja) and Others v Juntas Generales del Territorio Histórico de Vizcaya and Others, [2008] I-
06747. 
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which is under the standard national rate of 35% and introduces a new 
deduction for investments not provided under Spanish tax law. For this reason, 
the issue of this case assumes a direct relevance in the context of the review, 
since it deals with an evident example of a territorial tax advantage granted in 
the form of a rate reduction for corporate income tax; in other words, the tax 
advantage under the scrutiny of the ECJ, being reserved to the entities 
established in a limited area of the Spanish territory,  is able to qualify the entire 
territory of the Autonomous Community of the Basque Country as a STZ for 
the scope of the present research. 
In details, the national court refers a question on the interpretation of Article 
107(1) TFEU to the ECJ, asking whether tax legislation which is adopted with a 
general application and which does not confer an advantage on certain 
undertakings or the production of certain goods, is to be regarded as “selective” 
and subject to the provisions of State aid rules, solely on the ground of the fact 
that the effects of that legislation are exclusively limited to the territorial 
jurisdiction of an infra-State authority with autonomy in tax matters. 
It is evident that, even in this case, the point under the scrutiny of the ECJ is 
strictly connected with the topic of STZs, considering that the application of 
State aid rules to such zones always involves the identification of the 
geographical reference framework for the purposes of the verification of the 
selectivity requirement. 
On these bases, the Court identifies the infra-State body to be taken as the 
reference framework, considering that the Autonomous Community of the 
Basque Country is made up of three provinces: Alava, Vizcaya and Guipuzcoa. 
The boundaries of those provinces coincide with those of the Historical 
Territories, bodies which enjoy rights of ancient origin called “fueros”, entitling 
them to levy and collect tax. According to the Court, it is both to the Historical 
Territories and to the Autonomous Community of the Basque Country that 
reference must be made for the purpose of determining whether the infra-State 
body made of those Historical Territories and that Community enjoy sufficient 
autonomy to constitute the reference framework in the light of which the 
selectivity of a measure should be assessed201. 
In particular, for what concerns the first condition of institutional autonomy, 
the Court states that infra-State bodies, such as the Historical Territories and 
the Autonomous Community of the Basque Country – to be considered as a 
STZ for the purposes of the present study - fully satisfy the institutional 
autonomy criterion considering their political and administrative status which 
is distinct from that of the central government202.  
                                                             
201 Ibid., paragraph 75. 
202 Ibid., paragraph 87. 
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Then, for what regards the procedural autonomy, the Court states that, 
according to provisions of the Economic Agreement between the Autonomous 
Community of the Basque Country and the Kingdom of Spain adopted by 
Law No. 12/2002203, a committee set by the central government may examine 
draft local laws (normas forales) in the area of taxation and seek, by negotiation, 
to eliminate any divergences between those draft laws and the tax legislation 
applicable in the rest of the Spanish territory. However, considering that, in the 
absence of an agreement within the committee, the central government is not 
able to impose the adoption of laws with a particular content, the committee 
merely represents a consultation and conciliation body rather than a 
mechanism by which the central government could impose its own decision. 
Thus, in this case, the central government is not able to directly intervene in the 
process of adopting local laws (normas forales) and, consequently, the 
procedural criterion seems to be fully fulfilled204. 
In the same case, the ECJ also analyzes the third criterion of financial autonomy 
making a further step towards a clear interpretation of the conditions under 
which a tax measure introduced in a STZ may not be considered as territorial 
selective. In this regard, according to the Advocate General Kokott, the mere 
fact that it appears from a general examination of the financial relations 
between the central State and its infra-State bodies that there are financial 
transfers between the former and the latter, cannot, in itself, suffice to 
demonstrate that those bodies do not assume the financial consequences of the 
tax measures which they adopt and, accordingly, that they do not enjoy 
financial autonomy, since such transfers may take place for reasons 
unconnected with the tax measures. Consequently, it is necessary to examine 
whether the local laws adopted by the Historical Territories may result in 
hidden compensation in sectors such as social security or in the functioning of 
an inter-territorial compensation fund205. 
Nevertheless, the Court concludes stating that it is reserved to the national 
court, which alone has jurisdiction to identify the national law applicable and to 
interpret it, to determine whether the Historical Territories and the 
Autonomous Community of the Basque Country have such autonomy, which, 
if so, would have the result that the laws adopted within the limits of the areas 
of competence granted to those infra-State bodies by the Constitution and the 
other provisions of Spanish law are not of a selective nature within the meaning 
of the concept of State aid as referred to in Article 107 (1) TFEU206. 
                                                             
203 Ley 12/2002, de 23 de mayo, por la que se aprueba el Concierto Económico con la Comunidad 
Autónoma del País Vasco, O.J. of Spain No. 124 of 24 May 2002, pp. 18617-18636. 
204 Ibid., paragraph 108. 
205 Ibid., paragraph 137. 
206 Ibid., paragraph 144. 
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Therefore, in this case, the reasoning of the ECJ assumes an important 
relevance in the context of the present study, as it clearly defines the conditions 
of the institutional, procedural and financial autonomy, opening an 
interpretative approach to Art. 107(1) TFEU which is able to influence the 
phenomenon of STZs. 
 
D. The Gibraltar case 
The issue of territorial selectivity with reference to a tax measure is further 
analyzed in the Gibraltar case (Commission and Spain v. Government of Gibraltar 
and United Kingdom207).  
The case deals with a Commission decision finding that some new tax measures 
introduced in Gibraltar constitute State aid because of a system of corporate 
taxation under which companies in Gibraltar are taxed, in general, at a lower 
rate than those in the United Kingdom. Therefore, the favouring tax treatment 
reserved to the companies based in this territory - and, in particular, the lower 
rate for the corporate income tax compared to the standard one applied in the 
United Kingdom - constitutes the key aspect which is able to qualify Gibraltar 
as a STZ for the purposes of the present research. 
In contrast with the Commission, the General Court here states that the 
applicable reference framework corresponds exclusively to the geographical 
limits of the territory of Gibraltar, which means that no comparison can be 
made between the tax regime applicable to companies established in Gibraltar 
and that applicable to companies established in the United Kingdom.  
In this case, the requirement of institutional autonomy is easily presumed by the 
General Court208, while the procedural autonomy is identified by the fact that 
no United Kingdom law in respect of tax matters has ever been applied to 
Gibraltar209. Finally, for what concerns the financial autonomy, the General 
Court states that the United Kingdom’s financial assistance to Gibraltar is only 
linked to specific circumstances and has no causal link with the tax reform210. 
The same case offers the opportunity to analyse the position taken by the ECJ 
with reference to the different aspect of material selectivity, namely a situation 
where the favouring tax treatment is reserved only to entities with some specific 
material features and not to all the entities based in a STZ. Following the appeal 
against the judgement of first instance, in fact, the Commission stresses again 
the fact that the tax measures introduced by the tax reform in Gibraltar are able 
to favour only off-shore companies without any real economic activity carried 
                                                             
207 Joined Cases T-211/04 to T-215/04 Commission and Spain v Government of Gibraltar and 
United Kingdom, [2008] II-03745. 
208 Ibid., paragraph 89. 
209 Ibid., paragraph 99. 
210 Ibid., paragraph 107. 
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out in the same territory. In this regard, the Grand Chamber of the ECJ finally 
states that, in this case, offshore companies avoid taxation precisely on account 
of their specific features and, thus, the proposed tax reform is materially 
selective in that it confers selective advantages on off-shore companies211. 
In summary, while territorial selectivity cannot be recognized in the present 
case under the reasoning of the ECJ – since only the territory of Gibraltar has to 
be considered as the reference framework for the assessment of the related tax 
measures – on the contrary, as far as the focus is set on material selectivity, the 
ECJ finally concludes that such tax advantages are able to favour only off-shore 
companies and not all business entities based in that territory. Therefore, the 
same tax advantages cannot be considered as a general measure within 
Gibraltar, but they assume a material selective nature since they favour only 
certain undertakings based in that territory212. 
 
E. The Sardinia case 
The issue of material selectivity is further analysed in the Sardinia case 
(Presidente del Consiglio dei Ministri v. Regione Sardegna213) with more elements 
able to clarify the position of the ECJ. 
The judgment refers to a preliminary ruling on the interpretation of Article 107 
TFEU in the context of a proceedings between the President of the Italian 
Council of Ministers and the Region of Sardinia regarding the establishment by 
that region of a tax on stopovers for tourist purposes by aircraft used for the 
private transportation of persons, or by recreational craft, to be imposed only 
on operators whose tax domicile is outside the territory of that region.  
The referring court asks whether Article 107 TFEU must be interpreted as 
meaning that tax legislation, adopted by a regional authority, which establishes 
a regional tax on stopovers, such as those provided for under Article 4 of 
Regional Law of 11 May 2006, No. 4214, to be imposed only on operators 
whose tax domicile is outside the territory of the region, constitutes a State aid 
measure in favour of undertakings established in that territory.  
                                                             
211 Case C-106/09 P & C-107/09 P Commission and Spain v Government of Gibraltar and 
United Kingdom, [2011] I-11113, paragraph 184. For a deep analysis of the case see R. 
LUJA, The selectivity test: the concept of sectorial aid, in A. RUST, C. MICHEAU, State Aid and 
Tax Law, Wolters Kluwer International, The Hague, 2013, pp. 110-112, where the author 
criticizes the conclusions of the ECJ because of the lack of a benchmark test in the 
evaluation of the selective nature of the tax regime for off-shore companies. 
212 For the last developments of the ECJ case law regarding material selectivity see also 
Joined cases C-20/15 P and C-21/15 P Commission v World Duty Free Group SA, formerly 
Autogrill España SA, Banco Santander SA, Santusa Holding SL, [2016] ECR I-0000. 
213 Case C-169/08 Presidente del Consiglio dei Ministri v Regione Sardegna, [2009] I-10821. 
214 O.J. of Region of Sardinia 2006, No. 15. 
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The Court here states that, in the light of the nature and objectives of that tax, 
all the natural and legal persons who receive stopover services in Sardinia are in 
an objectively comparable situation, irrespective of their place of residence or 
the place where they are established. Consequently, the measure cannot be 
regarded as general, since it does not apply to all operators of aircraft or 
pleasure boats which make a stopover in Sardinia and, thus, such measure is 
material selective representing a State aid in favour of specific undertakings 
established in Sardinia215. 
In this case, the assessment of comparability between natural and legal persons 
who receive stopover services in Sardinia assumes a fundamental relevance for 
the final judgement about the compliance of such tax measure with State aid 
rules. In this sense, according to the position held by the ECJ, the measure 
cannot be considered as general in its reference framework (Sardinia) since it 
assumes a material selective nature as far as it is targeted to favour only 
operators with a domicile in the territory of that region. 
The reasoning of the ECJ directly influences the same approach to STZs; in this 
regard, in fact, it is evident that territorial tax incentives must always be 
designed as general measures for all the entities in a comparable situation which 
are based in the territory of a STZ, without assuming a material selective nature 
in the terms above described. 
 
F. The Deufil case 
In the case Deufil GmbH & Co. KG v. Commission216 the ECJ evaluates the 
introduction of investment subsidies aimed at promoting the economic 
development of the Bergkamen area in Germany where, according to the 
claimant, the standard of living is abnormally low because of a serious 
unemployment.  
The case is interesting for the purposes of STZs since it deals with an initiative 
clearly aimed at the introduction of a set of incentives for a limited territory of a 
Member State, involving the criteria under which investment subsidies may be 
granted in consideration of the level of development of the area. 
The Court stresses again the principle under which the Commission has a 
discretion involving economic and social assessments to be made in the EU 
                                                             
215 Case C-169/08 Presidente del Consiglio dei Ministri v Regione Sardegna, [2009] I-10821, 
paragraph 63. For a comprehensive review of the case see R. LUJA, Revisiting the balance 
between aid, selectivity and selective aid in respect of taxes and special levies, in European State 
Aid Law Quarterly, 2010, No. 1, pp. 161-168, where the author focuses on the 
comparability analysis related to selectivity and on the identification of the proper 
benchmark by looking at the nature and structure of tax system as a whole. 
216 Case C-310/85 Deufil GmbH & Co. KG v Commission, [1987] 00901. 
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context217. In this case, according to the ECJ, the Commission does not exceed 
the limits of its discretion by considering an aid for investments - which 
increases production capacity in a sector where there is already considerable 
overproduction - as contrary to the common interest218.  
Apart from the statements on the extent of the Commission competence, the 
same case offers further elements of analysis, considering that the Court here 
specifies that Article 107 TFEU does not distinguish between the measures of 
State intervention concerned by reference to their causes or their aims but 
defines them in relation to their effects219. In other words, the general 
objectives pursued by the Member State with reference to the territorial 
benefits introduced in an area are not in themselves sufficient to put them 
outside the scope of Article 107 TFEU220. Accordingly, measures that fulfill the 
criteria of State aid do not fall outside the scope of Article 107(1) TFEU merely 
because they might seek to achieve some other social or economic objectives221. 
The position here held by the ECJ clearly influences the approach to the 
phenomenon of STZs in the EU context. In particular, it finally recognizes that 
the judgement on such initiatives under State aid rules cannot be limited to the 
original aims and the social and economic objectives pursed by the tax measures 
adopted in a STZ; therefore, it is always necessary to carry out an evaluation 
focused on the potential effects of territorial tax incentives, paying attention to 
a set of economic indicators able to influence the internal market and the trade 
between Member States. 
In summary, on the ground of the above case law, it is evident that the ECJ has a 
fundamental role in the interpretation of State aid rules with reference to the 
phenomenon of STZs; the positions held by the ECJ, in fact, - especially for 
217 See also Case C-169/95 Spain v Commission, [1997] I-00135 where it is clearly expressed 
the principle according to which the Courts, “when examining the lawfulness of the exercise 
of such freedom, cannot substitute their own assessment of the matter for that of the competent 
authority but must restrict themselves to examining whether the assessment of the competent 
authority contains a manifest error or constitutes a misuse of power”. 
218 Case C-310/85 Deufil GmbH & Co. KG v Commission, [1987] 00901, paragraph 18. 
219 Case C-173/73 Italy v Commission, [1974] ECR 709, paragraph 13; Case C-241/94 
France v Commission, [1996] ECR I-4551, paragraph 20; Case C-75/97 Belgium v 
Commission, [1999] ECR I-3671, paragraph 20. 
220 The same principle is expressed in the Joined Cases C-278/92, C-279/92 and C-280/92 
Kingdom of Spain v Commission, [1994] I-04103, where the Court states that, “as regards 
the application of Article 92(3) of the Treaty, the Commission enjoys a wide discretion, the 
exercise of which involves assessment of an economic and social nature which must be made 
within a Community context”. 
221 Case C-487/06 British Aggregates Association v Commission, [2008] ECR I-10515, 
paragraph 84. 
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what concerns the requirement of selectivity – provide the essential coordinates 
for the initiatives aimed at the establishment of a STZ, better defining the limits 
of their legitimacy in the context of the present study. 
3.2.2 Regional aid in secondary law 
3.2.2.1 General Block Exemption Regulation 
The framework of State aid rules that are relevant for the purposes of the 
present research is completed by the secondary legislation developed on the 
ground of Article 109 TFEU according to which the Council may enact 
regulations for the application of Articles 107 and 108 TFEU at its own 
political discretion222. Under this rule, the Council has adopted Regulation 
(EC) No. 994/98223, replaced by Regulation (EU) No. 1588/2015224, allowing 
the Commission to exempt from the notification not only aid for small and 
medium-sized enterprises, research and development, aid concerning the 
environment, employment and training, but also investment aid and operating 
aid in compliance with the map for regional aid approved by the Commission 
for each Member State. Accordingly, the Commission has declared certain 
categories of aid compatible with the internal market, enacting Regulation (EU) 
No. 651/2014225 (the so-called “General Block Exemption Regulation”), 
amended by Regulation (EU) No. 1084/2017226. 
Under this Regulation, regional investment aid measures are considered as 
compatible with the internal market within the meaning of Article 107(3) 
                                                             
222 See L. DEL FEDERICO, Introduzione allo studio della finanza pubblica per le aree colpite da 
calamità, in M. BASILAVECCHIA - L. DEL FEDERICO – A. PACE – C. VERRIGNI,  op. cit., 
Giappichelli (ed.), Turin, 2016, pp. 16-18. 
223 Council Regulation (EC) No. 994/98 of 7 May 1998 on the application of Articles 92 and 
93 (now 87 and 88 respectively) of the Treaty establishing the European Community to 
certain categories of horizontal State aid, O.J. 1998, L 142, pp. 1-4. 
224 Council Regulation (EU) No. 1588/2015 of 13 July 2015 on the application of Articles 
107 and 108 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to certain 
categories of horizontal State aid, O.J. 2015, L 248, pp. 1-8, which replaces as of 14 
October 2015 Council Regulation (EC) No. 994/98 of 7 May 1998. 
225 Commission Regulation (EU) No. 651/2014 of 17 June 2014 declaring certain categories 
of aid compatible with the internal market in application of Article 107 and 108 of the 
Treaty, O.J. 2014, L 187, pp. 1-78. 
226 Commission Regulation (EU) No. 1084/2017 of 14 June 2017, amending Commission 
Regulation (EU) No. 651/2014 of 17 June 2014, as regards aid for port and airport 
infrastructure, notification thresholds for aid for culture and heritage conservation and 
for aid for sport and multifunctional recreational infrastructures, and regional operating 
aid schemes for outermost regions and amending Regulation (EU) No. 702/2014 as 
regards the calculation of eligible costs, O.J. 2017, L 156, pp. 1-18. 
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TFEU and are exempted from the notification requirement of Article 108(3) 
TFEU227, provided that a set of conditions are fulfilled concerning the eligible 
costs in tangible and intangible assets and the estimated wage costs arising from 
job creation as a result of an initial investment228. 
In any case, the aid intensity in gross grant equivalent shall not exceed the 
maximum aid intensity established in the regional aid map which is in force at 
the time the aid is granted in the area concerned229.  
The General Block Exemption Regulation also provides that operating aid 
schemes in outermost regions, sparsely populated areas, and very sparsely 
populated areas are compatible with the internal market within the meaning of 
Article 107(3) TFEU and are exempted from the notification requirement of 
Article 108(3) TFEU, as far as some specific conditions are fulfilled230. 
In particular, for what regards sparsely populated areas, the regional operating 
aid schemes must compensate for the additional transport costs of goods which 
have been produced in areas eligible for operating aid, as well as additional 
transport costs of goods that are further processed in those areas231. 
Otherwise, in outermost regions, the operating aid schemes must compensate 
for the additional operating costs incurred in those regions as a direct result of 
one or several of the permanent handicaps referred to in Article 349 TFEU, 
provided that the annual aid amount per beneficiary under all operating aid 
schemes implemented under this Regulation does not exceed a certain 
percentage232. 
Given the above, the General Block Exemption Regulation offers an interesting 
support for the initiatives aimed at the establishment of a STZ; in this sense, in 
fact, the introduction of territorial tax incentives – in the form of investment 
and operating aid – can be exempted from the notification obligation, provided 
that the same measures are granted in compliance with a series of conditions 
and according to the regional aid map approved by the Commission for each 
Member State. 
3.2.2.2 De minimis Regulation 
In quantitative terms, the rule of Article 107 TFEU represents a “de minimis 
rule” in the sense that State aid below certain thresholds of intensity cannot 
negatively influence EU trade. In this regard, the regulatory framework is 
                                                             
227 Commission Regulation (EU) No. 651/2014 of 17 June 2014, Art. 14(1). 
228 Ibid., Art. 14(4). 
229 Ibid., Art. 14(12). 
230 Ibid., Art. 15(1). 
231 Ibid., Art. 15(2). 
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represented by the Commission Regulation (EU) No. 1407/2013233 (also 
defined as “de minimis Regulation”), adopted on the basis of Council Regulation 
(EC) No. 994/1998234. The Regulation provides an exemption from the 
notification requirement, provided that the measure is in compliance with 
specific conditions, such as the total amount of the aid (not exceeding EUR 
200.000 for each enterprise over a period of three fiscal years), the method of 
calculation and the methods of control235. 
In this regard, the de minimis Regulation only applies to transparent aid, namely 
aid in respect of which it is possible to calculate precisely the gross equivalent of 
the aid ex ante without any need to undertake a risk assessment236. 
On these bases, the de minimis Regulation can assume a specific relevance for 
allowing the establishment of a STZ under State aid rules; in this sense, the 
introduction of a set of tax incentives in a limited territory assumes a legitimate 
form under State aid rules as far as the related thresholds – in terms of gross 
equivalent of the aid – do not exceed the same limits set by the de minimis 
Regulation, corresponding to EUR 200.000 for each enterprise in a period of 
three fiscal years. 
3.2.2.3 The EU cohesion policy: guidelines on regional aid 
In the context of secondary law, the Commission has also been able to develop 
its own vision of “good” State aid policy with reference to all the other 
measures not covered by the General Block Exemption Regulation or by the de 
minimis Regulation. 
As already seen, Regional aid, as defined under Article 107(3)(a) and (c) TFEU, 
represent an exception to the general State aid prohibition, considering that the 
distortion of competition resulting from their application is justified in 
                                                             
233 Commission Regulation (EU) No. 1407/2013 of 18 December 2013 on the application 
of Articles 107 and 108 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to de 
minimis aid, O.J. 2013, L 352, pp. 1-8 (replacing Commission Regulation (EC) 
No. 1998/2006 of 15 December 2006 on the application of Articles 87 and 88 of the 
Treaty to de minimis aid, O.J. 2006, L 379, pp. 5-10). 
234 Council Regulation (EC) No. 994/98 of 7 May 1998 on the application of Articles 92 and 
93 of the Treaty establishing the European Community to certain categories of 
horizontal State aid, O.J. 1998, L 142, pp. 1–4, replaced by Council Regulation (EU) No. 
1588/2015 of 13 July 2015 on the application of Articles 107 and 108 of the Treaty on 
the Functioning of the European Union to certain categories of horizontal State aid, O.J. 
2015, L 248, pp. 1-8. 
235 Commission Regulation (EU) No. 1407/2013 of 18 December 2013 on the application 
of Articles 107 and 108 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to de 
minimis ad, O.J. 2013, L 352, pp. 1-8; C. FONTANA, op. cit., G. Giappichelli (ed.), Turin, 
2012, pp. 196 et seq. 
236 Ibid., Art. 4(1). 
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presence of certain conditions. The first condition is based on the exceptional 
nature of regional aid; pursuant to the provision of Article 107(3)(a) TFEU, in 
fact, State aid may be declared acceptable by the Commission when the rules in 
question are settled to promote the economic development of areas where the 
standard of living is abnormally low or where there is serious unemployment. 
Furthermore, according to Article 107(3)(c) TFEU, State aid may also be 
declared acceptable when they facilitate the development of certain economic 
areas without adversely affecting trade between Member States to an extent 
contrary to the common interest.  
On these bases, the Commission sets its focus on the harmonization of national 
policies through a soft law approach in the context of the EU cohesion policy, 
with the definition of a common framework of non-binding rules for the 
interpretation of the exemptions provided under Article 107(3)(a) and (c) 
TFEU237. 
The first step is the adoption of the guidelines on regional aid covering the 
period 2000-2006238, then replaced by new guidelines for the period 2007-
2013239. 
A review process is launched in 2010 to adapt the same guidelines to the overall 
reduction in regional disparities in the EU over the last years, to the effects of 
the economic crisis and to the objectives of State aid modernization in the 
context of EU cohesion policy240.  
On these bases, the Commission has adopted new guidelines for the period 
2014 - 2020241 highlighting the basic criteria under which Member States may 
grant aid to companies in order to support the development of disadvantaged 
regions in the Union. 
The new document also involves the study and the development of the fiscal 
policies related to regional aid, offering an important point of reference for the 
definition of the legal framework of STZs. 
These guidelines are part of a broader strategy aimed at the modernization of 
State aid control, through the use of more effective aid measures targeted to 
cases with the most relevant impact on competition. 
237 For an interesting deepening of the concept of “Regional aid” see E. TRAVERSA, The 
selectivity test:: the concept of Regional Aid”, in A. RUST, C. MICHEAU, State Aid and Tax Law, 
Wolters Kluwer International, Alphen aan den Rijn, 2013, pp. 119 et seq. 
238 Communication from the Commission - Guidelines on national regional aid, O.J. 1998, 
C 74, pp. 9-18. 
239 Communication from the Commission - Guidelines on national regional aid for 2007-
2013, O.J. 2006, C 54, pp. 13-44. 
240 See also F.G. WISHLADE, Regional state aid and competition policy in the European Union, 
Kluwer Law International, The Hague, 2003. 
241 Communication from the Commission - Guidelines on regional State aid for 2014-2020, 
O.J. 2013, C 209, pp. 1-45.  
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According to the Commission242, the primary objective of State aid control in 
the field of regional aid is to ensure a level playing field between Member 
States, promoting the implementation of various measures in accordance with 
regional development strategies defined in the context of the European 
Regional Development Fund (ERDF), the European Social Fund, the Cohesion 
Fund, the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development or the European 
Maritime and Fisheries Fund. 
In these guidelines, the Commission sets out the conditions under which 
regional aid may be considered compatible with the internal market under the 
system of exemptions defined by Article 107(3)(a) and (c) TFEU. 
In detail, an aid measure is considered compatible with EU law only if it satisfies 
each of the following criteria:  
(a)  contribution to a well-defined objective of common interest: a State aid 
measure must be aimed at an objective of common interest in accordance 
with Article 107(3) TFEU;  
(b)  need for state intervention: a State aid measure must be targeted towards a 
situation where aid can lead to a material improvement that the market 
cannot deliver itself, for example by remedying a market failure;  
(c)  appropriateness of the aid measure: the proposed aid measure must be an 
appropriate policy instrument to address the objective of common interest;   
(d)  incentive effect: the aid must change the behavior of the undertaking 
concerned supporting an additional activity which would not be carried 
out without the aid or would be carried out in a restricted or different 
manner or location;  
(e)  proportionality of the aid (aid to the minimum): the aid amount must be 
limited to the minimum necessary to induce the additional investment or 
activity in the area concerned;  
(f)  avoidance of undue negative effects on competition and trade between 
Member States: the negative effects of aid must be sufficiently limited, so 
that the overall balance of the measure is positive;  
(g)  transparency of the aid: Member States, the Commission, economic 
operators and the public must have easy access to all relevant acts and to 
pertinent information about the aid awarded.  
Moreover, in the same guidelines, the Commission establishes the criteria for 
identifying the areas that fulfill the conditions of Article 107(3) (a) and (c) 
TFEU. Accordingly, Member States can designate the areas that fulfill these 
conditions as “A” or “C” areas; the resulting regional aid map must be notified 
and approved by the Commission before regional aid can be awarded to 
undertakings located in the same areas. 
                                                             
242 Ibid., paragraph 3. 
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In this regard, the Commission considers that the combined population of “A” 
and “C” areas in the Union must be lower than that of the non-designated areas; 
thus, the total coverage of those designated areas must be less than 50% of the 
EU population. 
In detail, the Commission considers that the conditions of Article 107(3)(a) 
TFEU are fulfilled in NUTS 2243 regions that have a gross domestic product 
(GDP) per capital below or equal to 75 % of the Union’s average. Accordingly, a 
Member State may designate the following areas as “A” areas:  
(a)  NUTS 2 regions whose GDP per capital in purchasing power standards 
(PPS) is below or equal to 75 % of the EU average (based on the average of 
the last three years for which Eurostat data are available);  
(b)  the outermost regions. 
Then, the Commission identifies two categories of “C” areas: 
(a)  areas that fulfill certain pre-established conditions and that a Member 
State may therefore designate as “C” areas without any further justification 
(predefined “C” areas)244;  
(b)  areas that a Member State may, at its own discretion, designate as “C” 
areas, provided that the Member State demonstrates that such areas fulfill 
certain socioeconomic criteria (non-predefined “C” areas)245. 
243 The current NUTS 2013 classification is valid from 1 January 2015 and lists 98 regions at 
NUTS 1 (major socio-economic regions), 276 regions at NUTS 2 (basic regions for the 
application of regional policies) and 1342 regions at NUTS 3 level (small regions for 
specific diagnoses). The NUTS classification (Nomenclature of territorial units for 
statistics) is a hierarchical system for dividing up the economic territory of the EU for the 
purpose of the collection, development and harmonisation of European regional 
statistics (available at   http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/nuts/overview). 
244 There are two sub-categories of predefined Article 107(3)(c) areas: former Article 
107(3)(a) areas and sparsely populated areas. The former are NUTS II regions that are 
designated as (a) areas during the period 2011-2013 but which no longer fall within that 
category. The latter are NUTS II regions with less than 8 inhabitants per km2 or NUTS 
III regions with less than 12,5 inhabitants per km2. 
245 A Member State may designate non-predefined Article 107(3)(c) areas on the basis of a 
number of criteria: Criterion 1: contiguous areas of at least 100.000 inhabitants located 
in NUTS 2 or NUTS 3 regions that have: (i) a GDP below or equal to the EU-28 average, 
or (ii) an unemployment rate above or equal to 115% of the national average. Criterion 2: 
NUTS 3 regions of less than 100.000 inhabitants that have: (i) a GDP below or equal to 
the EU-28 average, or (ii) an unemployment rate above or equal to 115% of the national 
average. Criterion 3: islands or contiguous areas characterised by similar geographical 
isolation (for example, peninsulas or mountain areas) that have: (i) a GDP below or equal 
to the EU-28 average, or (ii) an unemployment rate above or equal to 115% of the 
national average, or (iii) less than 5.000 inhabitants. Criterion 4: NUTS 3 regions, or 
parts of NUTS 3 regions that form contiguous areas, that are adjacent to an ‘a’ area or 
that share a land border with a country outside the EEA or the European Free Trade 
Association (EFTA). Criterion 5: contiguous areas of at least 50.000 inhabitants that are 
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According to the same guidelines, regional aid aimed at reducing the current 
expenses of an undertaking constitute operating aid and are not to be regarded 
as compatible with the internal market. Nevertheless, such aid may be 
considered compatible if it is aimed at tackling specific or permanent handicaps 
faced by undertakings in disadvantaged areas falling within the scope of Article 
107(3)(a) TFEU, or to compensate for additional costs to carry out an 
economic activity in an outermost region or to prevent or reduce depopulation 
in very sparsely populated areas. 
Given the above, the guidelines of the Commission assume a primary role in 
the review of the legal framework of STZs; in this sense, in fact, they define not 
only the conditions for considering a measure compatible with the internal 
market, but also the criteria for identifying the eligible areas under Article 
107(3)(a) and (c) TFEU . 
In this regard, the establishment of STZs is clearly influenced by the regional 
aid map and the identification of the “A” and “C” areas, especially when the 
related tax benefits are introduced to support the development of the most 
disadvantaged areas of the Union in accordance with the objectives set by 
Article 107(3)(a) and (c) TFEU. 
As it will be shown in the next Chapter 4, Urban Tax-Free Zones in Italy offer 
an interesting example regarding the application of the guidelines to STZs; in 
that case, in fact, the Commission identifies the tax benefits there granted as 
measures falling within the exception provided by Article 107(3)(c) TFEU (aid 
of social and economic policy), considering them proportionate to the 
objectives pursued and, therefore, not able to distort competition and trade 
between Member States246. 
3.2.2.4 Communications from the Commission on notified regional aid 
schemes 
For the purposes of the present research, it is also necessary to approach the 
study of the various communications issued by the Commission with reference 
to the evaluation process of the regional aid schemes notified by the Member 
States pursuant to Art. 108 TFEU. 
In fact, when an initiative is not covered by the General Block Exemption 
Regulation or by the de minimis Regulation, the Member State concerned must 
notify the relevant tax scheme to the Commission in order to allow a prior 
                                                                                                                                               
undergoing major structural change or are in serious relative decline, provided that such 
areas are not located in NUTS 3 regions or contiguous areas that fulfil the conditions to 
be designated as predefined areas or under Criteria 1 to 4. 
246 Communication from the Commission of 28 October 2009, COM (2009) No. 8126 
final. 
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assessment based on the criteria set by Art. 107(3) TFEU (according to the 
principles of the guidelines on regional aid). 
The communications from the Commission, any time they authorize the 
introduction of a tax scheme in the context of a STZ, assume a fundamental 
relevance, offering a view on the practical implementation of the principles set 
within the Guidelines on regional aid and contributing to clarify the approach 
of the Commission to the phenomenon of STZs. 
In particular, according to the general structure of these communications, the 
assessment of the Commission is first focused on the existence of the aid with 
the identification of the conditions required under Article 107(1) TFEU. Then, 
under this methodology, the second step is generally aimed at verifying the 
compatibility of the measure with reference to the necessity and 
proportionality, the avoidance of undue negative effects on competition, and 
the transparency247. 
This material will be reviewed in detail in the next Chapter 4 where each STZ 
established under Article 107(3) TFEU is scrutinized not only with reference to 
the set of tax incentives there provided, but also with reference to the content of 
the specific authorization issued by the Commission.  
3.2.3 Social Services of General Interest in the TFEU 
3.2.3.1 General aspects 
In the context of the present study, the review of the EU legal framework and 
the selection of the relevant sources must be driven according to the object of 
the research questions which includes, under the scope of research question No. 
2, the development of a new model of STZs based on the introduction of tax 
incentives of a social character. 
Accordingly, as far as State aid law is concerned, the so-called Social Services of 
General Interest (SSGIs) assume a fundamental role for the purposes of this 
research, considering the possible introduction of tax incentives of a social 
character for the undertakings involved in the provision of such services within 
the perimeter of a STZ. 
SSGIs, in fact, cover a wide set of services which are aimed at countering 
possible market failures and enhancing citizens’ protection, in particular for 
disadvantaged groups of people. The  pursued  objective  is  mainly  to  improve  
citizens’  welfare  by  providing accessible  services; in this sense, SSGIs are 
generally aimed at achieving high  levels of employment,  high  levels  of  human  
247 For a recent example of this methodology in the assessment of a tax measure see 
Communication from the Commission of 6 April 2018 (State aid No. 48571), COM 
(2018) No. 1661 final, O.J. 2018, C 180, pp. 1-8. 
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health  protection,  social  and  territorial cohesion, etc. 
Therefore, EU rules for SSGIs, including the case law of the ECJ and the soft 
law instruments developed by the Commission, represent an important field of 
investigation, as they are able to set a bridge between STZs and tax incentives 
of a social character in the context of State aid law.  
The result is the definition of a wider framework for the possible 
implementation of social tax incentives in the context of STZs, with the outline 
of a fundamental background for the development of a new model of STZs 
within the scope of research question No. 2.  
3.2.3.2 Exemption under Art. 106(2) TFEU 
The review must first be focused on the provisions of the Treaty able to identify 
the discipline of SSGIs in the context of State aid rules. 
SSGIs are generally considered, together with the so-called “Services of 
General Economic Interest” (SGEIs), as a sub-set of what is referred to as 
“Services  of  General  Interest” (SGIs)248. 
In this regard, it is important to observe that SSGIs, as they generally 
correspond to an activity of an economic nature249, are subject to the same 
SGEI regime, including the related State aid rules. Therefore, in the context of 
the present review, the legal framework of SSGIs will be outlined with a direct 
reference to the discipline provided for SGEIs, considering that a strict 
distinction between the two categories is not necessary for such a purpose. 
On these premises, according to Article 106(2) TFEU250, SGEIs are defined as 
an exception to the general State aid prohibition set by Article 107(1) TFEU, 
becoming compatible with the internal market any time a specific set of 
conditions is fulfilled251. 
The  first  condition requires  the  existence  of  a SGEI; in other words, aid 
                                                             
248 For the concept of SGI see Commission staff working document, Guide to the 
application of the European Union rules on state aid, public procurement and the internal 
market to services of general economic interest, and in particular to social services of 
general interest, Brussels, 2013, SWD(2013) 53 final/2, p. 21. 
249 See Communication from the Commission of 26 April 2006, Implementing the 
Community Lisbon programme: Social services of general interest in the European Union, 
COM (2006) No. 177 final. 
250 For a general overview of Article 106(2) TFEU see P. CRAIG, G. DE BÚRCA, op. cit., New 
York, 2015, pp. 1155 et seq. 
251  Article 106(2) TFEU: “Undertakings entrusted with the operation of services of general 
economic interest or having the character of a revenue-producing monopoly shall be subject to 
the rules contained in the Treaties, in particular to the rules on competition, in so far as the 
application of such rules does not obstruct the performance, in law or in fact, of the particular 
tasks assigned to them. The development of trade must not be affected to such an extent as would 
be contrary to the interests of the Union”. 
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falling under Article 106(2) TFEU must be  granted  to  an  undertaking  for  a  
“genuine  and  correctly  defined” SGEI252.  
Article 106(2) TFEU does not contain a clear-cut definition of SGEI and, 
therefore, Member States enjoy a wide discretion in determining what  they  
consider  to  be  a  SGEI253. Nevertheless, important limits to this discretion are 
imposed by EU law and in case of a manifest error of assessment254;  for 
example, some conceptual limits to the notion of SGEIs can be identified under 
Article 14 TFEU where the role of SGEIs is underlined “in promoting social 
and territorial cohesion”.Therefore, although  Member  States  have  a  wide  
margin  of  discretion,  according to the position held by the ECJ, it is necessary 
that the service designated as a SGEI satisfies certain minimum criteria. For 
example, the ECJ states that a SGEI must be universal  and  compulsory  in  
nature, even though a SGEI does not need to be a service that meets the need of 
the whole population since it is sufficient that a limited group of people enjoys 
the same service255.  
One more characteristic of SGEIs is the need for such services to be undertaken 
in the public  interest  or  to  be  addressed  to  citizens.  
In this regard, an undertaking may have an exclusive or special right to provide 
the service in question; however, even in absence of such rights, the existence of 
a SGEI can finally be established by concluding that the service needs to be 
offered to every citizen requesting the service256. 
According to the second condition, the responsibility to provide a SGEI must 
have  been  entrusted  to  an  undertaking by a public authority257. The  
undertaking  can  be  either private or public in order to fall under Article 
106(2) of the TFEU.  
In this regard, the  national  hierarchical  level  at which  the  entrustment  takes  
place  is  irrelevant  in  order  to  meet  this  requirement (municipality, regions, 
                                                             
252  Case T-125/12 Viasat Broadcasting UK v Commission, O.J. 2015, C 389, paragraph 61. 
253 Communication from the Commission of 19 January 2001, Services of general interest in 
Europe, O.J. 2001 C 17; Case T-289/03 BUPA and others v Commission, [2008] ECR II-
00081, paragraph 167; Case T-17/02 Fred Olsen, SA v Commission, [2005] ECR II-
02031, paragraph 216. 
254 Case T-289/03 BUPA and others v Commission, [2008] ECR II-00081, paragraph 166; 
Case T-17/02 Fred Olsen, SA v Commission, [2005] ECR II-02031, paragraph 216. In this 
sense, see also A. KOUKIADAKI, EU governance and social services  of  general interest: When  
even the UK is concerned, in J.C. BARBIER, EU  Law, Governance and Social Policy European 
Integration online Papers, 2012, Special Mini-Issue 1, Vol. 16, Article 5,   available at 
http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2012-005a.htm. 
255 Case T-289/03 BUPA and others v Commission, [2008] ECR II-00081, paragraphs 186-
187. 
256 Ibid., paragraphs 188-190 
257 Case T-125/12 Viasat Broadcasting UK v Commission, O.J. 2015, C 389, paragraph 61. 
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government, etc.). Nonetheless a vertical relation is necessary between the 
contracting authority and the undertaking and an act of entrustment must 
always be established258.   
The third and last condition involves to determine whether  or  not  the  Treaty  
rules  obstruct  the performance of the service obligation assigned to the 
undertaking. This assessment  is  done  by  reviewing  whether  the  advantage  
given  to  the beneficiary undertaking is necessary in order for the SGEI to be 
carried out by the  undertaking  under  economically  acceptable  conditions. In  
other words, assessment under Article 106(2) of the TFEU involves a necessity 
test259. 
In summary, if a compensation measure addressed to a SGEI (or to a SSGI) – 
such as a specific set of social tax incentives - is considered to be State aid 
pursuant to Article 107(1) TFEU, it can still fall under Article 106(2) of the 
TFEU and be declared compatible with the internal market if the Member State 
is able to demonstrate that the same measure meets all the three conditions 
above described.  
3.2.3.3 The Altmark criteria 
The Altmark case260 represents a fundamental step for the interpretation of 
State aid rules with reference to SGEIs and SSGIs. 
In this case, the ECJ identifies under what circumstances a State measure 
relevant for a SGEI or a SSGI, such as  a  public  service  compensation,  is  not  
considered  a State aid.  
For what regards the facts, Altmark Trans GmbH is a  local  bus  company  
benefiting from  State  aid  by  the  German government; one  of  its  competitors  
asks  for  the  annulment  of  the licenses granted to Altmark Trans on the basis 
that the financial solvency of this company cannot be guaranteed as it needs 
subsidies for operating the service. The same competitor also claims  that  the  
subsidies  are not compatible  with  EU  law,  representing prohibited State aid 
under Article 107 TFEU261. 
                                                             
258 Commission Decision 82/371/EEC of 17 December 1981 relating to a proceeding under 
Article 85 of the EEC Treaty (IV/29.995 - NAVEWA-ANSEAU), O.J. 1982, L 167, pp 
39-52.259 
259 Case T-125/12 Viasat Broadcasting UK v Commission, O.J. 2015, C 389, paragraph 61. 
260 Case  C-280/00 Altmark Trans GmbH and Regierungspräsidium Magdeburg v 
Nahverkehrsgesellschaft Altmark GmbH, and Oberbundesanwalt beim Bundesverwal- 
tungsgericht, [2003] ECR I-07747. For a detailed review of the case see inter alia, M. 
KLASSE, The Impact of Altmark: The European Commission Case Law Responses, in E. 
SZYZYCZAK, J.W. VAN DE GRONDEN, Financing Services of General Economic Interest, TMC 
Asser Press, The Hague, 2013, p. 36. 
261 Case  C-280/00 Altmark Trans GmbH and Regierungspräsidium Magdeburg v 
Nahverkehrsgesellschaft Altmark GmbH, and Oberbundesanwalt beim Bundesverwal-
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The  German  court  refers  questions  to  the ECJ  for  a  preliminary  ruling,  
asking  whether  subsidies intended to  compensate a public transport service 
always  fall  under  the general State aid prohibition or  whether, having regard to 
the service provided and the significance of the field of the activity concerned, 
the same subsidies are not liable to affect trade between Member States262. 
The  ECJ  reasoning starts from the basic assumption   that,  when  assessing  
whether  a  State  aid  measure  is compatible with the internal market, only the 
effects of such measures must be taken into consideration263. 
On these premises, the ECJ identifies four  cumulative criteria  to  be  fulfilled  
in  order  for  such measure to fall outside the definition of State aid which is 
relevant for the purposes of Article 107(1) TFEU.   
First, the beneficiary must have a clearly defined public service obligation to 
discharge 264. In particular, the public service obligation in question must be 
external to the operator concerned and, thus, not including measures in the  
interest  of  the  undertaking  (such  as  improvement  of  employee relations)265.  
Second,  the  parameters  on  which  compensation  is calculated  must  be  
established  in  advance  in  an  objective  and  transparent manner, to avoid 
overcompensation which may confer economic advantages to the  recipient266.  
Third, the compensation cannot exceed what is necessary to cover all costs 
incurred in the discharge of the public service in question, taking into account 
the relevant expenses and a reasonable profit for the undertaking267.  
Fourth, the  undertaking  must be  selected  pursuant  to  a  public  procurement 
procedure  or, in alternative,  the  compensation  to  the  beneficiary  must  be 
determined on the basis of an analysis of the costs of  a  typical  well-run  
undertaking which meets all the necessary public service requirements, 
considering the relevant receipts and a reasonable profit for discharging the 
obligations268.  
Given the above, from the Altmark case onwards the cumulative criteria defined 
by the ECJ become a testing tool to verify whether or not a compensation 
measure for a public service, corresponding to a SGEI or a SSGI,  constitutes 
tungsgericht, [2003] ECR I-07747, paragraphs 19-29. 
262 Ibid., paragraphs 30-31. 
263 Ibid., paragraph 77. 
264 Ibid., paragraph 89. 
265 See Case C-251/97 France v Commission of the European Communities [1999] ECR I-
6639, Opinion of Advocate General G. Fennelly, paragraph 20. 
266 Case  C-280/00 Altmark Trans GmbH and Regierungspräsidium Magdeburg v 
Nahverkehrsgesellschaft Altmark GmbH, and Oberbundesanwalt beim Bundesverwaltungs-
gericht, [2003] ECR I-07747, paragraph 90. 
267 Ibid., paragraph 92. 
268 Ibid., paragraph 93. 
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State aid for the purpose of Article 107(1) TFEU269.  
Accordingly, any time the above four criteria are fulfilled, the measure falls 
outside the scope of State aid law and, therefore, it is not necessary to provide 
evidence of the conditions set by Article 106(2) TFEU in order to make the 
same measure compatible with the internal market. At the same time, as the 
four criteria are all met, Member States are no longer bound by the obligation 
to notify their measure to the Commission according to the procedural rules of 
Article 108 TFEU270. 
Differently, if a Member State fails to fulfil even one of the Altmark criteria, the 
compensation constitutes State aid and is subject to the notification 
requirement and the standstill obligation laid down in Article 108 TFEU. In this 
case, the aid measures can still be declared compatible with the internal market 
as far as the conditions set by Article 106(2) TFEU are fulfilled or when they 
fall under the exemptions provided by Article 107(3) TFEU271.  
In conclusion, the Altmark test, which is based on the four criteria above 
described, assumes a fundamental role for the assessment of any measure 
specifically targeted to a SGEI or to a SSGI. Therefore, for the scope of the 
present research, as far as a set of tax incentives is granted within a limited part 
of a Member State only in favor of enterprises providing a SGEI or a SSGI, the 
application of the Altmark criteria finally outlines the dimension of State aid 
rules and, in particular, whether or not the tax measure at issue has to be 
scrutinized under the general State aid prohibition set by Article 107(1) TFEU 
and the related system of exemptions. 
3.2.4 SSGIs in secondary law: the Almunia package 
The  Almunia  package, consisting  of  a  Decision,  a  Communication,  a  de  
minimis  Regulation, a Framework, and a working document, represents  an  
essential source of secondary law in the context of SSGIs. 
The main scope of the Almunia package is to provide guidance for Member 
States in the identification of the requirements to fulfil in order to introduce 
measures compatible with the internal market, better defining not only the 
concepts of SGEI and SSGI, but also  the circumstances under which the grant 
of compensation does not entail an infringement of State aid law.   
Therefore, these instruments are adopted with the purpose of clarifying State 
                                                             
269 K. BACON, European Union Law of State Aid, 3rd edition, Oxford University Press,  2017, 
pp. 54-55. 
270 P. CRAIG, G. DE BÚRCA, op. cit., New York, 2015, p. 1136. 
271 For the relation between the Altmark test and Article 106(2) TFEU see P. NICOLAIDES, 
Altmark Requires Efficiency; Article 106(2) TFEU Does Not!, 2017, available at 
http://www.sipotra.it/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/Altmark-Requires-Efficiency.pdf 
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aid principles and  to  simplify  the  application  of State  aid  rules  by  national  
governments, limiting the focus of the Commission to  larger  cases involving 
serious negative effects on the internal market. 
3.2.4.1 Commission Decision 2012/21/EU 
Commission Decision 2012/21/EU272 clarifies under which conditions a public 
service compensation measure, constituting State aid under Article 107(1) 
TFEU (therefore, not fulfilling the four Altmark criteria), may be compatible 
with the internal market and exempt from the notification obligation laid down 
in Article 108(3) TFEU273.  
In particular, Article 2(1)(c) of the Decision provides an exhaustive list of 
services constituting SSGIs which are exempted from the notification 
requirement,  no matter  the  size  of  the  compensation, namely “health  and 
long term care, childcare, access to and reintegration into the labour market, social  
housing  and  the  care  and  social  inclusion  of  vulnerable  groups”.  
Therefore, the Decision does not exempt all services constituting SSGIs, but 
merely provides the mentioned list which is held to be exhaustive. Nonetheless, 
it is evident that the concept of “inclusion of vulnerable groups” puts emphasis 
on  the  possibility  for  Member  States  to  include  various  types  of  social 
services within the concept and, by this way, to benefit from the exemption of 
the notification requirement.  
Differently, in case of public services not included in the aforementioned list, the 
related measures can eventually  fall  under  Article  2(1)(a)  of  the  Decision,  
according  to  which only compensation that does not exceed EUR 15 million a 
year is exempt from the notification requirement. In the views of the Com-
mission, in fact, such amounts of aid are exempt because they are not considered 
to affect EU trade and competition.  
In any case, the applicability of the Decision is subject to the condition of 
entrustment, namely whether the  beneficiary undertaking  has  been  
specifically  entrusted,  by  way  of  one  or  more  acts, with  the  provision  of  a  
particular  public service. According to the Decision, the entrustment act should 
include the content and duration of the public service obligation, the 
undertaking and, where applicable, the territory concerned, the nature of any 
exclusive or special rights assigned to the undertaking by the granting authority, 
a description of the compensation mechanism, the parameters for calculating, 
controlling and reviewing the compensation, and a specific reference to the 
                                                             
272 Commission Decision 2012/21/EU of 20 December 2011 on the application of Article 
106(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to State aid in the form 
of public service compensation granted to certain undertakings entrusted with the 
operation of services of general economic interest, O.J. 2012, L 7, p. 3–10. 
273 Ibid., Art. 1. 
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same Decision274. 
The Decision outlines a few more important conditions for its applicability, 
such as the time limit of ten years in regard of the period of time a public service 
is entrusted to an  undertaking275 and the prohibition of overcompensation  
with reference to the  public service obligation276.  
Furthermore, the Decision provides a number of  provisions  with  the  purpose  
of  monitoring  the  fulfilment  of  the conditions laid  down  in  Article  106(2)  
TFEU. Among such provisions, it is worth to remember the regular control 
from the Member States on the risk of overcompensation for public service 
obligations277, and an obligation for Member States to submit reports on the 
application of the Decision278.  
3.2.4.2 Commission Communication 2012/C 8/02 
The main scope of the Communication of the Almunia package279 is to clarify 
the various aspects of the Altmark judgement with particular reference to 
concepts of State aid rules such as economic activity, undertaking, State 
resources and SGEI. 
In  the  first section of the Communication, the Commission underlines the 
basic principle according to which Member States are generally free to 
determine the content of a SGEI – and, thus, also of a SSGI - the organization 
and the financing mechanism280. 
In any case, the same discretion is counterbalanced by the need to comply with 
the EU rules on  public procurement, and, where  these  are  not  applicable,  
with  the principles of the Treaty, namely non-discrimination and the  basic 
standards  of transparency,  equality in treatment, proportionality  and  mutual  
recognition281. 
In the second section, the Commission clarifies the meaning of many 
provisions relating to State aid in general.  For what regards the concept of 
undertaking, for example, the Commission underlines the distinction  between  
economic  and  non-economic  activities, limiting the application of  State aid 
                                                             
274 Ibid., Art. 4. 
275 Ibid., Art. 2(2). 
276 According to Article 5(1) of the Decision “the amount of compensation shall not exceed what 
is necessary to cover the net cost incurred in discharging the public service obligations, including a 
reasonable profit”. 
277 Ibid., Art. 6. 
278 Ibid., Art. 9. 
279 Communication  from  the  Commission of 11 January 2012  on  the  application  of  the  
European  Union  State  aid  rules  to compensation  granted  for  the  provision  of  
services  of  general  economic  interest, O.J. 2012, C 8, pp. 4-14. 
280 Ibid., paragraph 2. 
281 Ibid., paragraph 5. 
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rules to the situations where a certain activity consists in offering  goods  and 
services  in  a  market environment282. 
Moreover, according to the Communication, the concept of “State resources” 
is associated not only to direct grants and payments from the State or other 
public bodies, but also to tax benefits of any kind283. In this sense, it is clear that 
under the perspective of the Commission, also a compensation for a SSGI 
granted in the form of a tax benefit can assume relevance for the purposes of 
the Altmark test; accordingly, the phenomenon of STZs can be linked to the 
topic of SSGIs as far as the compensation is granted from the State through the 
use of tax incentives in favor of the enterprises which are entrusted with the 
provision of a specific public service in a limited territory of the Member State. 
Then, concerning the concept “effect on trade”, the Commission emphasizes 
that  in  an open and competitive market the  entrustment  of  a  SGEI  “by  
methods  other  than  through  a  public procurement procedure”  may lead to 
preventing the entry to the market for competitors and therefore to a market 
distortion284. 
The third section of the Communication is dedicated to the discussion of the  
Altmark criteria under which compensation for SGEIs - and, thus, for SSGIs - 
does not constitute State aid.  
With reference to the first criterion, namely the existence of a SGEI, the 
Commission clarifies that Member  States  have  a  wide margin  of  discretion  
in  defining  a  given  service  as  a  SGEI and  in  granting  compensation  to  the  
service  provider.  The Commission’s  competence  in  this  respect  is  limited  
to checking  whether  the  Member  State  has  made  a  manifest error  when  
defining  the  service  as  a  SGEI and  to the assessment of  any  State  aid  
involved  in  the  compensation285. 
For what regards the second criterion (entrustment), the Commission focuses 
on the content of the entrustment act, specifying a set of requirements which 
essentially reproduce those described under the Commission Decision 
2012/21/EU286. 
The Communication then clarifies the concept of “reasonable profit” with 
282 Ibid., paragraph 12. 
283 Ibid., paragraph 32. 
284 Ibid., paragraph 37. 
285 Ibid., paragraph 46. 
286 According to paragraph 52 of the Communication “Based on the  approach  taken  by  the  
Commission  in  such  cases,  the act  or  series  of  acts  must  at  least  specify: (a)  the  content  and  
duration  of  the  public  service  obligations; (b)  the  undertaking  and,  where  applicable,  the  
territory concerned; (c)  the  nature of any  exclusive or  special rights assigned to the  
undertaking  by  the  authority  in  question; (d)  the  parameters  for  calculating,  controlling  
and reviewing  the  compensation;  and (e)  the arrangements for avoiding and recovering any 
over­compensation”. 
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respect to the third Altmark criterion (avoidance of overcompensation), making 
reference to  “the  rate  of return  on  capital that  would  be  required  by  a  typical 
company  considering  whether  or  not  to  provide  the service  of  general  economic  
interest  for  the  whole duration  of  the  period  of  entrustment,  taking  into account  
the  level  of  risk”287. 
Furthermore, with reference to the fourth Altmark criterion, the Commission 
recommends the adoption of an  open,  transparent  and  non-discriminatory  
public  procurement  procedure. In this sense, the Commission recommends 
the use of the open procedure as the one which ensures the best conditions, 
allowing the participation of the greatest  number  of  competitors. 
Nonetheless, also the restricted procedure is considered acceptable in the views 
of the Commission, especially where the contracting authority selects the 
economic operators from a range of previous candidates, making the whole 
process more manageable and less costly.  Otherwise, the competitive dialogue 
can be “acceptable” only in “exceptional cases”, such as where the authority is 
not able to accurately define the technical means of the contract in advance. 
This is due  to  the  fact  that  this procedure  confers  a  wider  discretion  in the 
hands of the contracting authority restricting the participation of interested 
operators. Finally, in the case of the negotiated procedure, only the negotiated 
procedure with prior publication can satisfy the Altmark criterion, while the 
negotiated procedure without prior publication has to be excluded from this 
field of application288. 
Then, the Communication clarifies the award criteria for a tender in the context 
of SGEIs. In this regard, the  ‘lowest  price’  in  every  case  fulfils the Altmark’s 
fourth criterion, while the ‘most economically advantageous tender’ is deemed 
sufficient only where “the award criteria  are  closely  related  to  the  subject-
matter  […]  and  allow  for  the  most economically  advantageous  offer  to  
match  the  value  of  the  market”289.  
Given the above, it is evident that the main scope of the Communication is not 
only to clarify the Altmark criteria, but also to achieve  more  use  of  a public 
procurement  procedure,  more  enforcement  of  transparency  and  non-
discrimination  in  these  procedures  and  eventually  more  competition  for  
the awarding of SGEI and SSGI contracts.   
3.2.4.3 Commission Regulation (EU) No. 360/2012 (de minimis regulation) 
One more  instrument  of  the  Almunia package  for simplifying  the  application  
287 Ibid., paragraph 61. 
288 Communication  from  the  Commission on  the  application  of  the  European  Union  
State  aid  rules  to compensation  granted  for  the  provision  of  services  of  general  
economic  interest, O.J. 2012, C 8, pp. 4-14, paragraph 66. 
289 Ibid., paragraph 67. 
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of SGEI rules is the SGEI de  minimis Regulation290.  
According to this Regulation, public  service  compensation  that  does  not  
exceed  EUR  500.000  over  a period of three years291 should be deemed not to 
distort competition in the internal market and the trade between Member 
States; therefore, such aid is exempt from the notification requirement set by 
Article 108(3) of the TFEU292.  
In the views of the Commission, the need of a  separate de minimis  Regulation 
for SGEI – whose effects can be extended to SSGIs not covered by the general 
exemption set by Article 2(1)(c) of the Decision - is associated to the idea that 
the  ceiling  below which public service compensation does not have an effect 
on trade or competition usually differs from that established under the general 
de minimis Regulation. On these premises, the ceiling for SGEIs is raised from 
the amount of EUR 200.000, which is provided in the general de  minimis  
Regulation,  to the amount of EUR 500.000. 
In any case, under the SGEI de minimis Regulation, there are some important 
requirements in order  for  a compensation measure to  avoid  scrutiny  by  the  
Commission. In this sense, in fact, Member  States  are  always required  to  
inform  the  beneficiary  undertaking  under which service obligation the 
advantage is granted for, and the undertaking has to be entrusted with the SGEI 
in writing293.  In addition, the entrustment act must contain a reference to the 
SGEI de minimis Regulation and the measure in question has to be specifically 
granted for the purpose of a SGEI294.  
Furthermore, it is required that the beneficiary undertaking is not in 
difficulty295; in this regard, the Commission does not consider it appropriate 
for beneficiary undertakings to receive aid when they are insolvent, unless such 
aid is part of a restructuring concept.  
3.2.4.4 Commission Framework 2012/C8/03 
The Framework296 is applicable to aid which is not covered by the Decision or 
by the SGEI de minimis Regulation and, therefore, not exempted from the 
                                                             
290 Commission Regulation (EU) No. 360/2012 of 25 April 2012 on the application of 
Articles 107 and 108 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to de 
minimis aid granted to undertakings providing services of general economic interest, O.J. 
L 114, p. 8–13. 
291 Ibid., Art. 2(2). 
292 Ibid., Art. 2(1). 
293 Ibid., Art. 3(1). 
294 Ibid., Recital 6. 
295 Ibid., Art. 1(2)(h). 
296 Communication from the Commission, European Union framework for State aid in the 
form of public service compensation, O.J. 2012, C 8, p. 15–22. 
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notification obligation. 
In these situations, in fact, the public service compensation constitutes State aid 
under Article 107(1) TFEU and, therefore, is subject to the notification 
requirement pursuant to Article 108(3) TFEU297. 
Being this the case, the Framework represents the basis on which the 
Commission verifies the fulfilment of the criteria set out in Article 106(2) 
TFEU in order to consider the same State aid measure as an aid compatible 
with the internal market. 
First, according to the Framework, aid  for  SGEIs  is considered  compatible  
with  the  internal  market when it is granted for a genuine and correctly defined 
SGEI as referred to in Article 106(2) TFEI298.  
Furthermore, the same aid is compatible only where  the  public authority  
complies with the EU rules on public procurement299; this is the most 
important condition of compliance under the Framework according to which 
the use of  public procurement procedures is always necessary in case of 
entrustment of a public service obligation in SGEIs.  
According to the Framework, the Commission, while fully respecting the 
Member State's wide margin of discretion to define the content of a SGEI, may 
require  amendments  in  the  related  scheme, for instance in the allocation of 
the aid, where it can reasonably show that it would be possible to provide the 
same SGEI at equivalent conditions for the users, in a less distortive manner 
and at lower cost for the State300. 
3.2.4.5 Commission staff working document 
The content of the  staff  working  document attached to the Almunia Package301 
is aimed at clarifying certain issues concerning the application of EU rules, 
notably those on State aid, public procurement, and fundamental freedoms. 
For the purposes of the present study, this document assumes a specific 
relevance in the parts dedicated to the concepts of Service of General Interest 
(SGI), Service of General Economic Interest (SGEI) and Social Service of 
General Interest (SSGI), with an important contribution to the clarification of 
the terminology used in the resulting legal framework. 
The concept of SGI is linked to a general macro-category including those 
services that public authorities of the Member States at national, regional or 
                                                             
297 Ibid., paragraph 3. 
298 Ibid., paragraph 12. 
299 Ibid., paragraph 19. 
300 Ibid., paragraph 56. 
301 Commission staff working document, Guide to the application of the European Union rules 
on state aid, public procurement and the internal market to services of general economic interest, 
and in particular to social services of general interest, Brussels, 2013, SWD(2013) 53 final/2. 
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local level classify as being of general interest and, therefore, subject to specific 
public service obligations. According to the document, although the  term 
covers both economic activities and  non-economic  services, only economic 
activities are subject to specific EU legislation and are influenced by the internal 
market and competition rules of the Treaty302.  
SGEIs, to be intended as a sub-set of SGIs, are defined as “economic activities 
which deliver outcomes in the overall public good that would not be supplied 
(or would be supplied under  different  conditions  in  terms  of  objective  
quality,  safety,  affordability,  equal treatment  or  universal  access)  by  the  
market  without  public  intervention”303.  In such cases, a public service 
obligation is imposed on the provider by way of an entrustment and on the 
basis of a general interest criterion. This definition is thus able to highlight one 
of the main purposes of SGEIs, namely to bring consumer welfare by providing 
services that, if left to market forces alone, would not have been provided or not 
under similar conditions.  
Finally, the concept of SSGIs corresponds to one more sub-set of SGIs 
including two main groups of services in addition to health services, namely: a) 
statutory  and  complementary  social  security  schemes,  organised  in  various 
ways (mutual or occupational organisations), covering the main risks of life, 
such as those linked to health, ageing, occupational accidents, unemployment, 
retirement and disability; b) other essential services provided directly to the 
person playing a  prevention  and  social  cohesion  role  with  customized  
assistance  to facilitate social inclusion and safeguard fundamental rights304.  
One more characteristic of SSGIs is related to their necessary nature; in this 
302 Ibid., p. 21. 
303 Ibid. 
304 Ibid., p. 22. In particular, according to the Commission staff working document, in the 
first place such services “offer assistance to persons faced by personal challenges or crises (such 
as debt,  unemployment,  drug  addiction  or  family  breakdown).  Secondly,  they include  
activities  to  ensure  that  the  people  concerned  are  able  to  completely reintegrate into society 
(rehabilitation, language training for immigrants) and, in  particular,  return  to  the  labour  
market  (occupational  training  and reintegration). These services complement and support the 
role of families in caring for the youngest and oldest members of society in particular. Thirdly, 
these  services  include  activities  to  integrate  people  with  long-term  health  or disability 
problems. Fourthly, they also include social housing, which provides housing for disadvantaged 
citizens or socially less advantaged groups”. 
For a definition of SSGI see also H. WOLLMANN, G. MARCOU, The provision of public 
services in Europe: between state, local government and market, Edward Elgar Publishing, 
2010. According to these authors “Social services are services for people and families. They 
include child care, long-term care for the elderly and frail, and health services; and they can 
include basic education, basic cultural amenities (e.g. public libraries) and sports facilities (e.g. 
swimming pools). Such  services  are  usually  financed  by  budgetary  appropriations  or  social  
security contributions and only to a limited extent by user contributions”. 
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sense, in fact,  SSGIs are essential, being specifically addressed  to 
disadvantaged groups of people  and not  to  citizens  as  a  whole  as in the case 
of SGEIs (e.g. electricity, water  supply,  waste management,  etc.)305. 
In principle, SSGIs  may  be  of  an  economic  or non-economic  nature,  
depending  on  the  activity  involved; in this regard, the working document 
points out that, according to the ECJ, the economic nature of an activity does 
not depend on the legal status of the operator or of the organisation (which may 
be a public body or not for-profit306), nor on the nature of the service (e.g. social 
security or health service307); furthermore, the economic nature of an activity 
does not depend on how it is classified in national law. Differently, in order to 
determine whether a given service constitutes an economic activity, a case-by-
case examination must be made of all the characteristics of the activity in 
question, particularly of the way the service is provided, organised and financed 
in the Member State concerned308. 
In this sense, according to ECJ case law, activities that are performed by the 
State - or on behalf of the State - as part of its duties in the social field, for 
example, do not constitute an economic activity309, such as in the case of 
services provided by an organisation as part of an obligatory insurance 
                                                             
305 For the identification and recognition of SSGIs see also Communication from the 
Commission of 26 April 2006, Implementing the Community Lisbon programme: Social 
services of general interest in the European Union, COM (2006) No. 177 final, paragraph 
1.1, where it is specified that general characteristics of these kinds of services are:  (i) “to 
operate on the basis of the solidarity principle, which is required, in particular by the non-
selection of  risks  or  the absence, on an individual basis, of equivalence between contributions 
and benefits’;  (ii)  to  be  a  ‘comprehensive  and  personalized  integrating  the  response  to  
differing needs  in  order  to  guarantee  fundamental  human  rights  and  protect  the  most 
vulnerable’;  (iii) not to be ‘for profit and in particular to address the most difficult situations and 
are often part of a historical legacy’;   (iv)  to  ‘include  the  participation  of  voluntary  workers,  
expression  of  citizenship capacity; they are strongly rooted in (local) cultural traditions’;  (vi) 
‘this often finds its expression in the proximity between the provider of the service and  the  
beneficiary,  enabling  the  taking  into  account  of  the  specific  needs  of  the latter’; and, (vi) to 
highlight ‘an asymmetric relationship between providers and beneficiaries that cannot be 
assimilated with a ‘normal’ ’ supplier/consumer relationship and requires the participation of a 
financing third party”.  
306 Case C-172/98 Commission of the European Communities v Kingdom of Belgium, [1999] 
ECR I-03999. 
307 Case C-157/99 B.S.M. Geraets-Smits v Stichting Ziekenfonds VGZ and H.T.M. Peerbooms v 
Stichting CZ Groep Zorgverzekeringen, [2001] ECR I-05473, paragraph 50. 
308 Commission staff working document, Guide to the application of the European Union rules 
on state aid, public procurement and the internal market to services of general economic interest, 
and in particular to social services of general interest, Brussels, 2013, SWD(2013) 53 final/2, 
p. 21, p. 103. 
309 Case C-109/92 Stephan Max Wirth v Landeshauptstadt Hannover, [1993] ECR I-06447. 
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scheme310, or courses provided under the national education system311. 
Despite the above case law from the ECJ, the Commission usually adopts a 
narrow position according to which every social service is deemed to be 
economic in nature312 and, therefore, subject to the same SGEI regime, 
including the related State aid rules. 
Given the above,  although  SGEIs  and  SSGIs  are two  distinct categories 
within the general macro-category of SGIs, it is possible to conclude that they 
usually overlap, at least partially, in the context of the Almunia package; in this 
sense, in fact, measures constituting SSGIs are generally subject to the same 
rules  applicable  to  SGEIs  since they both are deemed to be economic in 
nature according to the position held by the Commission.  
3.3 STZs and internal market law 
The internal market has always been the core of the European integration 
process. 
In this respect, the fundamental freedoms are defined in the context of internal 
market law, also influencing the initiatives aimed at the establishment of 
territorial tax incentives. 
Therefore, it is necessary to focus the present review on the aspects of internal 
market law which are able to influence and characterize the phenomenon of 
STZs at the EU level, including the aspects associated to social tax incentives. 
The review will first approach the provisions of primary law dealing with the 
fundamental freedoms, including an overview on the main decisions issued by the 
ECJ based on the implementation of the principle of tax non-discrimination. 
Afterwards, secondary law will represent a further step of the same review with 
the description of the harmonization measures adopted by the EU legislator for 
what regards the discipline of indirect taxes (customs duties, value added tax 
and excise duties) and the concepts of social advantages and social enterprises. 
3.3.1 Fundamental freedoms in primary law 
3.3.1.1 General aspects 
The fundamental freedoms are aimed at ensuring the effective pursuit of the 
310 Case C-355/00 Freskot AE v Elliniko Dimosio, [2003] ECR I-05264. 
311 Case C-263/86 Belgian State v René Humbel and Marie-Thérèse Edel, [1988] ECR 05365. 
312 See Communication from the Commission of 26 April 2006, Implementing the 
Community Lisbon programme: Social services of general interest in the European Union, 
COM (2006) No. 177 final, paragraph 2.1, where, according to the Commission “almost 
all services offered in the social field can be considered “economic activities” within the meaning 
of Articles 43 and 49 of the EC Treaty”. 
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basic goals of the European internal market, promoting a reduction of physical 
barriers and legal restrictions imposed by the various Member States313. 
The fundamental freedoms have a specific relevance for the phenomenon of 
STZs, as they involve a prohibition for the Member States to adopt protectionist 
tax policies able to obstruct or restrict the free movement of goods, persons, 
services or capital. 
In particular, the principle of free movement of goods is fixed by Article 28(1) 
TFEU, where the establishment of customs duties or charges with equivalent 
effect which can obstruct or limit the circulation of the goods in the trade 
between the Member States is forbidden. The free movement of goods has 
already found a detailed layout in secondary EU law, with a series of initiatives 
aimed at providing a detailed discipline in the field. Given the above, in the ECJ 
case law there are no relevant cases dealing with the restriction of the free 
movement of goods; the principle of the free movement of goods, in fact, is not 
questioned in the tax jurisdiction of the Member States precisely because of the 
incisiveness and the accuracy of the rules contained in EU secondary legislation, 
such as the Union Customs Code, the Recast VAT Directive and the Excise 
Duty Directive. 
The free movement of services is basically ensured through a policy of 
harmonization of indirect taxes; even in this case, secondary legislation 
represents the instrument used for the implementation of the free movement of 
services, considering the importance of the Recast VAT Directive in the context 
of value added tax. 
The free movement of capital is ensured by Article 63 TFEU according to 
which all restrictions on the movement of capital between Member States and 
between Member States and third countries are prohibited. Finally, the 
principle of free movement of persons is defined by Article 21 TFEU with the 
right of every citizen of the EU to move and reside freely within the territory of 
the Member States. Consequently, this general rule results in a prohibition of 
any restrictions and discrimination which may hinder nationals to move within 
the EU. 
The principle of free movement of persons gives birth to two different rights. 
First, there is the right of workers to move freely within the EU (free movement 
of workers); in this regard, Art. 45 TFEU provides the abolition of all 
restrictions based on nationality or residence of the employee in relation to 
remuneration and all the other conditions of employment. Second, there is the 
right to establish a self-employed activity (i.e. a business or a professional 
                                                             
313 For a comprehensive overview of the free movement of persons in EU law see P. CRAIG, 
G. DE BÚRCA, EU Law: Text, Cases, and Materials, Sixth Edition, Oxford University Press, 
New York, 2015, pp. 1136. 
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activity) within the EU (freedom of establishment); on the basis of the freedom 
of establishment the non-resident has the right to access to the self-employed 
activities and the right to establish enterprises in the Member State concerned 
under the same conditions defined for residents. Within this context, it is 
evident that the establishment of STZs with a set of territorial tax incentives 
may determine a differentiated tax treatment for the undertakings which are 
based in a limited area of the Member State, with a restriction of the freedom of 
establishment for all the other economic operators out of the perimeter of the 
zone. 
3.3.1.2 The principle of tax non-discrimination 
The protection of fundamental freedoms through the prohibition of 
restrictions is inherent to the principle of tax non-discrimination; in this sense, 
for instance, the violation of the free movement of persons is mostly found in 
the presence of national measures which introduce a disadvantage for residents 
of other Member States and, therefore, produce a discriminatory effect. 
From the systematic point of view, the principle of tax non-discrimination is 
instrumental to the pursuit and the defence of the internal market and, 
therefore, it can be considered as a species of the broader genus of the 
fundamental freedoms314. 
In particular, the principle of tax non-discrimination focuses on the legality of a 
national rule with respect to the EU order with particular reference to the 
discriminatory effect produced in the treatment of non-residents compared to 
residents315. 
In this context, the ECJ assumes a fundamental role in the interpretation of the 
prohibitions set by the TFEU, tracing the limits of the initiatives of the Member 
States aimed at the introduction of restrictive measures, including those 
generally provided with the establishment of a STZ. 
In this sense, the fundamental freedoms, as far as they are interpreted in the 
light of the principle of tax non-discrimination, become relevant in the 
reasoning of the ECJ in order to prevent nationality-based tax discrimination, 
namely a situation where a Member State, for example, uses its tax system to 
discriminate against nationals of other Member States who enter its territory to 
work316.   
Furthermore, the ECJ uses the same approach to forbid not only nationality-
based tax discrimination, but also residence-based tax discrimination, thus 
                                                             
314 For these views see P. BORIA, Taxation in European Union, Second Edition, Springer 
International Publishing, 2017, p. 111. 
315 Ibid., p. 112. 
316 See Case  C-204/90 Hanns-Martin Bachmann v Belgian State, [1992] ECR I-00249. 
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highlighting the relevance of the principle of non-discrimination in the context 
of STZs317.  
Today, the principle of non-discrimination, which is mainly based on 
differences in treatment on the ground of nationality or on the residence of the 
persons involved, usually refers to the eventual presence of a less favourable 
treatment clause for citizens or residents of other Member States, while the 
introduction of a more favourable treatment is generally permitted. The ECJ, in 
fact, excludes the application of this principle to the so-called “reverse 
discrimination”, which is realized any time a Member State reserves to its own 
citizens a less favourable treatment than the one granted to citizens of other 
Member States318. 
As far as STZs are concerned, the relevance of the principle of tax non-
discrimination is essentially associated to the possibility of a differentiated tax 
treatment between the residents of a STZ and all the other residents of the 
hosting State; in such cases, in fact, there are still important doubts of 
legitimacy about the introduction of a more favourable treatment for the 
residents of a STZ, considering that the situations of residents and non-
residents could be considered as comparable in the eyes of the EU institutions. 
In this sense, territorial tax incentives are generally considered by the ECJ as 
violating the free movement of persons or the freedom to provide services and, 
therefore, as producing a discriminatory effect; the case-law, in fact, is generally 
focused on cases where such incentives are seen as discriminatory on the basis 
of nationality or assimilated criteria based on the residence of the taxpayer 
benefiting from the tax advantage319. 
Given the above, it is clear that the principle of tax non-discrimination plays a 
relevant role for the implementation of the fundamental freedoms within 
STZs, especially with regard to the linking criteria through which an individual 
or an enterprise may finally be considered based within the territory of a zone; 
these criteria, in fact, may be defined according to the nationality, the residence, 
or, in the case of enterprises, also through the criterion of the “permanent 
establishment”. 
In summary, on the ground of the specific linking criteria adopted by the 
national legislator, the principle of tax non-discrimination represents an 
                                                             
317 See, Case C-279/93 Finanzamt Köln-Altstadt v Roland Schumacker, [1995] ECR I-225, 
paragraphs 27-29. 
318 P. ADONNINO, Non-discrimination rules in International taxation, General report, in Cahiers 
de droit fiscal international, IFA, Periodicals Service Company, Vol. 78b, Deventer, 1993, 
pp. 26 et seq. 
319 See Case C-169/08 Presidente del Consiglio dei Ministri v Regione Sardegna, [2009] I-
10821. 
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essential tool for the assessment of the compliance of a STZ with the 
fundamental freedoms320.  
This is true not only with reference to the field of indirect taxation where the 
legislative competence has already been turned over to the EU, but also in the 
case of direct taxation. In the latter case, in fact, the ECJ always states that, even 
though direct taxation does not fall within the EU competence, nevertheless 
Member States are required to exercise their legislative powers in compliance 
with EU law321. Therefore, the principle of tax non-discrimination is 
considered as the benchmark for assessing the implementation of the 
fundamental freedoms and to define the limits of the initiatives at the national 
level aimed at the establishment of restrictive measures, including those usually 
applied in the context of a STZ322. 
3.3.1.3 ECJ case law  
The review of the case law on the topic offers the opportunity to identify some 
relevant decisions where STZs are scrutinized under the perspective of the 
fundamental freedoms and with reference to a discrimination in the tax 
treatment between residents and non-residents. 
In this regard, the work of the ECJ is focused on the implementation of the 
principle of tax non-discrimination, in particular through the identification of a 
valid cause of justification within the provisions of the TFEU.  
In these cases, the Court carries out the so-called “rule of reason test” with a 
careful evaluation of the relevance of the interests involved through a process 
usually split into four steps323:  
1)  assessment of the comparability of a situation involving a non-resident with 
the situation of a resident (comparability test); 
2)  verification of the existence of a national rule with a discriminatory content, 
with a differential treatment of the two comparable situations (discrimination 
test); 
                                                             
320 A. DAGNINO, op. cit., CEDAM, 2008, p. 173. 
321 Case C-279/93 Finanzamt Köln-Altstadt v Roland Schumacker, [1995] ECR I-225; Case 
C-80/94 H. E. J. Wielockx ν. Inspecteur der Directe Belastingen, [1995] ECR I-2493; Case 
C-107/94 P. H. Asscher v Staatssecretaris van Financiën, [1996] ECR I-03089; Case C-
250/95 Futura Participations SA and Singer v Administration des contributions, [1997] ECR 
I-02471; Case C-118/96 Jessica Safir v Skattemyndigheten i Dalarnas Län, formerly 
Skattemyndigheten i Kopparbergs Län, [1998] ECR I-01897. 
322 A. DAGNINO, op. cit., CEDAM, 2008, p. 176. 
323 For an overview of the four steps of the rule of reason test see M. LANG, P. PISTONE, J. 
SCHUCH, C. STARINGER, Introduction to European Tax Law: Direct Taxation, Spiramus 
Press, 3rd edition, Wien, 2013, p. 56 et seq. 
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3) existence of a reasonable cause of justification of the discriminatory national 
rule (justification test); 
4) when a cause of justification exists, verification of the proportionality of the 
national discriminatory rule (proportionality test). 
Therefore, the rule of reason test is crucial to verify the limits of the Member 
State’s competence in the establishment of STZs, being essentially aimed at 
identifying the proper balance between fundamental freedoms, on one part, 
and the national interests invoked as justifications, on the other. 
Among such interests, the Court sometimes accepts not only those related to 
the cohesion of the tax system324 or the effective implementation of tax 
controls aimed to combat tax avoidance and evasion325, but also those 
associated to objectives of social policy326. In any case, such measures – 
pursuant to the test of proportionality representing the fourth step of the ECJ 
determination process - must be suitable for guaranteeing the achievement of 
one or more legitimate objectives invoked by that Member State and must not 
go beyond what is necessary to achieve those objectives. 
In more details, the proportionality test involves three stages concerning the 
suitability, the necessity, and the proportionality strictu sensu of a tax 
measure327.  The suitability of the tax measure deals with the relationship 
between the means and the end: the question asked is whether the chosen 
measure is suitable or appropriate to achieve the given aim proposed328. In the 
second stage the measure’s proportionality is assessed under the profile of its 
necessity. In particular, the “least restrictive alternative” usually represents the 
basic concept around which such interpretation is carried out; therefore, if 
there are several different measures a Member State can adopt for achieving the 
324 See Case  C-204/90 Hanns-Martin Bachmann v Belgian State, [1992] ECR I-00249. 
325 Case C-264/96 Imperial Chemical Industries plc (ICI) v Kenneth Hall Colmer, [1998] ECR I-
04695; Case C-270/83 Commission of the European Communities v French Republic (Avoir 
fiscal), [1986] ECR 273. 
326 See joined Cases C-447/08 and C-448/08 Criminal proceedings against Otto Sjöberg (C-
447/08) and Anders Gerdin (C-448/08), [2010] ECR I-06921, paragraph 43 where 
according to the Court “considerations of a cultural, moral or religious nature can justify 
restrictions on the freedom of gambling operators to provide services, in particular in so far as it 
might be considered unacceptable to allow private profit to be drawn from the exploitation of a 
social evil or the weakness of players and their misfortune. According to the scale of values held 
by each of the Member States and having regard to the discretion available to them, a Member 
State may restrict the operation of gambling by entrusting it to public or charitable bodies”. 
327 T.I. HARBO, The function of the Proportionality Principle in EU Law, in European Law 
Journal, 2010, Vol. 16, No. 2, p. 165. 
328 See in this regard Case C-145/88 Torfaen Borough Council v B&Q plc, [1989] ECR I-
3815; Case C-169/91 Stoke-on-Trent CC v B&Q plc, [1992] ECR I-6457. 
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given objective, it must choose that measure which is the least restrictive with 
regard to the fundamental freedoms329. Finally, the test of proportionality 
involves the so-called “proportionality stricto sensu”, meaning that a measure is 
disproportionate if it imposes an excessive burden on the individual330. 
Given the above, the following case law review does not cover the multitude of 
cases where the ECJ implements the various steps of the rule of reason with 
reference to the use of tax incentives in general; in this sense, in fact, the 
selection is strictly limited to the cases where the ECJ directly approaches a 
situation specifically involving a STZ, issuing a final decision on the 
compatibility between the preferential tax treatment there granted and the 
fundamental freedoms. 
Based on such methodology, the resulting framework focuses only on two 
relevant decisions issued by the ECJ where important statements are made 
concerning the implementation of the fundamental freedoms in the context of a 
STZ. 
A.  The Sardinia case 
The case Presidente del Consiglio dei Ministri v. Regione Sardegna331 – already 
mentioned in relation to State aid rules332 - is an important example of the 
position held by the ECJ on the differences in the tax treatment between 
resident and non-resident companies with reference to a limited territory of a 
Member State (the region of Sardinia in Italy). Here, the analysis of the Court 
approaches a situation where the non-resident company is affected by a less 
favourable tax treatment, with the final identification of a form of 
discrimination based on the application of different rules to comparable 
situations. Among the relevant number of cases on the topic, this judgement 
assumes a specific value as it focuses on the compatibility of a tax measure 
adopted by a regional authority which is specifically targeted to the 
undertakings based in the region of Sardinia.  
In detail, the preliminary ruling concerns the interpretation, among others, of 
Article 56 TFEU (ex Article 49 EC) on the freedom of providing services in the 
context of a proceeding between the President of the Italian Council of 
Ministers and the Region of Sardinia regarding the establishment by that 
region of a tax on stopovers for tourist purposes. In this case, the referring 
329 D. WEBER, Tax avoidance and the EC treaty freedoms: a study of the limitations under 
European law to the prevention of tax avoidance, in Eucotax series on European taxation 11, 
The Hague, Kluwer law international, 2005, p. 209. See Case C-101/94 Commission of the 
European Communities v Italian Republic, [1996] ECR I-02691. 
330 T.I. HARBO, op. cit., in European Law Journal, 2010, Vol. 16, No. 2, p. 165. 
331 Case C-169/08 Presidente del Consiglio dei Ministri v Regione Sardegna, [2009] I-10821. 
332 See supra paragraph 3.2.1.5. 
100
THE EU LAW FRAMEWORK 
 
court asks whether Article 56 TFEU must be interpreted as precluding tax 
legislation, adopted by a regional authority, such as Article 4 of Regional Law of 
11 May 2006, No. 4, which provides the imposition of a regional tax in the 
event of stopovers for tourist purposes by aircraft used for the private transport 
of persons, or by recreational craft, where that tax is imposed only on 
undertakings which have their tax domicile outside the territory of the region. 
The ECJ confirms that the situation of residents and the situation of non-
residents in a given Member State are not generally comparable, since there are 
objective differences between them, both from the point of view of the source 
of the income and from the point of view of the ability to pay tax333. 
Nevertheless, the Court makes a further step on the ground of the principle of 
tax non-discrimination, stating that also the specific characteristics of the 
relevant tax must be taken into account in the comparison of the situation of the 
taxpayers; accordingly, a difference in treatment between residents and non-
residents may constitute a restriction on the freedom to provide services 
prohibited by Article 56 TFEU where, as in this case, there is no objective 
difference in the situation which would justify different treatment between 
various categories of taxpayers. In this specific situation, in fact, in terms of the 
consequences for the environment, all natural and legal persons who receive the 
services in question are in an objectively comparable situation with regard to 
that tax, irrespective of the place where they reside or are established334. In 
particular, as the Advocate General Kokott states, even if it is accepted that 
private aircraft and recreational craft making stopovers in Sardinia constitute a 
source of pollution, that pollution is caused regardless of where those aircraft 
and boats come from and, in particular, it is not linked to the tax domicile of 
those operators. Therefore, the restriction on the freedom to provide services 
set by the tax legislation at issue cannot be justified on grounds relating to 
environmental protection since the basis for applying the regional tax on 
stopovers introduced by that legislation is a distinction between persons which 
is unrelated to that environmental objective335. Therefore, the tax legislation at 
issue constitutes a form of discrimination and a restriction on the freedom to 
provide services since it taxes only operators of aircraft used for the private 
transport of persons, or of pleasure boats, who have their tax domicile outside 
the territory of the region, without imposing the same tax on the operators 
established in that territory.  
In summary, a difference in treatment between residents and non-residents of 
the zone is permitted – in the light of the above decision of the ECJ – only if the 
                                                             
333 See Case C-527/06 Renneberg, [2008] ECR I-7735, paragraph 59. 
334 Case C-169/08 Presidente del Consiglio dei Ministri v Regione Sardegna, [2009] I-10821, 
paragraph 37. 
335 Ibid., paragraph 45. 
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non-resident taxpayer is not in an objectively comparable situation to the one of 
the resident, considering the specific characteristics of the relevant tax measure. 
B.  The Juntas Generales case 
In the case of companies, the terms of comparison are generally between a non-
resident company with a permanent establishment in the STZ territory, on one 
part, and a resident company based in the same STZ, on the other; here, it is 
evident that the permanent establishment of the non-resident company is in a 
comparable situation with the resident company and, thus, both situations have 
to be treated in the same manner336. 
Consequently, the linking criteria to define if a company is based in a STZ 
cannot be identified with the residence of the company, but with the place in 
which its permanent establishment is based, since any other solution could lead 
to a violation of the principle of tax non-discrimination. 
In this regard, the case Administración General del Estado v Juntas Generales de 
Guipúzcoa and Diputación Foral de Guipúzcoa, Juntas Generales d'Alava and 
Diputación Foral d'Alava and Juntas Generales de Vizcaya337, even in the absence 
of a final decision from the ECJ338, offers an interesting perspective for the 
evaluation of the linking criteria in the light of the Opinion here issued by 
Advocate General Saggio.339. 
In this case, the Court is asked for a preliminary ruling concerning the 
interpretation of Article 49 TFEU (ex Article 52 EC) on the freedom of 
establishment and, in particular, whether it precludes the Basque legislation on 
urgent fiscal measures to stimulate investment and the development of 
economic activities340. Such legislation, in fact, makes the grant of tax benefits 
conditional on residence or on a considerable percentage of the total volume of 
transactions in the Basque territory. According to such provisions, a company 
from another Member State which wishes to open a branch, agency, or 
establishment in the Basque Country while maintaining its own business (and 
therefore its residence for tax purposes) in the State of origin cannot benefit 
336 K. DZIURDZ, C. MARCHGRABER, Non-Discrimination in European and Tax Treaty Law, 
Series on International Tax Law, Michael Lang (ed.), Wien, 2015, p. 52. 
337 Joined cases C-400/97, C-401/97 and C-402/97 Administración General del Estado v Juntas 
Generales de Guipúzcoa and Diputación Foral de Guipúzcoa, Juntas Generales d'Alava and 
Diputación Foral d'Alava and Juntas Generales de Vizcaya, [2000] ECR I-01073. 
338 See supra note 188. 
339 Opinion of Advocate General Saggio delivered on 1 July 1999 in Joined cases C-400/97, 
C-401/97 and C-402/97 Administración General del Estado v Juntas Generales de Guipúzcoa 
and Diputación Foral de Guipúzcoa, Juntas Generales d'Alava and Diputación Foral d'Alava 
and Juntas Generales de Vizcaya, [2000] ECR I-01073. 
340 Ibid., paragraph 16. 
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from this tax benefit341. According to the Opinion of Advocate General Saggio, 
the conditions imposed by the Basque legislation for entitlement to fiscal 
advantages constitute a discriminatory measure for the purposes of Article 49 
TFEU and, thus, the same principle of tax non-discrimination precludes such 
legislation342. In conclusion, according to the same Opinion, a permanent 
establishment of a non-resident company cannot be excluded from tax benefits 
in such a situation, since, otherwise, a discriminatory treatment would be 
unlawfully imposed. 
3.3.1.4 Fundamental freedoms and SSGIs 
As already seen for State aid law, Social Services of General Interest (SSGIs) 
assume a fundamental role in the context of the present research, considering 
the possible introduction of territorial tax incentives in a STZ for the 
undertakings involved in services of a social character. 
SSGIs, where they constitute an economic activity in the terms defined by the 
ECJ343, are covered by the freedom of establishment (Article 49) and the free 
movement of services (Article 56)344. 
In this context, the freedom of establishment for SSGIs is ensured through the 
application of the principle of tax non-discrimination, with the prohibition of 
any restriction able to produce a discriminatory effect in the treatment of non-
residents compared to residents. 
For this purpose, the ECJ carries out the “rule of reason test” where the 
eventual existence of a reasonable cause of justification assumes a specific role 
in the assessment of the discriminatory national rule (third step of the rule of 
reason). 
In particular, in the case of SSGIs, a discriminatory rule can be justified by the 
Member State when the objectives pursued may be qualified as “overriding 
reasons of public interest” under the rule of reason test; in this sense, in fact, 
according to the ECJ, considerations of social policy may justify restrictions on 
the fundamental freedoms345, as far as they are suitable for guaranteeing the 
achievement of one or more legitimate objectives invoked by that Member 
                                                             
341 Ibid., paragraph 19. 
342 Ibid., paragraph 25. 
343 Commission staff working document, Guide to the application of the European Union rules 
on state aid, public procurement and the internal market to services of general economic interest, 
and in particular to social services of general interest, Brussels, 2013, SWD(2013) 53 final/2, 
p. 103. In particular, according to this document, non-economic activities are not covered 
by any of these rules. 
344 Ibid. 
345 Joined Cases C-447/08 and C-448/08 Criminal proceedings against Otto Sjöberg (C-
447/08) and Anders Gerdin (C-448/08), [2010] ECR I-06921, paragraph 43. 
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State and do not go beyond what is necessary to achieve those objectives. 
For example, the ECJ states that overriding reasons relating to the public 
interest capable of justifying a restriction on the freedom to provide services 
include the protection of workers346, the fight against undeclared work, as well 
as the protection of the financial balance of social security systems347. 
At the same time, it is important to observe that the case law of the ECJ does 
not provide a comprehensive definition of public interest, limiting its decisions 
to the description of a series of examples of situations that are relevant under 
such notion.  
Therefore, the ECJ always leaves open the list of public interests, on the ground 
of the fact that the choice of public interests which a Member State wishes to 
promote by granting tax incentives is a matter of its own discretion348. 
According to this flexible approach to the concept of public interest, it is 
possible to conclude that also the social policy objectives pursued in the context 
of a SSGI may constitute “overriding reasons of general interest” able to justify 
the application of discriminatory measures under the rule of reason test, 
provided that the said measures are proportionate to the objectives pursued349. 
3.3.2 Harmonization measures in secondary law 
In the context of internal market law, the review of the sources of secondary law 
includes a set of legislative measures adopted at the EU level for the 
harmonization of indirect taxation with particular reference to customs duties, 
value added tax and excise duties, in consideration of the aspects related to the 
phenomenon of STZs. 
Furthermore, secondary law in this field includes the various sources dealing 
with the concepts of social advantages and social enterprises; the analysis of the 
research question No. 2, in fact, requires the definition of a comprehensive 
346 Case C-515/08 Dos Santos Palhota and Others, [2010] ECR I-09133, paragraph 47. 
347 See, to that effect, Case C-346/06 Dirk Rüffert v Land Niedersachsen, [2008] ECR I-
01989, paragraph 42. 
348 See E. TRAVERSA, Tax Incentives and Territoriality within the European Union: Balancing the 
Internal Market with the Tax Sovereignty of Member States, in World Tax Journal, 2014, p. 
339. See also G. BIZIOLI, Impact of the freedom of establishment on tax law, in EC Tax 
Review, 1998, No. 4, pp. 239-247, where the author stresses the relativity of concepts 
such as public policy or public security (often used by the ECJ to refer to the general 
concept of public interest) “because they change in time, national usage, and geographic 
location”.  
349 Commission staff working document, Guide to the application of the European Union rules 
on state aid, public procurement and the internal market to services of general economic interest, 
and in particular to social services of general interest, Brussels, 2013, SWD(2013) 53 final/2, 
p. 105. 
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background for the discipline of social tax incentives, including such relevant 
concepts belonging to the EU law framework. 
3.3.2.1 Free Zones in the Union Customs Code 
The Union Customs Code (UCC), approved by Regulation (EU) No. 
952/2013350, represents an essential source of norms for ensuring the free 
movement of Union goods in the customs territory of the Union and a 
common customs treatment of non-Union goods brought into that territory. 
In the UCC - as well as in the Recast VAT Directive and in the Excise Duty 
Directive - the phenomenon of STZs is essentially associated to the so-called 
“Free Zones”, according to a terminology traditionally in use in the context of 
customs operations and indirect taxation.  
In other words, Free Zones are here identified as a sub-category of STZs and, in 
this regard, the UCC offers a fundamental support in the definition of the 
related EU legal framework, with a set of norms aimed at regulating the tax 
benefits there provided through the suspension of custom duties and other 
charges in the context of indirect taxation. 
The review of title VII of the UCC deals with special procedures and, in 
particular, with a situation corresponding to a delimited area of land that is 
characterized by the presence of territorial tax benefits. According to Article 
210 UCC, in fact, Free Zones are considered as a special procedure of storage 
under which Union or non-Union goods may be placed. More precisely, a Free 
Zone, under the scope defined by Article 237 UCC, is a part of the customs 
territory of the Union limited from the rest of it, in which non-EU goods 
introduced therein are considered, both for the customs duties and for trade 
policy measures, as not situated in the territory of the Union, provided that they 
are not released for free circulation or placed under another customs procedure 
or used or consumed under conditions other than those provided by customs 
regulations. 
Compared to previous sources351, the new regulatory context set by the UCC is 
characterized not only by the cancellation of the distinction between 
warehouses and Free Zones, but also by the inclusion of the latter zones within 
the so-called special customs regimes for storage and by the abolition of Free 
Zones “not landlocked”. 
In a first period, in fact, according to Regulation (EC) No. 2700/2000352 two 
350 Council Regulation (EU) No. 952/2013 of 9 October 2013 laying down the Union 
Customs Code, O.J. 2013, L. 269, pp. 1-101. 
351 Council Regulation (EEC) No. 2913/92 of 12 October 1992 establishing the 
Community Customs Code, O.J. 1992, L 302, pp. 1-50. 
352 Council Regulation (EC) No. 2700/2000 of 16 November 2000 amending Council 
Regulation (EEC) No. 2913/92 establishing the Community Customs Code, O.J. 2000, 
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different types of zones have been established: 
– “Control type I Free Zones” that have a perimeter fence supervised by 
customs, so that goods placed there are automatically under this regime353. 
– “Control type II Free Zones” that are regulated by a set of norms similar to 
those governing customs warehouses. Consequently, unlike traditional-style 
Free Zones, physical control does not take place at entry and exit points, 
while the goods are subjected to a declaration in order to be able to benefit 
from the regime354. 
Nevertheless, today, according to Article 243 UCC, the Free Zone may only be 
set in a landlocked mode, confirming an approach already announced by 
Regulation (EC) No. 450/2008355. 
Then, Articles 243 and 244 UCC recognize the possibility for Member States 
to designate parts of the customs territory of the Union as Free Zones; Member 
States shall also determine the area covered and the entry and exit points of 
each Free Zone, which are subjected to customs supervision. 
The tax benefits of the Free Zone generally consist in the suspension of the levy 
of customs duties through a deferral regime for goods introduced into the area; 
in this regard, in fact, Article 237(1)(a) UCC provides that under a storage 
procedure – such as the Free Zone – non-Union goods may be stored in the 
customs territory of the Union without being subject to import duties. 
Furthermore, pursuant to Article 237(1)(b) UCC, the same tax benefits are 
extended to other charges “as provided for under other relevant provisions in force”, 
considering that, beside customs duties, these are other charges usually applied 
as non-Union goods are introduced into the territory of the Union. 
The goods introduced in a Free Zone may be stored without time limit356, with 
the suspension of import customs duties and other charges, until they are not 
assigned to the final exportation to non-EU countries (without satisfying the 
customs duties imposed on goods at the time of import) or to the release for 
free circulation in the Union (with the consequent payment of custom duties on 
importation). 
L 311, pp. 17-20. 
353 Article 799(1)(a) of Council Regulation (EEC) No. 2454/93 of 2 July 1993 laying down 
provisions for the implementation of Council Regulation (EEC) No. 2913/92 
establishing the Community Customs Code, O.J. 1993, L 253, pp. 1-766. 
354 Ibid., Article 799 (1)(b). In this regard, see W. DE JONG, Establishing free zones for regional 
development, Library of the European Parliament, 2013, available at  http://www. 
europarl.europa.eu/RegData/bibliotheque/br-iefing/2013/130481/LDM_BRI(20-
13)130481REVEN.pdf  
355 Council Regulation (EC) No. 450/2008 of 23 April 2008 laying down the Community 
Customs Code (Modernized Customs Code), O.J. 2008, L 145, pp. 1–64. 
356 Article 238(1) UCC. 
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In exceptional circumstances, the customs authorities may set a time-limit by 
which a storage procedure must be discharged, in particular where the type and 
nature of the goods may, in the case of long-term storage, pose a threat to 
human, animal or plant health or to the environment357. 
From the functional point of view, the tax benefits granted in a Free Zone – 
essentially represented by the suspension of custom duties – are the result of 
economic policies carried out by the Member States and, therefore, it is not 
possible to identify any kind of influence related to social policies and welfare. 
In the territory of a Free Zone it is possible to carry out any industrial or 
commercial activity and any type of provision of services, even if the exercise of 
such activities must be previously notified to the customs authorities which may 
apply certain prohibitions or limitations (Article 244 UCC). 
In particular, the use of a Free Zone is not confined to a mere storage function. 
Under Article 220 UCC, in fact, it is expected that during their stay goods 
within the Free Zone may (i) be subjected to usual forms of handling, even 
without prior authorization; (ii) be placed under the inward processing 
arrangements; (iii) be placed under the transform processing under customs 
control; (iv) be placed under the temporary admission regime; (v) be 
abandoned; (vi) be destroyed; (vii) be used or consumed on the sole condition 
that such goods, in the case of release for free circulation or temporary 
admission, would not be subject to import duties or to the common agricultural 
policy or commercial policy measures. 
The regulatory framework of Free Zones is completed by a series of further 
provisions that define the administrative aspects relevant for their 
establishment and their supervision by the customs authorities.  
For example, according to Article 214 UCC, all persons carrying on an activity 
involving the storage, working, or processing of goods, or the sale or purchase 
of goods in Free Zones, must keep appropriate records in a form approved by 
the customs authorities. The records must contain the information which 
enable the customs authorities to supervise the procedure concerned, in 
particular with regard to identification of the goods placed under that 
procedure, their customs status and their movements. 
Finally, it is worth to note that Member States must communicate to the 
Commission information on their Free Zones which are in operation358; 
accordingly, the Commission has released a list of the Free Zones in operation 
in the customs territory of the Union, which is periodically updated following 
new communications from the Member States359. 
                                                             
357 Article 238(2) UCC. 
358 Article 243(2) UCC. 
359 See supra note 22. 
107
CHAPTER 3 
 
3.3.2.2 Free Zones in the Recast VAT Directive 
The Directive 2006/112/EC360 - also named “Recast VAT Directive” - provides 
relevant norms that contribute to define the regulatory framework of STZs for 
ensuring the free movement of goods and services. 
In this case, the terminology used by the EU legislator is the same already found 
in the UCC and, therefore, the notion of Free Zone provided in the latter – 
defined as a special procedure of storage - represents the fundamental model of 
reference even for any aspect linked to the application of VAT. 
The Recast VAT Directive allows the Member States to exempt from VAT the 
supply of goods and services carried out in a Free Zone, giving them the 
possibility of introducing national norms aimed at providing such exemption. 
According to Article 156 of the same Directive, in fact, Member States are able 
to exempt from VAT, among others, the supply of goods that are intended to be 
placed in a Free Zone, while the following Article 159 specifies that the same 
Member States may also exempt the supply of services related to the supply of 
goods referred to in Article 156. 
In this regard, it is important to note that the tax incentive is generally related to 
the supplies of goods and services made between entities based within the 
territory of a Free Zone. Otherwise, in the case of a supply between a non-EU 
operator and an operator based in a Free Zone, the exemption from VAT is 
already determined pursuant to Article 237 UCC according to which under a 
Free Zone, “non-Union goods may be stored in the customs territory of the Union 
without being subject to other charges as provided for under other relevant provisions 
in force”. 
In any case, the Directive provides an exemption from VAT which is merely 
temporary, consisting in a suspension of the taxation; it is evident, in fact, that 
the same goods brought into the Free Zone regime are to be subjected to charge 
of VAT once they exit the zone to enter the Union territory or are released for 
consumption. 
In this sense, Article 71 of the Recast Vat Directive provides that “where, on 
entry into the Community, goods are placed under one of the arrangements or 
situations referred to in Articles 156, 276 and 277, [including the Free Zone361] or 
under temporary importation arrangements with total exemption from import duty, 
or under external transit arrangements, the chargeable event shall occur and VAT 
shall become chargeable only when the goods cease to be covered by those 
arrangements or situations”. 
360 Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on the common system of value 
added tax, O.J. 2006, L 347, pp. 1-118. 
361 In this sense see Case C-571/15, Wallenborn Transports SA v Hauptzollamt GießenCase, 
published in the electronic Report of Cases (Court Reports -general). 
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In other words, any time goods are introduced into a Free Zone, the chargeable 
event is delayed until such goods are covered by the Free Zone regime. 
These conclusions are also confirmed by Article 202 of the Recast VAT 
Directive according to which “VAT shall be payable by any person who causes 
goods to cease to be covered by the arrangements or situations listed in Articles 156, 
157, 160 and 161”. 
Finally, from the functional point of view, it is interesting to observe that, also 
in this case, the tax incentives provided through the Recast VAT Directive are 
generally related to the development of economic policies in the context of 
international trade, without any implication concerning social policy objectives 
and welfare in general. 
3.3.2.3 Free zones in Directive 2008/118/EC (excise duty) 
The main scope of Directive 2008/118/EC362 (hereinafter also Excise Duty 
Directive) is to ensure the free movement of excise goods in the territory of the 
Union. 
In this case, the tax benefits on excise duty are designed in the same form used 
for customs duties and VAT, with a structure of the tax norm founded on the 
delay of the chargeable event for the goods introduced in the territory of a Free 
Zone. 
The set of these provisions is very complex and it is based on the coordination 
of different norms, whose final result is the suspension of excise duty until 
goods are placed under the Free Zone procedure. 
In detail, pursuant to Article 7 of Directive 2008/118/EC, excise duty becomes 
chargeable at the time of release for consumption, assuming that “release for 
consumption shall mean, among others, the importation of excise goods, including 
irregular importation, unless the excise goods are placed, immediately upon 
importation, under a duty suspension arrangement”. Moreover, Article 4 defines 
“importation of excise goods” as the entry into the territory of the Union of excise 
goods unless the goods upon their entry into the Union are placed under a 
customs suspensive procedure or arrangement, as well as their release from a 
customs suspensive procedure or arrangement. And, finally, the same Article 4 
clarifies that “customs suspensive procedure or arrangement” means any one of the 
special procedures provided under Regulation (EEC) No. 2913/92363, among 
which it is possible to identify the same Free Zone. 
                                                             
362 Council Directive 2008/118/EC of 16 December 2008 concerning the general 
arrangements for excise duty and repealing Directive 92/12/EEC, O.J. 2009, L 9, pp. 12-
30. 
363 Council Regulation (EEC) No. 2913/92 establishing the Community Customs Code, 
O.J. 1992, L 302. 
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By the above set of norms, it is clear that the chargeable event for what 
concerns excise duty is excluded any time the goods are placed within the Free 
Zone, since the placement of goods in such zones is not considered as 
importation and, consequently, as a form of release for consumption. 
Also in the case of excise duty, from the functional point of view, the tax 
benefits that characterize the Free Zone are clearly targeted to objectives of 
economic policy, while the pursuit of a specific social aim is generally excluded.  
3.3.2.4 The concept of “social advantages” 
In the context of internal market law, the review of the discipline of “social 
advantages” assumes a specific relevance for the purposes of research question 
No. 2, which is focused on the possibility of a new model of STZs based on 
social tax incentives. 
The concept of “social advantages”, in fact, as used in Article 7(2) of Regulation 
(EU) No. 492/2011364, can be associated with the category of social tax 
incentives, since they both share the same objectives and the same functional 
perspective. 
Regulation  (EU) No. 492/2011  aims  to  ensure the achievement of the free 
movement of workers as  enshrined  in  primary  law  (Article  45  TFEU), 
guarantying equal treatment for what regards any conditions of  employment 
and also access to social advantages within the internal market. 
Nonetheless, it is not possible to identify a uniform definition of “social 
advantages” in the text of this Regulation nor in other EU legislative sources. 
The concept of social advantages, in fact, is only defined in the case law of the 
ECJ in a very broad and general way365, simply referring to all the advantages 
which, “whether or not linked to a contract of employment, are generally granted to 
national workers primarily because of their objective status as workers or by virtue of 
the mere fact of their residence on the national territory and the extension of which to 
workers who are nationals of other Member States therefore seems suitable to 
facilitate their mobility within the Union”366.  
On the ground of such a broad concept, today social advantages also include 
financial benefits and non-financial benefits which are not traditionally 
perceived as social advantages, such as in the case of public transport fare 
                                                             
364 Regulation (EU) No. 492/2011 of 5 April 2011 on freedom of movement for workers 
within the Union, O.J. 2011, L 141, p. 1-12. 
365 A. CZEKAY-DANCEWICZ, Access to social benefits and advantages for EU migrant workers, 
members of their families and other categories of migrating EU citizens, 2013, p. 1, available at   
http://ec.europa.eu/social/BlobServlet?d ocId=11714&langId=en 
366 Case C-207/78 Criminal proceedings against Gilbert Even and Office national des pensions 
pour travailleurs salariés, [1979] ECR I-02019, paragraph 22; Case C-85/96 María 
Martínez Sala v Freistaat Bayern, [1998] ECR I–2691. 
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reductions for large families367, child raising allowances368, funeral payments369, 
minimum subsistence payments370 and study grants371. 
In this context, it is then important to observe that a strict definition of the 
concept of social advantages at the EU level would probably interfere with the 
legislative competence of Member States372; thus, a broad and flexible concept 
of social advantages seems to represent the only feasible option at the current 
stage of the European integration process. 
In conclusion, even if the notion of social advantages can easily be associated 
with the category of social tax incentives – at least from the conceptual point of 
view -  the review of EU law does not offer a useful path for better defining the 
limits of the same category for the purposes of the present research. In this 
sense, in fact, the broad concept of social advantages resulting from the ECJ 
case law, on one part, and the absence of a clear definition in the related 
Regulation, on the other, do not allow the identification of relevant elements 
for the purposes of the present research. 
3.3.2.5 The concept of “social enterprises”  
As already said in the previous Chapter 2, social enterprises may assume a 
fundamental role in the context of the present study, considering their possible 
use as an instrument to introduce social tax incentives within the territory of 
STZs. 
Therefore, in the light of the scope of research question  No. 2, which is aimed 
at the development of a new model of STZs based on social tax incentives, it is 
now necessary to review the sources of internal market law dealing with the 
phenomenon of social enterprises. 
The notion of social enterprises is defined under Regulation (EU) No. 
1296/2013373 establishing  a  European  Union  Programme  for  Employment  
                                                             
367 Case C-32/75 Cristini v SNCF, [1975] ECR 1085. 
368 Case C-85/96 María Martínez Sala v Freistaat Bayern, [1998] ECR I–2691. 
369 Case C-237/94 O'Flynn v Adjudication Officer, [1996] ECR I-2617. 
370 Case C-75/63 Hoekstra v Bestuur der Bedrijfsvereniging voor detailhandel en Ambachten, 
[1964], ECR 987. 
371 Case C-237/87 Volvo AB v Erik Veng (UK) Ltd., [1988] ECR 6211; Case C-3/90 Bernini 
(MJE) v Netherlands Ministry of Education and Science, [1992] ECR I-1071; Case C-542/09 
Commission v Netherlands, published in the electronic Reports of Cases (Court Reports – 
general). 
372 Ibid. 
373 Regulation (EU) No. 1296/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
11 December 2013 on a European Union Programme for Employment and Social 
Innovation ("EaSI") and amending Decision No 283/2010/EU establishing a European 
Progress Microfinance Facility for employment and social inclusion, O.J. 2013, L 347, p. 
238–252.  
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and  Social  Innovation  for the period 2014-2020. Under  this Programme, 
social enterprises are established with the aim to (i) increase the availability of  
finance  for  vulnerable  persons,  micro-enterprises  and  social  enterprises;  
and  (ii)  build  up  the institutional  capacity  of  microcredit  providers  and  
support  the  development  of  the  social  investment market374.  The final 
objective is to consolidate the social dimension of the Union and to ensure the 
free movement of persons in the context of internal market law375. 
According to Article 2(1) of this Regulation “social enterprise” is an 
undertaking, regardless of its legal form, which:   
(a)  in  accordance  with  its  articles  of  association,  statutes or  with  any  other  
legal  document,  has  as  its  primary  objective  the  achievement  of 
measurable,  positive  social  impacts  rather  than generating  profit  for  its  
owners,  members  and  share­holders,  and  which: (i)  provides  services  
or  goods  able to  generate  a  social return  and/or (ii)  employs  a  method  
of  production  of  goods  or services  that  embodies  its  social  objective;  
(b)   uses  its  profits  first  and  foremost  to  achieve its  primary objective  and 
has  predefined  procedures  and  rules covering  any  distribution  of  
profits  to  shareholders and  owners  which  ensure  that  such  distribution  
does not  undermine  the  primary  objective;  and  
(c)   is managed in an entrepreneurial, accountable and transparent  way,  in  
particular  by  involving  workers, customers  and  stakeholders  affected  
by  its  business activities. 
Therefore, according to the above definition, the  notion  of  social  enterprise 
entails organizational  forms  which are characterized by  governance criteria,  
economic  criteria and  social criteria. 
First, for what concerns the governance criteria,  social enterprises always 
benefit from a certain degree  of  autonomy since they are  voluntarily  
established, independent,  and private  legal  entities; in particular,  even when 
they heavily  depend  on  public  subsidies, they are not managed, directly or 
indirectly, by public authorities. Moreover, their decision-making  power  is not 
usually  based  on  the  founders/members'  stake  in  the  share  capital  of  the 
organization, but is rather democratic with one member corresponding to one 
vote. However, also  private  companies  (e.g. limited liability companies) may 
be considered social enterprises, insofar as they are established to pursue social 
goals, rather than generate profit.  
Second, for the economic  criteria, it is important to note that  social enterprises 
are usually based on the exercise of  an  economic  activity  producing and 
selling goods  and/or services and they must have at least one employee to be 
374 Ibid., Article 26. 
375 Ibid., Recital 9. 
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considered a social enterprise.  
Third, the social criteria are associated to the existence of an explicit social 
purpose, such as to benefit the community or a specific group of people, for 
example; the primary goal of a social enterprise, in fact, is to pursue social goals,  
rather  than  generate  profit.  In this regard, it is worth to remember the fact 
that social enterprises must re-invest the majority of profit or  surplus  to  
pursue  their  main  statutory  goals376.   
In summary, today the concept of social enterprises is part of the internal 
market law where it is defined under Regulation (EU) No. 1296/2013. In the 
same context, social enterprises may influence the approach to STZs any time a 
set of territorial tax incentives is designed with a clear objective of a social 
character; this basically means that, in such cases, social enterprises may 
become a vehicle and an instrument to be used for the achievement of the 
objectives pursued through the establishment of a STZ. 
3.3.2.6 Social enterprises and other soft law instruments 
Within soft law it is possible to identify one more definition of social enterprise 
at the EU level aimed at avoiding unqualified or abusive practices.   
According to a Communication of 2011 from the Commission, in fact, a social 
enterprise is “an operator in the social economy whose main objective is to have 
a social impact rather than make a profit for their owners or shareholders. It 
operates by providing goods and services for the market in an entrepreneurial 
and  innovative  fashion  and  uses  its  profits  primarily  to  achieve  social 
objectives.  It  is  managed  in  an  open  and  responsible  manner  and,  in  
particular,  involves employees,  consumers  and  stakeholders  affected  by  its  
commercial  activities”377.   
The idea of “social economy”, which is included in the above definition, relies  
on  democratic  decision-making processes able to control the effective 
achievement of the organization’s goals. Many types of organizations can be 
associated to the idea of social economy, such as associations, cooperatives, 
foundations  and  social enterprises378.  
                                                             
376 UNDP, Legal  Framework  for  social  economy  and social enterprises: A comparative report, 
European Center for Not-for-Profit Law, 2012, p. 5, available at http://ecnl.org/ dindo 
cuments/442_ECNL%20UNDP%20Social%20Economy%20Report.pdf 
377 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the 
European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of Regions, Social 
business initiative creating a favourable climate for social enterprises, key stakeholders in the 
social economy and innovation, COM(2011) No. 0682 final, paragraph 1. 
378 EUROPEAN COMMISSION – DIRECTORATE-GENERAL FOR INTERNAL MARKET, INDUSTRY, 
ENTERPREUNERSHIP AND SMES, Social enterprises and the social economy going forward. A 
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In this regard, the same Communication underlines the following defining 
features of social economy organizations: (i) the primacy of the social objective 
over capital; (ii) voluntary and open membership; (iii) democratic control by 
membership; (iv) the combination of the interests of members/users and/or the 
general interest; (v) the defense and application of the principle of solidarity and 
responsibility; (vi) autonomous management and independence from public 
authorities; (vii) most of the surpluses are used in pursuit of sustainable 
development objectives, services of interest to members or the general 
interest379.  
Furthermore, in the context of social enterprises, there are two additional terms 
that are usually brought into the discussion for defining the same phenomenon, 
namely, “solidarity economy” and “third sector”. The former term refers to 
those economic activities in which social relations of solidarity have priority 
over individual  interests  or  material  profit; thus,  these  organizations  
emphasize  the social dimension involved in any economic activity. Differently, 
the term “third sector” is mainly used in literature to refer  to organizations 
other than those publicly owned and the private for-profit ones, thus 
emphasizing their  hybrid  nature380. 
3.4 STZs and harmful tax competition 
3.4.1 General aspects 
From the point of view of the EU institutions, the promotion of policies with an 
emphasis on the use of territorial tax incentives, aimed in particular at 
promoting the localization of economic activities or capital investment in a 
limited area of a Member State, is generally considered as harmful for the 
process of European integration and, therefore, as an element to counteract.  
According to this perspective, in fact, the Commission promotes the 
integration at the EU level of national tax policies in order to reduce the 
phenomenon of tax competition between the Member States. 
In this context, the so-called “harmful tax competition” is identified with the 
adoption of fiscal policies by a Member State through a set of measures which 
lead to the excessive lowering of the domestic tax burden in order to provide an 
attractive tax system; an example is the introduction of tax incentives that 
induce the economic operators to relocate from the State of residence to a zone 
call for action from the Commission Expert Group on Social Entrepreneurship (GECES), 
2016, p. 51, available at http://ec.europa.eu/growth/sectors/social-economy/enterprises/exp 
   ert-groups 
379 Ibid. 
380 Ibid., p. 52. 
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in a different State on the ground of strategic choices which are not in line with 
the natural development of a business381. 
In this sense, the use of territorial tax incentives is sometimes a deviation from 
the standard tax policies adopted by other States, representing an interference 
with respect to the allocation decisions of economic operators; such a situation 
could lead to a form of harmful tax competition when attracting capital and 
enterprises from the territory of residence to a different territory. 
In the case of STZs, harmful tax competition may arise as far as tax benefits are 
there reserved exclusively for non-residents and when the same advantages do 
not result as proportionate and transparent, and do not refer to genuine 
economic activities. 
On these bases, harmful tax competition becomes a serious issue, especially 
when the measures adopted within a STZ are able to affect in a significant way 
the location of business activities in the EU territory, providing a significantly 
lower level of taxation than that applied out of the territory of the zone. 
Given the above, the initiatives at the EU level aimed at fighting against harmful 
tax competition  assume a specific relevance for the purposes of the present 
research;  therefore, it is now necessary to approach the same issue from the 
perspective of STZs, identifying the limits of legitimacy of territorial tax 
incentives according to the soft law instruments adopted by the EU institutions 
to counteract the negative effects of harmful tax competition. 
3.4.2 The Code of Conduct for Business Taxation 
3.4.2.1 Main features 
Beside the relevant provisions of State aid law and internal market law, the 
framework of STZs at the EU level is completed by the Code of Conduct for 
Business Taxation adopted by the ECOFIN Council on 1 December 1997382. 
The document is a legally non-binding political commitment between Member 
States and represents a very important point of reference in the planning 
activity aimed to the establishment of STZs. 
The Code embodies a soft law process strategy designed to circumvent the 
Member States’ propensity to disagree about taxation383. In particular, the 
                                                             
381 For these considerations see P. BORIA, Taxation in European Union, Second Edition, 
Springer International Publishing, 2017, p. 166. 
382 Conclusions of the ECOFIN Council Meeting on 1 December 1997 concerning taxation 
policy – Resolution of the Council and the Representatives of the Governments of the 
Member States, meeting within the Council of 1 December 1997, O.J. 1998, C 2, pp. 1-6. 
383 W.W. BRATTON, J. MC CAHERY, Tax coordination and tax competition in the European 
Union: Evaluating the Code of Conduct on Business Taxation, in 38 Internal market Law 
Review, 2001, No. 2, p. 677. 
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Code defines harmful tax measures as measures (including administrative 
practices) which affect or may affect in a significant way the location of business 
activities in the EU territory and which provide for a significantly lower level of 
taxation, including zero taxation, than that generally applied in the Member 
State concerned. 
In this context, the fight against harmful tax competition is aimed not only to a 
more effective use of State aid rules, but also to the elimination of general tax 
measures which lure foreign capital and other investments away from their 
source country, by offering lower tax rates or different tax bases. Thus, from an 
economic point of view, the Code of Conduct intervenes when the foreign 
investor is influenced to invest capital in a country at a preferential lower tax 
charge. 
For the assessment of national tax measures, the Code lists the following 
characteristics as relevant and harmful: a) availability of the tax advantage only 
for non-residents or for domestic goods, or for transactions with non-residents; 
b) ring-fencing: protection of the domestic market against the tax advantage, so 
that the measure does not erode the domestic tax base of the State concerned 
(but only other States’ tax bases); c) lack of substance: granting of the tax 
advantage irrespective of any real economic activity; d) lack of arm’s length 
dealing; e) non-transparency: unpublished advance ruling and negotiability of 
the tax burden384. 
The Code of Conduct, which belongs to the genus of soft law, provides the 
blocking of new measures of direct taxation favouring some activities in a 
country and producing competitive situations related to a particular territory 
(so-called “standstill clause”). Accordingly, there is a sort of freezing of such tax 
regulations in Member States since the introduction of the Code of Conduct, 
preventing them to grow in quantity and quality.  
Furthermore, the Code of Conduct provides the gradual dismantling of the tax 
measures producing harmful tax competition (so-called “rollback clause”)385. 
Since the Code of Conduct has no binding force, it is crucial for the 
Commission’s practice to identify the line between general and selective tax 
incentives, as only the latter category is under the control of State aid rules386. 
In this regard, it is important to note that a measure previously authorized by 
the Commission under the State aid rules might not be  acceptable under the 
Code of Conduct criteria for harmful tax competition, as the State aid rules 
                                                             
384 For an in-depth analysis of the Code of Conduct, see also B. J.M. TERRA, P. J. WATTEL, op. 
cit., Sixth Edition, Kluwer Law International, Alphen aan den Rijn, 2012, p. 236; W.W. 
BRATTON, J. MC CAHERY, op.cit., in 38 Internal market Law Review, 2001, No. 2, pp. 677-
718. 
385 P. BORIA, Diritto tributario europeo, Giuffrè (ed.), Milan, 2010, pp. 245 et seq. 
386 W. SCHON, op. cit., in Internal market Law Review, 1999, Vol. 36, No. 5, pp. 911-936. 
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(especially for what concerns the requirement of selectivity) may partly overlap 
with those for harmful tax competition, but they are not identical387.  
The group implementing the Code of Conduct – also named “Code of Conduct 
Group” - consists of high representatives of the Member States and is chaired 
by one of them rotating every two years. The Commission is a mere observer 
and adviser, while the group directly reports to the Council. 
In order to achieve the objectives of the Code, the aforementioned working 
group is in charge of the assessment of the tax measures that may fall within the 
scope of the Code of Conduct and of the supervision of the information 
regarding such measures.  
Since the year 2003, the Code of Conduct Group is an institutionalized part of 
EU direct tax policy. Its assessment of national measures has become an 
ongoing process, the scope of which has been extended considerably upon the 
accession of new Member States. The Group mainly checks that no new 
harmful tax measures are introduced and that previously rolled-back measures 
are not reintroduced in any form388. 
Given the above, the Code of Conduct represents one more element to be 
considered in the establishment of STZs. In fact, even though it is true that this 
document is not binding for the Member States - belonging to the genus of soft 
law – it is clear that the political strength resulting from its approval and 
implementation clearly influences any initiative of a single Member State aimed 
at introducing territorial tax benefits in the context of a STZ. 
Therefore, each STZ should be set in compliance with the prohibitions set by 
the Code, without any form of tax benefit reserved exclusively for non-
residents or for domestic goods, and provided that the same benefits are 
proportionate, transparent, and only granted to genuine economic activities. 
Nevertheless, it is worth to note that there is no scientific consensus on the 
theoretical definition of harmful tax competition and even the factual evidence 
is somewhat disputed by both economists and political scientists389. This is 
because the criteria identified by the Code of Conduct Group do not derive 
from a list on which a representative panel of economists has previously agreed; 
according to some economists, in fact, it would be nonsense to discriminate 
between harmful and non-harmful competition390 and, therefore, the same 
                                                             
387 P. BORIA, op. cit., Giuffrè, (ed.) Milan 2010, pp. 247 et seq. 
388 B. J.M. TERRA, P. J. WATTEL, op. cit., Sixth Edition, Kluwer Law International, Alphen aan 
den Rijn, 2012, p. 236 et seq. 
389 See, inter alia, S.J. BASINGER, M. HALLERBERG, Remodeling the competition for capital: how 
domestic politics erase the race to bottom, in American Political Science Review, 2004, Vol. 98, 
No. 2, pp. 261-276. 
390 C. M. RADAELLI, The Code of Conduct Against Harmful Tax Competition: Open Method of 
Coordination in Disguise? in Public Administration, 2003, Vol. 81, No. 3, p. 522.  
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Code would not seem to score well in terms of transparency and legitimacy391. 
3.4.2.2  STZs and harmful tax measures 
In the so-called “Primarolo report” 392, which is written on the ground of 
paragraph G of the Code, the Code of Conduct Group identifies 66 tax 
measures considered as harmful, including various examples of territorial tax 
benefits granted in the territory of STZs. 
The first situation considered as harmful in the context of a STZ corresponds to 
the Captive Insurance regime of Aland Islands where tax benefits are granted to 
captive insurance companies – even to non-residents - with a reduced CIT 
rate393. 
Then, the Group identifies as harmful the tax measure applied in the Shannon 
Airport Zone to income for certified trading operations of companies based 
therein, both residents and non-residents.  In this case, in fact, income from 
certified operations is taxed at a reduced CIT rate, provided that the companies 
are engaged in the repair or maintenance of aircraft or in trading operations, 
including financial service activities able to contribute to the use or 
development of the airport394.  
In the case of Trieste Financial Services and Insurance Centre, authorized 
financial services, subject to a number of conditions and offered to Eastern 
European countries, benefit from the corporate income tax exemption and 
from the 50% reduction in local income tax. However, ceilings are put on the 
total amount of tax concessions and on the total amount of investments and 
loans. The above scheme – considered as harmful according to the Code of 
Conduct Group - is open to Italian residents and there are limits on the 
amounts of loans or investments that can be made and on the amount of tax 
benefits available, as well as control procedures to ensure that funds are 
invested in Eastern Europe395.  
Furthermore, tax benefits granted to Madeira and Sta. Maria (Azores) Free 
Zones are considered harmful by the Primarolo report since they are available 
to authorized financial activities carried out principally with non-residents of 
Portugal. Some of these activities, in fact, are exempted from corporate income 
tax. Equally, exemption is provided from municipal and local taxes as well as 
                                                             
391 Ibid., p. 528. 
392 See Report from the Code of Conduct Group (Business Taxation) to ECOFIN Council 
of 4 November 1999, Council of European Union, SN(1999) 4901, Annex A, p. 72, 
available at: https://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/sites/taxation/files/docs/body/ primarolo 
_en.pdf. The measure has been abolished as of 1 January 2003. 
393 Ibid. 
394 See Ibid., p. 162. 
395 See Ibid., p. 63. 
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from taxes on income from patents and royalties. Interests on foreign loans and 
securities are not subject to withholding tax if those loans are used for 
investments in the same Free Zones396. 
One more example of a regime considered as harmful under the work of the 
Code of Conduct Group is the one related to the Basque Country and Navarra 
coordination centers, being these entities whose activities consist of 
management, direction, supervision and centralization of transactions and 
services within an international group of companies. At the time of the 
investigation, the tax rate is lower than the standard corporate income tax in 
Spain and the tax base is calculated in accordance with two alternative methods 
to be chosen by the taxpayer; the normal method (accounting profit) or the 
simplified method (25% of all operating expenses, except financial expenses), 
provided that at least 25% of the equity is related to shareholders non-resident 
in Spain397. 
Then, for what concerns the STZ of Gibraltar, three different measures are 
considered as potentially harmful. The first measure is the Gibraltar 1992 
Companies regime reserved to the companies registered in Gibraltar whose 
principal object is to hold 5% or more participations in other companies, 
provided that, in any year of assessment, 51% or more of the company’s income 
derives from investments and no Gibraltar resident owns a beneficial interest in 
any share of the company. According to such regime, a 1992 company that is a 
parent company of a subsidiary (minimum share of 25%) is exempt from tax in 
respect of the income of the subsidiary398.   
The second harmful measure adopted in Gibraltar is the exempt (Offshore) 
Companies and Captive Insurance regime according to which benefits are 
available to companies incorporated in Gibraltar, or to registered branches of 
non-resident companies in Gibraltar. The main requirements are that no 
Gibraltar resident must have any beneficial interest in the shares of the 
company, and that the company must not trade (or carry on a business) with 
Gibraltarian resident individuals or resident corporate entities. A Gibraltar 
incorporated company may apply for a tax exempt status; such registration 
entitles the company and the beneficial owner to exemption from all income tax 
and estate duty for 25 years.  Accordingly, no tax is payable on profits, 
dividends, interests, payable to non-residents of Gibraltar399. 
The third and last tax measure in Gibraltar identified as potentially harmful is 
the Qualifying (offshore) Companies and Captive Insurance regime according 
to which Qualifying Companies are either companies incorporated in Gibraltar 
                                                             
396 See Ibid., p. 70. 
397 See Ibid., p. 34. 
398 See Ibid., p. 256. 
399 See Ibid., p. 258. 
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or registered in Gibraltar as branches of foreign companies, provided that they 
do not trade or carry on business operations in Gibraltar unless income arises 
from outside Gibraltar and no Gibraltarian or resident of Gibraltar has a 
beneficial interest in the Qualifying Company. In this case, the tax rate, charged 
on profits at a rate between 2 and 18%, is determined by the Financial and 
Development Secretary and is valid for 25 years400.   
In case of Poland, the Special Economic Zones regime has been scrutinized and 
classified as harmful by the Code of Conduct Group, especially for what 
concerns the possibility of granting export aid in the Mielec Special Economic 
Zone401. The consequent amendments adopted by Poland have been 
considered adequate by the Group, even though two enterprises have been 
allowed to benefit from the export aid for a transitional period granted by the 
Accession Treaty until 31 December 2011402. 
In conclusion, all the tax measures above described, since they are considered as 
harmful according to the principles of the Code of Conduct, have been strongly 
revised or even gradually dismantled pursuant to the so-called rollback clause, 
with the aim to avoid any further production of the effects of harmful tax 
competition. 
Nevertheless, such measures still represent an interesting example of the 
implementation of the criteria set out by the Code, providing a further field of 
study for the definition of the legal framework of STZs. 
3.4.2.3  Guidance on tax privileges related to SEZs 
The Code of Conduct Group has recently issued a specific Guidance on tax 
privileges related to the phenomenon of STZs403. 
This document, which has been endorsed by the Council (ECOFIN) on 16 June 
2017, is literally dedicated to “special economic zones”, intended as a special 
geographic area of a Member State404, and it is aimed at counteracting harmful 
tax competition, with specific reference to the use of territorial tax incentives. 
                                                             
400 See Ibid., p. 259. 
401 Report from the Code of Conduct Group (Business Taxation) to the ECOFIN Council 
of 25 May 2010, Council of the European Union, document No. 10033/10, p. 4. 
402 Ibid. 
403 Guidance of the Code of Conduct Group (Business Taxation) on tax privileges related to 
special economic zones of 19 June 2017, Council of the European Union, Brussels, 
document No. 10487/17. 
404 The term “special economic zones” is here used in a very broad and comprehensive way; 
therefore, the content of this document can assume a general relevance in all the 
situations included within the general category of Special Tax Zones. 
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According to the document, business tax privileges available for STZs have to 
be particularly scrutinized by the Code of Conduct Group when one or more of 
the following circumstances are met:  
“a. access to the zone, either de jure or de facto, specifically favours foreign 
investors or discriminates against domestic investors or the tax benefits 
available to companies operating in the zone specifically favour transactions 
with non-residents or discriminate against domestic transactions;  
b.  the regulations for the zone place restrictions on activities that require a 
substantial economic presence;  
c.   the regulations do not require a definite de jure and de facto link between real 
economic activity carried on within the zone (such  as distribution and 
manufacturing activities and activities that generate employment, assets and 
investments) and the profits for which the tax privilege is granted;  
d.   tax privileges are also available for the highly mobile activities (for example, 
activities typical of the banking or insurance industry, intra-group services 
or activities consisting only of the holding of equity participations and 
earning only dividends and capital gains) that are permitted in the zone;  
e.   there is a lack of regular tax audits verifying that the profits accruing in the 
zone and allocated to the activities to which tax privileges are available are 
commensurate with those activities;  
f.   the terms and conditions for establishing a zone, for being allowed to 
operate in the zone and for the benefits available for companies operating in 
a zone are not clearly defined in public legislation or are not limited in time, 
or permission to establish a zone or to be active in a zone is subject to 
discretionary powers”405. 
Given the above, according to this document, the main elements which suggest 
the existence of a harmful tax measure are essentially associated to the presence 
of tax incentives specifically targeted to non-residents, to the absence of a 
substantial economic activity within the zone, and to the lack of transparency in 
the granting of the same measure. 
Therefore, as far as at least one of the above conditions is met, the measures 
adopted in a STZ must be assessed under the principles of the Code of Conduct 
for business taxation in order to determine whether or not they can finally be 
considered as harmful. 
In any case, this initiative of the Code of Conduct Group represents an 
important point of reference for the definition of the EU legal framework 
which is relevant for STZs; the above mentioned conditions, in fact, contribute 
to clarify the views of the EU institutions around the phenomenon of STZs in 
                                                             
405 Guidance of the Code of Conduct Group (Business Taxation) on tax privileges related to 
special economic zones of 19 June 2017, Council of the European Union, Brussels, 
document No. 10487/17, Annex. 
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the context of harmful tax competition, with a better definition of the 
conditions under which the tax measures there granted may be considered as 
harmful. 
3.5 Final remarks 
The review of the legal sources made in this chapter offers the opportunity to 
evaluate the current stage of development of the discipline of STZs within the 
EU law framework. 
As seen, the approach of the EU institutions is based on multiple instruments 
with the use of hard law and soft law in the context of State aid rules, 
fundamental freedoms and harmful tax competition. 
In any case, the perspective changes as far as indirect taxation and direct 
taxation are separately considered for the purposes of STZs.  
In the first situation, customs duties, value added tax and excise duties are fully 
harmonized at the EU level through a set of regulations and directives  which 
replace national legislation; this basically means that the discipline of the tax 
incentives granted in STZs for the purposes of indirect taxation is already 
defined at the EU level, while national norms only assume a marginal role 
which is generally limited to the clarification of some implementing aspects. 
Differently, in the case of direct taxation, there is a lack of substantial 
harmonization, considering that the use of hard law is limited to the regulations 
dealing with the general block exemption406 and to the de minimis exemption407 
in the context of State aid rules. In this sense, soft law actually represents the 
preferred option in the field, especially when it is necessary to identify non-
binding instruments for the adoption of a common approach to regional aid 
and the related policies408; furthermore, here the ECJ case law becomes an 
essential point of reference for the interpretation of State aid rules and 
fundamental freedoms as stated in the TFEU.  
Soft law is also the approach used for counteracting harmful tax competition; 
the Code of Conduct for business taxation, in fact, is a non-binding instrument 
406 Commission Regulation (EU) No. 651/2014 of 17 June 2014 declaring certain categories 
of aid compatible with the internal market in application of Article 107 and 108 of the 
Treaty, O.J. 2014, L 187, pp. 1-78 
407 Commission Regulation (EU) No. 1407/2013 of 18 December 2013 on the application 
of Articles 107 and 108 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to de 
minimis aid, O.J. 2013, L 352, pp. 1-8 (replacing Commission Regulation (EC) 
No. 1998/2006 of 15 December 2006 on the application of Articles 87 and 88 of the 
Treaty to de minimis aid, O.J. 2006, L 379, pp. 5-10). 
408 Communication from the Commission - Guidelines on regional State aid for 2014-2020, 
O.J. 2013, C 209, pp. 1-45. 
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which exclusively assumes a political value in the relations between the 
Member States and the EU institutions. 
These differences between indirect and direct taxation strongly influence the 
current framework of STZs: for example, while in the case of customs duties it 
is possible to identify an harmonized instrument at the EU level for granting tax 
incentives in the territory of a STZ – namely the Free Zone intended as a 
customs procedure under the UCC - on the contrary, in the case of income tax, 
it is not possible to immediately recognize a uniform EU model applied to the 
tax incentives granted within such zones. 
In conclusion, despite the various instruments used within hard law and soft 
law, the current stage of development of the discipline of STZs still presents 
some important limits which contribute to create uncertainty in the EU law 
framework in a continuous tension between the opposite thrusts of tax 
harmonization and tax sovereignty; in this sense, in fact, the main issues are still 
today the absence of harmonization in the field of direct taxation and the 
important differences in the various Member States in the approach to some 
basic concepts and notions (e.g. SSGIs, social advantages, social enterprises).  
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CHAPTER 4 
SPECIAL TAX ZONES IN THE MEMBER STATES 
4.1 Introduction 
Beside the literature and the legal framework already examined in the previous 
chapters, the review of the material collected must also include the factual 
experience of STZs in the EU context, with a focus on the different situations 
where a set of territorial tax advantages is granted to the entities based in a 
limited area of a Member State. 
On these premises, the content of this chapter deals with the experience of each 
Member State, providing a comprehensive description of the various examples 
of STZs with a review of the national legislation in force. 
The selection of the relevant situations is based on the coordinates defined 
under the previous chapters; in this sense, the literature on the topic, with the 
definitions of STZs and other similar figures, on one part, and the relevant 
legislation at the EU level, on the other, offer an essential instrument for the 
identification of each STZ in the factual experience.  
For example, the discipline set under the Union Customs Code is here used to 
recognize the Free Zones in existence in the Member States, assuming that the 
same areas can be defined under the macro-category of STZs, according to the 
legal dimension already explored in the context of Chapter 2.  
Then, State aid rules represent one more useful tool for the identification of 
many other STZs in the Member States, not only considering the position of 
the ECJ in the Azores case, but also in the light of the exemptions for regional 
aid provided under Article 107(3)(a) and (c) TFEU. In such cases, the attention 
is focused on tax law provisions able to introduce a special regime within a 
limited part of the national territory, assuming as the reference framework the 
standard tax regime applied in the rest of the Member State.  
Furthermore, other situations derive from the mere exclusion of an area of a 
Member State from the territorial scope of one or more taxes already 
harmonized at the EU level; therefore, in these situations, EU secondary law, as 
far as it provides the limits of the territorial scope of taxation, becomes the 
parameter to measure and verify the existence of a STZ in such terms. 
In any case, the incentives that are considered for the identification of a STZ are 
only those provided under tax law provisions, while other types of incentives of 
a merely economical nature - such as those related to the use of simplified 
125
CHAPTER 4 
 
administration procedures409 - are not considered for the purposes of the 
present investigation. 
Furthermore, the present review exclusively covers the situations where tax 
incentives concern business taxation, focusing on the tax measures granted in 
favour of enterprises, namely all the entities engaged in an economic activity, 
irrespective of their legal form, according to the definition set by Article 1 of 
Commission Recommendation of 6 May 2003410. Accordingly, as far as direct 
taxation is concerned, STZs generally involve income tax - both in the form of 
corporate income tax (CIT) and personal income tax (PIT) when related to self-
employed activities - dividend withholding tax, capital gains tax and real estate 
tax (RET) for the aspects associated to business taxation411. Differently, under 
indirect taxation, many examples of STZs mainly include tax incentives for 
what regards VAT, custom duties, and excise duty. 
Various resources are used to support the research process on the ground of the 
above parameters, such as the list of Free Zones in existence and in operation in 
the EU, communicated to the Commission by the customs authorities of the 
Member States according to Article 243(2) UCC412. Among other relevant 
sources, it is also important to mention the data base of the Export Helpdesk of 
the EU Commission413, the data base in the search engine for State aid cases 
provided by the EU Commission414, and the Investment Climate Statement 
Reports of the Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs of the US Department 
of State415. Furthermore, the legal texts of the relevant national legislation 
represent one more instrument used to identify the territorial tax incentives in 
force in each Member State. 
The final result of the research confirms the existence of situations 
corresponding to a STZ within most of the Member States (21 over a total of 
28 Member States), with the sole exclusion of Austria416, Belgium, Cyprus, 
                                                             
409 For instance, Bulgaria industrial zones cannot be considered STZs as they offer modern 
infrastructures and attractive conditions for establishing production, warehousing, 
logistics and other activities, without grating any kind of specific tax advantage. 
410 Commission Recommendation of 6 May 2003 concerning the definition of micro, small 
and medium-sized enterprises, O.J. L 124, 2003, pp. 36-41. 
411 In Italy, it is possible to identify one more type of direct tax: the Regional Tax on 
Productive Activities (IRAP). 
412 See note 22. 
413 Available at http://exporthelp.europa.eu 
414 Available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/register 
415 Available at https://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/othr/ics/index.htm 
416 In the case of Austria, the territories of Jungholz and Mittelberg cannot be regarded as 
STZs, considering that they are excluded from the application of the Austrian VAT but 
the German VAT is applied therein. Consequently, it is not possible to identify any tax 
advantage granted to entities based in these zones. 
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Ireland, Netherlands, Slovakia, and Sweden417. 
In this context, some Member States have a dedicated legislation on STZs418, at 
least for the aspects of direct taxation not already harmonized at the EU level, 
while other Member States do not have an organic approach to the 
phenomenon since the relevant provisions are set within various legal sources 
of a more general content419. 
Given the above, the following review is organized in a series of paragraphs 
dedicated to each single Member State, with the description of the relevant 
situations corresponding to the basic scheme of a STZ. 
Accordingly, the review will include all the relevant situations which can be set 
under the legal dimension of STZs, including not only the Free Zones regulated 
by the UCC, but also “Free Ports” (Denmark, Luxembourg, Malta, Slovenia), 
“Urban Tax-Free Zones” (France, Italy), “Overseas Departments” (France), 
“Special Economic Zones” (Italy, Latvia), “Free Economic Zones” (Lithuania), 
“Free Customs Duty Areas” (Poland), as well as other single zones 
characterized by the presence of a specific set of tax advantages (Aland Islands 
in Finland, Saint-Martin in France, Helgoland and Busingen in Germany, 
Mount Athos in Greece, Livigno and Campione d’Italia in Italy, Madeira and 
Azores in Portugal, Canary Islands, Basque Country, Navarra, Ceuta and 
Melilla in Spain, Gibraltar in the United Kingdom).    
4.2 STZs review 
4.2.1 Bulgaria 
4.2.1.1 Bulgarian Free Zones 
Free Zones in Bulgaria are expressly mentioned in the comprehensive list420 of 
the Commission including all the Free Zones in existence in the customs 
territory of the Union; they are established under the harmonized rules set at 
                                                             
417 The list of Free Zones in existence in the Union (last update 17 November 2017, see note 
22) contains a reference to a Free Zone within the territory of the United Kingdom (Isle of 
Man Free Zone and Business Park); nevertheless, the same zone must be excluded from the 
review of this chapter, considering that the geographical limit of the present study 
corresponds to the territory where the EU law applies (see supra paragraph 1.8). In this 
regard, the Isle of Man is neither part of the United Kingdom nor a direct member of the 
European Union, but its relationship with the EU is defined under Article 355(5)(c) TFEU. 
418 The main examples are Bulgaria, Croatia, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Romania, 
Slovenia. 
419 Such in the case of the following Member States: Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, 
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Portugal, and Spain. 
420 See supra note 22. 
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the EU level by the Union Customs Code and, for this reason, they assume a 
specific relevance for the purposes of the present research, being a form of 
implementation of the EU law framework for STZs, as already reviewed in the 
context of the previous chapter. 
Therefore, such zones consist in a special storage procedure under a suspension 
arrangement421, with tax benefits limited to indirect taxation (i.e. deferral of 
customs duties, VAT and excise duty), and are characterized by the presence of 
a perimeter fence with control at entry and exit points.  
For what regards national legislation, an interesting definition of Free Zones is 
contained in Decree of 14 July 1987, No. 2242422, according to which “a Free 
Zone shall be a delimited part of the territory of the People’s Republic of Bulgaria, 
where the pursued economic activities shall be exempted from taxation with custom 
duties”423. 
In Bulgaria, there are actually six Free Zones which are located on strategic 
transport routes close to the ports of Vidin and Rousse and to the cities of 
Dragoman, Svilengrad, Plovdiv, and Bourgas424.  
In line with the provisions of the UCC, the national legislation provides for the 
suspension of the levy of customs duties for goods introduced in such zones; in 
this sense, according to Decree of 14 July 1987, No. 2242, “imported and 
exported goods services rendered, from and to foreign countries, subject to 
manufacturing, commercial and other economic activities in the zones, shall be 
exempted from customs duties”425. The same national norm specifies that such 
advantage “shall also apply to exchange of goods and services between Free Zones on 
the territory of this country”426. 
Also the other indirect taxes, namely VAT and excise duty, are applied 
according to the principles stated, respectively, by the Recast VAT Directive 
and the Excise Duty Directive. 
421 According to Article 210 of UCC the storage is a special customs procedure which 
includes Free Zones. 
422 Decree of 14 July 1987, No. 2242, O.J. of Bulgaria No. 55 of 17 July 1987. 
423 Ibid. Article 3. 
424 See US DEPARTMENT OF STATE, BUREAU OF ECONOMIC AND BUSINESS AFFAIRS, 2014 
Investment Climate Statement, June 2014, available at www.state.gov. 
425 Article 13(2) Decree of 14 July 1987, No. 2242, O.J. of Bulgaria No 55 of 17 July 1987. 
426 Furthermore, Article 166 of the Bulgarian Customs Act of 1998 confirms the exemption 
from custom duties, stating that “for the purpose of import customs duties and trade policy 
importation measures foreign goods are considered as being outside the customs territory of the 
Republic of Bulgaria provided they have not been placed under import regime or another customs 
regime and have not been used or consumed in contravention to the customs regulations”. On 
these premises, the exemption from customs duties is granted by national law in 
compliance with Article 237 UCC according to which non-Union goods placed under a 
storage procedure – as a Free Zone – are not subject to import duties or other charges. 
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In particular, the application of VAT427 is suspended as non-Union goods enter 
the zone and, until they leave the zone, they remain under the customs regime 
of a Free Zone regulated by the UCC. According to the Bulgarian VAT Act428, 
in fact, when the goods are placed in a FZ, the import (i.e. the chargeable event) 
is considered as implemented only when the goods are no longer under the Free 
Zone procedure on the territory of the State.  
In the same way, excise duty is not applied in case of transaction of goods in a 
Free Zone pursuant to the Excises and Tax Warehouses Act according to which 
the goods are subject to excise duty “at the time of their import in the territory of 
the country” 429. 
4.2.2 Croatia 
4.2.2.1 Croatian Free Zones 
In Croatia there are eleven operating FZs ranging from sea port-based zones 
located at Pula, Rijeka, Split, Ploče, and in the Splitsko-dalmatinska area, to 
other strategically located zones in Krapina, Kukuljanovo, Osijek, Vukovar, 
Skrljevo, and Zagreb430. 
Croatian Free Zones are all mentioned in the list of FZs in operation in the 
customs territory of the Union431 and they essentially consist in a special 
storage procedure with a fully harmonized discipline under the provisions of 
the UCC – as already reviewed in Chapter 3 - and tax benefits limited to 
indirect taxation (i.e. deferral of customs duties, VAT and excise duty). 
Nonetheless, it is possible to identify some national norms which expressly deal 
with the phenomenon of FZs.  
In this regard, according to national legislation, Free Zones432 are defined as a 
“part of the territory of the Republic of Croatia, enclosed and marked, in which the 
economic activities are carried out according to some specific conditions"433. 
                                                             
427 The Bulgarian standard VAT rate is 20%. 
428 O.J. of Bulgaria No. 63 of 4 August 2006, effective as from the date of entry into force of 
the Treaty concerning the Accession of the Republic of Bulgaria to the European Union 
(1 Janaury 2007). 
429 See Article 19 Law on Excises and Tax Warehouses Act, O.J. of Bulgaria No. 91 of 15 
November 2005. 
430 For further information on Croatian STZs see D. BOROZAN, Free zone – the Source of 
Socio-Economic Benefit, in Interdisciplinary Management Research Journal, Osijek, 2007, 
Vol. 3, pp. 75-91; I. KIRETA, Tax incentive Regimes in Croatia, Macedonia (FYR) and Serbia – 
Should they compete?, in European Taxation, 2013, pp. 215 et seq. 
431 See supra note 22. 
432 In some cases, the Croatian legislator also uses the term “Free Trade Zone”. 
433 Article 2 of the Croatian Act on Free Zones, O.J. of Croatia No. 44/96, 92/05, 85/08, 
148/13. 
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Furthermore, Article 172 of the Croatian Customs Law434 identifies these 
zones as “a part of the customs territory that is separated from the rest of the customs 
territory, where: a) foreign goods are not considered to be within the customs territory 
of the Republic of Croatia for the purpose of paying the import duty and commercial 
policy import measures, on condition that the goods are not released for free 
circulation or placed under some other customs procedure or use, or that they are not 
consumed or used otherwise than provided for in the conditions regulated by the 
customs rules, and b) on the Croatian goods intended for export, that are regulated by 
special rules based on their placing in a free zone or free warehouse, are to be applied 
measures which would have been applied when exporting those goods”. 
More provisions in the national legislation are then aimed at implementing the 
harmonized EU discipline for indirect taxes; first, entities based in Croatian 
FZs join the suspension of the levy of custom duties according to Article 27(a) 
of the Act on Free Zones; second, according to Article 37 (b) of the Act on Free 
Zones, the supply of goods to a free zone and the supply of goods within a free 
zone are exempt from VAT until the same goods are not imported into the 
national territory; third, goods introduced in Croatian FZs are exempt from 
excise duties under a suspension arrangement pursuant to Article 6, paragraph 
2 of the Excise Duties Act435.  
4.2.3 Czech Republic 
4.2.3.1 Czech Free Zones 
In the Czech Republic there are currently seven Free Zones in the following 
areas: Kralove, Mosnov, Pardubice, Praha 1 (Graddo), Praha 4 (Spedquick), 
Praha 10 (Esces Spol.), Veverskè Kninice (B.F.C.W. Logistic). 
Also in the case of the Czech Republic, Free Zones assume relevance for the 
purposes of this study since they are established under the harmonized rules of 
the UCC and, thus, under the same EU legal framework of STZs; they are 
included in the list of Free Zones in operation in the customs territory of the 
Union as communicated by the Member States to the Commission436; they are 
enclosed areas with entry and exit points subject to customs supervision where 
a special procedure of storage applies with tax benefits limited to indirect 
taxation (i.e. deferral of customs duties, VAT and excise duty). 
Within national legislation it is possible to identify some provisions which 
434 O.J. of Croatia No. 78/99, 94/99, 117/99, 73/00, 92/01. 
435 O.J. of Croatia No. 83/09. Pursuant to Article 6, paragraph 2 of the Excise Duties Act “the 
payment of excise duty shall be suspended in respect of the excise products which been placed, 
immediately after their import, under a custom suspension procedure or brought into a free 
zones or a free warehouse”. 
436 See supra note 22. 
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merely implement the EU harmonized rules concerning the application of VAT 
in a FZ; in particular, according to Act No. 235/2004437, when non-Union 
goods are stored into such zones, VAT is suspended until the goods are 
imported into the EU (where they become "Union goods") or consumed within 
the zone438, while Union goods introduced into the FZ territory are considered 
as already exported outside the EU439. 
Similar rules are provided for what regards excise duty; according to Act No. 
353/2003440, in fact, when non-Union goods are imported into Czech STZs 
from outside the EU territory, excise duties are suspended until the goods are 
exported out of the zone into the EU (where they become "Union goods") or 
are consumed within the zone. 
4.2.4 Denmark 
4.2.4.1 Copenhagen Free Port 
Denmark has one FZ corresponding to the Copenhagen Free Port, whose tax 
regime is defined under the harmonized EU framework. 
The Copenhagen Freeport regime, in fact, is set according to the free zone 
regime provided under Article 237 of the UCC, consisting in a special 
procedure of storage with benefits limited to indirect taxation (i.e. deferral of 
customs duties and other charges, such as VAT and excise duty). 
As all the other FZs which are relevant for the present review, the Copenhagen 
Free Port is mentioned in the list of FZs in operation in the customs territory of 
the Union441. 
The same area, which is totally enclosed with customs control at entry and exit 
points, is actually managed by the Port Authority represented by the 
Copenhagen Malmo Port AB (CMP). In this regard, manufacturing operations 
can be established in the Freeport area provided that a special permission is 
granted by customs authorities442.  
 
 
 
                                                             
437 VAT Act No. 235/2004, available at https://www.mzv.cz/jnp/. 
438 Ibid., Article 12. 
439 Ibid., Article 66. 
440 Excise Tax Act No. 353/2003, available at https://www.mzv.cz/jnp/. 
441 See supra note 22. 
442 See US DEPARTMENT OF STATE, BUREAU OF ECONOMIC AND BUSINESS AFFAIRS, 2013 
Investment Climate Statement – Denmark, April 2013, Report, available at 
http://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/othr/ics/2013/204630.htm 
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4.2.5 Estonia 
4.2.5.1 Estonian Free Zones 
Free Zones in Estonia are established in the ports of Paldiski, Muuga, and 
Sillamae and are all regulated under the harmonized framework of the UCC, 
with benefits limited to indirect taxation (deferral of customs duties and other 
charges, such as VAT and excise duty). 
Paldiski Port and Muuga Port are both located in Northern Estonia, while 
Sillamae Port is located in the Eastern part of Estonia, being thus the closest EU 
port to Russia443. 
These FZs are totally enclosed areas with entry and exit points under the 
customs supervision and are all mentioned in the list of FZs as communicated 
by the Member States to the Commission444. 
Also in this case, there are some national provisions which implement the set of 
rules already harmonized at the EU level under the common framework 
described within Chapter 3. In this sense, the deferral of customs duties is 
provided under Article 54 of the Estonian Customs Act in compliance with the 
rules set out by Article 237 of the UCC.  
Then, Article 15 (3) of the Estonian Value Added Tax Act445 states that VAT is 
not charged when non-Union goods are placed in a FZ and such goods have not 
been consumed or used under conditions other than those prescribed by the 
customs rules. The same benefit is applied to Union goods transferred and 
placed in a free zone for export purposes.  
Furthermore, Estonian FZs benefit from the suspension of the levy of excise 
duties according to the provisions set out by the Estonian Alcohol, Tobacco, 
Fuel and Electricity Excise Duty Act446 in line with the content of the Excise 
Duty Directive. In detail, in fact, Article 24 of the mentioned Act establishes that 
the tax liability arises only upon release for consumption of excise goods or 
“bringing them into Estonia from another Member State outside an excise suspension 
arrangement”447. 
 
 
 
                                                             
443 For further information on Estonian Free Zones see O. PAVUK, T. NARUSHEVICH, G. 
PILAITIS, T. MERKULOVA, Free Zones on the fence, in The Baltic Course, No. 2(5) 2002.  
444 See supra note 22. 
445 O.J. of Estonia, I, 2003, 82, 554.  
446 O.J. of Estonia, I, 2003, 2, 17. 
447 Ibid., Art. 24. 
132
SPECIAL TAX ZONES IN THE MEMBER STATES 
 
4.2.6 Finland 
4.2.6.1 Finnish Free Zones 
Finland has two FZs, the Hanko Free Port and the Oulu Free Port, whose 
operations are subject to the supervision of the National Board of Customs.  
The Finnish Customs Act of 2004448 outlines the essential elements of Free 
Zones according to the fundamentals of the UCC specifying that the National 
Board of Customs of the Ministry of Finance may grant permission to establish 
such zones449. 
These FZs, whose benefits are limited to indirect taxation (i.e. deferral of 
customs duties and other charges, such as VAT and excise duty), have a 
perimeter fence with entry and exit points under the customs supervision and 
are mentioned in the list of FZs in operation in the Union, as communicated by 
the Member States to the Commission450. 
Beside the deferral of custom duties provided by Article 237 UCC, it is possible 
to identify some national provisions implementing the EU Directives on VAT 
and excise duties. 
In the case of VAT, under Article 72(3) of the Finnish Value Added Tax Act451, 
tax is neither payable on sales of goods, which are transferred to a FZ or already 
situated in a FZ, nor on sales of services performed therein. This is in line with 
the provision set out by Article 156 of the Council Directive 2006/112/EC 
according to which Member States are able to exempt, among the others, the 
supply of goods that are intended to be placed in a FZ. 
Then, for what regards excise duties, the regime set out by the Finnish Act on 
Excise Duty452 provides for the exemption from excise duty of the goods 
introduced in the perimeter of FZs until such goods are realized for 
consumption or moved outside the zone and imported into the EU. 
4.2.6.2 Aland Islands  
The territory of the Aland Islands is excluded from EU rules on VAT and excise 
duties pursuant to Article 2(a) of the Protocol No. 2 of the Treaty for the 
Accession of Finland in the EU453; as a result of this regulatory framework, this 
                                                             
448 Customs Act No. 1466 of 29 December 1994, available at http://www.wipo.int 
/wipolex/en/details.jsp?id=1499. 
449 Ibid., Section 8. 
450 See supra note 22. 
451 Valued Added Tax Act No. 1501 of 30 December 1993, available at https://www.finlex.fi/ 
452 See Article 17 of the Act on Excise Duty  No. 182/2010 of 19 March 2010, available at 
https://www.alko.fi/. 
453 Act concerning the conditions of accession of the Kingdom of Norway, the Republic of 
Austria, the Republic of Finland and the Kingdom of Sweden and the adjustments to the 
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territory falls outside the EU fiscal area of VAT and excise duties, while, at the 
same time, it is part of the EU Customs Union.  
The exclusion from the territorial scope of the EU VAT system and excise duty 
system is then confirmed respectively by Article 6 of the Recast VAT Directive 
and by Article 5 of the Excise Duty Directive. 
In this case, the tax benefits applied within the Aland Islands are wider in their 
scope than the corresponding advantages granted to the Free Zones regulated by 
the UCC; while in the latter case, there is a mere suspension of the levy of VAT 
and excise duty under a customs suspension arrangement, differently, in the 
former case, the tax advantage is the result of a territorial exclusion and, thus, it is 
granted for any relevant operation, including the release for consumption. 
Apart from the above benefits on indirect taxation (in this case limited to VAT 
and excise duty), it is important to observe that the taxation system of this zone 
- falling within the competence of Finland454 - is characterized by a certain level 
of fiscal autonomy under Finnish constitutional law mainly based on the Act on 
the Autonomy of Aland455. According to these norms, in fact, “Aland Islands 
shall have legislative powers in respect of […] the additional tax on income for Aland 
and the provisional extra income tax, as well as the trade and amusement taxes, the 
bases of the dues levied for Aland and the municipal tax”456. Nevertheless, the 
autonomy of the Aland Islands does not only rely on its own resources, but also 
comes from the central government through the use of State funds whose 
amount is calculated on the basis of the “equalization” principle457. 
In summary, the Aland Islands are a relevant situation for the scope the present 
review in the light of their exclusion from the territorial scope of indirect taxes 
harmonized at the EU level; in this regard, the provisions of the Recast VAT 
Directive and of the Excise Duty Directive, as far as they set the territorial limit 
of their application, become the parameter used to qualify the Aland Islands as a 
STZ in the context of the present research. 
4.2.7 France 
4.2.7.1 French Free Zones 
The list of Free Zones published by the Commission458 includes two FZs based 
                                                                                                                                               
treaties on which the European Union is founded, O.J. 1994, C 241, pp. 9–404. 
454 F. MURRAY, The European Union and Member State Territories: a new legal framework under 
the EU Treaties, Springer, The Hague, 2012, pp. 131 et seq. 
455 Act of 16 August 1991, No. 1144, available at: http://www.finlex.fi/fi/laki/kaannokset/19-
91/en19911144.pdf 
456 Ibid., section 18. 
457 Ibid., section 46. 
458 See supra note 22. 
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in the French territory: the Free Zone of Le Verdon at the Port of Bordeaux and 
the Free Zone of French Guyana. 
The Free Zone of Le Verdon, managed by the Port of Bordeaux Authority, is 
based in a strategic area for agricultural and industrial trade in southwest 
France; differently, the Free Zone of French Guyana is based on a strategical 
position in South America and is managed by the local chamber of commerce 
and industry. 
French Free Zones, which are also defined under Article 286 of the French 
Customs Code459, are set in accordance with the harmonized framework of the 
UCC, with benefits which are limited to indirect taxation (i.e. deferral of 
customs duties and other charges, such as VAT and excise duty). 
Apart from the deferral of customs duties provided under Article 237 UCC, as 
far as the focus is set on the national legislation, it is possible to identify some 
norms regarding VAT and excise duty which implement the legislation adopted 
at the EU level (i.e. Recast VAT Directive and Excise Duty Directive); for 
example, according to Article 277A of the French Tax Code460, VAT is not 
charged within the perimeter of a Free Zone until goods introduced therein are 
released for consumption461; the same deferral is provided for excise duty 
under Article 302G of the French Tax Code462. 
However, it is worth to note that the entire territory of French Guyana is 
already excluded from the application of VAT according to the territorial 
limitation of the scope of the VAT directive. 
                                                             
459 See Article 286 of the French Customs Code (Code des douanes) according to which “on 
entend par zone franche toute enclave territoriale instituée en vue de faire considérer les 
marchandises qui s'y trouvent comme n'étant pas sur le territoire douanier pour l'application des 
droits de douane et des taxes dont elles sont passibles à raison de l'importation, ainsi que des 
restrictions quantitatives”. 
460 See Article 277A Code General des Impotes according to which “Sont effectuées en 
suspension du paiement de la taxe sur la valeur ajoutée les opérations ci-après :[…] Les livraisons 
de biens destinés à être placés sous l'un des régimes suivants: Le régime fiscal suspensif” (e.g. Free 
Zone). 
461 See Article 291 Code General des Impotes: “Les importations de biens sont soumises à la taxe 
sur la valeur ajoutée […] Est considérée comme importation d'un bien : […] b. la mise à la 
consommation en France d'un bien placé, lors de son entrée sur le territoire sous l'un des régimes 
suivants prévus par les règlements communautaires en vigueur : conduite en douane, magasins et 
aires de dépôt temporaire, zone franche, entrepôt franc, entrepôt d'importation, 
perfectionnement actif, admission temporaire en exonération totale des droits à l'importation, 
transit externe ou sous le régime du transit communautaire interne”. 
462 See Article 302G Code général des impôts: “Sont également considérés comme se trouvant en 
régime suspensif des droits d'accises, les alcools, les boissons alcooliques et les tabacs manufacturés 
placés ou destinés à être placés sous l'un des régimes suivants prévus par les règlements 
communautaires en vigueur : magasins et aires de dépôt temporaire, entrepôt d'importation, 
zone franche, entrepôt franc, perfectionnement actif, admission”. 
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4.2.7.2 Urban Tax-Free Zones 
Urban Tax-Free Zones or “Zones Franches Urbaines” (ZFUs)463 have been 
introduced in France by the Law of 14 November 1996, No. 96-987464, with 
the aim to develop economic activities and to create social integration and 
employment for local residents. 
The Commission has authorized the French ZFUs465, considering the same tax 
scheme as an exemption to State aid rules under Article 107(3)(c) TFEU, 
referring to the category of aid to facilitate the development of certain 
economic activities or of certain economic areas. 
In particular, the Commission, in its authorizing communication, has 
considered the tax measures at issue as necessary and proportionate with 
respect to the objective pursued (social and economic cohesion) and, therefore, 
compatible with the internal market466. 
Nowadays, more than one hundred of ZFUs are based in various parts of the 
French territory467, all characterized by the fact that the tax advantages granted 
only concern direct taxes and are finalized to contribute to objectives of social 
policy. 
According to the Law of 14 November 1996, No. 96-987, enterprises 
established in the ZFU territory and meeting a certain number of criteria enjoy 
the exemption from income tax due on profits derived from activities in the 
ZFU, limited to EUR 50.000 per taxpayer per 12-month period. The ceiling is 
increased by EUR 5.000 per every new employee hired as of 1 January 2006 
resident in a ZFU and employed full-time for a period of at least 6 months. The 
exemption is for the total amount during the first 5 years, while there is a partial 
and digressive exemption during the next 3 years468 . 
Some conditions must be respected in order to benefit from the ZFU regime; 
enterprises, in fact, must have no more than 50 employees and must realize a 
turnover or total assets of less than EUR 10 million, while the capital or voting 
rights  must not be held directly or indirectly (25% or more) by companies 
463 In 2014 the French Parliament (Assemblee Nationale) has adopted an amendement 
modifying the denomination of “Zones Franches Urbaines”, adding the term “territoires 
entrepreneurs” (see Amending Finance Law of 29 December 2014, No. 1655, O.J. of 
France of 30 December 2014, Article 48). 
464 Loi No. 96-987 du 14 novembre 1996 relative à la mise en oeuvre du pacte de relance pour la 
ville, available at https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTE-
XT000000196404 
465 See Communication from the Commission of 22 June 2006 (State aid No. 70/A/2006), 
COM (2006) No. 2329 final, O.J. 2006, C 242, pp. 18. 
466 Ibid., paragraph 3.4. 
467 The complete list of French ZFUs is available at http://sig.ville.gouv.fr/atlas/ZFU/ 
468 60% exemption for the 6th year, 40% exemption for the 7th year, and 20% exemption for 
the 8th year. 
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whose workforce exceeds 250 employees and whose annual turnover before 
tax exceeds EUR 50 million or whose total annual balance sheet exceeds EUR 
43 million469. 
The exemption is not applicable to entities that are active in the areas of 
automotive, shipbuilding, manufacture of handmade textile fibers, steel or road 
transport of goods and furniture leasing, leasing of non-commercial buildings, 
agriculture and construction-sale. 
According to the Law of 29 December 2014, No. 1655470, the ZFU regime 
with its tax benefits is extended until 31 December 2020, but the enterprises 
established from 1 January 2015 onwards, must comply with the following 
further conditions. First, the number of employees living in a ZFU territory 
with a permanent employment contract or with a contract of at least 12 months 
must be equal to at least half of the total employees. Second, the number of 
employees hired after the fulfillment of the same conditions of contract and 
residence must be at least half of all employees hired during the same period. 
Given the above, ZFUs in France represent relevant examples of STZs in the 
context of the present research; the set of tax advantages provided under their 
regime, in fact, is granted according to the EU law framework of STZs and, in 
particular, according to an exemption to the general State aid prohibition which 
is stated by Article 107(3)(c). 
4.2.7.3 French Overseas Departments – DOM 
The French Overseas Departments (DOM), which include the territories of 
Guadaloupe, French Guyana, Martinique, Reunion, and Mayotte, can be 
considered as STZs in the light of a complex set of tax advantages granted 
according to the EU law framework described in the previous Chapter 3; in this 
sense, in fact, the related tax advantages derive not only from the exclusion of 
such zones from the territorial scope of EU directives on VAT and excise duty, 
but also from the introduction of a favouring tax regime on direct taxation 
under State aid rules. 
The Commission, in fact, has authorized the tax schemes there granted through 
a series of communications issued in the context of State aid rules; in a first 
                                                             
469 In non-fixed activities (e.g. building trades, street trading, taxis), the enterprise benefits 
from the tax exemption since it has an effective implementation in the area (e.g. office or 
workshop) and one of the following conditions is met: (i) it employs at least one full-time 
employee sedentary who operates in areas assigned to the activity: (ii) it achieves at least 
25% of its revenue from customers located in the ZFU territory. 
470 Amending Finance Law of 29 December 2014, No. 1655, O.J. of France of 30 December 
2014, Article 48. For further information about ZFUs see C. BUCICCO, Il fondamento 
giuridico delle zone franche urbane e l’equivoco con le zone franche di diritto doganale, in 
Diritto e Pratica Tributaria, 2008, I, pp. 105 et seq. 
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time, the Commission states that such measures are compatible with the 
internal market in the light of Article 107(3)(a), considering that French 
Overseas Departments are defined as outermost regions in the terms set by 
Article 349 TFEU471; then, more recently, the authorization is granted 
according to the exemption set under Article 107(3)(c) TFEU with a final 
evaluation from the Commission essentially based on the proportionality and 
the transparency of the aid472. 
On these bases, the French government has introduced a set of tax advantages 
in the French Overseas Departments in order to encourage investments therein 
and to support their industrial and economic development. 
According to Girardin Law473, individuals investing in a new building enjoy a 
full deduction from their taxable income of the total amount paid in the year of 
acquisition – taxes and fees excluded - provided that the building acquired has 
to be rented for six years as a principal residence; if the total amount exceeds the 
net taxable income of the year of acquisition, the surplus can be carried forward 
to the following taxable income. Girardin Law also permits the deduction of 
rental charges and loan interests. 
Furthermore, taxpayers domiciled in DOM territories benefit from a tax credit 
on income tax to be paid as specified in Article 197 of the French Tax Code. The 
amount of the tax credit granted starts from 30% (Guadaloupe, Martinique and 
Reunion, with a maximum of EUR 5.100 of tax credit) to 40% of the total 
amount due (Guyana and Mayotte, with a maximum of EUR 6.700 of tax credit). 
The benefit is applied for taxpayers domiciled in a DOM territory on the 31 
December of the tax year and is calculated on the tax due on the income earned 
through the same year. 
As far as indirect taxation is concerned, French overseas departments are 
excluded from the territorial scope of the Recast VAT Directive and, therefore, 
from the application of the common EU VAT system. Nevertheless, some DOM 
territories enjoy a special VAT system that sensibly differs from the common 
EU VAT system; for example, according to Article 296 of the French Tax Code, 
in Guadaloupe, Martinique and Reunion the standard VAT rate for importing 
items is 8,5%, with certain products eligible at a reduced VAT rate of 2,1%. 
                                                             
471 See, inter alia, Communication from the Commission of 23 October 2007 (State aid No. 
21502), COM (2007) No. 5115, O.J. 2008, C 14, p. 10. 
472 See Communication from the Commission of 19 July 2018 (State aid No. 50370), COM 
(2018) No. 4545 final, O.J. 2018, C 317, pp. 1-10; Communication from the 
Commission of 10 December 2014 (State aid No. 38566), COM (2014) No. 9316 final, 
O.J. 2015, C 44, pp. 1-12. 
473 Law of 21 July 2003, No. 2003-660, amending Article 199-undecies of the French Tax 
Code, available at https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000-
000605656 
138
SPECIAL TAX ZONES IN THE MEMBER STATES 
 
French overseas departments are also excluded from the territorial scope of 
Directive 2008/118/EC concerning the general arrangements for excise 
duty474; therefore, instead of the common EU excise system, these territories 
have their own excise system, with a sea excise (Octroi de Mer - OM) and a 
regional sea excise (Octroi de Mer Regional - OMR) charged on various goods at 
different rates475. 
4.2.7.4 Saint-Martin 
Saint-Martin in the Caribbean Sea is an outermost region of the French 
Overseas Collectivities (COM) characterized by a composite framework of 
territorial tax benefits 
According to the Commission476, the tax advantages on direct taxation which 
are available in  Saint-Martin do not constitute State aid, considering that such 
zone enjoys sufficient institutional, procedural and economic autonomy to 
determine its own tax system in line with the position held by the ECJ from the 
Azores case onwards477. 
On these premises, Saint-Martin assumes a relevance in the context of this 
review, representing an important example of STZs where a sub-State body 
establishes a favouring tax regime with respect to the standard one applied in 
the mainland France. 
In details, business entities based in Saint-Martin join reduced CIT rates; for 
example, while in case of large companies a standard rate of 20% is applied, 
small and medium businesses (SMEs) benefit from a reduced corporate tax rate 
of 10% up to EUR 40.000 of profits478; furthermore, gains derived from certain 
intangible fees (sale, concession, sub-concession) or from financial securities 
giving access to capital enjoy a tax rate of 10%479. 
Then, under the provisions of Girardin Law480, entities investing in a new 
building join a full deduction from their taxable income of the total amount paid 
in the year of acquisition – taxes and fees excluded – at the same conditions 
                                                             
474 See Article 5(2) of Council Directive 2008/118/EC of 16 December 2008. 
475 See Article 37 of Law of 2 July 2004, No. 2004-639, available at https://www.legifrance-
.gouv.fr/affichTexte.Do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000000253374&cateo-rieLien=id 
476 Communication from the Commission of 3 June 2009 (State aid No. 326/08 Réduction 
des taux d’imposition à Saint-Martin), COM (2009) No. 4026 final, O.J. 2009, C 264, p. 3. 
477 Case C-88/03 Portugal v Commission, [2006] ECR I-7115. 
478 See Article 219 of Code General des Impots de la Collectivite de Saint-Martin, available at 
http://www.com-saint-martin.fr/ressources/CGI_SM-1er-janvier-2016-v.1.1.pdf 
479 Ibid., Article 200A(2). 
480 The Commission has approved the related tax scheme in 2010 as an aid compatible with 
the internal market pursuant to Article 107(3)(a) TFEU. See Communication from the 
Commission of 29 September 2010 (State aid No. 325/08 Aide fiscale à l’investissement à 
Saint-Martin), COM (2010) No. 6471 final, O.J. 2011, C 181, p. 31. 
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already seen for the French Overseas Departments (DOM).  
For what concerns indirect taxation, the Collectivité of Saint-Martin, although 
formally part of the customs territory of the EU, has a special “Free Port” status 
granted in 1939; accordingly, goods imported into the territory are not subject 
to customs duties or import tariffs, with the sole exception of a special import 
tariff on gasoline applied according to local laws. 
Furthermore, Saint-Martin is excluded from the territorial scope of Directive 
2006/112/EC; thus, instead of VAT, a general tax on turnover is applied in the 
island with a rate of 4%481. 
The territory of Saint-Martin is also excluded from the territorial scope of the 
EU Excise Directive and, therefore, from the common EU excise duty system. 
4.2.8 Germany 
4.2.8.1 German Free Zones 
In Germany there are currently two Free Zones (Freeport of Cuxhaven and 
Freeport Bremerhaven) which are set as a special procedure of storage under 
the provisions of the UCC. 
Such zones, both mentioned in the list of FZs periodically updated by the 
Commission482, have a perimeter fence with entry and exit points under the 
customs supervision and provide a set of tax benefits limited to indirect taxation 
according to the harmonized EU law framework described in Chapter 3 (i.e. 
deferral of customs duties and other charges, such as VAT and excise duty). 
The deferral of customs duties is there granted according  to Article 237 of the 
UCC, while, for excise duty, the same deferral is provided under the relevant 
national legislation483 in line with Article 7 of the Directive 2008/118/EC. 
Then, Article 5 of the Turnover Tax Act (UStG)484 provides that VAT is not 
charged where non-Union goods are introduced in German FZs until the same 
goods are not moved outside the zone and imported in the EU territory. 
4.2.8.2 Helgoland and Busingen 
The island of Helgoland and the zone of Busingen enjoy a tax-exempt status, as 
they are part of the political territory of Germany and the EU, but at the same 
                                                             
481 See Article 259 Code General des Impots de la Collectivite de Saint-Martin. 
482 See supra note 22. 
483 For instance, see Article 19 of Tobacco Tax Law (TabStG) of 15 July 2009, O.J. of 
Germany, I S. 1870. 
484 Value Added Tax Act (UStG) of 26 November 1979, available at http://www.gesetze-im-
internet.de/ustg_1980/BJNR119530979.html 
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time excluded from the common VAT area485, from the common excise duty 
area486 and from the Customs Union487. 
Therefore, customs duties, VAT and excise duties are not applied within these 
STZs, considering their exclusion from the territorial scope of the relevant EU 
legislation.  
On these bases, it is interesting to observe that the tax-exempt status of these 
territories is very different from the situation of the Free Zones regulated under 
the UCC; while in the latter case, in fact, there is a mere deferral of indirect taxes 
until the goods are moved out of the zone and imported into the EU or realized 
for consumption, differently, in the case of Helgoland and Busingen, the 
exclusion from the territorial scope of the EU legislation produces definitive 
effects covering not only the import/export operations, but also the release for 
consumption.  
In summary, Helgoland and Busingen can be qualified as STZs because their 
territories are excluded from the scope of the EU legislation on indirect 
taxation, with the establishment of an exceptional situation in comparison to 
the standard tax regime applied in the rest of Germany for customs duties, VAT 
and excise duty. 
4.2.9 Greece 
4.2.9.1 Greek Free Zones 
In Greece, there are four Free Zones located in the port areas of Piraeus, 
Thessaloniki, Heraklion, and Astakos (Platigiali), which are all set as a special 
procedure of storage under the harmonized framework of the UCC with 
benefits limited to indirect taxation. 
These zones are mentioned in the list of Free Zones in operation in the customs 
territory of the Union, as communicated by the Member States to the 
Commission488; they have a perimeter fence with entry and exit points under 
the supervision of customs authorities. 
Within the national legislation, FZs are identified – in accordance with the 
provisions of the UCC - as parts of the territory where non-Union goods are 
considered, for the application of import duties, taxes and other commercial 
policy measures, as not being within the customs territory, while Union goods 
485 Article 6(2) of the Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on the 
common system of value added tax, O.J. 2006, L 347, pp. 1-118. 
486 Article 5(3) of the Council Directive 2008/118/EC of 16 December 2008 concerning the 
general arrangements for excise duty and repealing Directive 92/12/EEC, O.J. 2009, L 9, 
pp. 12-30. 
487 Article 4(1) UCC. 
488 See supra note 22. 
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introduced therein are considered as already exported outside the EU489. 
Accordingly, national provisions provide that VAT and excise duty are not 
charged on non-Union goods imported into a FZ until the goods are 
transferred out of the zone into the EU (where they become "Union goods") or 
consumed within the zone490. 
4.2.9.2 Mount Athos 
The territory of Mount Athos is excluded from the VAT area according to 
Article 6 of Directive 2006/112/EC and, therefore, constitutes a STZ with 
respect to the rest of Greece where VAT is fully applied according to a set of 
rules harmonized at the EU level. 
The exclusion, which is provided on the basis of the specific status of Mount 
Athos granted by Article 105 of the Greek Constitution, is definitive and 
general, producing effects which are relevant for all the types of operations, 
including the release for consumption.   
4.2.10  Hungary 
4.2.10.1 Hungarian Free Zones 
In Hungary there is only one Free Zone in the area of Záhony which is included 
in the updated version of the list of Free Zones provided by the Commission491. 
This area, established in 2017, is regulated by the same harmonized rules of the 
UCC as a special procedure of storage with a perimeter fence under the control 
of customs authorities. 
The set of benefits available is the same as provided for all the Free Zones under 
the UCC, with the deferral of customs duties, VAT and excise duties until the 
goods are moved out of the zone and imported into the EU or realized for 
consumption. 
In the context of national legislation, the deferral of VAT is confirmed under 
the Act on VAT of 2007 where it is expressely stated that “exemption shall be 
granted for the supply of goods and the intra-Community acquisition of goods which 
are intended to be placed in a free zone or in a free warehouse”492. 
                                                             
489 See Article 39(1) of the Greek Customs Code (Law No. 2960 of 22 November 2001, O.J. 
of Greece No. 265/A/2001). 
490 See Article 25 of the Greek VAT Code (Law No. 2859/2000, O.J. of Greece No. 
248/A/2000). 
491 See supra note 22. 
492 See Section 111 of Act CXXVII of 2007 on Value Added Tax, available at 
http://www.icnl.org/research/library/files/Hungary/vatact_ENG.pdf 
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4.2.11     Italy 
4.2.11.1 Italian Free Zones 
The Italian peninsula is characterized by the presence of two FZs based in the 
Port of Trieste and in Venice493. 
The Port of Trieste represents the first FZ established in the Italian territory, 
considering that it has always enjoyed special tax incentives aimed at the 
implementation of international trade in a strategic geographical area. 
After the Second World War, the area is “internationalized” by the Peace 
Treaty of 10 February 1947494. The London Memorandum of 1954 establishes 
the maintenance of the “Free Port of Trieste” in general accordance with the 
provisions of the Peace Treaty, while Decree of 19 January 1955, No. 29495, and 
Decree of 21 December 1959, No. 53496, contain special rules implementing 
the international obligation. 
The Free Zone of Venice is firstly established by Law Decree of 5 January 1948, 
No. 268497, amended by Law of 12 February 1955, No. 41498. Later on, Article 
5 of Law of 9 January 1991, No. 19499, authorizes the transfer of the Free Zone 
of Venice in the area of the commercial port of Marghera. 
Nowadays, these zones are set under the harmonized EU framework for 
indirect taxation, as they both consist in a special procedure of storage 
regulated by the UCC with benefits limited to customs duties, VAT and excise 
duty. 
The deferral of customs duties is provided pursuant to Article 237 UCC; 
accordingly, customs duties are not charged on non-Union goods placed in 
these zones until the same goods are moved out of the zones and imported into 
                                                             
493 It is wort to note that, before the entry in force of the new provisions of the UCC – with 
the abolition of Control Type II Free Zones as of 1 May 2016 – there were also two 
Control Type II FZs in the South of Italy based in Taranto and in Gioia Tauro. Today, 
such zones are not mentioned anymore in the updated version of the list of existing free 
zones published by the Commission (last update of 17 November 2017). 
494 With reference to the same Peace Treaty (published in United Nations - Treaty Series, 
1950, Vol. 49, No 747), see in particular Articles 1-20 of Annex VIII “Instrument relating 
to the Free Port of Trieste” and Articles 34 and 35 of Annex VI “Permanent Statute of the 
Free Territory of Trieste”. See also London Memorandum of 5 October 1954 published 
in United Nations -Treaty Series, 1956, No. 3297. 
495 Decreto del Commissario Generale del Governo italiano per il territorio di Trieste of 19 
January 1955, No. 29, O.J. of Italy No. 3 of 21 January 1955. 
496 Decreto del Commissario Generale del Governo italiano per il territorio di Trieste of 21 
December 1959, No. 53, O.J. No. 36 of 21 December 1959. 
497 O.J. of Italy No. 91 of 17 April 1948. 
498 O.J. of Italy No. 51 of 3 March 1955. 
499 O.J. of Italy No. 17 of 21 January 1991. 
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the EU or released for consumption. 
For what regards VAT and excise duty, the same deferral is established 
respectively by the Italian VAT Act500 and by Law Decree of 26 October 1995, 
No. 504501, which represent implementing provisions of the Recast VAT 
Directive and the Excise Duty Directive. 
4.2.11.2 Urban Tax-Free Zones  
The Italian Urban Tax-Free Zones or “Zone Franche Urbane” (hereinafter 
ZFUs) are minimal areas of municipal territories where tax relief programs on 
direct taxation are set for the creation of small and micro enterprises502. The 
main objective is the promotion of the economic and social development of 
urban areas characterized by a high level of unemployment. 
As in the case of France, the Commission has authorized, under the provisions 
of the TFEU, the creation of the Italian ZFUs, considering them as a form of aid 
to facilitate the development of certain economic activities or of certain 
economic areas pursuant to the exception to the State aid prohibition provided 
by Article 107(3)(c) TFEU503. 
On these premises, the first ZFU has been established in 2012 in the 
municipality of the city of L’Aquila after the earthquake of April 2009 and 
includes the areas affected by the natural disaster with a set of territorial tax 
advantages in favour of small and micro enterprises for supporting the 
development of the local economy504. 
More ZFUs have been established in the same year within the macro areas 
covered by the regional policies of the EU (Campania, Calabria, Sicily and 
500 See Article 67 Decreto del Presidente della Repubblica of 26 October 1972, No. 633. 
501 O.J. of Italy No. 279 of 29 November 1995. 
502 See Interministerial Decree April 10, 2013, O.J. of Italy No. 161 of 11 July 2013. For an 
overview of Italian ZFUs see http://www.sviluppoeconomico.gov.it/index.php/it/incentivi/i-
mpresa/zone-franche-urbane 
503 The authorization issued by the Commission is provided in the Communication from the 
Commission of 28 October 2009 (State aid No. 346/2009), COM (2009) No. 8126 final, 
O.J. 2009, C 299, p. 1 
504 The establishment of the ZFU of L’Aquila is first provided by Article 10(1-bis) of Law 
Decree of 28 April 2009, No. 39 (O.J. of Italy No. 97 of 28 April 2009), converted in Law 
of 24 June 2009, No. 7 (O.J. of Italy No. 147 of 27 June 2009), while the implementation 
of the related tax measures is realized through the provisions set by Law Decree of 24 
January 2012, No. 1 (O.J. of Italy No. 19 of 24 January 2012), converted in Law of 24 
March 2012, No. 27 (O.J. of Italy No. 71 of 24 March 2012). For a comprehensive 
analysis and evaluation fo the ZFU of L’Aquila see F. MICONI, La Zona Franca Urbana di 
L’Aquila, in M. BASILAVECCHIA - L. DEL FEDERICO – A. PACE – C. VERRIGNI,  op. cit., 
Giappichelli (ed.), Turin, 2016, pp. 368-383. 
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Puglia) and within the island of Sardinia in the municipalities of the province of 
Carbonia – Iglesias505. 
Later, in 2015, new ZFUs have been established in some areas of the regions of 
Emilia-Romagna506 and Lombardia507 affected by another earthquake occurred 
in May 2012. 
Then, following the recent earthquake of August 2016 in Central Italy, a new 
group of ZFUs is provided by Law Decree of 24 April 2017, No. 50508, with tax 
benefits in favour of enterprises based in some municipalities of the regions of 
Lazio, Umbria, Marche and Abruzzo. 
Finally, one more initiative is adopted in April 2018 for the establishment of 
new ZFUs in the urban areas of Pescara, Matera, Velletri, Sora, Ventimiglia, 
Campobasso, Cagliari, Iglesias, Quartu Sant’Elena, and Massa Carrara509. 
In all the above cases, the tax scheme of the Italian ZFU is defined under the 
perimeter of the de minimis rule510 and, therefore, the related tax benefits have 
limited effects compared to the case of French ZFUs511.  
In particular, enterprises based in the ZFU territory can join a set of tax 
advantages on direct taxation provided that they fulfill all the conditions 
                                                             
505 See Law Decree of 18 October 2012, No. 179, O.J. of Italy No. 245 of 19 October 2012. 
506 See Article 12 Law Decree of 19 June 2015, No. 78 (O.J. of Italy No. 140 of 19 June 
2015), converted in Law of 6 august 2015, No. 125 (O.J. of Italy, No, 188 of 14 August 
2015). 
507 See Article 1(445) Law of 28 December 2015, No. 208 (O.J. of Italy No. 302 of 20 
December 2015). 
508 O.J. of Italy No. 95 of 24 April 2017. 
509 See Circolare Italian Ministry of Economic Development No. 172230 of 9 April 2018, 
available at http://www.sviluppoeconomico.gov.it/index.php/it/incentivi/impresa/zone-franche-
urbane/nuove-zone-franche-urbane 
510 Commission Regulation (EU) No. 1407/2013 of 18 December 2013 on the application 
of Articles 107 and 108 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to de 
minimis ad, O.J. 2013, L 352, pp. 1-8 (replacing Commission Regulation (EC) 
No. 1998/2006 of 15 December 2006 on the application of Articles 87 and 88 of the 
Treaty to de minimis aid, O.J. 2006, L 379, pp. 5-10). 
511 In this regard, it is important to note that, despite the original authorization issued in 
2009 within the exception provided by Article 107(3)(c) TFEU, the Commission has 
considered the tax measures notified by the Italian government in 2011 for the ZFU of 
L’Aquila as an amendment to the approved scheme not fulfilling the requirements set by 
the first authorization. Therefore, in the light of the position held by the Commission and 
considering the difficulties for obtaining a new authorization – such as, for example, the 
circumstance that the notified measures have been considered as measures of economic 
development and not as aid to make good the damage caused by natural disaster or 
exceptional occurences - the Italian government has decided to define the ZFU tax 
scheme within the limits of the de minimis rule in order to comply with State aid 
provisions. For these considerations, see F. MICONI, op. cit., in M. BASILAVECCHIA - L. DEL 
FEDERICO – A. PACE – C. VERRIGNI,  op. cit., Giappichelli (ed.), Turin, 2016, p. 372. 
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described under Article 3 of the Interministerial Decree of 10 April 2013512. 
For example, they must be micro and small size enterprises pursuant to the 
provisions of Annex 1 of Regulation (EC) No. 800/2008513; they must carry 
out their activities within the ZFU pursuant to the provisions of Article 3(5) 
and (6) of the Interministerial Decree of 10 April 2013514; moreover, these 
enterprises must be in the full and free exercise of their rights, being not subject 
to a voluntary liquidation or to bankruptcy proceedings515. 
Legal entities based in the ZFU, both individuals and companies, join a full 
income tax exemption for the first years of activity, while for the following 
periods, the exemption is generally limited to a decreasing percentage of their 
income. 
The exemption is granted up to the amount of EUR 100.000 of income derived 
from the activity carried out in the ZFU, plus an amount of further EUR 5.000 
per year for any new employee with a permanent residence within the territory 
of the zone516.  
Moreover, in the case that the company carries out a movable activity (e.g. 
construction company), it can benefit from the income tax exemption as it 
meets at least one of the following conditions: (a) achieving at least 25% of the 
volume of business with customers residing in the ZFU; (b) employing at least 
one full-time employee who performs his job in a stable manner within the 
perimeter of the ZFU517. 
Furthermore, within a time limit provided by the law, enterprises based in 
ZFUs, both individuals and companies, are exempt from the regional tax on 
productive activities (IRAP) up to the amount of EUR 300.000 for each tax 
period518 and from the property tax on real estates located in the ZFU 
perimeter, provided that the same properties are used for the economic 
activity519. 
In the context of the Italian Urban Tax-Free Zones, it is also important to 
remember one recent initiative of the Italian government for the introduction 
of a tax credit - calculated on the basis of the cost of acquired assets – in favour 
of enterprises  investing in 140 municipalities of the regions of Lazio, Umbria, 
                                                             
512 Interministerial Decree April 10, 2013, O.J. of Italy No. 161 of 11 July 2013. 
513 Commission Regulation (EC) No. 800/2008 of 6 August 2008 declaring certain 
categories of aid compatible with the internal market in application of Articles 87 and 88 
of the Treaty (Block Exemption Regulation), O.J. 2008, L 214, pp. 3–47. 
514 In particular, according to such provisions, enterprises must have an office within the 
perimeter of the ZFU. 
515 See Article 3, Interministerial Decree April 10, 2013, Article 3. 
516 Ibid., Article 9. 
517 Ibid., Article 3(6). 
518 Ibid., Article 11. 
519 Ibid., Article 12. 
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Marche and Abruzzo where ZFUs are already operative following the 
earthquake of August 2016520. The Commission, through its authorizing 
communication, has considered this specific measure as compatible  with  the  
internal  market  pursuant  to Article 107(3)(c) of the TFEU, since it pursues a 
policy objective of common interest, is necessary and proportionate and does 
not cause undue distortion of competition521. 
As already seen in the case of ZFUs in France, these zones represent relevant 
examples of STZs, since their tax advantages are granted according to the same 
EU law framework described under Chapter 3 and, in particular, according to 
the exemption to the general State aid prohibition stated by Article 107(3)(c). 
4.2.11.3 Special Economic Zones  
The Italian government has recently introduced the instrument of Special 
Economic Zones (hereinafter also “SEZs) for the establishment of territorial 
tax incentives aimed at the economic development of the southern and central 
regions of Campania, Basilicata, Puglia, Calabria, Sicily, Sardinia, Abruzzo and 
Molise. 
The instrument can be used within the threshold of the maximum aid intensity 
set by the regional aid map and, therefore, without a formal approval by the 
Commission according to the exemption from the notification requirement 
provided under the General Block Exemption Regulation522. In this sense, in 
fact, Article 5(4) of Decree-Law of 20 June 2017523, No. 91, as amended by Law 
of 3 August 2017, No. 123524, provides that the tax incentives of SEZs are 
granted within the limits set by Article 14 of Regulation (EU) No. 651/2014 
where the reference to the maximum aid intensity of the regional aid map is 
made. 
The relevance of the instrument for the scope of this review is evident; tax 
advantages are here granted according to a general block exemption which 
represents one of the main characteristic of the EU framework for State aid 
rules already described in Chapter 3; therefore, Italian SEZs constitute a clear 
example of regional aid designed within the limits of a general block exemption 
                                                             
520 On 7 April 2017 the Italian Parliament adopted Law n. 45 concerning new urgent 
measures  in  favour  of  the  population  affected  by  the  earthquakes  of  2016  and  of  
2017.  The  Law  of  7  April  2017  includes  Article  18-quarter  which  represents  the 
legal basis for an aid scheme for new investments in the 140 municipalities of the area 
surrounding the small towns hit by the earthquakes. 
521 Communication from the Commission of 6 April 2018 (State aid No. 48571), COM 
(2018) No. 1661 final, O.J. 2018, C 180, pp. 1-8. 
522 See supra paragraph 3.2.2.1 
523 O.J. of Italy No. 141 of 20 June 2017. 
524 O.J. of Italy No. 188 of 12 August 2017. 
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and, at the same time, an interesting form of expression of the phenomenon of 
STZs. 
The Decree of the President of the Council of Ministers of 25 January 2018, 
No. 12525, defines the modalities for the establishment of SEZs, including their 
duration (from a minimum of 7 years to a maximum of 14 years)526, the criteria 
for identifying and delimiting the SEZ area527, the criteria governing company 
access, and general coordination of development objectives528. In particular, the 
procedure for the establishment of a SEZ includes the submission from the 
regions to the Italian government of a proposal based on the strategic 
development529.  
The tax benefits granted are limited to direct taxation; SEZs in Italy, in fact, 
include a tax credit for companies initiating their economic activities or 
investments in such areas. The tax credit corresponds to 20% of investments 
(limited to a maximum of EUR 50 million) for small undertakings, 15% for 
average businesses and 10% for large companies, unless different rates are 
applied in certain areas530.  
The requirements for benefiting from a tax credit are: (i) maintaining the 
business established in a SEZ for seven years, at least, after the completion of 
the investment; and (ii) no order of dissolution is allowed531. 
At the time of writing, on the ground of the above legislation, only two SEZs 
have been established in Italy in the regions of Campania and Calabria, 
precisely in the harbour district composed of Naples, Salerno and 
Castellammare di Stabia, and in the harbour district of Gioia Tauro. 
4.2.11.4 Livigno  
The special tax-status of the municipality of Livigno, firstly introduced by the 
Austrian Empire in 1840, is based on its disadvantaged geographical condition 
that affects transports and connections. 
This STZ is excluded from the scope of the Union Customs Code532; 
accordingly, Article 2 of Italian Law of 1 November 1973, No. 762533 qualifies 
                                                             
525 O.J. of Italy No. 47 of 26 February 2018. 
526 Ibid., Art. 7. 
527 Ibid., Art. 3. 
528 Ibid., Art. 6. 
529 Ibid. According to this provision, the proposal must include a strategic development plan 
with data and elements that identify the types of activities intended to be promoted 
within the area and demonstrate the existence of an economic and functional link with a 
port area. 
530 See Art. 5(2) of Decree-Law of 20 June 2017, No. 91, as amended by Law of 3 August 
2017, No. 123. 
531 Ibid., Art. 5(3). 
532 See Article 4 UCC. 
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Livigno as an area outside the Customs Union line so that customs duties are 
not applied to goods introduced therein534. 
Furthermore, Livigno is outside the VAT area535; in this sense, in fact, Article 7 
of the Decree of the President of the Republic of 26 October 1973, No. 633536 
excludes this territory from the application of VAT. 
Livigno is also excluded from the application of excise duties according to 
Article 5(2) of Directive 2008/118/EC and, thus, the EU common system for 
excise duties does not apply therein. 
On these bases, Livigno represents one more relevant example of STZs 
essentially based on the exclusion of its territory from the scope of the indirect 
taxes harmonized at the EU level. 
4.2.11.5 Campione d’Italia 
Campione d’Italia is an Italian municipality and enclave surrounded by the 
Swiss territory and by the Lake of Lugano. 
Also Campione d’Italia can be considered as a STZ because of its exclusion 
from the territorial scope of the harmonized legislation on indirect taxes; this 
territory, in fact, is not only outside the Customs Union line537, but also outside 
the territorial scope of VAT538 and the common EU system for excise duty539. 
Nonetheless, indirect taxes in Campione d’Italia are applied according to Swiss 
customary law with the imposition of Swiss customs duties, Swiss VAT (8%) 
and Swiss excise duties.  
Otherwise, for what regards direct taxation, the Italian tax regime is regularly 
applied therein with some minimal exceptions540. 
                                                                                                                                               
533 Law of 1 November 1973, No. 762, O.J. of Italy No. 310 of 1 December 1973. 
534 This exemption is also applied to the following goods: liqueurs and spirits, sporting 
goods, perfumes and beauty products, cameras, radio and television, leather goods and 
articles of clothing.  
535 See Art. 4(1) UCC. 
536 Decree of the President of the Republic of 26 October 1972, No. 633, O.J. of Italy No. 
292 of 11 November 1972. 
537 See Art. 4(1) UCC. 
538 Article 6(2) of the Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on the 
common system of value added tax, O.J. 2006, L 347, pp. 1-118 
539 Campione d’Italia is excluded from the application of harmonized excise duties according 
to Article 5(2) of Council Directive 2008/118/EC under which the EU common system 
for excise duties shall not apply to this territory. 
540 For what concerns direct taxation, individuals that are resident in Campione d’Italia pay 
taxes on taxable income calculated with a favourable exchange rate. In fact, under Article 
188-bis of the Italian Income Tax Act, their income in Swiss currency for a total amount 
not exceeding CHF 200.000 is converted in EUR – for the purposes of the calculation of 
their tax debt - on the bases of a 27,91% flat reduction of the exchange rate (last update of 
10 February 2017). 
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4.2.12     Latvia 
4.2.12.1 Special Economic Zones in Latvia 
Special Economic Zones in Latvia (hereinafter also SEZs) have been 
established in 1997 to promote the international trade, the attraction of 
investments and the development of production and services, as well as the 
creation of new jobs541. 
In 2001 the Latvian Parliament has adopted the Law on “Tax Application in 
Free Ports and Special Economic Zones”542 to unify at national level the 
regulations applied on direct and indirect taxation. By this instrument, the 
Latvian legislator simplifies the legal framework of such zones creating a set of 
norms within a comprehensive legislative text aimed at describing all the 
elements and conditions of the tax advantages granted therein. 
At present, there are five SEZs in Latvia: the Free Port of Riga, the Free Port of 
Ventspils, the Special Economic Zone of Liepaja, the Special Economic Zone 
of Rezekne and the Special Economic Zone of Latgale. 
In order to qualify for tax benefits, companies based in Latvian SEZs must 
receive permits and sign agreements with the appropriate authorities: the state 
joint stock company “Rigas Tirdzniecibas Osta” (Riga Commercial Port) for the 
Free Port of Riga, the Ventspils Port Authority for the Ventspils Freeport, the 
Liepaja SEZ administration, the Rezekne SEZ administration, or the Latgale 
SEZ administration543. 
In this context, it is possible to identify a complex set of tax advantages dealing 
not only with direct taxation, but also with indirect taxation544. 
For direct taxation, the Commission has authorized the related measures, 
considering this regime as compatibile with the internal market pursuant to 
Article 107(3)(a) TFEU545.  
In details, companies based in Latvian SEZs are entitled to apply a CIT rebate 
in the amount of 80% of the gross tax due546; nevertheless, the same rebate is 
granted in the limit of a maximum amount compensated to the company 
                                                             
541 For an economic evaluation of the establishment of STZs in Latvia see M. E. PORTER, C. 
KETELS, Latvia: economic strategy after EU accession, Harvard Business School Case 707-
515, 2007, pp. 1-32, available at http://probni.fpn.bg.ac.rs/wp-content/uploads/Porter-
Ketels_Latvia_707515p2.pdf 
542 Law on “Tax Application in Free Ports and Special Economic Zones” of 27 July 2001, 
O.J. of Latvia No. 117 (2504) of 10 August 2001. 
543 Ibid., Section 7(4). 
544 See Section 8 of Law on Tax Application in Free Ports and Special Economic Zones. 
545 Communication from the Commission of 29 October 2014, COM (2014) No. 7812, O.J. 
2015, C 44, p. 1 
546 See Section 7(1) of Law on Tax Application in Free Ports and Special Economic Zones. 
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corresponding to 35% (45% for medium and 55% for small enterprises) of the 
accumulated amount of investments in these territories of up to EUR 50 
million547. 
Incentives for large-scale investment projects allow taxpayers to claim tax 
rebate for initial long-term investment in the following amounts: 35% of a total 
initial long-term investment up to EUR 50 million and 17,5% of the part of the 
total initial long-term investment exceeding EUR 50 million up to EUR 100 
million548. 
Companies based in Latvian SEZs are also entitled to apply a RET rebate in the 
amount of 80% of the tax amount calculated with reference to their immovable 
properties located in the territory of the zone549. 
Also in this case, the rebate is granted in the limit of a maximum amount 
compensated to the company corresponding to 35% (45% for medium and 
55% for small enterprises) of the accumulated amount of investments in these 
territories of up to EUR 50 million550. 
Furthermore, companies based in Latvian SEZs, which pay dividends, 
remuneration for management, consultancy services or royalties for intellectual 
property to a non-resident, withhold income tax from such payments with an 
80% rebate of the tax amount calculated551. 
For what regards indirect taxation, Latvian SEZs are fully harmonized 
according to the EU rules set for FZs by the UCC; in fact, these zones are 
mentioned in the updated list of the EU Commission552 and they have a 
perimeter fence with entry and exit points under the supervision of customs 
authorities.  
Therefore, pursuant to Article 237 UCC, customs duties and other indirect 
taxes are not charged when non-Union goods are introduced in these zones 
until the same goods are released for circulation or for another customs-
approved treatment. 
On the ground of the above characteristics, it is clear that SEZs in Latvia are 
one more important situation to be considered in the context of the present 
review; the related measures, in fact, are designed in line with the EU law 
framework for STZs, not only for what regards indirect taxation with the 
                                                             
547 Ibid., Section 8(1). 
548 Ibid., Section 8(1). 
549 Ibid., Section 6(1). 
550 Ibid., Section 8(1). 
551 Ibid., Section 7(3). 
552 See supra note 22. It is interesting to note that, even if, as of 2 January 2017, 
entrepreneurs operating within the newly established Special Economic Zone of Latgale 
may be eligible for certain tax breaks, the same zone is not yet mentioned in the last 
updated version of the list of existing Free Zones issued by the Commission. 
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harmonized rules of the UCC, but also with reference to direct taxation under 
the exemption stated by Article 107(3)(a) TFEU. 
4.2.13     Lithuania 
4.2.13.1 Free Economic Zones in Lithuania 
In Lithuania, the phenomenon of STZs can be identified in the context of  the 
so-called Free Economic Zones (hereinafter FEZs) introduced in 1995 in order 
to grant a complex set of tax benefits regarding both direct and indirect 
taxation553. 
According to the national legislator, a Free Economic Zone is defined as “a 
territory designated for the purpose of economic-commercial and financial activities 
within which economic entities are provided with special economic and legal 
conditions of operation as established by this Law”554. 
The aim of the national law is to create favourable conditions in these areas for 
the establishment of enterprises and the improvement of international trade, 
production and export, with the development of foreign investments and the 
creation of new jobs555; in particular, in order to start an activity in a FEZ, a 
company incorporated according to laws of the Republic of Lithuania must 
register and get a license issued by the zone administration company556. 
Currently there are seven FEZs in Lithuania: Klaipeda FEZ, Akmene FEZ, 
Siauliai FEZ, Panevezys FEZ, Kaunas FEZ, Marjampole FEZ and Kedainiai 
FEZ557. 
From the point of view of direct taxation, the Commission has authorized a 
special tax scheme considering it as an aid compatible with the internal market 
in the light of the exemption provided under Article 107(3)(a) TFEU558. 
In detail, companies based in FEZs whose capital investments in the area are no 
less than EUR 1 million do not pay any CIT for the first 6 years. The same 
companies pay an amount for CIT which is reduced by 50% for the next 10 
553 Law on the Fundamentals of Free Economic Zones of 28 June 1995, No. I-976, O.J. of 
Lithuania,1995, No. 59-1462. 
554 Ibid., Article 2(1). 
555 Ibid., Article 1. For a critical analysis of the establishment of STZs in Lithuania see O. 
PAVUK, T. NARUSHEVICH, G. PILAITIS, T. MERKULOVA, op. cit., in The Baltic Course, 2002, 
available at http://www.baltic-course.com/archive/eng/winter_2002/03free_zones.htm 
556 Ibid., Article 7 and Article 8(2) 
557 US DEPARTMENT OF STATE, BUREAU OF ECONOMIC AND BUSINESS AFFAIRS, 2017 
Investment Climate Statement, 2017, available at www.state.gov. 
558 For what concerns the Kaunas FEZ see Communication from the Commission of 1 July 
2005, COM (2005) No. 1327 final, O.J. 2005, C 230, p. 1. For FEZs in general see Case 
SA.39365 Regional State aid in the free economic zones scheme, notified on 18 August 2014. 
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taxable periods559.  
In any case, the tax benefit above described may be applied only if at least 75% 
of the company’s income during the tax period derives from manufacturing, 
processing, warehousing activities performed within the zone, from wholesale 
of goods warehoused within the zone or provision of services related to the 
activities carried out in the territory of the zone560. 
Furthermore, dividends earned from investments into a FEZ are exempt from 
withholding tax561, while, according to the Lithuanian Law on Immovable 
Property Tax562, the immovable property of the undertakings based in FEZs is 
exempt from RET. 
As far as indirect taxation is concerned, the Law on the Fundamentals of Free 
Economic Zones provides that “upon agreement with the Customs Department 
under the Ministry of Finance, parts of the zone territory may be up in conformity with 
the requirements for Free Zones defined in Council Regulation (EEC) No 2913/92 of 
12 October 1992 […]”563; accordingly, these territories should also be considered 
as Free Zones within the meaning of the Union Customs Code564, with a regime 
of deferral for what regards customs duties and other indirect taxes565. 
In this regard, there are some national provision which are able to implement 
the harmonized rules defined at the EU level for the purposes of VAT and 
excise duty; for example, Article 53 of Law of 5 March 2002, No. IX-751566 
provides that VAT is not charged on the supply of goods placed in a FEZ , while 
excise duty is not applied in such situations pursuant to Article 13 of Law of 30 
October 2001, No. IX-569567. 
Given the above, it is possible to conclude that, like in the case of Latvia, these 
zones are relevant for the scope of this review because the set of tax advantages 
provided is an expression of the same common EU law framework described in 
                                                             
559 Article 15(3) of Law on the Fundamentals of Free Economic Zones of 28 June 1995, No. 
I-976. 
560 Ibid., Article 15(3). 
561 Ibid., Article 15(4). 
562 Article 7(2) of the Law of 7 June 2005, No. X-233, O.J. of Lithuania, 2005, No. 76-2741. 
563 Article 2(2) of Law on the Fundamentals of Free Economic Zones of 28 June 1995, No. I-
976. 
564 Ibid., Article 16. The Union Customs Code has entirely replaced Council Regulation 
(EEC) No. 2913/92 of 12 October 1992. 
565 In this regard, it is worth to note that the last version of the EU list of FZs in operation in 
the customs territory of the Union (updated as of 17 November 2017) only includes the 
FEZs of Klaipeda, Kaunas and Siauliai. At the same time, this same list includes other 
areas in Lithuania close to Trakai and Vilnius which are not defined as Free Economic 
Zones under the national law.  
566 Law on VAT of 5 March 2002, No. IX-751, O.J. of Lithuania, 2002, No. 35-1271. 
567 Law on Excise Duty of 30 October 2001, No. IX-569, O.J. of Lithuania, 2001, No. 98-
3482. 
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Chapter 3, both for what concerns direct and indirect taxation. 
4.2.14   Luxembourg 
4.2.14.1 Luxembourg Free Port 
In Luxembourg, there is one Free Port established in 2014 as a facility 
constructed within the Luxembourg airport next to the Air Cargo Terminal. 
This area is considered as a Free Zone under the terms of the UCC and, 
therefore, it is expressely included in the list of FZs in operation in the customs 
territory of the Union, as communicated by the Member States to the 
Commission568. 
Accordingly, as non-Union goods enter the Luxembourg Free Port, they are 
automatically set under a special procedure of storage regulated by the UCC 
with a regime for deferral of customs duties and other charges, such as VAT and 
excise duty. 
Among the relevant national provisions, it is worth to mention the Law of 28 
July 2011569 which enables “freeport activities” in compliance with EU law, 
introducing a regime of suspension of VAT and other indirect taxes570; 
according to Article 60-bis of the Luxembourg VAT Act, in fact, VAT is not 
charged on the supplies of goods in the territory of the Luxembourg Freeport 
until the same goods are moved outside the zone or released for consumption. 
4.2.15    Malta 
4.2.15.1 Malta Free Port 
Malta has a Free Zone (Malta Freeport) located close to the Marsaxlokk harbor 
in the southern part of the island. 
The tax regime of this STZ entirely complies with the harmonized rules of the 
UCC and, therefore, the set of benefits there available is limited to indirect 
taxation, with  the deferral of custom duties, VAT and excise duty. 
The zone is mentioned in the list of FZs in operation in the EU and has a 
perimeter fence which is under the control of customs authorities. 
In this case, the Malta Freeport Corporation Ltd571 is the declared Authority 
568 See supra note 22. 
569 See Article 60-bis(1) of the VAT Act of 12 February 1979, O.J. of Luxembourg, 1979, 
Part A, No. 23. 
570 Further information are available at http://luxfreeport.lu 
571 See Act XXVI of 1989 (Malta Freeports Act), as amended by Legal Notice 103 of 1995 
(available at http://www.maltafreeport.com.mt); according to Article 5(1) “Malta Freeport 
Corporation Limited, a limited liability company (No. C9353) registered under the Commercial 
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responsible for the administration of the affairs of the zone by encouraging the 
establishment of enterprises following the issue of a specific license572.  
Within national legislation, the Malta Freeports Act, in line with the regime of 
deferral set by Article 237 UCC, provides that customs duties are not charged 
on the goods that are intended to be placed into the Freeport573. 
Furthermore, according to the Maltese VAT Act574 when goods are, on 
importation, placed under a customs duty suspension regime (i.e. into the Malta 
Freeport575) – the chargeable event does not take place and VAT becomes 
chargeable only when goods cease to remain subject to that regime576. 
Finally, excise duty is not charged pursuant to Article 15(8) of the Customs and 
Excise Tax Act 577 when non-Union goods are introduced in the Malta Free 
Port and until the same goods are moved outside the zone and imported in the 
customs territory of the Union or released for consumption. 
4.2.16     Poland 
4.2.16.1 Polish “Free Customs Duty Areas” 
The Polish Law on customs duties of 1989578 defines a Free Customs Duty 
Area as a separated and uninhabited part of Poland’s customs duty territory, 
considered as a territory in which Polish and international companies are 
allowed to carry out business activities, excluding retail trading579. 
The new Polish Customs Code, in force since 1 January 1998, defines these 
territories in a slightly different manner as zones separated from Poland’s 
customs duty area, in which non-domestic products are regarded to be outside 
the Poland’s customs duty line in the case of charging import duty fees and 
application of trading policies concerning the importation of goods 580. 
                                                                                                                                               
Partnerships Ordinance on the 25th day of January 1988 shall be deemed to be constituted under 
this Act and shall constitute the Freeport Authority”. 
572 Ibid., Article 6 according to which “Without prejudice to the generality of the powers 
conferred upon the Authority by this Act, the Authority may (b) enter into agreements with 
companies that seek to become licensed to operate in a Freeport”. 
573 Ibid., Article 15(1).  
574 See Act XXIII of 1998 (VAT Act), available at https://parlament.mt/media/1166/xxiii-of-
1998-value-added-tax-act.pdf 
575 Ibid., Fourth Schedule, Article 8(7)(4). 
576 Ibid., Fourth Schedule, Article 8(7)(1). 
577 Act XII of 1997 (Customs and Excise Tax Act), available at http://www.justiceservices. 
gov.mt/ 
578 Customs Law of 28 December 1989, as amended, O.J. of Poland No. 75/1989. 
579 K. BUDZOWSKI, Polish Free Customs Duty Areas, Customs Depots and Special Zones, in 
Zeszyty Naukowe / Polskie Towarzystwo Ekonomiczne, 2003, No. 1, pp. 49-59. 
580 Customs Code Act 1997, O.J. of Poland No. 1997/23/117. 
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Today, Polish Free Customs Duty Areas are relevant situations in the context of 
this research since they are entirely regulated according to the harmonized set 
of rules of the UCC, being a part of the territory of Poland separated from the 
rest of the State with clearly designated exit and entry points under the control 
of customs authorities. 
Today, seven Free Customs Duty Areas are functioning in Poland: the free area 
of Mszczonów (the region of Mazowsze), the free area of Gdańsk, the free area 
of Gliwice, the free area of Szczecin, the free area of Małaszewicze Małe 
(Terespol), the free area of Świnoujście, and the free area of Warszawa–Okęcie 
International Airport581.  
The major objective of these zones is to expand export activities, considering 
that all these areas have favourable locations in terms of transport and 
international communication582. 
The set of tax benefits available is limited to indirect taxation according to the 
harmonized rules of the UCC, with a regime of deferral for customs duties, 
VAT and excise duty. 
As far as the national legislation is concerned, the relevant provisions have only 
an implementing role with respect to the principles and rules stated by the 
Recast VAT Directive and the Excise Duty Directive; for example, under the 
Polish VAT Act of 2004583, a zero-tax rate applies to the supply of goods into 
Free Customs Duty Areas intended for export to non-EU countries. At the 
same time, Article 40(3) of the Polish Excise Duty Act584 provides that in the 
case of entry of goods into such zones the application of excise duty is 
suspended under a suspension arrangement585. 
4.2.17    Portugal 
4.2.17.1 Madeira  
The Madeira Free Trade Zone (FTZ) – also known as “The International 
581 See supra note 22. 
582 K. BUDZOWSKI, op. cit, in Zeszyty Naukowe / Polskie Towarzystwo Ekonomiczne, 2003, No. 
1, p.51. 
583 Article 83(22) of the Polish VAT Act, O.J. of Poland 2004, No. 54, Item. 535. 
584 Excise Duty Act of 6 December 2008, O.J. of Poland 2009, No. 3, Item 11. 
585 This provision represents the implementation of the norm set out by Article 7 of 
Directive 2008/118/EC, under which excise duties become chargeable only at the time of 
release for consumption or importation, while the Article 4 of the same Directive 
specifies that “importation of excise goods means the entry into the territory of the EU of excise 
goods unless the goods upon their entry into the Union are placed under a customs suspensive 
procedure or arrangement” (e.g. Free Zones). 
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Business Centre of Madeira” – has been established in 1980586 and is actually 
composed of an “Industrial Free Trade Zone”, an “International Shipping 
Register”, an “International Financial Service Centre” and an “International 
Service Centre”587. 
Today, the legal framework of this territory is characterized by the presence of 
three different State aid regimes authorized by the Commission under the 
exemption provided by Article 107(3)(a) TFEU and regulated by Portuguese 
domestic law588. In this regard, in fact, the Commission has considered the tax 
scheme as compatible with the internal market, as it is targeted to address the 
specific handicaps of Madeira, as an outermost region, and is proportional, 
since its conditions do not lead to an overcompensation of the additional costs 
of the aid beneficiaries; therefore the Commission has considered that the same 
scheme contributes to the regional development and to the diversification of 
the economic structure of Madeira, without negative effects on the trade 
between Member States589. 
Under the authorized tax scheme, service companies licensed in the Madeira 
FTZ enjoy many different benefits regarding direct taxation590. On these 
premises, the Madeira FTZ is relevant for this research, considering that the 
benefits granted are the result of the same EU legal framework described in 
Chapter 3, with particular reference to State aid rules and their system of 
exemptions. 
In detail, in the Madeira FTZ, according to the Tax Incentives Statute591, the 
                                                             
586 Decree Law of 20 October 1980, No. 500, O.J. of Portugal No. 243 of 20 October 1980. 
587 S. VASQUES, The Madeira Free Trade Zone: Compliance and Control Issues, in European 
Taxation, IBFD 2012, p. 149. 
588 State Aid Regime No. E19/1994 has been authorized by Commission Decision of 3 
November 1995 (SG95 D/1287); State Aid Regimes No. 222/A/2002 and No. 
222/B/2002 have been authorized by Communication from the Commission of 11 
December 2002, COM (2002) No. 4811 (O.J. 2003, C 134, p. 1), and by 
Communication from the Commission of 4 February 2003, COM (2003) No. 92; State 
Aid Regime No. 421/2006 has been authorized by Communication from the 
Commission of 27 June 2007, COM (2007) No. 3037 final (O.J. 2007, C 240, p. 1). For a 
comprehensive review of such state aid regimes see F. BRAS, P. DEWERBE, R. BORGES, The 
Madeira Free Zone and its standpoint within the European Union, in EC Tax Review, 2004, 
III, pp. 122-134. 
589 See Communication from the Commission of 27 June 2007, COM (2007) No. 3037 
final (O.J. 2007, C 240, p. 1). 
590 The present tax regime is outlined in Article 36 of the Portuguese Tax Incentives Statute 
approved by Decree Law of 1 July 1989, No. 215, O.J. of Portugal No. 149/1 of 1 July 
1989. 
591 See Article 36 of Statute of Tax Benefits as approved by Decree-Law of 1 July 1989, No. 
215, as amended, available at http://www.ibc-madeira.com/images/pdf/en-03-Art_33_34_T-
ax_Incent.pdf 
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income obtained by entities licensed between 1 January 2007 and 31 December 
2014 to carry out industrial, commercial, shipping and other services activities, 
is subject to taxation, until 31 December 2020, under the following terms:  a) in 
the years from 2007 to 2009 at a rate of 3%; b) in the years from 2010 to 2012 
at a rate of 4%; c) in the years from 2013 to 2020 at a rate of 5%.   
The entities who wish to enjoy these benefits also have to create one to five jobs 
in the first six months of their activity and undertake a minimum investment of 
EUR 75.000 in the acquisition of tangible or intangible fixed assets during the 
first two years of their activity or to create six or more jobs in the first six 
months of their activity592. 
Furthermore, dividends paid to corporate shareholders of companies licensed 
to operate within the Madeira FTZ, who are resident in EU countries or in 
countries with which Portugal has an agreement with a tax information 
exchange clause, benefit from the exemption from withholding tax in Madeira 
on dividends, royalties, and interests593. 
In addition, shareholders of companies based in the Madeira Free Zone are 
exempt from capital gains tax due on the sale of shares or on any share capital 
increase594, while no property tax is levied from companies based in the 
Madeira Free Zone in relation to real estate specifically allocated to the 
performance of the company’s activity595. 
For what regards indirect taxation, reduced VAT rates are applicable to 
operations localized in the territory of Madeira as follows: a standard VAT rate 
of 22% (instead of 23% applied in mainland Portugal), a reduced VAT rate of 
5% (instead of 6% applied in mainland Portugal) and a second reduced VAT 
rate of 12% (instead of 13% applied in mainland Portugal)596. 
592 Ibid., Article 36(5). Pursuant to this norm, in the case of non-fixed activity (e.g. building 
trades, street trading, taxis), the enterprise benefits from the tax exemption since it has an 
effective implementation in the area (e.g. office or workshop) and one of the following 
conditions is met: (i) it employs at least one full-time employee sedentary who operates in 
areas assigned to the activity; (ii) it achieves at least 25% of its revenue from customers 
located in the FTZ territory. In this regard, the European Commission has recently 
opened an in-depth investigation to examine whether Portugal has applied the Madeira 
Free Zone regional aid scheme in conformity with the Commission decisions approving 
it and, in particular, with the requirements that (i) the company profits benefiting from 
the income tax reductions originated exclusively from activities carried out in Madeira; 
and (ii) the beneficiary companies actually created and maintained jobs in Madeira (see 
European Commission, Press release of 6 July 2018, available at http://europa.eu/ 
rapid/press-release_IP-18-4384_en.htm. 
593 See Article 6(b) of Decree Law of 26 June 1986, No. 165, O.J. of Portugal No. 144/1 of 
26 June 1986. 
594 Ibid., Article 6(c). 
595 Ibid., Article 7(c). 
596 Available at http://exporthelp.europa.eu 
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Moreover, in Madeira, oil and energy products are exempt from excise duties 
when used in the production of electricity or city gas, as well as for entities that 
develop activities with reference to some categories of products597. Then, 
liqueur and “crème de”, which are respectively defined in categories 32 and 33 of 
Annex II of Regulation (EC) No. 110/2008  and are obtained from regional 
fruit or plants, are subject to a reduced rate of EUR 296,24 per hectoliter when 
produced and consumed in the autonomous region of Madeira. A reduced rate 
of EUR 34,34 per hectoliter applies to “Madeira Wine” (wine obtained from 
regional grapes specified in Article 15 of Regulation (EEC) No. 4252/88598), 
when produced and consumed in the autonomous region of Madeira599. 
Excise duty on tobacco and cigarettes manufactured in Madeira by small 
producers (with an annual production of less than 500 tones) are subject to a 
reduced rate of up to 50% less than the overall minimum rate when consumed 
in the autonomous region of Madeira600. 
Companies established in the FTZ of Madeira are also exempt from property 
transfer tax due on the acquisition of immovable property for their activities601. 
Documents, books, papers, contracts, acts and products included in the stamp 
tax general table, regarding entities licensed in the Madeira FTZ, are exempt 
from stamp tax602. 
In the territory of Madeira, there is also a Free Zone (Zona Franca da Madeira) 
in the port of Caniçal regulated by the UCC provisions, with entry and exit 
points under the supervision of customs authorities; thus, goods introduced 
into this zone are automatically set under a special procedure of storage 
according to Article 237 UCC, with the deferral of customs duties, VAT and 
excise duty603. 
4.2.17.2 Azores 
The legal framework of the Azores is characterized by the presence of a 
regional statute604 that embodies the system of autonomy envisaged by the 
                                                             
597 See Article 89 of Decree of 21 June 2010, No. 73, O.J. of Portugal No. 118/1 of 21 June 
2010. 
598 Council Regulation (EEC) No. 4252/88 of 21 December 1988 on the preparation and 
marketing of liqueur wines produced in the Community, O.J. 1998, L 373, pp. 59-65. 
599 See Article 78 Decree of 21 June 2010, No. 73.  
600 Ibid., Article 105.  
601 See Article 7(a) of Decree Law of 26 June 1986, No. 165. 
602 See Article 33(11) of the Statute of Tax Benefits as approved by Decree Law  of 1 July 
1989, No. 215, as amended. 
603 This zone is mentioned in the EU Commission list. See supra note 22. 
604 Law of 12 January 2009, No. 2, on the “Political and Administrative Statute of the 
Autonomous Region of the Azores”, available at http://www.alra.pt/documentos/estatuto_i-
ng.pdf 
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constitution of the Portuguese Republic of 1976. 
The region exercises its own fiscal power and may adapt the national tax system 
to the specific characteristics of the zone605. 
According to the Statute of the Azores, the Legislative Assembly of the region 
is able to legislate on matters regarding its own powers and to adapt the 
national tax system606, including the power to create and regulate taxes, 
defining their incidence, rate, liquidation, collection, and tax benefits607. 
Moreover, the Legislative Assembly detains the power to reduce the rates of 
income tax and VAT in accordance with the current legislation608 and the 
power to determine the application, in the Autonomous Region of the Azores, 
of special reduced rates for corporate income tax609. Finally, the fiscal 
autonomy provides for the power to concede temporary and conditioned tax 
benefits, related to national and regional taxes, within a contractual regime, 
applicable to relevant investment projects in the terms of the Finance Law of 
the Autonomous Regions610. 
Nevertheless, in the light of a decision of the ECJ611, the measures adopted in 
the past by the Autonomous Region of the Azores under the above institutional 
framework – consisting, for example, in rate reductions of income tax - have 
been considered as territorial selective and, therefore, as prohibited State aid. In 
this regard, in fact, the ECJ has put in evidence the lack of a real financial 
autonomy of the Azores, considering the presence of budgetary transfers from 
the central government pursuant to the duties of solidarity provided under the 
Portuguese Constitution; therefore, according to the same decision, the 
relevant legal framework for determining the selectivity of the tax measures 
adopted by the Azores has to be defined with reference to the whole of the 
Portuguese territory, in the context of which they appear to be selective.  
Given the above, the main tax benefits granted in the Azores are now 
essentially limited to indirect taxation, considering that, at the time of writing, 
for what regards direct taxation, it is not possible to identify neither a specific 
authorization issued by the Commission under the exemption of Article 107(3) 
TFEU, nor any other tax measure covered by a general block exemption for the 
entities based in the Azores. 
As far as indirect taxation is concerned, reduced VAT rates are applicable to 
operations localized in the Azores territory, as follows: a standard VAT rate of 
                                                             
605 Ibid., Article 20.  
606 Ibid., Article 50(1).  
607 Ibid., Article 50(2)(a).  
608 Ibid., Article 50(2)(d).  
609 Ibid., Article 50(2)(e).  
610 Ibid., Article 50(2)(g).  
611 Case C-88/03 Portugal v Commission, [2006] ECR I-7115.  
160
SPECIAL TAX ZONES IN THE MEMBER STATES 
 
18%, a reduced VAT rate of 4%, and a second reduced VAT rate of 9%612. 
For what concerns excises, liqueur and “crème de”, defined respectively in 
categories 32 and 33 of Annex II of Regulation (EC) No. 110/2008613, obtained 
from regional fruit or plants, are subject to a rate of EUR 322,32 per hectoliter 
when produced and consumed in the autonomous region of the Azores614. 
Cigarettes manufactured in the autonomous region of the Azores by small 
producers (with an annual production of less than 500 tones) are subject to a 
rate of 36,5% + EUR 15,30 per 1000 units when consumed in the same 
territory615. 
In conclusion, today the relevance of the Azores for this research is essentially 
limited to a set of tax advantages granted in the field of indirect taxation and, 
therefore, only under such terms, this territory should be qualified as a STZ 
with respect to mainland Portugal. 
4.2.18    Romania 
4.2.18.1 Romanian Free Zones 
The legal framework of STZs in Romania is mainly represented by Law of 21 
July 1992, No. 84616, concerning the regime of Free Zones, by Government 
Urgency Ordinance of 16 June 1997, No. 31617, concerning the regime of 
foreign investments in Romania, and by Law of 29 June 2001, No. 332618, 
regarding the promotion of foreign investments with significant impact on the 
economy. 
Under the above set of norms, today Romanian FZs only offer advantages on 
indirect taxation in compliance with the harmonized rules of the UCC, 
                                                             
612 Article 18(3)(a) of the Portuguese VAT Code. Mainland Portugal standard rate is 23%. 
An intermediate rate of 13% and a reduced rate of 6% are also applied to some specific 
products and services in the mainland. 
613 Regulation (EC) No. 110/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 
January on the definition, description, presentation, labelling and the protection of 
geographical indications of spirit drinks and repealing Council Regulation (EEC) No. 
1576/89, O.J. 2008, L-39, pp. 16-54. 
614 See Council Decision 376/2014/EU of 12 June 2014 authorizing Portugal to apply a 
reduced rate of excise duty in the autonomous region of Madeira on locally produced and 
consumed rum and liqueurs and in the autonomous region of the Azores on locally 
produced and consumed liqueurs and eaux-de-vie, O.J. 2014, L. 182, pp. 1-3. 
615 Portugal may apply a reduced rate of up to 50% less than the overall minimum rate to 
cigarettes consumed in the most remote regions of the Azores and Madeira, made by 
small-scale manufacturers each of whose annual production does not exceed 500 tonnes. 
616 O.J. of Romania, Part I, No. 182 of 30 July 1992. 
617 O.J. of Romania, Part I, No. 125 of 19 June 1997. 
618 O.J. of Romania, Part I, No. 356 of 3 July 2001. 
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representing one more example of the implementation of STZs according to 
the EU law framework described in Chapter 3. 
Pursuant to Article 1 of Law of 21 July 1992, No. 84, a Free Zone regime can be 
set up in maritime and river ports of Romania, along the Danube-Black Sea 
Channel, along other waterways and in the areas near the border crossing 
points in order to promote international trade and to attract foreign capital for 
the introduction of new technologies. 
The territorial delimitation of FZs is established by a government decision, 
following a proposal of the ministries interested and of the local public 
administration bodies619. 
Today, six FZs are established in the territory of Romania as confirmed in the 
updated list of the FZs in operation in the Union620 (Galati, Curtici – Arad, 
Sulina, Constantia South and Basarabi, Braila, and Giurgiu). 
These zones have entry and exit points controlled by customs authorities621 and 
are characterized by the application of a customs suspension regime regulated 
by the UCC, with the deferral of customs duties and other indirect taxes. 
Accordingly, the Romanian Customs Code establishes that customs duties are 
not charged on non-Union goods introduced in a FZ until the same goods are 
not realized for free circulation or placed under another procedure622. 
Other relevant national provisions include Article 144(1) of the Romanian 
Fiscal Code623, according to which operations carried out in a Free Zone are 
exempt from VAT624 except when goods are delivered for use or 
consumption625.  
The deferral of excise duty is then provided by Article 14 of Law of 21 July 
1992, No. 84626, while Article 167 of the Fiscal Code of 2003 specifies that the 
                                                             
619 See Article 6 of Law No. 84/1992, O.J. of Romania, Part I, No. 182 of 30 July 1992. 
620 See supra note 22. 
621 See Article 3 of  Law No. 84/1992, O.J. of Romania, Part I, No. 182 of 30 July 1992. 
622 See Article 17 of Law No. 84/1992, O.J. of Romania, Part I, No. 182 of 30 July 1992. 
623 Law No. 571/2003, O.J. of Romania No. 927 of 23 December 2003. 
624 The exempted operations are: 1) the entrance of foreign goods within a Free Zone 
directly from abroad, for simple storage, without customs formalities; 2) the commercial 
operation of sale-purchase of a foreign commodity between various operators from a 
Free Zone or between such operators and other persons from outside a Free Zone; 3) the 
removal of foreign goods from a Free Zone, outside the country, without customs export 
declarations, where the goods are in the same state as when they were introduced into the 
Free Zone; 4) supplies of services that are directly connected with the previous 
mentioned operations. 
625 See Article 144(2) of Romanian Fiscal Code. 
626 Article 14 of Law No. 84/1992: “For activities carried out in Free Zones, economic agents 
shall be exempt from the goods-circulation tax, excise and profits tax throughout the period of 
activity”. 
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placement of excisable products in a Free Zone cannot be considered as import 
for the purpose of chargeability627. 
4.2.19     Slovenia 
4.2.19.1 Free Port of Koper 
Today, there is only one FZ operating in Slovenia: the Free Port of Koper 
located on the Adriatic coastline. 
Also in this case, the tax regime of the zone is relevant for this research because 
it is based on the harmonized rules of the UCC – and, therefore, on the 
common EU framework of FZs described in Chapter 3 - with a set of benefits 
limited to indirect taxation and consisting in the deferral of customs duties, 
VAT and excise duty. 
The zone, which has entry and exit points supervised by the customs 
authorities628, is included in the list of FZs in operation in the customs territory 
of the Union, as communicated by the Member States to the Commission629. 
Among the relevant national legislation, Article 57(1) of the Slovenian Value 
Added Tax Act630 represents an implementation of the rules set by the Recast 
VAT Directive, providing the exemption from VAT for the supply of goods 
placed in a free zone (i.e. Free Port of Koper). Furthermore, according to Article 
6 of the Slovenian Excise Duty Act631, the charge of excise duty is suspended on 
importation where excise products are placed in a Free Zone (i.e. Free Port of 
Koper). 
4.2.20     Spain 
4.2.20.1 Spanish Free Zones 
Free Zones in Spain are located in Vigo, Cadiz, Barcelona, Las Palmas de Gran 
                                                             
627 Article 167 of the Romanian Fiscal Code of 2003: “The excise is chargeable at the moment 
of release for consumption or when losses or shortages of excisable products are discovered”. The 
national norm fully complies with the scope set out by Article 7 of Directive 
2008/118/EC, under which excise duties become chargeable only at the time of release 
for consumption or importation, considering that according to Article 4 of the same 
Directive “importation of excise goods means the entry into the territory of the EU of excise 
goods unless the goods upon their entry into the Union are placed under a customs suspensive 
procedure or arrangement” (e.g. Free Zones). 
628 See in this sense Article 16 of the Economic Zones Act, O.J. of Slovenia of 12 June 1998, 
No. 45. 
629 See supra note 22. 
630 O.J. of Slovenia No. 117/2006. 
631 O.J. of Slovenia No. 97/2010. 
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Canaria, Santa Cruz de Tenerife, Sevilla, and Santander632. They are all 
mentioned in the EU list of Free Zones633 and they have a perimeter fence with 
entry and exit points under the control of customs authorities, thus consisting 
in a special procedure of storage according to the harmonized rules of the 
UCC. 
The Zone Franca de Vigo - managed by a public institution named Consorcio de la 
Zona Franca de Vigo – has been established in 1947 and since then is involved in 
the promotion of the international trade with third countries634. 
The Zone Franca de Cadiz offers services of warehousing, loading and 
unloading, handling of goods, classification, stock control and transport. The 
zone is managed by the Cadiz Zona Franca Consortium, which is an institution 
of Public Law controlled by the Ministry of Treasury635. 
The Zone Franca Aduanera de Barcelona has been established in 1916 under the 
original denomination of Puerto Franco and it is actually managed by the 
“Barcelona Free Zone Consortium”636. 
The Free Zone of Las Palmas de Gran Canaria – which belongs to the region of 
Canary Islands - enjoys the Free Port status since its establishment in 1852 by 
the Decreto de Puerto Francos de Canarias and by the Free Ports Law of 6 May 
1900. In addition to the advantages on indirect taxation set by the harmonized 
EU rules, the Free Zone of Las Palmas also benefits from a special Fiscal 
Economic Regime (REF), which contains a series of favouring measures on 
direct taxation focused on the establishment of companies in the Canary 
Islands637.  
In 2006 the Ministry of Finance authorises the establishment of one more zone 
in Santa Cruz de Tenerife, allowing its entire port site area as well as the port of 
Granadilla, to be used as a Free Zone. The zone is administrated by the 
Consortium of Santa Cruz de Tenerife Free Trade Zone638. Also in this case, 
companies located therein may benefit from further advantages on direct 
                                                             
 632 For the review of the main literature on the topic see J. ARTEAGA ORTIZ, X. MARTINEZ 
COBAS, Las Zonas Francas en Espana y su utilidad, Delimitacion del concepto y perspectivas de 
futuro, in Boletin Economico de ICE, 2003, No. 2758, pp. 1-7; J. ARTEAGA ORTIZ, A 
CONESA FONTES, Las Zonas Francas en Espana, in Boletin Economico de ICE, 2000, No. 
2649, pp. 9-15; F. TRAMPUS, The Spanish Free Trade Zones as logistic platforms for trade with 
Latin America, in Trasporti – diritto, economia, politica, 2002, No. 88, pp. 87-105. 
633 See supra note 22. 
634 Available at http://www.zonafrancavigo.com 
635 Available at http://www.zonafrancacadiz.com 
636 Available at http://www.elconsorci.net/ 
637 See infra paragraph 4.2.20.2. 
638 Available at http://www.puertosdetenerife.org/memorias/memoria2010/7/7-port-activity-
en.html 
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taxation provided by the special Fiscal Economic Regime (REF)639.  
Finally, in 2016, two more FZs have been established in Santander and in 
Sevilla following the creation of a consortium with administrative functions640.  
Apart from the general deferral of custom duties provided under Article 237 
UCC, Article 23 of the Spanish VAT Law641 states that the entry of goods into 
a FZ is exempt from VAT; also in this case, the national norm clearly 
implements the provision set out by Article 156 of Directive 2006/112/EC 
according to which Member States are able to exempt, among the others, the 
supply of goods that are intended to be placed in a Free Zone. 
Furthermore, when non-Union goods are imported into a Spanish Free Zone 
from outside EU territory, excise duties are suspended until the goods are 
moved out of the zone and imported into the EU (where they become “Union 
goods”) or consumed within the zone; in this regard, in fact, Article 4(19) and 
(26) of the Spanish “Ley de Impuestos Especiales”642 specifies that the entry of 
goods into a suspension customs arrangement cannot be considered as 
importation and, consequently, such operations are not charged for the 
purposes of excise duties643. 
4.2.20.2 Canary Islands 
In the Canary Islands it is possibile to identify a complex set of tax advantages 
with respect ot the standard tax regime applied in the rest of Spain. 
For what regards direct taxation, the Commission has authorized the Economic 
and Fiscal Regime of the Canaries Islands (REF)644, stating that the same aid 
fulfils the criteria to be considered compatible with the internal market 
                                                             
639 See infra paragraph 4.2.20.2. 
640 See Order HAP/1412 of 29 August 2016 which authorizes the establishment of the 
“Consorcio de la Zona Franca de Santander”, O.J. of Spain No. 210 of 31 August 2016, pp. 
62091-62100; Order HAP/1358 of 25 July 2014 which authorizes the establishment of 
the “Consorcio de la Zona Franca de Sevilla”, O.J. of Spain No. 182 of 28 July 2014, pp. 
59873-59881. 
641 Law of 28 December 1992, No. 37, O.J. of Spain No. 312 of 29 December 1992. 
642 Law of 20 December 1992, No. 38, O.J. of Spain No. 312 of 29 December 1992. 
643 That is the implementation of the scope set out by Article 7 of the Directive 
2008/118/EC, under which excise duties become chargeable only at the time of release 
for consumption or importation, while Article 4 of the same Directive specifies that 
“importation of excise goods means the entry into the territory of the EU of excise goods unless 
the goods upon their entry into the Union are placed under a customs suspensive procedure or 
arrangement” (e.g. Free Zones). 
644 For a review of the REF regime, see CONFEDERACION REGIONAL DE EMPRESARIOS DE LAS 
ISLAS CANARIAS, Actualizacion del Regimen Economico y Fiscal de Canaria para el period 
2014-2020, Documento de bases, 2013, available at www.ccelpa.org. 
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pursuant to Article 107(3)(a) TFEU645. 
In this sense, the benefits there granted are shaped on the basis of the guidelines 
on regional aid and according to the regional aid maps for the period 2014-
2020646, taking into account the situation of the Canary Islands as an outermost 
region of the EU.  
The main rules on taxation are contained in Law of 6 July 1994, No. 19647, for 
the amendment of the Economic and Fiscal Regime of the Canary Islands, and 
in Law of 7 June 1991, No. 20648, for the amendment of the tax aspects of the 
same regime. 
One of the main characteristics of this tax scheme is that the most relevant 
benefits are conditioned to the realization of an investment in the Canary 
Islands; in fact, the Reserve for Investments in the Canary Islands (RIC) – one 
of the tax advantages granted in the context of the REF - is a tax benefit to 
promote investments, which can be applied to corporate entities subject to CIT 
with an establishment in the Canary Islands, as well as to individual 
entrepreneurs that determine their net income by the method of direct 
appreciation, provided that the income derives from economic activities located 
in the area. 
The RIC can also be applied to individuals and entities not resident in Spain 
that operate in the Canary Islands through a permanent establishment in order 
to obtain a reduction in the income taxable base. 
In detail, for what concerns companies, up to 90% of the annual undistributed 
profits can be allocated to a special investment reserve and will not be taxed, 
provided that the same profits are invested within a four-year period (including 
the period during which the profits are obtained) in qualifying assets in the 
Canary Islands or in certain public debt securities or shares in other companies 
operating in the Canary Islands that invest in qualifying assets649. 
For individual entrepreneurs the tax benefit consists in a PIT tax credit, based 
on the net income deriving from business exploitation assigned to the RIC, 
provided that it derives from activities located therein. 
The tax credit is determined applying the average tax rate to the annual 
allocation of the reserve, with the limit of 80% of the tax payable amount650. 
In the Canary Islands, State aid cannot exceed the 40% of the investment that is 
645 Communication from the Commission of 20 December 2006 (State aid No. 377/2006), 
COM (2006) No. 6635, O.J. 2007, C 30, p. 4. 
646 Communication from the Commission - Guidelines on regional State aid for 2014-2020, 
O.J. 2013, C 209, pp. 1-45. 
647 Law of 6 July 1994, No. 19, O.J. of Spain No. 161 of 7 July 1994. 
648 Law of 7 June 1991, No. 20, O.J. of Spain No. 137 of 8 June 1991. 
649 Ibid., Article 27(2). 
650 Ibid., Article 27(9). 
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financed by the same aid (percentage that increases to 50% for medium sized 
companies and 60% for small companies); these limits are applied considering 
not only the savings in the tax payable due to RIC, but any other aid (for 
example, subsidies). 
Taxpayers subject to CIT or PIT have the right to apply a rebate of 50% of the 
payable gross tax that proportionally corresponds to the net income obtained 
from the sale of goods manufactured in the Canary Islands in the agricultural, 
livestock, industry and fishing sectors651. 
The Special Register for Ships and Shipping Companies (REB) is a further tax 
incentive provided under the REF; according to this tax benefit, shipping 
companies benefit from a CIT rebate of 90% of the gross tax due, which 
corresponds to the apportion of the taxable base deriving from services 
rendered - by their ships registered in the Special Register - between the Canary 
Islands and between the Canary Islands and the rest of the Spanish territory652. 
Contracts and other legal acts executed over ships registered in this Special 
Register, which are subject to the transfer tax and stamp duty tax, are exempt 
from taxation653. 
Other benefits are granted under the Canary Islands Special Zone (ZEC) which 
consists in a low taxation plan created within the framework of the Canary 
Islands Economic and Fiscal Regime (REF) with the intention of encouraging 
the economic and social development of the Canary Islands and the 
diversification of their productive structure654.  
Some requirements must be fulfilled in order to qualify for the application of 
the ZEC regime.  
First, the recipient must be a newly constituted entity with its domicile and 
effective office in the ZEC territory. At least one of its directors must be 
resident in the territory of the Canary Islands655. The new company must make 
an investment in the territory of the Canary Islands of at least EUR 100.000 in 
fixed assets related to the activity within the first two years subsequent to the 
authorization by the Consorcio de la Zona Especial Canaria656.  
Additionally, the new entity must create at least 5 jobs within six months from 
the date it receives the authorization to establish itself as a ZEC entity, and 
                                                             
651 Ibid., Article 26(1). 
652 Ibid., Article 76. 
653 Ibid., Article 74. 
654 According to the Commission, the ZEC regime (State aid No. 376/2006) fulfils the 
criteria to be considered compatible with the internal market pursuant to Article 
107(3)(a) of the TFEU. See Communication from the Commission of 20 December 
2006, COM (2008) No. 6632, O.J. 2007, C 30, p. 4 
655 Article 40 of Law of 6 July 1994, No. 19. 
656 Ibid., Article 41. The limit of investments in fixed assets is at least EUR 50.000 in the 
following islands: La Palma, La Gomera, El Hierro, Fuerteventura and Lanzarote. 
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maintain an average of at least 5 jobs during the time it is registered as a ZEC 
entity657.  
According to the limit of EU law on accumulation of financial support and 
under certain conditions, ZEC tax advantages are compatible with other REF 
tax incentives such as the Reserve for Investments658. 
The companies in the ZEC territory are subject to CIT at a reduced rate of 
4%659, while the standard tax rate of CIT in Spain is currently 25%. 
The applicable tax rate is levied on the taxable amount arising from operations 
effectively carried out within the ZEC territory660. 
Even though the Canary Islands are outside the VAT EU area, a similar local 
indirect tax, known as the IGIC (Impuesto General Indirecto de Canarias), is 
applied at several different rates on imports661. The standard rate is 7%; there 
are also reduced rates for first necessity products or those which are not 
manufactured in the Canary Islands (0% and 3%). Nevertheless, under the 
Canary Islands Special Zone (ZEC), entities are also exempt from IGIC when 
selling goods and delivering services to other entities based in the ZEC, as well 
as when importing goods662.  
Then, the Canary Islands are excluded from the territorial scope of Directive 
2008/118/EC on excise duty663; therefore, instead of the common EU system 
for excise duty, the Canary Islands apply a tax authorized under Article 349 
TFEU, the so-called “Arbitrio sobre las Importaciones y Entregas de Mercancías” 
(AIEM). This tax is levied not only on goods originating from the territory of 
the Canary Islands, but also on importations of goods into the Canary 
Islands664. 
ZEC companies are also exempt from transfer tax (Impuesto sobre Transmisiones 
Patrimoniales - ITP) and stamp duty in certain operations such as, for instance, 
the purchase of goods for the development of the activity665. 
In conclusion, the Canary Islands, with their complex set of tax benefits, are an 
important example of a STZ; in this case, in fact, the aspects which are more 
relevant for the scope of this review involve not only the presence of an 
                                                             
657 The requirement is at least three jobs in La Palma, La Gomera, El Hierro, Fuerteventura 
and Lanzarote. 
658 See Article 42(2) Law of 6 July 1994, No. 19. 
659 Ibid., Article 44. 
660 Ibid., Article 44(1).  
661 See Article 2 of Law of 6 July 1994, No. 19. 
662See Article 46 Law of 6 July 1994, No. 19. 
663 Article 5(2) of Council Directive 2008/118/EC of 16 December 2008 concerning the 
general arrangements for excise duty and repealing Directive 92/12/EEC 
 664 For further details see Law of 26 June 2014, No. 4, O.J. of Spain No. 168 of 11 July 2015 
pp. 54383-54399. 
665 Ibid., Article 45. 
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authorized State aid regime under the exemption of Article 107(3)(a) TFEU, 
but also the exclusion of this zone from the territorial scope of the EU 
legislation for VAT and excise duty. 
4.2.20.3 Basque Country and Navarra 
The Economic Agreement between the Autonomous Community 
Government of the Basque Country and Spain666 recognizes the power of the 
institutions of the provinces of the Basque Country (Álava, Guipúzcoa and 
Vizcaya) to regulate taxes. In general, these provinces, being STZs, have full or 
shared regulatory authority in the area of direct taxation, but far more limited 
authority in the indirect taxation area. 
The institutions of the provinces of the Basque Country also have the power to 
levy, manage, assess, inspect, review and collect taxes, except with respect to 
custom duties and excises. All taxes levied under the Basque system are 
managed and collected by the Foral Treasuries as stipulated in the Economic 
Agreement. 
As already seen for Azores, this territory is a relevant example of STZ since it 
involves an assessment of the related tax measures in the perspective of 
territorial selectivity under State aid rules; also in this case, in fact, the ECJ has 
analyzed the conditions of institutional, procedural and financial autonomy in 
order to identify the Basque Country – and not the entire territory of Spain – as 
the reference framework of the judgement of selectivity667.  
As far as direct taxation is concerned, the Basque Country has its own PIT and 
CIT systems; differently, indirect taxes are almost completely harmonized at 
the EU level and the powers of the local authority are limited to specific aspects 
of managing such taxes.  
There are certain provisions in the Economic Agreement regarding CIT that 
make this region of Spain more attractive for companies; in the Basque 
Country, for example, a reduced rate of 20% is levied on small companies668 
                                                             
666 Ley 12/2002 de 23 de mayo 2002, por la que se aprueba el Concierto Económico con la 
Comunidad Autónoma del País Vasco, O.J. of Spain No. 124 of 24 May 2002.  
667 Joined cases C-428/06 to C-434/06 Unión General de Trabajadores de La Rioja (UGT-
Rioja) and Others v Juntas Generales del Territorio Histórico de Vizcaya and Others, [2008] I-
06747. 
668 See Article 13 Norma Foral 2/2014 de 17 de enero, sobre el Impuesto de Sociedades del 
Territorio Histórico de Gipuzkoa, O.J. of Spain No. 13 of 22 January 2014, according to 
which a small company is considered to be a company that meets the following 
requirements in the year prior to the application of the special tax regime: (i) it carries 
on a business activity; (ii) its net turnover or assets is under EUR 10 million; (iii) its 
average number of staff is under 50; (iv) an interest of 25% or more in the company is not 
held, directly or indirectly, by a company that does not meet the above requirements. 
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and on micro companies669. 
For small companies, other benefits concern the free depreciation for new 
tangible fixed assets (except buildings) and a general bad debt provision of up to 
1% of credit sales and services. 
In the case of micro companies, further tax benefits are identified in a general 
bad debt provision of up to 1% of receivables, a total depreciation/amortization 
charge of up to 25% of the net tax value or free depreciation for new tangible 
fixed assets (except buildings), and a general tax relief of 10% of prior positive 
taxable income given as a “tax compensation” for the difficulties faced by 
companies of this size670. 
For holding companies, including, amongst others, real estate companies, the 
tax rates are set on a range between 20% and 25%671, while other benefits 
regard the fact that an amount equal to 20% of gross income generated from 
leases of housing and their financial expenses may be considered tax deductible, 
as well as an amount equal to 30% of gross income generated from leases of 
other real estate and their financial expenses672. 
Beside the Basque Country, also Navarra is a STZ with respect to the CIT rate 
applied in comparison with the standard tax regime of the rest of Spain. In this 
case, in fact, the CIT rate is between 19% and 23% for small companies and 
                                                             
669 See Article 13 Norma Foral 2/2014, de 17 de enero, sobre el Impuesto de Sociedades del 
Territorio Histórico de Gipuzkoa, O.J. of Spain No. 13 of 22 January 2014, according to 
which a micro company is considered to be a company that meets the following 
requirements in the year prior to the application of the special tax regime: (i) it carries on 
a business activity; (ii) its net turnover or assets is under EUR 2 million; (iii) its average 
number of staff is under 10; (iv) an interest of 25% or more in the company is not held, 
directly or indirectly, by a company that does not meet the above requirements. 
670 Information available at http://taxsummaries.pwc.com/ID/Spain-Corporate-Other-issues 
671 See Article 55 Norma Foral 2/2014 de 17 de enero, sobre el Impuesto de Sociedades del 
Territorio Histórico de Gipuzkoa, O.J. of Spain No. 13 of 22 January 2014. According to 
Article 14 of the same law, the requirements to be taxed under these rates are as follows: 
a) the company's shareholders representing at least 75% of its capital are persons, holding 
companies, or other companies associated with such persons or companies. This 
requirement should be met throughout the tax period; 
b) for at least 90 days of the tax period, over half of the company’s assets are made up of 
securities or are not used to carry on business activities. Leased real estate is not 
considered to be used to carry on a business activity when the company does not have at 
least five employees on average in a year who work exclusively for the company on a full-
time basis; 
c) companies where at least 80% of their income is generated from assignments of use of 
real estate that is not considered to be a real estate leasing business activity or is generated 
from transfers of own capital to third parties or from provisions of services to associated 
parties and that do not have sufficient personal and material resources may also be taxed 
under this tax regime. 
672 Information available at http://taxsummaries.pwc.com/ID/Spain-Corporate-Other-issues 
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micro companies673 and, thus, lower than the average rate for Spain (25%); 
furthermore, 45% of the amounts accountable for a special investment reserve 
can here be reduced from the tax base674. Other benefits include freedom of 
depreciation for elements of tangible fixed assets whose unit value does not 
exceed EUR 1.800 and for elements related, exclusively and permanently, to 
research and development675. 
In summary, the tax regime of Navarra, unless not directly investigated by the 
Commission and the ECJ, clearly represents one more relevant example of 
STZ; also in this case, in fact, the conditions of institutional, procedural and 
financial autonomy qualify this territory as an infra-State body and, therefore, 
as the only reference framework to be considered for the assessment of 
selectivity. 
4.2.20.4 Ceuta and Melilla 
Ceuta and Melilla are Spanish territories located in continental North Africa. 
These zones belong to Spain since the formation of the modern Spanish State 
and, therefore, they are also a part of the EU and the Schengen Area. 
Pursuant to Article 144(b) of the Spanish Constitution, the cities of Ceuta and 
Melilla both have Statutes of Autonomy, respectively approved by Organic Law 
of 13 March 1995, No. 1676, and by Organic Law of 13 March 1995, No. 2677.  
However, on the ground of the same Statutes of Autonomy, these territories do 
not own any power concerning taxation and, thus, fiscal matters remain an 
exclusive competence of the central government. 
On these bases, Ceuta and Melilla can be identified as STZs with respect to the 
standard tax regime applied in Spain, considering the presence of a set of tax 
benefits both on direct and indirect taxation. 
In this regard, it is worth to note that the tax scheme on direct taxation for 
Ceuta and Melilla as provided by the national law678 – unless not previously 
investigated by the Commission – clearly represents an exception to the general 
State aid prohibition within the terms defined under Article 107(3)(a)679; 
                                                             
673 Article 51 Ley  Foral  26/2016  de  28  de  diciembre,  del  Impuesto  sobre Sociedades, O.J. of 
Spain No. 55, of 6 March 2017. 
674 Ibid., Article 44. 
675 Ibid., Article 18. 
676 Organic Law No. 1 of 13 March 1995 on the Statute of Autonomy of Ceuta, O.J. of Spain 
No. 62 of 14 March 1995. 
677 Organic Law No. 2 of 13 March 1995, No. 1, on the Statute of Autonomy of Melilla, O.J. 
of Spain No. 62 of 14 March 1995. 
678 See Article 69 of Royal Decree of 5 March 2004, No. 3, O.J. of Spain No. 60 of 10 March 
2004, pp. 10670-10721. 
679 In this sense see M. MORON PEREZ, El Regimen Fiscal de las Ciudades Autonomas de Ceuta y 
Melilla: Presente y Futuro, Cronica Triburaria, in Crónica tributaria, 2006, 121, pp. 88 et seq. 
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therefore, both these territories have to be considered as relevant situations for 
the purposes of the present research. 
In detail, the set of tax incentives is characterized by a deduction from CIT and 
PIT applied in the amount of 50% of the income obtained in Ceuta and 
Melilla680; income generated in trading activities is deemed to be obtained in 
Ceuta or Melilla, as long as these activities are organized, controlled, managed 
and invoiced from these territories through a fixed place of business located 
therein681. 
Activities other than trading (e.g. manufacturing or services) can also enjoy the 
tax relief, although in this case the activity must be performed in these 
territories. Spanish legislation also provides for specific rules to allocate to 
Ceuta and Melilla the profits of fishing, shipping and air transport. These 
criteria are based on the place of effective management of the company, the 
place where the contracts are closed and the place where the boats and aircrafts 
are registered682. 
Then, for what regards indirect taxation, further aspects confirm the possibility 
to qualify Ceuta and Melilla as STZs; both these territories, in fact,  are 
excluded from the application of VAT683 and, thus, they are not part of the EU 
VAT area. They levy an indirect tax on production, services and imports called 
IPSI (Impuesto sobre la Producción, los Servicios y la Importación), but with lower 
tax rates (from 0,5% to 10%)684 and with a supplementary levy on tobacco and 
fuels685. 
At the same time, customs duties are not applied to goods introduced in Ceuta 
and Melilla, considering that these territories are outside the line of the 
Customs Union pursuant to Article 4 UCC. 
As Ceuta and Melilla are both excluded from the EU excise area686, only a 
special tax on certain forms of transportation (Impuesto Especial sobre 
Determinados Medios de Transporte)687 and a special electricity tax (Impuesto 
Especial sobre la Electricidad)688 are applicable.  
680 See Article 69 of Royal Decree of 5 March 2004, No. 3. 
681 Article 33(2) of Royal Decree of 5 March 2004, No. 4, as amended by Law of 29 October 
2013, No. 16, O.J. of Spain No. 260 of 30 October 2013, pp. 87528 – 87568. 
682 Ibid., Article 33(5). 
683 See Article 3 of Law of 28 December 1992, No. 37, O.J. of Spain No. 312 of 29 
December 1992. See also Article 6 of Council Directive 2006/112/EC. 
684 See Law of 25 March 1991, No. 8, O.J. of Spain No. 73 of 26 March 1991. 
685 Ibid., Article 18-bis. 
686 Article 5(2) Council Directive 2008/118/EC of 16 December 2008 concerning the 
general arrangements for excise duty and repealing Directive 92/12/EEC. 
687 Law of 28 December 1992, No. 38, O.J. of Spain No. 312 of 29 December 1992, pp. 
44305-44331. 
688 Ibid., Article 3. 
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4.2.21     United Kingdom 
4.2.21.1 Gibraltar 
Gibraltar is a British overseas territory located near the southernmost tip of the 
Iberian peninsula, sharing its border with Spain to the north. It is part of the 
EU, having joined the European Economic Community under the United 
Kingdom in 1973.  
According to Article 355(3) TFEU, the EC Treaty is applied to “the European 
territories for whose external relations a Member State is responsible”, a provision 
which in practice only applies to Gibraltar.  
As a separate jurisdiction to the UK, Gibraltar’s government and parliament are 
responsible for the transposition of EU law into local law.  
The constitutional status of Gibraltar is unique; although Gibraltar is not a 
separate Member State689, it is a distinct jurisdiction with its own Parliament 
enacting legislation in all areas of local concern, while UK retains responsibility 
in limited aspects such as foreign affairs and defense690. 
However, Gibraltar has to be considered a STZ for the purposes of the present 
research; its tax system, in fact, deviates from the standard regime applied in the 
mainland United Kingdom which remains the Member State responsible for its 
external relations. 
At the same time, Gibraltar is an infra-State body which enjoys enough 
institutional, procedural and financial autonomy with respect to the mainland 
United Kingdom; consequently, as stated by the ECJ691, the reference 
framework for the assessment of the selectivity of the tax measures under State 
aid rules must be identified in Gibraltar a not in the mainland United Kingdom. 
As far as corporate income tax is concerned, a tax rate of 10% is applied in 
Gibraltar692, but there is a surcharge of an additional 10% on utilities companies 
and on any company which has a dominant market position693. 
Gibraltar adopts a territorial source principle of taxation under which income 
689 In this sense, see Case C-591/15 The Gibraltar Betting and Gaming Association Limited v 
Commissioners for Her Majesty's Revenue and Customs and Her Majesty's Treasury, [2017] 
ECR I-00000, where the ECJ states that “Article 355(3) TFEU, in conjunction with 
Article 56 TFEU, is to be interpreted as meaning that the provision of services by operators 
established in Gibraltar to persons established in the United Kingdom constitutes, as a matter of 
EU law, a situation confined in all respects within a single Member State” (paragraph 56). 
690 HOUSE OF COMMONS, FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE, Gibraltar: Time to Get off the Fence, 
Second Report of Session 2014-15, House of Commons, London, 2014. 
691 Joined Cases T-211/04 to T-215/04 Commission and Spain v Government of Gibraltar and 
United Kingdom, [2008] II-03745. For the review of the case see supra paragraph 3.2.1.5. 
692 The standard CIT rate in the United Kingdom is 19%. 
693 Legal Notice No. 187 of 2010,  O.J. of Gibraltar, II, No. 3827 of 23 December 2010. 
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not accrued in or derived from Gibraltar is not taxed in Gibraltar. 
Thus, companies are liable to CIT in Gibraltar on specified sources of income 
that are accrued in, derived from, or received in Gibraltar.  
Furthermore, dividend income of a Gibraltar company from foreign 
investments or from another Gibraltar company is exempt from tax in 
Gibraltar. 
Interests received or receivable from inter-company loans are taxable in 
Gibraltar if the company receiving the interests is registered in Gibraltar at the 
following tax rates: 10% for inter-company interests above GBP 100.000; 0% 
for inter-company interests less than GBP 100.000 unless the income falls 
within the scope of trading income (e.g. banks)694. 
Among the other main tax benefits, it is important to note that there is no 
withholding tax on dividends, interests or royalties paid by a Gibraltar 
company to a foreign shareholder (company or individual) or to another 
Gibraltar company695. 
There is no capital gains tax in Gibraltar, which means that there is no tax or 
charge payable in respect of gains made by companies in relation to the disposal 
of capital assets. 
According to this principle, the Gibraltar Income Tax Act specifies that capital 
gains and capital losses shall be excluded in ascertaining the amount of profits 
or gains696. 
Further tax advantages derive from the exclusion of Gibraltar from the 
territorial scope of indirect taxes harmonized at the EU level. 
In this regard, in fact, Gibraltar is outside the perimeter of the Customs 
Union697, with a special regime on customs according to which customs duties 
are levied on goods imported into Gibraltar, mostly at rates from 6% to 12%, 
while, as of 1 July 2010, import duty on pedal cycles, electric cars, solar paneling 
and related equipment is reduced to 0%698.  
Furthermore, Gibraltar is outside the EU VAT area699 and EU excise area700 
and, thus, it is a VAT free jurisdiction with local excises levied mainly on spirits, 
wines, tobacco and mineral oil. 
                                                             
694 Income Tax Act, Schedule 5, Article 6(1), available at http://www.gibraltarlaws.gov.gi/-
articles/2010-21o.pdf 
695 Ibid., Schedule 5, Article 6(1). 
696 Ibid., Schedule 3, Article 1(1) 
697 See Article 29 of the Treaty of Accession of Denmark, Ireland, and the United Kingdom 
(1972), O.J. 1972, L 73, pp. 1-204.  
698 Imports and Exports Act, 1986 (Act. No. 1986-21), available at http://www.gibraltarlaw-
s.gov.gi/articles/1986-21o.pdf 
699 See Article 28 of Treaty of Accession of Denmark, Ireland, and the United Kingdom 
(1972), O.J. 1972, L 73, pp. 1-204. 
700 Ibid. 
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4.3 Final remarks 
The factual experience of the EU outlines a complex framework characterized 
by the presence of various situations which correspond to the phenomenon of 
STZs. 
As seen in this chapter, it is possible to identify many initiatives aimed at the 
introduction of a specific set of tax advantages for the entities based in a limited 
territory at the sub-State level. At the same time, apart from the adoption of a 
specific tax policy, also the exclusion of some territories from the territorial 
scope of EU legislation is a relevant situation for the purposes of the present 
study. 
From the structural point of view, the tax advantages cover all the main 
typologies of taxes, both for what regards direct and indirect taxation, and are 
granted through different instruments, including exemptions, deductions, 
rebates, tax credit, etc. Also the objectives pursued can be different; while in 
some cases, the scope of such initiatives is the development of a specific 
economic policy, in other cases, the objectives of a social character are the main 
driver of a STZ, with the inclusion of the same initiative in the context of a 
social policy. 
Given the above, besides the literature and the EU law sources reviewed in the 
previous chapters, the description of the various STZs in the Member States is 
one more useful starting point for the analysis of the research questions. 
In this direction, all the collected material can now be used as the basis for the 
next phase of the research where the approach will be focused on a conceptual 
analysis aimed to the identification of new findings and original results.  
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CHAPTER 5 
ANALYSIS OF THE FIRST RESEARCH QUESTION: 
DEVELOPING A GENERAL LEGAL THEORY OF 
SPECIAL TAX ZONES 
5.1 Introduction 
The material reviewed in the previous chapters gives evidence of various 
situations where tax incentives are reserved to a limited area of a Member State. 
As already seen, in fact, STZs are a common phenomenon within the EU 
framework, representing not only an instrument of tax policy for the public 
authorities, but also a strategic factor for the allocation choices of the economic 
operators. 
However, the legal bases on which STZs are established are often different, as 
well as the objectives pursued in the context of such initiatives. Some zones are 
essentially structured on the ground of the customs legislation or other sources 
of indirect taxation which are already harmonized at the EU level; in other 
cases, as far as direct taxation is concerned, national or local legislation fulfills 
the main role in the definition of the tax regime applied in a STZ, although with 
important limits due to the fundamental principles and freedoms of the TFEU. 
At the same time, there are situations where the tax advantages provided within 
a STZ are clearly aimed to the achievement of objectives of economic policy, 
with growth-focused measures specifically targeted to improve the margin of 
profit of enterprises; nonetheless, beside such measures, there are also other 
examples where STZs are used as an instrument of social cohesion policy for 
the improvement of the living conditions of disadvantaged groups of 
individuals. 
In this context, the literature on the topic does not offer the possibility to 
explain the multiform sides of the phenomenon, especially in the area of 
European tax law, where the aspects of STZs are not properly investigated 
from a systematic perspective; the previous studies, in fact, as already seen in 
Chapter 2, are generally limited in their scope and mainly based on an 
economic approach to the topic701. 
On these premises, the aim of this chapter is to fill this gap of knowledge with 
the definition of a general legal theory for all these different experiences of 
STZs, approaching the issues which involve the following research question: 
 
                                                             
701 For these considerations see supra paragraph 2.7. 
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Research question No. 1  
In the context of European tax law, is it possible to develop a general legal theory of 
STZs able to explain the different experiences of territorial tax incentives in the 
Member States?   
 
The general legal theory is here developed through the conceptual analysis of 
the material reviewed in the previous chapters; in this sense, the literature on 
the topic, the EU law framework for direct and indirect taxation, and the factual 
experience of the Member States, represent the fields of analysis for the 
identification of a common reading-key and a set of basic coordinates. 
As it will be shown in the next paragraphs, this process valorizes all the 
different issues related to the phenomenon, with the development of a general 
legal theory focused on the concept of STZs and on its territorial, structural and 
the functional dimension. 
At the end of this process, the analysis of the findings will include the provision 
of a comprehensive definition of STZs able to encompass all the different 
situations identified at the EU level, both for what regards the areas 
characterized by tax benefits on direct taxation and the other areas with tax 
benefits limited to indirect taxation.  
As the last step, the general legal theory will be completed with the 
identification of the implementing models adopted in the EU framework; for 
this scope, the catalogue of STZs described in Chapter 4 will be used as the 
starting point for the recognition of the common features of each model, with a 
specific focus on the perspective emerging from the concept of STZs and from 
its territorial, structural and functional dimension. 
5.2 The concept 
The analysis of the experience of the various Member States outlines a set of 
essential elements representing the basics of the concept of STZs. 
In the light of the legal dimension and the EU law framework respectively 
explored in Chapter 2 and in Chapter 3, the characteristics of each area can be 
compared and deeply screened under a three-dimensional approach; in all the 
cases, in fact, a STZ presents basic features for what regards the territorial 
limits, the typologies of tax benefits and the methods used for granting them, 
and, finally, also for what concerns the specific objective pursued by the public 
authority responsible for the same measures.  
Given the above, the next paragraphs will be dedicated to the explanation of the 
results of the research process, giving evidence of the various aspects which 
influence the design of a zone. 
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The resulting concept includes a territorial dimension, mainly related to the 
necessary presence of a well-defined geographical border, a structural 
dimension, focusing on the typologies of the tax benefits provided, and, finally, 
a functional dimension that considers the objectives of tax policy carried out 
through the establishment of STZs. 
The outcome of the research involves a new approach to STZs in the context of 
European tax law, with the identification of a general concept able to explain 
the various experiences of the Member States. 
In this direction, the research overcomes the limits of the previous studies702, 
opening a new perspective where the territorial, the structural and the 
functional dimension of STZs become the essential reading-key for a better 
understanding of the phenomenon. 
5.2.1 The territorial dimension 
The territorial dimension is the first issue to be analyzed in the process aimed at 
formulating the definition of the concept of STZs. 
In particular, the results of this research put in evidence three different profiles 
to be considered under the same territorial dimension, namely the geographical 
delimitation, the reference framework and the territorial connecting factor 
which is adopted in the context of each zone. 
5.2.1.1 The geographical delimitation 
The existence of a geographical border represents the most basic feature of 
STZs which is immediately recognizable in the factual experience. 
The analysis of the literature on the topic confirms the importance and the 
necessity of a clear delimination of each zone; the scholars, in fact, often focus 
on this aspect in their attempts to provide a comprehensive definition of the 
same phenomenon. 
In this sense, the “Special Tax Zone”, regardless of the specific denominations 
used  in each national context, is sometimes defined as a “preferential tax regime 
that is ring-fenced”703, “a well-defined geographical area”704, or “as a geographically 
                                                             
702 For these considerations see supra paragraph 2.7. 
703 R.S. AVI-YONAH, M. VALLESPINOS, Special Tax Zones and the WTO, University of 
Michigan Public Law Research Paper No. 545, 2017, available at https:// 
ssrn.com/abstract=2928644 
704 P. LOROT, T. SCWOB, Les Zones franches dans le monde, in La Documentation francaise, 1987, 
pp. 11 et seq. ; A. T. ROMERO, ILO's World Labour Report of 1996, International Labour 
Organization (ILO), 1996 ; UNCTAD, Export Processing Zones: role of foreign direct 
investment and development impact, UNCTAD Secretariat, Geneva, 1993, p. 5. 
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or administratively limited area”705; other scholars, which stress the point of view 
of customs, define STZs “as areas with specific definition in or near a port, which 
are considered external to the customs territory”706, “an area of a port separated from 
the national customs territory through a barrier”707, or as “a defined area, closed and 
controlled under the supervision of a special office of federal official”708. 
In the context of EU law, the geographical delimitation of STZs emerges from 
State aid rules considering that the exemptions provided under Article 
107(3)(a) and (c) TFEU are set with regard to aid in order to promote the 
economic development of “certain areas”. Then, the same profile is also 
valorized by the Union Customs Code where a Free Zone is defined as a part of 
the customs territory of the Union limited from the rest of it709, having a 
perimeter fence supervised by customs authorities710. 
Furthermore, the recent Guidance of the Code of Conduct Group711 defines 
these zones as a “special geographic area”, stressing again the aspect of the 
geographical delimitation. 
Beside the EU law sources, also national legislation offers some opportunities 
to set a focus on the profile of the geographical delimitation; for example, in the 
case of Bulgaria, a STZ is defined as “a delimited part of the territory”712, while in 
Italy such zones are considered as “a geographically delimited and clearly identified 
area”713. 
Given the above, the geographical delimitation always constitutes a necessary 
element of STZs; nonetheless, it is also important to distinguish the various 
ways through which the same geographical delimitation is concretely defined.  
In this direction, the analysis and the comparison of the factual experience of 
the Member States offer important results able to give evidence of the various 
options available; in fact, beside the construction of an artificial fence requiring 
705  M. INGROSSO, O. NOCERINO, F. ROCCATAGLIATA, C. SACCHETTO, op. cit., Chamber of 
Commerce of Naples, Naples, 1998, pp. 9 et seq.; A. BASILE, D. GERMIDIS, Investing in 
Free Export Processing Zones, OECD Development Centre Studies, Paris, 1984, p. 20. 
706 A.L. LOMAX, The Foreign Trade Zone, School of Business Administration, University of 
Oregon, Eugene (Oregon), 1947, p. 5. 
707 R. S. MAC ELWEE, Port Development, 1926, p. 381. See also R.S. THOMAN, Free ports and 
foreign-trade zones, Cornell Maritime Press, Cambridge, 1956. 
708 See A. ISAACS, International Trade Tariff and Commercial Policies, Richard D. Irwin Inc., 
Chicago (Illinois), 1948, pp. 753 et seq. 
709 Art. 237 UCC. 
710 Art. 243(3) UCC. 
711 Guidance of the Code of Conduct Group (Business Taxation) on tax privileges related to 
special economic zones of 19 June 2017, Council of the European Union, Bruxelles, 
document No. 10487/17. 
712 Article 3 of Decree of 14 July 1987, No. 2242, O.J. of Bulgaria No. 55 of 17 July 1987. 
713 Article 4(2) Law Decree of 20 June 2017, No. 91, O.J. of Italy No. 141 of 20 June 2017. 
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the human intervention, there are also situations where the border of a STZ is 
identified with a natural barrier. Consequently, while in the first case the 
delimitation of the zone is assured by the presence of a perimeter fence such as 
a wall, a net, or other artificial constructions714, in the second case the natural 
landscape represents a geographic limit used to precisely identify the area715. 
A third option consists in the conventional delimitation of the zone through the 
use of an ideal line on the map, without any artificial or natural barrier set to 
identify the geographical border of the zone716. 
Finally, it is also possible to find some hybrid situations where one part of the 
geographical border is delimited by the natural landscape (e.g. sea or lake) and 
the other one is delimited by an artificial barrier, such as a perimeter fence717, or 
even conventionally through an ideal line drawn on the map718. 
5.2.1.2 The reference framework 
The territorial dimension also involves some considerations about the 
reference framework which is relevant for the assessment of the tax incentives; 
the identification of a STZ, in fact, is always the outcome of a process of critical 
comparison between the tax benefits there provided and the standard regime 
applied in the reference framework. 
The analysis of the EU experience confirms that the standard tax regime of each 
Member State represents the fundamental parameter for the identification of 
the exceptional regime applied in a STZ; in other words, each Member State 
becomes the sole reference framework for the recognition of the favouring 
effects produced by the tax regime applied in a STZ. 
The same conclusions are also valid for the sub-State bodies with sufficient 
autonomy, such as  the Basque Country, Navarra, Saint-Martin, and Gibraltar; 
in all the situations, in fact, the reference framework for the concept of STZs 
corresponds to the territory of the hosting Member State and not to the 
territory of the infra-State body as stated by the ECJ in the Azores case719. This 
is because the decision of the ECJ in the Azores case, with reference to the 
conditions of institutional, procedural and financial autonomy, assumes its 
relevance in a different context, namely for the purposes of the selectivity test 
under State aid rules. Differently, for what regards the concept of STZs here 
                                                             
714 E.g. Free Zones under the Union Customs Code where the presence of a perimeter fence 
is always required. 
715 E.g. Canary Islands, Madeira, Azores where the ocean represents the natural barrier of 
the STZ. 
716 E.g. Urban Tax-Free Zones in France and in Italy. 
717 E.g. Campione d’Italia, Mount Athos, Gibraltar, Ceuta, Melilla and French Guyana. 
718 E.g. Saint-Martin. 
719 Case C-88/03 Portugal v Commission, [2006] ECR I-7115. 
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developed, the reference framework remains the national territory of the 
Member State which is responsible for the external relation of the infra-State 
body720, in accordance to the approach used in Chapter 4 for the identification 
of the various examples of STZs. 
In other terms, situations like those of Gibraltar, the Basque Country, Navarra 
or Saint-Martin, all fulfilling the conditions of institutional, procedural and 
financial autonomy according to the position of the ECJ, have to be considered 
as STZs for the purposes of this study, since their reference framework can 
always be identified in the territory of the Member State which is responsible 
for their external relations (i.e. United Kingdom, Spain and France). 
On these premises, as far as the reference framework becomes an essential 
profile of the territorial dimension, it finally can be concluded that STZs can 
only cover a minor part of the national territory according to a basic scheme 
with an exceptional tax regime, on one part, and a standard tax regime, on the 
other; in all the situations reviewed under Chapter 4, in fact, the territory of 
each STZ is always defined as a minor part of the Member State where a 
specific set of territorial tax advantages deviates, totally or in part, from the 
standard system of taxation applied in the rest of the State. 
In this regard, it is also important to note that the territorial dimension of a STZ 
only involves cases of asymmetrical autonomy where a minor part of a State 
claims a special tax treatment that is not applied elsewhere in the same State. 
Differently, in the case of symmetrical autonomy, namely the situation where a 
State is equally divided in regions or other infra-State bodies with their own 
taxing powers, it is not possible to identify any kind of STZs, since in such 
situations there is not a reference framework with a standard tax regime to be 
used as a term of comparison. 
In summary, the assessment of the tax regime of a STZ has always to be carried 
out with a focus set on the standard tax regime applied in the Member State 
concerned; in this sense, the national territory becomes the reference 
framework for this process of critical comparison. 
It is thus possible to conclude that the reference framework represents one 
more qualifying aspect to be considered in the context of the territorial 
dimension; this aspect always involves an assessment in terms of comparison 
between the exceptional tax regime applied in a STZ and the standard tax 
regime applied in the rest of the hosting Member State.  
5.2.1.3 The territorial connecting factor 
Lastly, the territorial dimension involves one more profile concerning the legal 
criteria used to consider an economic activity as based within the perimeter of a 
                                                             
720 See Art. 355(3) TFEU. 
182
ANALYSIS OF THE FIRST RESEARCH QUESTION 
 
STZ and, thus, as covered by the tax incentives granted therein. 
In this regard, the discussion generally deals with the territorial connecting 
factor adopted by the legislator, namely the rules through which an economic 
activity carried out by an individual or a company may be linked to the territory 
of a STZ and benefit from the related tax incentives721. 
Within the Member States, it is possible to identify a multitude of different 
criteria on the ground of the various forms of taxation and the corresponding 
level of harmonization. 
For what regards indirect taxation, the Union Customs Code identifies the 
territorial connecting factor for the purposes of custom duties considering the 
placement of goods; in this sense, Article 237 UCC defines the Free Zones as a 
special procedure of storage under which Union or non-Union goods may be 
placed without being subject to customs duties and other indirect charges.  
Then, it is important to consider the territorial connecting factor identified for 
VAT and excise duty, as this assumes a specific relevance for distinguishing the 
economic activities which benefit from the exclusion from the territorial scope 
of the Recast VAT Directive and the Excise Duty Directive. 
In the case of VAT, the territorial connecting factor is defined with reference to 
the place where the goods are located at the time when the supply takes place722 
or the place where the goods are located at the time when dispatch or transport 
of the goods to the customer begins723, or, for supply of services, with reference 
to the place where the supplier has established his business or has a fixed 
establishment from which the service is supplied, or, in the absence of such a 
place of business or fixed establishment, the place where he has his permanent 
address or usually resides724. Differently, for the general arrangements on 
excise duty, the EU legislation provides that excise duty becomes chargeable at 
the time, and in the Member State, of release for consumption725. 
                                                             
721 A. DAGNINO, op. cit., CEDAM, 2008, p. 37. 
722 See Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on the common system of 
value added tax, O.J. 2006, L 347, pp. 1-118, Art. 31. 
723 Ibid., Art. 32 
724 Ibid., Art. 43 
725 Council Directive 2008/118/EC of 16 December 2008 concerning the general 
arrangements for excise duty and repealing Directive 92/12/EEC, Art. 7 according to 
which “release for consumption” means any of the following: (a) the departure of excise 
goods, including irregular departure, from a duty suspension arrangement; (b) the 
holding of excise goods outside a duty suspension arrangement where excise duty has not 
been levied pursuant to the applicable provisions of Community law and national 
legislation; (c) the production of excise goods, including irregular production, outside a 
duty suspension arrangement; (d) the importation of excise goods, including irregular 
importation, unless the excise goods are placed, immediately upon importation, under a 
duty suspension arrangement. 
183
CHAPTER 5 
 
The criteria used sensibly change as far as direct taxation is concerned; in the 
case of income tax, in fact, Member States are in principle free to determine 
their own criteria through national legislation, considering the absence of 
harmonized rules at the EU level. 
For example, Madeira, the Canary Islands and the Urban Tax-Free Zones in 
France and in Italy are all characterized by a territorial connecting factor 
associated to the presence of an economic activity in the area with the 
fulfillment of some specific requirements, such as the number of employees 
hired726, the volume of business with customers residing in the zone727, or the 
minimum amount of investment in fixed assets728. In other cases, the criteria 
used refer to a “fixed place of business” from where the economic activity is 
organized, controlled, managed and invoiced (e.g. Ceuta and Melilla)729.  
In any case, regardless of some minimal differences in the national legislation, 
the experience of the Member States, as outlined in the above examples, 
confirms the possibility to associate the territorial connecting factor for direct 
taxation to the concept of “permanent establishment” which is defined, under 
Article 5 of the OECD Model Tax Convention, as “a fixed place of business, 
through which the business of an enterprise is wholly or partly carried on”730. 
                                                             
726 In Madeira the entities who wish to enjoy the tax benefits have to create one to five jobs in 
the first six months of activity (see supra paragraph 4.2.17.1). In the Canary Islands 
Special Zone (ZEC), the new entities must create at least five jobs within six months 
from the date they receive the authorization to establish in the zone and maintain an 
average of at least five jobs during the time there are registered as a ZEC entity (see supra 
paragraph 4.2.20.2). In the case of the enterprises established in the French Urban Tax-
Free Zones the number of employees living in the zone territory with a permanent 
contract or with a contract of at least 12 months must be equal to at least half of the total 
employees; furthermore, the number of employees hired after the fulfilment of the same 
conditions of contract and residence must be at least half of the employees hired during 
the same period (see supra paragraph 4.2.7.2). In the Italian Urban Tax-Free Zones, 
enterprises which benefit from the income tax exemption must employ at least one-full 
employee who performs his job in a stable manner within the perimeter of the ZFU (see 
supra paragraph 4.2.11.2). 
727 In the Italian Urban Tax-Free Zones, enterprise must achieve at least 25% of the volume 
of business with customers residing in the ZFU (see supra paragraph 4.2.11.2). 
728 In Madeira the entities who wish to enjoy the tax benefits also have to undertake a 
minimum investment of EUR 75.000 in the acquisition of tangible or intangible fixed 
assets during the first two years of activity (see supra paragraph 4.2.17.1). In the Canary 
Islands the new companies based in the ZEC must make an investimetn in the territory of 
at least EUR 100.000 in fixed assets related to the activity within the first two years 
subsequent to the authorization by the administrative authority (see supra paragraph 
4.2.20.2). 
729 See supra paragraph 4.2.20.4. 
730 OECD, Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital: Condensed Version 2017, OECD 
Publishing, 2017, Paris, available at https://doi.org/10.1787/mtc_cond-2017-en. For a 
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This conclusion finds clear evidence in the situations of Gibraltar and the 
Basque Country where the national legislation in force explicitly extends the tax 
benefits granted within such zones to the “permanent establishment of a non-
resident company”731. 
In this regard, it is important to observe that the general use at the national level 
of the permanent establishment concept as a territorial connecting factor for 
STZs is not the result of a random process; the use of such a criterion, in fact, 
represents the effect of the negative integration of EU law, with particular 
reference to the limits set by the freedom of establishment to the legislative 
initiatives of the Member States. Member States, in fact, are generally free to 
determine their own legislation in the areas of exclusive competence – such as 
direction taxation – but are obliged, at the same time, to exercise their power in 
compliance with the basic principles of EU law, including the freedom of 
establishment. 
In this sense, a territorial connecting factor defined by the national legislator 
with exclusive reference to the residence of an individual or a company – and 
not also with reference to its permanent establishment – would determine a 
differentiated tax treatment between the residents and non-residents of a STZ, 
with the production of a discriminatory effect and the infringement of the 
freedom of establishment732. 
According to the ECJ, in fact, the evaluation of a tax measure applied in a STZ, 
including its territorial connecting factor, has to be carried out in the light of the 
principle of tax non-discrimination; from this perspective, a national rule with a 
discriminatory content, with a differential treatment of residents and non-
residents, may constitute a restriction on the freedom of establishment where 
there is no objective difference in the situation which would justify different 
treatment between various categories of taxpayers733. 
In other words, as expressly stated in a case concerning the previous tax regime 
applied in the Basque Country734, a permanent establishment of a non-resident 
comprehensive review of “permanent establishments” see E. REIMER, N. URBAN, S. 
SCHMID, A domestic taxation, bilateral tax treaty, and OECD Perspective, Kluwer Law 
International, Alphen aan den Rijn, 2011. 
731 See supra paragraph 4.2.20.3 (for the case of the Basque Country) and paragraph 4.2.21.1 
(for the case of Gibraltar). 
732 See Case C-169/08 Presidente del Consiglio dei Ministri v Regione Sardegna, [2009] I-
10821. 
733 Case C-169/08 Presidente del Consiglio dei Ministri v Regione Sardegna, [2009] I-10821, 
paragraph 37. 
734 Opinion of Advocate General Saggio delivered on 1 July 1999. Joined cases C-400/97, C-
401/97 and C-402/97 Administración General del Estado v Juntas Generales de Guipúzcoa 
and Diputación Foral de Guipúzcoa, Juntas Generales d'Alava and Diputación Foral d'Alava 
and Juntas Generales de Vizcaya, [2000] ECR I-01073. 
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company cannot be excluded from the tax benefits provided in the same zone 
solely on the ground of the lack of the condition of residence 735.  
In conclusion, from the analysis of the EU framework and the experiences of 
the Member States it is clear that the territorial connecting factor assumes 
different forms in the case of indirect taxation, on one part, and in the case of 
direct taxation, on the other. While in the first situation, the criteria used 
correspond to the place where the goods are located at the time of the relevant 
operation – except for the supply of services under VAT rules where the place 
of business or fixed establishment is considered – differently, in the case of 
direct taxation, Member States generally define the territorial connecting factor 
in accordance with the limits set by the ECJ in order to avoid an infringement of 
the freedom of establishment; in this sense, in fact, the permanent 
establishment, even with the specific characteristics of each national context, 
represents today the parameter in accordance with EU law which is normally 
used to set a link between a business entity and the tax benefits available within 
a STZ.  
5.2.2 The structural dimension 
The structural dimension of STZs is probably the most decisive factor from the 
economic operator’s point of view, since the strategic choice of establishing a 
business within a zone is usually linked to the exploitation of the related tax 
benefits. In this sense, the focus turns to the specific provisions able to 
introduce exceptions to the standard rules applied in the hosting State with the 
final aim of reducing the tax burden. 
Given the above, it is now necessary to switch to a more technical approach and 
to deepen the analysis of the structural aspects of STZs by the review of the 
different types of tax benefits usually introduced therein.  
Preliminary, it must be noted that, in such cases, the standard rules of the tax 
system of the hosting Member State – namely the reference framework - are 
not applied in the area, in whole or in part; in this sense, the tax benefits 
introduced in STZs are based on a negative conception characterized by the 
total or partial denial of the standard tax rules applied in the reference 
framework736. 
The denial of the standard tax rules is set in various forms in the experiences of 
the Member States and can lead to different outcomes that are described here 
below under the conceptual categories of the “exclusion regimes”, on one part, 
and “subtractive regimes”, on the other737. 
735 Ibid., paragraph 25. 
736 P. BORIA, Il sistema tributario, Wolters Kluwer Italia, Milan, 2008, p. 1035. 
737 Ibid., p. 1039. 
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5.2.2.1 Exclusion regimes 
The “exclusion regimes” are the result of an intervention through which the 
legislator limits the effects of the standard rules relevant under the discipline of 
one or more taxes, with the consequent refusal of such rules within the territory 
of the zone. 
The term “exclusion”, in fact, can be used to identify those areas that are entirely 
outside the perimeter in which the standard tax rules produce their effects.  
In these cases, it is not possible to identify the presence of a subtractive scheme 
with positive rules for counterbalancing the effects of the exclusion and, thus, 
the structural dimension merely corresponds to the negative result of the 
limitation of the area of application of one or more taxes.  
In other words, a situation of “exclusion” is characterized by the mere outlining 
of the external perimeter of the national territory where tax rules produce their 
effects; at the same time, the national legislator does not provide any special 
regime for the STZ whose territory remains outside the geographical limits of 
application of the same rules738. 
On these bases, the exclusion regimes clearly differ from the concept of 
exemption where - as it will be explained in the next paragraph - there is a 
subtractive regime provided by the legislator with exceptions to the standard 
rules of taxation generally applied in the rest of the hosting State. 
Following the analysis of the material reviewed in the previous chapters, typical 
examples of tax benefits belonging to the category of the “exclusion regimes” 
may be identified with the zones that are entirely set outside the Union 
Customs line739 or the EU VAT area740 where customs duties and VAT are not 
applied and where, at the same time, no subtractive regimes have been 
introduced for the regulation of the same taxes.  
5.2.2.2 Subtractive regimes 
In other cases, STZs are characterized by the presence of a subtractive regime 
with a positive discipline that differs from the standard one applied throughout 
the rest of the State. These rules usually affect the elements of the tax structure, 
such as the tax base or the tax rate, by the modification of the sequence that 
                                                             
738 For a comparison between exclusions and exemptions, see S. LA ROSA, Esclusioni 
tributarie, Enc. Giur., XIII, Rome, 1989; N. D’AMATI, Agevolazioni ed esenzioni tributarie, in 
Noviss. Dig. It., Appendix, I, Turin, 1980, pp. 153 et seq.; v UCKMAR, Principi comuni di 
diritto costituzionale tributario, CEDAM, Padova, 1999, pp. 71 et seq.  
739 E.g. Livigno (Italy), Ceuta and Melilla (Spain), Gibraltar (United Kingdom), Mayotte and 
French Guyana (France). 
740 E.g. Mount Athos (Greece), Livigno (Italy), Ceuta and Melilla (Spain), Gibraltar (United 
Kingdom). 
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leads from the general factual element relevant under the tax rule to the 
determination of the final amount due by the taxpayer741.  
All these situations are considered as exceptions to the standard rules of 
taxation, given the fact that, otherwise, the activities carried out in the zone 
would be subject to the standard tax discipline applied in the reference 
framework. 
Therefore, there is always a relationship and a comparison between the basic 
situation (the standard tax treatment applied in the reference framework) and 
the subtractive discipline and, consequently, the result of this comparison 
highlights a negative difference suitable to generate a benefit to the taxpayer. 
The subtractive discipline consists of a rule of positive law according to which 
the standard norm does not produce its effects, definitely or temporarily, with 
reference to one or more elements of the tax structure742. 
Under these subtractive regimes it is possible to work out a classification 
according to the way through which the tax structure is affected, considering 
that tax benefits, both as they are temporary or perpetual, may intervene on the 
premises of the tax, on the tax base, on the tax rate, or on the procedures of 
assessment or those of collection743. 
On these bases, it is possible to analyze the factual experience of the EU, with 
reference to the tax benefits classification proposed by Sandford744, later used 
by Cedefop745, which distinguishes five categories of incentives: 
(a) tax exemptions: the income produced by entities based in STZs is exempted 
from taxation and, thus, it is not considered as taxable income. Among such tax 
incentives, it is possible to identify situations of full746 or partial exemption747 
in which the subtractive discipline is aimed at excluding the income produced, 
totally or in part, from the application of taxation; 
741 P. BORIA, op. cit., Wolters Kluwer Italia, Milan, 2008, p. 1039. 
742 Ibid., p. 1037. 
743 F. FICHERA, Le agevolazioni fiscali, CEDAM, Padova, 1992, p. 67. 
744 C. SANFORD, Why Tax Systems Differ: A Comparative Study of the Political Economy of 
Taxation, Fiscal Publications, Bath, 2000. 
745 CEDEFOP, Using tax incentive to promote education and training, European Centre for the 
Development of Vocational Training (Ed.), CEDEFOP panorama series, Luxembourg, 
2009, p. 21. 
746 E.g. CIT and PIT exemption for Zone Franche Urbaine (ZFU) in France; IRAP and RET 
exemption for Zone Franche Urbane (ZFU) in Italy; CIT and RET exemption for Free 
Economic Zones in Lithuania; PIT and RET exemption for Madeira in Portugal. 
747 E.g. CIT and PIT exemption for Zone Franche Urbane (ZFU) in Italy, limited to 60% from 
the sixth to the tenth year, to 40% from the eleventh to the twelfth year and to 20% from 
the thirteenth to the fourteenth year; CIT dividends exemption for Canary Islands 
Economic and Fiscal Regime (REF) up to 90% of annual undistributed profits. 
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(b) tax allowances748: the deduction from the gross income (gross tax base) of 
an amount usually corresponding to the expenses occurred for some specific 
needs previously identified by the legislator. The result of the deduction 
determines the net taxable income;  
(c) tax credits749: the deduction from the gross tax due of an amount (tax credit) 
usually corresponding to a percentage of the total expenses made by the 
taxpayer for some specific needs previously identified by the legislator. The 
result of the deduction determines the net tax due;  
(d) tax relief750: the application of a lower tax rate to the net taxable income;  
(e) tax deferrals: the delay in the payment of taxes with the consequent 
suspension of any obligation set by the tax rule. Such provisions simply 
postpone the withdrawal, without changing the amount of the tax. The most 
classic example is the Free Zone regulated by the UCC where the tax benefit 
consists of a mere suspension of the taxation, given the fact that the same goods 
introduced into the Free Zone may be subjected to the levy once they exit out of 
the zone or are released for consumption. 
Furthermore, apart from the above classification proposed by Sandford, the 
analysis of STZs in the EU context, as already carried out in Chapter 4, offers 
the opportunity to recognize other situations belonging to the category of 
subtractive regimes as follows: 
f) tax rebate751: a reduction in the amount of tax to be paid, generally expressed 
in the form of a percentage; 
g) tax replacement regime752: in this case the subtractive discipline does not 
represent a mere modification of one or more elements of the existing tax 
structure applied in the rest of the State, but it contains a replacement regime 
                                                             
748 E.g. PIT reduction for Overseas departments (DOM) in France; PIT and CIT deduction 
for Ceuta and Melilla in Spain. 
749 E.g. PIT tax credit for Overseas departments (DOM) in France; PIT tax credit for Canary 
Islands Economic and Fiscal Regime (REF), CIT tax credit for Special Economic Zones 
in Italy. 
750 E.g. CIT rate reduction for Saint-Martin in France; CIT, PIT, Excise and VAT rate 
reduction for Azores; CIT rate reduction for Madeira; CIT rate reduction for Canary 
Islands Special Economic Zone (ZEC) in Spain. 
751 E.g. CIT, RET and withholding tax rebate for Special Economic Zones in Latvia; CIT and 
PIT rebate for the production of corporal goods in the Canary Islands; CIT rebate for the 
Special Register for Ships and Shipping Companies Regime (REB) in Canary Islands. 
752 E.g. Special import duties and local excise are applied in Gibraltar; in Ceuta and Melilla 
IPSI is applied instead of VAT; in Canary Islands IGIC and AIEM are applied instead of 
VAT and excise; in French Overseas departments OM and OMR are applied instead of 
excise duties, while an alternative VAT system is applied in the same zones; in Saint-
Martin Tax Generale sur le Chiffre d’Affaire is applied instead of VAT. 
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with regulations able to introduce a totally different tax structure, even through 
the introduction of a new tax.  
5.2.3 The functional dimension 
Beside the structural and the territorial dimension, there is one more 
perspective to be used for the definition of the concept of STZs which is mainly 
focused on the reasons according to which territorial tax benefits are granted. 
In this direction, the functional dimension involves the analysis of the tax 
policies and the government functions associated to the establishment of STZs 
with a teleological approach to the topic where the objectives pursued become 
the main aspect to be considered753. 
Only a few previous studies have outlined the importance of this perspective; 
under the theory of tax expenditures754, for example, scholars identify a strict 
link between the favouring tax measures, on one part, and the objectives of tax 
policy which are pursued by the government, on the other755. 
In this case, tax benefits are seen as a tool in the hands of governments to grant, 
indirectly, a form of subsidy which could also be introduced through different 
rules not belonging to the tax law field (i.e. contributions and other public 
grants); therefore, the concept of tax expenditures is representative of the active 
role of the State in the management of public resources through the 
establishment of tax benefits aimed at pursuing some specific objectives of tax 
policy. 
The conclusion is that the introduction of tax advantages in a limited territory 
of a Member State always represents the result of a political choice involving 
the management of public resources and, thus, assuming relevance in the 
context of the functional dimension. 
Given the above, the experience of the Member States confirms the existence 
of a functional dimension of STZs; all the related tax measures, in fact, are 
753 S. LA ROSA, Le agevolazioni tributarie, in Trattato di diritto tributario, diretto da Amatucci A., 
Padova, 1994, I, 1, pp. 401 et seq. 
754 See P.R. MC DANIEL, S.S. SURREY, International Aspects of Tax expenditures: A comparative 
study, Springer Netherlands, Deventer, 1985; SS. SURREY, Pathways to Tax Reform: The 
Concept of Tax Expenditures, Harvard University Press, 1973. The results of these studies 
have been later used by international organizations. See, for instance, OECD 
COMMITTEE ON FISCAL AFFAIRS, Tax expenditures. A review of the issues and country 
practices, OECD publications, Paris, 1984; v HALBERSTADT, Tax incentives as an instrument 
for achievement of governmental goal, Report from the Netherlands for the 1976 Congress of 
the International Fiscal Association, Jerusalem (Israel), 13-17 September 1976, Deventer, 
1976. 
755 A. DAGNINO, op. cit, CEDAM, Padova, 2008, p. 20. 
190
ANALYSIS OF THE FIRST RESEARCH QUESTION 
 
defined on the ground of a specific objective of economic and/or social policy 
pursued at the national level.  
In this sense, the adoption of a functional perspective offers the opportunity to 
associate each tax measure in a STZ with a specific government function; under 
this approach it is thus possible to distinguish between economic policies, on 
one part, including government functions like commerce and economic 
development, and social policies, on the other, including government functions 
such as welfare, employment or social services. 
On the ground of these ideas, the analysis of the material of the previous 
chapters finally outlines the possibility of a classification of tax incentives based 
on the same perspective; in this regard, in fact, the category of economic tax 
incentives, on one part, and the category of social tax incentives, on the other, 
represent the systematic approach used in the next paragraphs to explore and 
to explain the functional dimension of STZs. 
5.2.3.1 Economic tax incentives 
The analysis of the experience of the Member States gives evidence of many 
situations where the tax incentives granted in a STZ are univocally aimed at 
pursuing economic objectives. 
As far as indirect taxation is concerned, the harmonization achieved at the EU 
level clearly influences the same objective pursued in the context of a STZ; the 
establishment of the internal market, in fact, is the main driver of the process of 
harmonization and, therefore, the tax incentives on indirect taxation, including 
those introduced within a STZ, are generally addressed to objectives of an 
economic character.  
For example, in the case of Free Zones, the deferral of customs duties and other 
indirect charges, as established under the Union Customs Code, is clearly 
aimed at the improvement of the efficiency in the import/export process and, 
thus, to the development of the international trade of goods. 
The economic objective can also be found in the STZs which are excluded from 
the territorial scope of the EU legislation on indirect taxation, such as Ceuta 
and Melilla in Spain756 or Helgoland and Busingen in Germany757. In these 
situations, the exclusion from the territorial scope of the Union Customs Code, 
the Recast VAT Directive and the Excise Duty Directive is established on the 
ground of some historical privileges due to the local communities in 
consideration of the disadvantaged geographical location; the tax benefits, in 
fact, - which are there granted through the establishment of an “exclusion 
regime” - represent a form of compensation of the high transportation costs 
                                                             
756 See supra paragraph 4.2.20.4. 
757 See supra paragraph 4.2.8.2. 
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and are aimed at promoting domestic products and services in the international 
market. 
For what regards direct taxation, there are also many situations where the tax 
incentives are targeted to the achievement of the same objectives of an 
economic character. 
In this sense, there is the example of Special Economic Zones in Italy which 
have been established to encourage the creation of favourable conditions in 
economic, financial and administrative terms, for the development, in some 
areas of the State, of existing economic activities or for the settlement of new 
ones758. 
The same purposes can be identified in the case of Special Economic Zones in 
Latvia759 and Free Economic Zones in Lithuania760, or also in the case of the 
business entities established in Saint-Martin761, where the objective is 
associated to the development of the international trade and the improvement 
of the attractiveness of such zones for foreign investments. 
The Basque Country and Navarra are also characterized by the presence of a set 
of tax incentives which are addressed to the improvement of the 
competitiveness of the economic activities based in these territories and to the 
development of the international trade762. 
Finally, in the case of Gibraltar it is evident that the tax advantages there 
granted are aimed to the pursuit of economic objectives; the territorial source 
principle of taxation and the withholding tax exemption for dividends, interests 
and royalties paid by a Gibraltar company to foreign shareholders give evidence 
of an objective which is associated to the development of foreign investments in 
the same territory763. 
In all the aforementioned situations, it is clear that the government functions 
which can be associated to the tax advantages granted are exclusively related to 
economic development and commerce in general, while it is not possible to 
recognize any social function under the same tax measures. 
These conclusions are also confirmed by the analysis of the conditions under 
which the tax benefits are granted in each STZ; in most of the cases, in fact, the 
eligibility requirements are related to a certain minimum amount of 
investments764 or to the establishment of the economic activity in the STZ for a 
758 See Article 4 of Decree-Law of 20 June 2017, No. 91, O.J. of Italy No. 141 of 20 June 
2017. 
759 See supra paragraph 4.2.12.1. 
760 See supra paragraph 4.2.13.1. 
761 See supra paragraph 4.2.7.4. 
762 See supra paragraph 4.2.20.3. 
763 See supra paragraph 4.2.21.1. 
764 For example, in the case of Free Economic Zones in Lithuania, companies whose capital 
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minimum number of years765. Differently, there are no conditions of a social 
character regarding, for example, the creation of a certain number of new jobs 
or the hiring of workers belonging to a disadvantaged category. 
Given the above, the results of the present research finally outline the 
fundamentals of a first category of tax incentives which characterize the 
functional dimension of STZs; in this context, in fact, it is possible to identify 
the category of “economic tax incentives” - also defined as “business related tax 
incentives” or “income related tax incentives”766 – which include all the tax 
measures addressed to the pursuit of objectives of an economic character. 
As already seen, economic tax incentives are widely used across the various 
Member States as an instrument of economic policy under specific government 
functions. In such situations, economic tax incentives are used to promote the 
economic development of certain areas and the international trade between the 
operators based therein; the aim is often to change the trend of the 
macroeconomic system and the level of different economic indicators, with the 
improvement of the results in terms of marginal profits for the undertakings 
which are active in the area concerned767. 
In summary, in the light of the experience of the Member States, it is possible to 
define the category of economic tax incentives in a broad manner through a 
series of different coordinates. First, it is necessary that tax incentives are aimed 
at pursuing a specific objective of economic character which is generally related 
to (i) the competitiveness in respect to the international trade, (ii) the 
attractiveness of the area for foreign investments, or (iii) the efficiency in the 
production and distribution chain in the import export/process. Second, it is 
necessary that the same objective is pursued under the impulse of a government 
function like economic development or commerce in general. Third, the 
outcome of the tax incentives programme, from the perspective of the taxpayer, 
is always linked to the improvement of the economic environment with a focus 
on the development of trade between economic operators; in this case, in fact, 
positive effects on employees and resident population in general are only an 
eventual result which is not directly pursued by the legislator. 
 
                                                                                                                                               
investments in the area are no less than EUR 1 million do not pay any CIT for the first 6 
years of activity (see supra paragraph 4.2.13.1) 
765 In the case of Special Economic Zones in Italy (see supra paragraph 4.2.11.3) enterprises 
benefit from a tax credit provided that they maintain the business established in the zone 
for seven years, at least, after the completion of the investment. 
766 E. TRAVERSA, Tax incentives and territoriality within the European Union: balancing the 
internal market with the tax sovereignty of Member States, in World Tax Journal, 2014, p. 339. 
767 Ibid. 
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5.2.3.2 Social tax incentives  
Beside the category of economic tax incentives, it is possible to identify other 
tax measures in the context of STZs which are instead addressed to objectives 
of a social character. 
In this sense, the aim of the present paragraph is to identify the boundaries of 
one more category which is relevant under the functional dimension of STZs: 
the category of “social tax incentives”. 
For this purpose, the research process is based on the analysis of the various 
resources which have been reviewed under the previous chapters, including the 
legal dimension of STZs with the relevant literature, the EU law framework, 
and the experience of the Member States. 
The literature on the topic of tax expenditures tries to investigate the concept of 
social tax incentives in general, without a direct link to the phenomenon of 
STZs.  In particular, according to some scholars, the establishment of social tax 
incentives is a matter of fact as far as two conditions are fulfilled: first, tax 
benefits must be addressed to disadvantaged groups of  individuals belonging to 
the low and the middle-income class; second, the same tax benefits must be 
designed within a specific government function related to social welfare 
objectives, such as income security, health, employment, training, housing, 
education, or social services768.  
The EU law framework offers more opportunities to define the category of 
social tax incentives and to explore its substantial content. In this direction, in 
fact, specific notions used at the EU level, such as “social services of general 
interest” (SSGIs), “social advantages” and social enterprises”, can be associated 
to the concept of social tax incentives and, therefore, can contribute to better 
define what the social character of these incentives really entails. 
The Commission, for example, provides a list of services which constitute 
SSGIs, giving a positive content to the social dimension of such initiatives; in 
this sense, Article 2(1)(c) of Decision 2012/21/EU makes reference to services 
related to “health and long term care, childcare, access to and reintegration into the 
labour market, social  housing  and  the  care  and  social  inclusion  of  vulnerable  
groups”.  
In particular, for the purposes of the present research, the concept of “inclusion 
of vulnerable groups” assumes a fundamental relevance for the establishment 
of the boundaries of the category of social tax incentives. In fact, as far as this 
concept is intended in a flexible and broad way, Member States are allowed to 
determine what they qualify as “social” with a wide margin of discretion.  
Nevertheless, some limits are imposed by EU law in case of a manifest error of 
768 See C. HOWARD, The Hidden Welfare State: Tax Expenditure and Social Policy in the United 
States, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1997 pp. 18 et seq. 
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assessment in the identification of what constitutes “inclusion of vulnerable 
groups”769; in this sense, certain minimum criteria have to be fulfilled 
concerning the universal and compulsory character of such measures770. 
In the context of the Almunia Package, this perspective is confirmed by the 
Commission staff working document771 where SSGIs cover not only health 
services and social security schemes, but also other essential services - of a more 
flexible and broad scope - playing a prevention and social cohesion role with 
customized assistance to facilitate social inclusion and to safeguard 
fundamental rights772. Therefore, it is clear that the social character of SSGIs, as 
defined under the above resources, can be associated to the social character of 
the tax benefits granted in a STZ, giving a positive content to the category of 
social tax incentives. 
Within the EU law framework, also the notion of social advantages is 
contiguous to the category of social tax incentives, including all the advantages 
which, whether or not linked to a contract of employment, are granted to 
national workers mainly because of their objective status or by virtue of their 
residence on the national territory773. 
Nevertheless, this definition is very broad and  general774 and, thus, it is not able 
to support the research path aimed at the identification of the conceptual limits 
of the category of social tax incentives. 
769 Case T-289/03 BUPA and others v Commission, [2008] ECR II-00081, paragraph 166; 
Case T-17/02 Fred Olsen, SA v Commission, [2005] ECR II-02031, paragraph 216. In this 
sense, see also A. KOUKIADAKI, EU governance and social services  of  general interest: When  
even the UK is concerned, in J.C. BARBIER, EU  Law, Governance and Social Policy European 
Integration online Papers, 2012, Special Mini-Issue 1, Vol. 16, Article 5   available at 
http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2012-005a.htm. 
770 Ibid., paragraphs 188-190 
771 See supra paragraph 3.2.4.5. 
772 In particular, according to the Commission staff working document, in the first place 
such services “offer assistance to persons faced by personal challenges or crises (such as debt,  
unemployment,  drug  addiction  or  family  breakdown).  Secondly,  they include  activities  to  
ensure  that  the  people  concerned  are  able  to  completely reintegrate into society 
(rehabilitation, language training for immigrants) and, in  particular,  return  to  the  labour  
market  (occupational  training  and reintegration). These services complement and support the 
role of families in caring for the youngest and oldest members of society in particular. Thirdly, 
these  services  include  activities  to  integrate  people  with  long-term  health  or disability 
problems. Fourthly, they also include social housing, which provides housing for disadvantaged 
citizens or socially less advantaged groups”. 
773 See supra paragraph 3.3.2.4. 
774 A. CZEKAY-DANCEWICZ, Access to social benefits and advantages for EU migrant workers, 
members of their families and other categories of migrating EU citizens, 2013, p. 1, available at  
http://ec.europa.eu/social/BlobServlet?d ocId=11714&langId=en 
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On the contrary, the notion of social enterprises775 is a more useful instrument; 
in particular, social enterprises assume relevance when the perspective of 
analysis is shifted on the recipient of the social tax incentives and, thus, on the 
specific rules according to which such entities operate in respect to vulnerable 
groups of individuals. In this sense, in fact, the boundaries of the category of 
social tax incentives can be better defined as long as the focus is set on the 
governance criteria, economic criteria, and social criteria which characterize 
social enterprises776; in this direction, social enterprises and social tax 
incentives seem to be part of the same framework which is related to the 
management of a government function within the welfare domain. In 
particular, social enterprises become a sort of vehicle to grant social tax 
incentives and, at the same time, a selective filter between public finance and the 
citizens. 
After the literature and the EU law framework, the analysis must finally be 
oriented to the factual experience of the Member States. 
In this regard, Urban Tax-Free Zones in France and in Italy represent important 
examples of areas with social tax incentives established on the ground of the 
same principles. Within these areas, the development of economic activities is 
directly addressed to social cohesion and to the creation of employment for 
local residents within the welfare domain in general and the related government 
775 See supra paragraph 3.3.2.5. 
776 See Art. 2 of Regulation (EU) No. 1296/2013 according to which a “social enterprise” is 
an undertaking, regardless of its legal form, which:  (a)  in  accordance  with  its  Articles  
of  Association,  Statutes or  with  any  other  legal  document,  has  as  its  primary  
objective  the  achievement  of measurable,  positive  social  impacts  rather  than 
generating  profit  for  its  owners,  members  and  share­holders,  and  which: (i)  provides  
services  or  goods  able to  generate  a  social return  and/or (ii)  employs  a  method  of  
production  of  goods  or services  that  embodies  its  social  objective; (b)  uses  its  profits  
first  and  foremost  to  achieve its  primary objective  and  has  predefined  procedures  
and  rules covering  any  distribution  of  profits  to  shareholders and  owners  which  
ensure  that  such  distribution  does not  undermine  the  primary  objective;  and (c)  is 
managed in an entrepreneurial, accountable and transparent  way,  in  particular  by  
involving  workers, customers  and  stakeholders  affected  by  its  business activities. See 
also Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the 
European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of Regions, Social 
business initiative creating a favourable climate for social enterprises, key stakeholders in the 
social economy and innovation, COM(2011) No. 0682 final, paragraph 1. According to 
this Communication, a social enterprise is “an operator in the social economy whose 
main objective is to have a social impact rather than make a profit for their owners or 
shareholders. It operates by providing goods and services for the market in an 
entrepreneurial  and  innovative  fashion  and  uses  its  profits  primarily  to  achieve  
social objectives.  It  is  managed  in  an  open  and  responsible  manner  and,  in  
particular,  involves employees,  consumers  and  stakeholders  affected  by  its  
commercial  activities”. 
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functions; in particular, under such tax regimes, the minimum number of 
resident employees to be hired by the recipient undertakings is a condition able 
to confirm the pursuit of an objective of social policy. 
Also Madeira and the Canary Islands are equally characterized by a set of tax 
incentives with a clear social objective and conditioned on the creation of a 
certain number of new jobs for local residents; also in this case, the scope is the 
creation of employment and, therefore, the welfare domain is again the 
government function interested by the related tax measures. 
Given the above, it is now necessary to summarize the results of this process of 
analysis, identifying the characteristics able to distinguish the category of social 
tax incentives from the category of economic tax incentives. 
In this direction, the scope of the tax measure, the filtering-role of enterprises, 
and the conditions under which the incentives are granted, finally represent 
three aspects to be considered in order to identify the presence of social tax 
incentives under the functional dimension of STZs. 
The scope, as the first aspect to be considered, is always connected to the 
exercise of  a specific government function within the social welfare domain, 
such as employment, housing or social services in general; here, the primacy of 
the social objective over capital and profits is the qualifying feature, being able 
to highlight the government function and the context of social policy where the 
same tax measures are adopted. Within the welfare domain and the related 
government functions, the social inclusion of vulnerable groups - or, more 
simply, the “social cohesion” – becomes a flexible and broad objective allowing 
Member State to valorize the peculiarities and the specific needs of each 
national context. 
Then, the autonomy of the concept of social tax incentives is also based on the 
role of enterprises within the same framework where such incentives are 
granted. In this sense, in fact, it is important to observe that enterprises, as the 
direct recipient of the favouring tax treatment, assume a filtering-role between 
public finance and groups of individuals who require more protection; they 
become a sort of a vehicle through which social tax incentives are finally 
brought to vulnerable groups of people usually identified with the new 
employees hired according to the conditions set under the tax scheme of a STZ. 
Under this mechanism, enterprises become a selective tool for the identification 
of vulnerable groups of individuals according to a set of conditions provided by 
the law and regarding the eligibility for the same tax incentives. 
Finally, the last aspect to be considered is related to the specific conditions 
under which tax incentives are granted within STZs. From the functional 
perspective, in fact, a certain number of conditions are necessary to address the 
tax measure to the effective achievement of an objective of a social character. 
Social tax incentives, in fact, as far as they are granted to entities carrying out an 
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economic activity, have to be carefully designed in order to influence the 
behavior of enterprises towards vulnerable groups of people, with an effect 
consisting in the creation of new jobs, for example. Differently, without these 
conditions, the category of social tax incentives would be inconsistent since the 
enterprises would be free to join the tax benefits and, at the same time, to 
pursue different objectives of an economic character related to the 
improvement of marginal profits. 
Therefore, enterprises, in order to qualify for the tax benefits, must comply 
with conditions concerning the creation of employment for residents or the re-
investment of the profits in projects or other activities related with social 
cohesion in general. Through the fulfillment of such conditions, social tax 
incentives are finally targeted to vulnerable groups of people, despite the fact 
that the same tax incentives are formally granted in favour of enterprises, 
allowing the reduction of their tax burden. 
Given the above, in the light of the material analyzed under the present 
research, it is possible to conclude that social tax incentives are an autonomous 
category which, beside economic tax incentives, characterizes the functional 
dimension of STZs. The scope of the related tax measure, the role of 
enterprises, and the conditions for eligibility give a positive content to the same 
conceptual category, with a series of requirements and qualifying features able 
to define the conceptual boundaries and to valorize the systematic perspective. 
5.2.4 The definition 
The term “Special Tax Zones” is used in this study to identify a comprehensive 
concept able to encompass all the geographic areas characterized by the 
presence of tax benefits according to the territorial, structural and functional 
dimension analyzed in the previous paragraphs. 
In this context, in fact, the other denominations used in literature and in 
legislation (e.g. Free Zones, Special Economic Zones, Tax Free Zones, etc.) are 
not able to clearly set the borders and the essential elements of the 
phenomenon in a comprehensive way, especially for what regards the legal 
aspects777.  
This lexical choice is thus supported by the idea of a macro-category able to 
include the different experiences of territorial tax benefits within the EU; in this 
regard, in fact, the present phenomenon does not only correspond to the 
situation of a tax-free zone where taxation is not applied778, but also to other 
777 For these considerations see supra paragraph 1.9. 
778 E.g. the Free Zones established under the EU customs legislation where no custom duties 
and other charges are applied. 
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situations with a more favourable regime of taxation compared to the standard 
regime applied in the rest of the State779.  
On these premises, the approach to the research question formulated in the 
introduction of the present chapter, as far as it is aimed at the development of a 
general legal theory of STZs, should also include a comprehensive definition on 
the ground of the territorial, structural and functional dimensions explored in 
the previous paragraphs.  
For this scope, it is thus necessary to summarize in a few words the key features 
of the concept of STZs, highlighting its basic elements as resulting from the 
research process. 
First, under the territorial dimension, it is important to remember that the 
geographical delimitation of a STZ always involves the presence of a natural, 
artificial or conventional border; in this sense, the territory within which the tax 
incentives are available is a well-defined geographical area and, at the same 
time, a minor part of the reference framework represented by the hosting 
Member State. Entities and goods which can benefit from the favouring tax 
regimes are those considered as based within the  STZ according to a territorial 
connecting factor provided by law. 
Second, from the structural point of view, these areas are characterized by a 
special tax treatment which deviates, in total or in part, from the standard tax 
regime applied in the rest of the Member State; thus, the tax benefits introduced 
in STZs are based on a negative conception characterized by the total or partial 
denial of the standard tax rules applied in the reference framework. As seen, the 
deviation from the standard tax rules can be set through the establishment of  
“exclusion regimes” or “subtractive regimes”. In the former case, the legislator 
limits the effects of the standard rules relevant under the discipline of one or 
more taxes, with the consequent refusal of such rules within the territory of the 
zone. In the latter case, STZs are characterized by a positive discipline that 
differs from the standard one applied throughout the rest of the State; in this 
situation, the positive discipline introduced in the STZ affects the elements of 
the tax structure, such as the tax base or the tax rate, by the modification of the 
sequence that leads from the general factual element relevant under the tax rule 
to the determination of the final amount due by the taxpayer.  
Third, for what regards the functional dimension, it is evident that the tax 
measures of a STZ are defined on the ground of a specific objective of 
economic or social policy pursued at the national level; in other words, each tax 
measure is associated to a specific government function, with a fundamental 
distinction between economic policies, on one part, including government 
                                                             
779 E.g. the Canary Islands Economic and Fiscal Regime (REF) characterized by the presence 
of a lower taxation. 
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functions like commerce and economic development, and social policies, on the 
other, including government functions such as welfare, employment or social 
services. 
On the ground of this summary of the main characteristics of the phenomenon, 
it is finally possible to outline a comprehensive definition within the general 
legal theory of STZs. In this sense, STZs can be defined as “areas delimited by a 
natural, artificial or conventional border where entities and goods, selected 
through a territorial connecting factor provided by the law, can benefit from a 
favouring tax treatment which deviates, under an exclusion regime or a 
subtractive regime, from the standard tax treatment applied in the rest of the 
hosting State on the ground of objectives of an economic or social character 
defined within a specific government function”. 
The proposed definition, essentially based on the identification of a territorial, a 
structural and a functional dimension, represents one more result of the 
research process, offering theoretical support for the comprehension of the 
phenomenon from the perspective of European tax law. 
5.3 The implementing models 
The analysis of the experience of the Member States also offers the opportunity 
to recognize different implementing models which are the direct expression of 
the concept of STZs developed according to the territorial, the structural and 
the functional dimension. 
In this direction, the examples of STZs reviewed in Chapter 4 are sometimes 
characterized by a set of common features, especially for what regards the legal 
background under which they are established. 
Accordingly, the research puts in evidence the presence of three implementing 
models respectively based on the Union Customs Code (Free Zones), on State 
aid rules (State Aid Zones), and on the territorial scope of the indirect taxes 
harmonized at EU level (Extra-Territorial Zones).  
5.3.1 The “Free Zone” model 
The first model of STZs identified under the present research corresponds to 
the areas defined as “Free Zones” within the Union Customs Code. 
In this case, the tax benefits granted are exclusively relevant in the context of 
indirect taxation, with a specific deferral regime provided for customs duties, 
VAT and excise duty, while no advantages can generally be identified for what 
concerns direct taxation. 
As seen in Chapter 4, this implementing model is widely used in the experience 
of the Member States, considering that the list of Free Zones in operation in the 
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Union, as communicated by the Member States to the Commission780, includes 
areas which are part of the national territory of Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech 
Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, 
Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Poland, Portugal, Romania, 
Slovenia, and Spain. 
The recognition of the basic features of the “Free Zone” model is the direct 
result of the analysis of the EU legal framework; its main legal source, in fact, is 
represented by the Union Customs Code (UCC) which includes a 
comprehensive regime for the application of custom duties. 
In general, according to Article 210 UCC, Free Zones are identified as a special 
procedure of storage under which Union or non-Union goods may be placed. 
More precisely, a Free Zone, as defined by Article 237 UCC, is a part of the 
customs territory of the Union limited from the rest of it, in which non-EU 
goods introduced therein are considered, both for customs duties and for trade 
policy measures, as not situated in the territory of the Union, provided that they 
are not released for free circulation or placed under another customs procedure 
or used or consumed under conditions other than those provided by customs 
regulations. 
Articles 243 and 244 UCC recognize the possibility for Member States to 
designate parts of the customs territory of the Union as Free Zones; in 
particular, for what regards the territorial dimension, Member States determine 
the area covered and the entry and exit points, considering that Free Zones are 
always ring-fenced and subjected to customs supervision. 
From the structural point of view, the tax benefits of the Free Zone generally 
consist in the suspension of the levy of customs duties thanks to a deferral 
regime for goods introduced into the area. 
In this regard, in fact, Article 237(a) UCC provides that under a storage 
procedure – such as the Free Zone – non-Union goods may be stored in the 
customs territory of the Union without being subject to import duties until they 
are not assigned to the final exportation to non-EU countries or released for 
free circulation in the Union.  
The Free Zone model is also characterized by the presence of further tax 
advantages granted by Directive 2006/112/EC and by Directive 2008/118/EC 
regarding, respectively, VAT and excise duty. 
In the case of VAT, Member States are allowed to exempt from VAT the supply 
of goods and services carried out in a Free Zone; according to Article 156 of 
Directive 2006/112/EC, in fact, Member States are able to exempt, among 
others, the supply of goods that are intended to be placed in a Free Zone, while 
                                                             
780 Communication from the Commission of 23 February 2002 publishing the list of free 
zones in existence and in operation in the Community, O.J. 2002, C 50, pp. 16-18 (last 
update 17 November 2017). 
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the following Article 159 specifies that the same Member States may also 
exempt the supply of services related to the supply of goods referred to in 
Article 156. In this regard, it is important to note that the tax incentives here 
provided only refer to the supplies of goods and services made between entities 
based within the Free Zone territory. Differently, the supply between a non-EU 
operator and an operator based in a Free Zone is regulated by Article 237 UCC 
according to which under a Free Zone, “non-Union goods may be stored in the 
customs territory of the Union without being subject to other charges as provided for 
under other relevant provisions in force”. 
The VAT exemption provided according to the above discipline is merely 
temporary and, thus, it consists in a form of tax deferral with the suspension of 
taxation; the same goods brought into the Free Zone regime, in fact, are 
subjected to VAT once they exit the zone to enter the Union territory or are 
released for consumption.  
In other words, any time goods are introduced into a Free Zone, the chargeable 
event of VAT - as in the case of customs duties - is delayed until such goods 
remain placed within the perimeter of the Free Zone. 
These conclusions are also confirmed by Article 202 of Directive 2006/112/EC 
according to which “VAT shall be payable by any person who causes goods to cease 
to be covered by the arrangements or situations listed in Articles 156 [referring to 
Free Zones], 157, 160 and 161”. 
For what regards excise duty, the deferral is equally granted through the delay 
of the chargeable event which corresponds, in this case, to the importation of 
the goods into the territory of the EU. The chargeable event, in fact, is excluded 
any time the goods are placed under the Free Zone regime, assuming that a Free 
Zone is a customs suspensive procedure and not a form of importation or 
release for consumption. 
Finally, from the functional point of view, it is worth to note that the tax 
benefits granted within the model of the Free Zone – represented by the 
suspension of custom duties, VAT and excise duty – are the result of the 
economic policy carried out by the hosting State, within a government function 
corresponding to the development of the international trade. No other 
objectives can be recognized under the establishment of Free Zones and, thus, 
the management of social policy and welfare remains an external issue not 
directly linked to the provision of such tax incentives.  
5.3.2 The “State Aid Zone” model 
Within the EU law framework also State aid rules assume a fundamental role 
for the discipline of STZs, especially as far as the topic of regional aid and the 
issue of territorial selectivity are concerned. 
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By the analysis of the experience of the Member States, in fact, it is possible to 
identify many examples of STZs where the special tax treatment – compared to 
the standard one applied in the reference framework – is defined on the ground 
of the discipline of State aid as set by Article 107 TFEU. 
In this regard, the resulting “State Aid Zone” model can be implemented in two 
different forms: as an exemption to the general State aid prohibition according 
to the situations of regional aid described under paragraph 3, letters (a) and (c) 
of Article 107 TFEU, on one part, or as an infra-State body with sufficient 
institutional, procedural and financial autonomy with tax measures considered 
as not selective according to ECJ case law, on the other part. 
5.3.2.1 Regional aid 
In the first case, the tax measures adopted in a STZ are in principle prohibited 
State aid, falling within the conditions set out by Article 107 TFEU; in 
particular, the tax advantages are considered territorial selective with reference 
to the territory of the Member State, in the sense that they favour only certain 
undertakings or certain products.  
Nonetheless, in such situations, the tax advantages may be structured as an 
exemption to the general State aid prohibition in the terms defined under 
Article 107(3) TFEU and on the ground of a discretional assessment by the 
Commission under which tax benefits may be declared acceptable if certain 
conditions are met. 
In this sense, in fact, paragraphs (a) and (c) of Article 107(3) TFEU identify two 
different categories of regional aid that may be authorized by the Commission. 
First, Article 107(3)(a) TFEU provides that aid may be granted to promote the 
economic development of areas where the standard of living is abnormally low 
or where there is serious underemployment. This exemption concerns only 
those regions where the economic situation is extremely unfavourable in 
relation to the entire territory of the EU, so that the assessment of these factors 
must be made with reference to the EU level, and not with reference to the 
national average in the Member State concerned781. 
Second, Article 107(3)(c) TFEU allows for the approval of aid to facilitate the 
development of certain economic activities or of certain economic areas; this 
second exception is wider in scope than that available under Article 107(3)(a) 
TFEU since it permits the development of certain areas without being restricted 
by the economic conditions necessary for the application of the first exception, 
allowing regional aid intended to favour the economic development of areas 
which are disadvantaged in relation to the national average782. 
781 See supra paragraph 3.2.1.2. 
782 See supra paragraph 3.2.1.3. 
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In both cases, the Commission has the responsibility, under a system of prior 
authorizations, to ensure that every Member State only conceives and designs 
aid measures useful to help companies in producing goods and services that 
would not otherwise be provided in the internal market, avoiding measures that 
distort competition783. 
Nevertheless, it is worth to remember that, following the introduction of the 
General Block Exemption Regulation, STZs may also be established within the 
threshold of the maximum aid intensity set by the regional aid map without a 
formal prior approval by the Commission as long as some conditions are 
fulfilled784. 
Today, the “State Aid Zone” model is often implemented in the Member States 
through the introduction of regional aid; in fact, there are various examples of 
zones characterized by a set of territorial tax advantaged established on the 
ground of the exemptions provided by Article 107(3) TFEU, such as in the case 
of Madeira in Portugal, Urban Tax-Free Zones in France and in Italy and 
Special Economic Zones in Italy. 
The common features of these zones are mainly recognizable under the 
structural dimension since in all the cases the tax advantages are granted with 
the establishment of a subtractive regime, namely a positive special discipline 
able to modify elements of the tax structure already defined at the national level, 
such as the tax base or the tax rate. On the contrary, for what regards the 
functional dimension, such zones are not always addressed towards the same 
aim, since they may pursue both objectives of a social character (i.e. Urban Tax-
Free Zones in France and in Italy) or of an economic character (i.e. Madeira in 
Portugal and Special Economic Zones in Italy).  
5.3.2.2 The “infra-State body”  
The State Aid Zone model may also be implemented through the establishment 
of an infra-State body where the tax incentives are not considered territorial 
selective as long as some requirements are fulfilled. 
According to ECJ case law, this possibility is associated to the situations in 
which an infra-State body, such as a region or a municipality, enjoys sufficient 
institutional, procedural and economic autonomy to be able to determine its 
own tax system, defining the political and economic environment in which 
undertakings operate785. 
Under this approach, the autonomy of the infra-State body excludes in 
principle the territorial selectivity for the scope of State aid rules, regardless of 
783 For the role of the Commission see supra paragraph 3.2.1.4. 
784 See supra paragraph 3.2.2.1. 
785 Case C-88/03 Portugal v Commission, [2006] ECR I-7115. 
204
ANALYSIS OF THE FIRST RESEARCH QUESTION 
 
any further evaluation of the disadvantaged economic conditions of the same 
territory.  
In particular, the infra-State body must enjoy a legal and factual status which 
makes it sufficiently autonomous in relation to the central government of a 
Member State, with the result that, by the measures it adopts, it is that body and 
not the central government which plays a fundamental role in the definition of 
the political and economic environment. In such a case, it is the area in which 
the infra-State body exercises its powers, and not the State as a whole, that 
constitutes the reference framework for the assessment of whether a measure 
adopted by such a body favours certain undertakings with respect to others in a 
comparable legal and factual situation786. 
In more details, three conditions must be fulfilled in order to obtain the 
requirement of autonomy under which tax benefits introduced within an infra-
State body may not be considered as selective for the scope of State aid rules.  
First, by a constitutional point of view, the regional authority needs to have a 
separate political and administrative status from the national government 
(institutional autonomy). 
Second, the measure must be adopted with no central government authorized 
to directly affect the decision (procedural autonomy). 
Third, the financial consequences of the beneficial treatment given to 
undertakings in the region must not be offset by aid or subsidies from other 
regions or from the central government (economic and financial autonomy)787.  
In conclusion, according to the above elements, it is always necessary to verify if 
the region plays a key role in the definition of a political and economic 
environment not constrained by decisions taken by the general economic policy 
of the Member State; in other words, the regional authority must assume the 
responsibility for the political and financial consequences of the tax measures 
implemented.  
On these premises, the model of STZs at issue represents an evident result of 
the phenomenon of asymmetrical fiscal federalism, being clear that the infra-
State body is set in a context where the political priority is the devolution of 
powers from the central State to a specific regional or local authority788. 
                                                             
786 Ibid. 
787 Ibid. 
788 In this regard, it is important to note that the model of STZ here identified – the infra-
State body – only refers to cases of asymmetrical autonomy where a single region (or a 
minor number of regions) of a State claims a special tax treatment that is not applied 
elsewhere in the same State. Differently, in the case of symmetrical autonomy, namely 
the situation where a State is equally divided in regions or other infra-State bodies with 
their own taxing powers, it is not possible to identify any kind of STZs, considering that 
the territorial dimension always requires that the zone with the special tax treatment 
represents a minor part of the political territory of the hosting State (see supra paragraph 
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Therefore, it is clear that the main common feature of the State Aid Zone 
implemented through an infra-State body is related to its territorial dimension 
and, in particular, to the identification of the reference framework for the 
purposes of the selectivity test under State aid rules789.  
From the structural point of view, the tax benefits granted are generally 
introduced in the form of a subtractive regime exclusively defined by the 
regional authority with reference to the standard regime adopted in the rest of 
the hosting State (e.g. Basque Country and Navarra). In some cases, the tax 
benefits are directly implemented by the local authority in the context of an 
autonomous tax system with the definition of an alternative legal framework 
under which the tax due is determined (e.g. Gibraltar). 
Finally, the functional dimension of the infra-State bodies recognized in the EU 
experience is generally characterized by the pursuit of objectives of an 
economic character, since the examples of Basque Country, Navarra and 
Gibraltar are all addressed in that sense; nonetheless, it is not possible to 
exclude in principle future initiatives for the establishment of infra-State bodies 
addressed to objectives belonging to the social and welfare domain. 
5.3.3 The “Extra-Territorial Zone” model 
The third and last implementing model identified in the experience of the 
Member States includes the so-called “Extra-Territorial Zones” where the tax 
incentives are merely the result of the exclusion of the area from the territorial 
scope of one or more taxes. 
In such situations, the effects of the standard rules are limited to the rest of the 
hosting State, with the consequent exclusion of the application of the same 
rules within the territory of the zone. 
Extra-Territorial Zones are entirely outside the perimeter in which standard tax 
rules produce their effects and, therefore, the favouring treatment is the 
negative result of the limitation of the territorial scope of the tax norm. 
On these bases, this model of STZs is founded on the definition of the 
geographical limits within which tax rules produce their effects, with the 
5.2.1.2). For some interesting considerations about the different approach of the 
Commission to asymmetrical and symmetrical autonomy see R. LUJA, Do State aid rules 
still allow European Union Member States to claim fiscal sovereignty?, in EC Tax Review, 
2016, No. 5-6, pp. 318-319. 
789 It is important to remember that the reference framework for the purposes of the 
selectivity test is different from the reference framework which is used to confirm the 
existence of a STZ; in the latter case, in fact, the reference framework always corresponds 
to the territory of the Member State which is responsible for the external relations of the 
infra-State body, regardless of any further investigation on the fulfilment of the 
conditions of institutional, procedural, and financial autonomy. 
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exclusion of a specific area of the national territory from the scope of 
application of one or more taxes. 
In all these situations, it is not possible to identify the introduction of a 
subtractive regime with a set of positive norms reserved to the area, considering 
that the favouring treatment is the mere result of the non-application of the 
standard tax rules implemented in the rest of the hosting State. 
Therefore, it is evident that the common feature of this model is defined under 
the structural dimension, considering that the special tax treatment is here 
provided through the establishment of “exclusion regimes” for one or more 
taxes790. 
Then, from the functional point of view, these zones usually represent an 
instrument for the development of economic policy; they are established on the 
ground of some historical privileges due to the local community based in the 
zone, as the result of compromises between national and local authorities 
signed at the time of the foundation of the State; these historical privileges are 
generally justified on the base of economic reasons related to the disadvantaged 
geographical position of the zone, especially when located far away from the 
main national financial centers. 
Therefore, the model of the Extra-Territorial Zone is generally associated to 
objectives of an economic character and it is aimed at improving the volume of 
the international trade and at offsetting the gap related to the distance from the 
main financial centers of the Member State; such zones, in fact, are generally 
located in disadvantages areas such as mountain areas (Livigno, Mount Athos), 
remote islands (Aland Island and Helgoland) or enclaves in the political 
territories of other States (Busingen, Campione d’Italia, Ceuta and Melilla). 
5.3.4 Hybrid situations 
In the EU context, the models of STZs described in the present chapter do not 
exclude the presence of hybrid situations where different features are combined 
together giving birth to original solutions. 
In general, there are examples in which both the elements of the State Aid Zone 
and of the Extra-Territorial Zone characterize the complex set of tax 
advantages granted to a limited area of land (e.g. Canary Islands, Ceuta and 
790 For the territories excluded from the scope of customs duties see Art. 4 of Regulation 
(EU) No. 952/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 October 2013 
laying down the Union Customs Code, O.J. 2013, L. 269, pp. 1-101; for the territories 
excluded from the scope of VAT see Art. 6 of Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 
November 2006 on the common system of value added tax, O.J. 2006, L 347, pp. 1-118; 
for the territories excluded from the scope of excise duty see Art. 5(2) of Council 
Directive 2008/118/EC of 16 December 2008 concerning the general arrangements for 
excise duty and repealing Directive 92/12/EEC, O.J. 2009, L 9, pp. 12-30. 
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Melilla, French Overseas Departments and Saint-Martin). 
In other cases, the “Free Zone” model is combined with the “State Aid Zone” 
model, with a mix of different tax benefits dealing not only with indirect 
taxation, but also with direct taxation (e.g. Free Economic Zones in Lithuania 
and Special Economic Zones in Latvia). 
Given the above, the implementing models identified in this research should 
always be considered as flexible instruments, both for what regards the analysis 
of the factual experience and the development of future initiatives for the 
establishment of new zones. 
In this sense, STZs may always be designed as a combination of the 
implementing models above described in order to adapt the set of tax 
advantages to the features of each national legal system and to the specific 
objectives pursued by the governments of the respective states. 
5.4 Summary of the results 
At the end of this chapter, it is necessary to summarize the results achieved with 
reference to the analysis of the research question formulated in the beginning. 
The research process has been carried out focusing on three main aspects: the 
concept of STZs with its territorial, structural and functional dimension, the 
definition of STZs in terms of a comprehensive macro-category, and, finally, 
the implementing models of STZs identified in the experience of the Member 
States. 
The same results can now be valorized as essential parts of a general legal 
theory of STZs in order to allow a better understanding of the phenomenon 
within European tax law. 
Starting from the concept of STZ, the first fundamental element to be 
considered is the territorial dimension and, in particular, the geographical 
border, the reference framework and the territorial connecting factor. In this 
regard, in fact, a STZ is always a well-defined area delimited by a natural, 
artificial or conventional border; then, the favouring tax treatment granted in 
the same area has to be measured and assessed in comparison with the standard 
tax treatment applied in the reference framework corresponding to the 
territory of the hosting Member State; furthermore, the entities and the goods 
which can benefit from the favouring tax treatment have to be selected 
according to a territorial connecting factor provided by law which may be 
identified with the place where the goods are stored (e.g. in the case of Free 
Zones) or with the permanent establishment (e.g. in the case of the State Aid 
Zone). 
The second element which characterizes the concept of STZs corresponds to 
the structural dimension and generally refers to the presence of a regime of 
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exception compared to the standard rules on taxation applied in the rest of the 
hosting State. In this sense, all the examples of STZs are characterized by the 
identification of a tax regime which, in whole or in part, deviates from the one 
normally applied in the hosting State. In detail, the tax treatment provided in a 
STZ may be purely and simply the negative result of a mere exclusion of the 
standard rules on taxation (i.e. exclusion regimes), or it may correspond to a 
subtractive scheme when the legislator introduces therein a set of special rules 
in place of the standard regime applied in the rest of the State (e.g. subtractive 
regimes with exemptions, exclusions, deferrals, etc.) 
The third element of the concept of STZ deals with the functional dimension 
and it is linked to the objectives pursued by the government of a state through 
the establishment of STZs; the favouring tax regime of a STZ, in fact, is always 
designed in the context of a specific government function, with the introduction 
of a set of tax benefits addressed to objectives of an economic or social 
character. In this regard, STZs may be established with the introduction of 
economic tax incentives, on one part, as long as the objectives pursued are of an 
economic character, or with the introduction of social tax incentives, on the 
other, any time the objectives are set within the social and welfare domain. 
Beside the concept of STZs, the general legal theory includes a comprehensive 
definition which has been outlined on the ground of the territorial, structural 
and functional dimension through the summary of the respective key-features. 
In this direction, STZs have been defined as “areas delimited by a natural, 
artificial or conventional border where entities and goods, selected through a 
territorial connecting factor provided by the law, can benefit from a favouring 
tax treatment which deviates, under an exclusion regime or a subtractive 
regime, from the standard tax treatment applied in the rest of the hosting State 
on the ground of objectives of an economic or social character defined within a 
specific government function”. This definition is able to encompass under its 
umbrella all the different experiences of STZs in the Member States and, at the 
same time, it is set in accordance with the legal dimension and the EU law 
framework as resulting from the material reviewed in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3. 
The last step of the research process has involved the identification of the 
implementing models of STZs within the EU. 
In particular, three different models assume an autonomous relevance in this 
context; first, the “Free Zone” model which is set on the ground of the 
provisions of the Union Customs Code where Free Zones are defined as a 
customs special procedure of storage according to which the charge of customs 
duties and other indirect charges is suspended under a regime of deferral; 
second, the “State Aid Zone” model which is developed, on one part, on the 
ground of State aid rules in the form of regional aid and as an exemption to the 
general State aid prohibition, or, on the other, in the form of an infra-State 
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body with sufficient autonomy, where the tax advantages granted are not 
considered as territorial selective; third, the “Extra-Territorial Zone” model 
where the tax incentives are merely the result of the exclusion of the area from 
the territorial scope of one or more taxes. 
5.5 Final remarks 
In the light of the above outcomes, the concept of STZs, the definition, and the 
implement models represent the fundamentals of the general legal theory of 
STZs as resulting from the research process. 
In this context, the same general legal theory, which is the point of arrival of the 
present chapter, is able to explain under a common reading-key not only the EU 
law framework on the topic, but also the factual experience of the Member 
States, improving the systematic perspective within the field of European tax 
law. 
In definitive, the results of the present research offer enough support for a 
positive answer to the research question formulated at the beginning of this 
chapter, as it will be better outlined in the conclusions of the thesis. 
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ANALYSIS OF THE SECOND RESEARCH QUESTION: 
DEVELOPING A NEW MODEL FOR SOCIAL COHESION 
POLICIES 
6.1 Introduction 
The experience of the Member States is currently characterized by the presence 
of three different implementing models of STZs whose territorial, structural, 
and functional dimensions assume various configurations, according to a 
common set of basic features identified in the previous chapter. 
The first model, which corresponds to the Free Zone regulated by the Union 
Customs Code, is addressed to undertakings active in the import-export 
process with economic tax incentives granted exclusively on indirect taxation 
through the deferral of customs duties, VAT, and excise duty.  
The second model, namely the State Aid Zone, covers both economic and 
social tax incentives on direct taxation defined on the ground of State aid rules 
according to the following two solutions: through the exemptions provided for 
regional aid under paragraphs (a) and (c) of Article 107(3) TFEU, on one part, 
or through the establishment of an infra-State body with sufficient institutional, 
procedural, and financial autonomy, on the other. 
The third and last model includes economic tax incentives granted in the 
geographical areas which are outside the territorial scope of the indirect taxes 
already harmonized at the EU level, namely customs duties, VAT and excise 
duty; the so-called Extra-Territorial Zones, in fact, may be established out of the 
Customs Union line, or, in other cases, outside the EU VAT area or the EU 
excise duty area, with the definition of tax-free territories pursuant to some 
historical privileges. 
On these premises, the research must now be addressed to verify the space left 
for future initiatives of the Member States aimed at the establishment of new 
STZs in accordance with EU law, even beyond the legal background of the 
implementing models already identified in the previous chapter. In other 
words, it is necessary to verify whether or not the three implementing models 
recognized in the factual experience cover all the possibilities for the 
establishment of territorial tax incentives according to the EU law framework. 
In this regard, it is interesting to note that none of the models recognized in the 
factual experience is specifically targeted to the development of social cohesion 
policies based on social tax incentives; even the examples of Urban Tax-Free Z 
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policies based on social tax incentives; even the examples of Urban Tax-Free 
Zones in France and in Italy, in fact, have been developed under a model – the 
State Aid Zone – which is neutral from the point of view of the functional 
dimension, considering that the related zones may pursue both objectives of a 
social or of an economic nature. 
This lack of an implementing model of STZs specifically based on social tax 
incentives sounds as a missed opportunity for the autonomous initiatives of the 
Member States aimed at developing social cohesion policies for their most 
disadvantaged areas. In this sense, it is thus necessary to measure the space left 
for such initiatives and to find the coordinates of a new model of STZs to be 
implemented beside the Free Zone, the State Aid Zone, and the Extra-
Territorial Zone. 
Therefore, on the ground of the above considerations, it is finally possible to 
outline the following research question: 
Research question No. 2  
Is it possible to identify a new implementing model of STZs within the EU law 
framework addressed to the development of social cohesion policies for the most 
disadvantaged areas of the Union? 
The declared objective becomes relevant in the current stage of European 
integration as long as the situation of the disadvantaged areas of the Union is 
considered in the context of social cohesion policies. 
The main priority, in fact, is to preserve the integrity and cohesion of the Union, 
through an approach to EU law able to support not only the growth of the 
internal market, but also the harmonious development of welfare and social 
cohesion in each Member State. 
On the ground of the research question, the following paragraphs will first 
outline the design of the new model in ideal terms within its territorial, 
structural, and functional dimension, defining the related profiles and its 
denomination in coherence with the idea resulting from the research question, 
namely the creation of an instrument for the development of social cohesion 
policies for the most disadvantaged areas of the Union. 
Then, the research will approach the analysis of the EU law framework testing 
the design of the new model under each of the relevant variables. In this regard, 
State aid rules, the fundamental freedoms and harmful tax competition will 
represent the essential variables to be considered. 
At the end of this process, the eventual space left for the autonomous initiatives 
of the Member States will be measured; accordingly, the research will finally 
outline the results of the analysis in order to verify whether and how the design 
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of the new model can be implemented in accordance with the EU law 
framework. 
6.2 Design of the model 
The methodology used for the development of the new model starts from a 
choice involving the characteristics of the territorial, the structural and the 
functional dimension in coherence with the scope of the research question. The 
initial idea, in fact, is that STZs may also be used for the management of social 
cohesion policies under a specific government function at the Member States’ 
level; accordingly, the design of the new model has to be structured in line with 
that idea, putting in evidence a set of characteristics addressed to the pursuit of 
the related objectives of a social nature. 
For the moment, the characteristics of the new model – such as the typologies 
of tax incentives provided, or the conditions established for the undertakings to 
be eligible for the same advantages - are exclusively set on the ground of the 
factual experience in order to address the tax measures in the context of social 
cohesion policies. 
This means that, in this first stage of the research, the selection of the options 
available is carried out regardless of the limits of compatibility of the EU law 
framework, leaving to the second stage of the research any assessment of the 
resulting design with reference to the variables of EU law. 
6.2.1    The territorial dimension 
6.2.1.1 Geographical delimitation 
In the design of the new model, the territorial dimension first leads to some 
considerations about the geographical borders of the area where tax incentives 
are granted; as seen, in fact, the geographical delimitation under the general 
legal theory of STZs may be defined through a natural barrier, through an 
artificial fence or simply through a conventional line on the map. 
Among the various options available, the use of a conventional line seems to be 
the most flexible solution for the targeted areas of the new model. By this way, 
the border of a STZ can be clearly defined also in the situations where the 
natural landscape does not offer any physical element for the same scope (e.g. a 
lake or a river) or in the situations where the presence of artificial or natural cut-
offs would undermine the continuity and the accessibility of the zone. Such 
barriers, in fact, are often able to physically isolate the zone from the 
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surrounding locations with negative effects on the development of the 
economic activities based therein791. 
For example, in the case of urban areas, the geographical delimitation through a 
conventional line is the only feasible solution to preserve the existing transport 
connections with the territories outside the zone; Urban Tax-Free Zones in 
France and in Italy, in fact, are characterized by a geographical delimitation of 
the areas which is achieved through the definition of an ideal line on the map 
without any further intervention aimed at the construction of a perimeter fence 
or to the use of different physical elements forming part of the natural 
landscape. Starting from these experiences, the new model of STZs should 
replicate the same approach to the territorial dimension, confirming the choice 
adopted in the mentioned case of Urban Tax-Free Zones in consideration of the 
broader possibilities offered. 
In summary, the use of a conventional line for the geographical limitation of the 
zone should be considered as the first fixed value of the territorial dimension of 
the new model; by this way, in fact, it is possible to guarantee a flexible design 
for the implementation of the new model not only in the case of the remote 
areas, but also in the case of urban areas where continuity and accessibility are 
fundamental parameters for the attractiveness of the zone. 
6.2.1.2 Reference framework 
The next profile to be considered in the context of the territorial dimension is 
the reference framework; the design of the new model, in fact, requires the 
identification of a standard tax regime to be compared with the special tax 
treatment applied in the zone in order to detect the favouring effect reserved to 
the entities based therein. In this regard, it is possible to conclude that, in the 
new model, the reference framework does not assume any specific form; in fact, 
as in all the other implementing models of STZs, the reference framework 
basically corresponds to the territory of the Member State which is responsible 
for the external relations of the zone according to the fundamentals of the 
general legal theory developed in the previous chapter792. This is because the 
objectives of social character, which represent the main driver of the new 
model, do not require for this specific profile any deviation from the standard 
features identified under the general legal theory. 
 
                                                             
791 For these considerations see A. BRIANT, L. MIREN, S. BENOIT, Can Tax Breaks Beat 
Geography? Lessons from the French Enterprise Zone Experience, in American Economic 
Journal: Economic Policy, 2015, No. 7(2), pp. 88-124. 
792 As seen in Chapter 5 (paragraph 5.2.1.2), this perspective is based on Article 355(3) 
TFEU according to which the Treaty is applied to “the European territories for whose 
external relations a Member State is responsible”. 
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6.2.1.3 Territorial connecting factor 
The last profile of the territorial dimension is the so-called “territorial 
connecting factor” which has been defined as the set of rules through which an 
economic activity carried out by an individual or a company may be linked to 
the territory of a STZ and benefit from the related tax incentives. 
In this case, the definition of the related criteria involves multiple aspects 
essentially focused on the distinction between indirect taxation and direct 
taxation. As far as the tax benefits are related to indirect taxation, the territorial 
connecting factor is generally defined according to secondary law and the 
harmonized EU rules on customs duties, VAT, and excise duties. Differently, in 
the case of direct taxation, the definition of the territorial connecting factor is 
influenced by the limits set by primary law and, in particular, by the freedom of 
establishment as interpreted by the ECJ. The main point, in fact, is that, as far as 
direct taxation is concerned, the adoption of a specific territorial connecting 
factor might determine a discriminatory treatment between residents and non-
residents with the possible infringement of the freedom of establishment. 
Within this context, the design of the new model should include a territorial 
connecting factor able to ensure the pursuit of the objectives of a social 
character; in this sense, the effective presence of the economic operator within 
the zone becomes a serious issue to be considered, as well as the definition of a 
territorial connecting factor able to guarantee the establishment of a fruitful 
relationship between the economic operator and the local community. 
For these purposes, it seems possible to confirm that the criterion of the 
permanent establishment is sufficient to ensure the objective, since it sets a link 
between the place of business and a specific geographic point, as well as a 
certain degree of permanence within the area concerned. 
However, the adoption of  a territorial connecting factor linked to the 
permanent establishment of a non-resident entity should always be carefully 
considered; as it will be explained under the functional dimension, in such cases, 
in fact, it is always necessary to provide a set of specific conditions in order to 
ensure that the same permanent establishment carries out a substantial 
economic activity, assuming an effective role in the support of the vulnerable 
groups of individuals resident of the zone. 
 
In conclusion, the territorial dimension of the new model assumes some 
qualifying features which are essentially based on the geographical delimitation 
of the area; in this case, in fact, the border of the zone should be defined 
through the use of a conventional line on the map, instead than through a 
natural barrier or an artificial fence. Differently, for what concerns the profiles 
of the reference framework and the territorial connecting factor, the design of 
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the new model does not deviate from the standard characteristics identified 
within the general legal theory of STZs. 
6.2.2        The structural dimension 
6.2.2.1 Tax allowances and tax credits 
For what regards the structural dimension, the design of the new model 
requires to focus on the specific provisions able to introduce exceptions to the 
standard rules applied in the hosting State with the final aim of reducing the tax 
burden. 
As seen under the general legal theory of STZs, the denial of the standard tax 
rules may be set in various forms and can lead to different outcomes 
corresponding to the categories of the “exclusion regimes”, on one part, and 
“subtractive regimes”, on the other. 
The exclusion regimes are the result of an intervention through which the 
legislator limits the effects of the standard rules relevant under the discipline of 
one or more taxes; consequently, the areas with the favouring tax treatment are 
entirely outside the perimeter in which the standard tax rules produce their 
effects.  
In the subtractive regimes, STZs are instead characterized by the presence of a 
positive discipline that differs from the standard one applied throughout the 
rest of the State. These rules usually affect the elements of the tax structure, 
such as the tax base or the tax rate, by the modification of the sequence that 
leads from the general factual element relevant under the tax rule to the 
determination of the final amount due by the taxpayer. 
Given the above, the structural dimension in the design of the new model 
involves the identification of the best options available to address the tax 
incentives towards the objectives of a social character according to the scope of 
the research question. 
For this purpose, the exclusion regimes do not seem a proper solution since, in 
such cases, the favouring tax treatment is merely the negative result of the 
limitation of the areas of application of one or more taxes; this means that, 
under the exclusion regimes, it is not possible to identify an active role of the 
legislator in the definition of a set of positive rules to pursue the objectives of a 
social cohesion policy. 
In other words, the establishment of exclusion regimes results as a neutral 
situation where the government is not the main character in the regulation and 
in the measurement of the value of the tax expenditures. Exclusion regimes, in 
fact, are essentially founded on the alternative between taxation or no taxation 
and, therefore, they do not offer the possibility of a broader set of options in 
order to better address the tax incentives to the expected results. 
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On the contrary, in the case of subtractive regimes, the legislator introduces a 
positive discipline under which the standard tax norm does not produce its 
effects with reference to specific elements of the tax structure, such as the tax 
base or the tax rate. Consequently, under the subtractive regimes, there are 
many different alternatives in the regulation and in the measurement of the 
value of the tax expenditures, considering the possibilities offered by incentives 
like tax exemptions, tax allowances, tax credits, tax reliefs, tax deferrals, tax 
rebates, or tax replacement regimes. 
For these reasons, it is clear that the design of the new model should exclusively 
include tax incentives belonging to the category of the subtractive regimes, 
since only in such cases, it is possible to safeguard the active role of the 
governments  and to shape the structural dimension with a specific focus on the 
aims pursued by the related tax measures. 
In particular, within the various options available under the category of the 
subtractive regimes, tax allowances and tax credits seem to be the most 
interesting types of tax incentives for the purposes of this model. In both cases, 
in fact, it is possible to clearly measure the value of the tax expenditures by 
reference to the nature and the value of the expenses which can be deducted 
from the gross income (tax allowances) or from the gross tax due (tax credits). 
On the contrary, in the case of tax exemptions, tax reliefs and tax rebates, it is 
more difficult to precisely define the cap of the value of tax expenditures, 
considering that such types of tax incentives are not generally associated to the 
amount of the expenses effectively incurred by the economic operator.  
Also tax deferrals and tax replacement regimes cannot be considered an 
interesting option under the design of the new model. Tax deferrals, in fact, 
determine a mere delay in the payment of taxes and, therefore, cannot be 
concretely addressed to grant a definitive advantage in favour of vulnerable 
groups of individuals. Then, tax replacement regimes, as far as they introduce a 
new tax and not a mere modification of one or more elements of the tax applied 
in the rest of the State, limit the possibilities of a clear comparison between the 
special tax treatment applied in the zone and the standard tax treatment applied 
in the reference framework. 
Therefore, the structural dimension of the new model should be characterized 
by the establishment of a set of tax incentives in the form of tax allowances or 
tax credits, being these the best options available to ensure the measurement of 
the value of the tax expenditures in coherence with the objectives of a social 
character pursued. 
In this sense, in fact, only tax allowances and tax credits, differently from what 
happens for other types of tax incentives, ensure that the government continues 
to keep the control of the effects of the STZ programme, with a better 
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monitoring and a continuous comparison between the value of tax 
expenditures and the effects over the local community. 
6.2.2.2 The focus on direct taxation 
Finally, the structural dimension of the new model involves a choice between 
the typologies of taxes which are established by the incentive programme 
adopted under the STZ regime. This choice is essentially associated to the 
distinction between indirect taxes and direct taxes and to the different 
outcomes that the related tax incentives may produce with reference to the 
objectives of a social character pursued through the new model. 
In this regard, it is not possible to put indirect taxes and direct taxes on the same 
level, considering that indirect taxation is always characterized by the shift of 
the tax burden from the economic operator to the final consumer through a 
mechanism of reimbursement. In other words, indirect taxes are generally 
neutral for the economic operator since the related tax burden is shifted over 
the final consumer. 
Therefore, it is evident that an incentive programme based on direct taxation 
could better pursue the objectives of a social character, since direct taxes cannot 
be shifted to the final consumer and, thus, they have a stronger influence on the 
allocation choices of enterprises. 
In this regard, in fact, the objective of the new model is the improvement of the 
employment rate through the introduction of tax measures able to lower the tax 
burden of business entities as long as new workers are hired. On these 
premises, it is clear that the incentive programme can produce the expected 
results only where the tax measures are concretely able to favour the position of 
the economic operator, such as in the case of an incentive programme based on 
business direct taxation793. In conclusion, the design of the new model should 
be characterized, for what regards its structural dimension, by the 
establishment of an incentive programme based on direct taxation, with the 
introduction of a set of tax incentives in the form of tax allowances or tax 
credits associated to the amount of expenses occurred by the economic 
operator for specific purposes defined under the functional dimension (e.g. 
expenses for new employees hired). 
Accordingly, the structural dimension can here assume a form in coherence 
with the social objectives pursued, addressing the design of the new model 
within the scope of the research question. 
                                                             
793 Differently, an incentive programme based on indirect taxation (for example with the use 
of lower VAT-rates) would only improve the financial situation of final consumers 
without any concrete effect on the job market. 
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6.2.3 The functional dimension 
The functional dimension covers the most qualifying aspects of the design of 
the new model, focusing on the objectives pursued by the related tax measures. 
The approach is driven by the scope of the research question formulated at the 
beginning of the chapter; the new model, in fact, must be aimed towards the 
development of social cohesion policies for the most disadvantaged areas of the 
Union and, accordingly, the tax incentives granted must univocally be 
addressed to objectives of a social character. 
In this direction, the category of social tax incentives must characterize the 
design of the new model with respect to the various profiles identified under 
the general legal theory, such as those related to the scope of the tax measure or 
the conditions under which the incentives are granted. 
Given the above, it is now necessary to define the design of the new model 
under its functional dimension outlining the corresponding values for the 
various profiles involved. 
6.2.3.1 The scope of the tax measures 
The first profile is related to the scope of the tax measures; in this regard, 
according to the research question, the new model should support a specific 
government function under the social cohesion policy domain with a focus on 
the employment factor and, in particular, on the social inclusion and work 
integration of low-income individuals which reside in disadvantaged areas. 
Therefore, as far as work integration is concerned, the main priority becomes 
the adoption of a series of actions addressed to the creation of new jobs for low-
income individuals; the expected result, in fact, is the improvement of the living 
conditions of people residing in disadvantaged areas affected by a high 
unemployment rate; thus, the functional dimension involves the development 
of social cohesion policies aimed at reducing the differences between low-
income areas and high-income areas of Member States. 
6.2.3.2 Eligible undertakings 
The second profile which is able to influence the design of the new model and 
its functional dimension is associated to the position of the recipient of the tax 
advantages; in this regard, in fact, it always necessary that the subjective 
characteristics of the economic operator are compatible, coherent and suitable 
with respect to the objectives pursued under the functional dimension. 
In this context, the recipient undertakings assume a filtering-role in the 
selection of the individuals which are the ultimate target of the tax measures (i.e. 
employees and small and medium-sized enterprises); this basically means that 
each recipient undertaking, in consideration of its crucial role within the tax 
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incentive mechanism, must ensure sufficient financial and economic strength 
and reliability. In this sense, in fact, the success of a STZ programme strictly 
depends on the effective fulfillment by the recipient undertakings of the 
obligations set by the various conditions under which tax incentives are 
granted, such as the hiring of a minimum number of new employees or a 
minimum volume of purchases from the local suppliers. The eventual non-
fulfillment of the same obligations would seriously undermine the results of the 
entire incentive programme, with the failure of the substantial scope set under 
the establishment of a STZ. 
For these reasons, the financial capacity of the recipient undertakings becomes 
an essential element to be considered. In this regard, serious doubts arise about 
the financial and economic capacity of small and medium enterprises to manage 
such a responsibility since they usually do not have sufficient strength and 
solidity to comply with the strict conditions which are now set under the design 
of this new model. 
On the ground of these considerations, the design of the new model should 
limit the granting of social tax incentives to large enterprises which can provide 
enough guarantees about their economical and financial strength and solidity. 
Large enterprises, in fact, generally have the economical and financial capacity 
to follow long term programs and, thus, to ensure the fulfillment of their 
obligations and the compliance with the set of conditions provided for the 
granting of the tax incentives available in the zone794. 
Beside large enterprises, it should also be considered the option of extending 
the tax benefits to social enterprises. In this case, in fact, regardless of the size of 
the economic operator, the legislation already offers enough guarantees to 
properly ensure the achievement of objectives of a social character. This is 
because the various requirements established under EU law to be qualified as a 
social enterprise already address the behavior of such entities to the effective 
fulfillment of the same obligations, concerning, for example, the hiring of a 
minimum number of new employees resident of the area. In particular, the 
social criteria for the qualification as a social enterprise are able to 
counterbalance any issue related to the economic and financial strength of the 
economic operator; for example, it is important to mention the existence of an 
                                                             
794 A proportional approach to the issue should be based on the assumption that the tax 
benefits must be limited to enterprises having sufficient financial resources in order to 
fulfil the social obligations concerned. In this case, having regard to the meaning 
of Article 2(1) of Annex I to Commission Regulation (EU) No. 651/2014 of 17 June 
2014, the notion of large enteprises seems to be appropriate for such a purpose, 
considering that it covers all the enterprises whose balance sheet total exceeds EUR 43 
million or whose total annual turnover exceeds EUR 50 million regardless of the number 
of employees (see infra paragraph 7.5.1.1).  
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explicit social purpose defined in the articles of the association, such as to 
benefit the local community or a disadvantaged group of people, or the pursuit 
of social goals rather than making profits. In other words, any risk of non-
fulfilment associated to insolvency can be counterbalanced by the subjective 
qualifications of social enterprises, considering that they have to respond to a 
series of specific requirements defined under EU law which already ensure the 
effective pursuit of their statutory social goals. 
For the above reasons, it seems thus possible to include social enterprises 
among the recipient undertakings in the context of the new model, regardless of 
any consideration on their financial and economic size. 
Differently, for what regards the other small and medium enterprises, which 
are not qualified as social enterprises, the doubts concerning their financial and 
economic strengths, associated to the consequent risk of non-fulfilment and 
insolvency, do not allow to confer them a filtering role which is crucial for the 
success of a tax incentive programme. 
6.2.3.3 Obligations of the recipient undertakings 
The third and last profile, concerning the conditions under which the incentives 
are granted, assumes a fundamental relevance for the design of the new model. 
In order to ensure the effective pursuit of the same objectives of a social 
character, in fact, it is necessary to define a set of specific conditions to be 
fulfilled by the recipient undertakings which should involve the hiring of new 
employees, on one part, and the purchases made from local suppliers, on the 
other.  
In this sense, the enterprise, in order to qualify for the benefits available under 
the STZ regime, should first hire a minimum number of new employees in the 
first year of its activity; under this condition, in fact, it seems possible to ensure 
that the tax expenditures are concretely addressed to the creation of 
employment, establishing a link between the tax incentives, the economic 
operators and the employees. In particular, the focus should be set on the 
residence of the employees, introducing one more condition according to 
which the new workers hired have to maintain their residence in the area for a 
certain minimum period of time; by this way, in fact, it is possible to avoid the 
situation of a temporary residence registered by the employee only for tax 
purposes, ensuring that the tax advantages are granted only to the economic 
operators which effectively respond to the substantial scope of the tax measure. 
Then, it is necessary to establish a minimum duration of the employment 
contract; by this condition, in fact, it seems possible to avoid a situation where 
the abuse of short term contracts could undermine the objectives set under the 
establishment of such zones. In this direction, the creation of stable 
employment should be supported through long term relationships between the 
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economic operators and the new employees in order to ensure the effective 
improvement of the living conditions of the residents of the zone on a long-
term basis. The functional dimension of the new model should also focus on the 
qualification of the new employees hired by the economic operators based in 
the zone; particular attention should be paid to the definition of a balanced 
solution where high-qualified employees and low-qualified employees could 
benefit from the same opportunities of the STZ regime. In this regard, one 
more condition should regard the hiring of a minimum number of high-
qualified employees, thus extending the effects of social tax incentives to a 
broader audience of individuals which reside in the disadvantaged areas of the 
Member States. 
Furthermore, in order to qualify for the same tax benefits, the recipient 
undertakings should guarantee a minimum volume of purchases from the 
suppliers based within the zone. The idea, in fact, is to limit the social tax 
incentives only to those undertakings which are able to guarantee a minimum 
annual volume of purchases of goods or services from the suppliers which are 
based in the zone, thus maximizing the positive effects of such tax measures 
with the creation of a virtuous circle in the productive and distributive chain. In 
this regard, the suppliers considered under the same condition should be 
limited to the small and medium-sized enterprises based in the zone795; this 
category of suppliers, in fact, is the most affected by the issues of the 
disadvantaged areas, especially in the case of self-employed economic activities 
requiring more protection. 
 
In summary, the functional dimension in the design of the new model is 
essentially defined around the scope of the research question. The declared 
objective, in fact, is the development of social cohesion policies for the most 
disadvantaged areas of the Union; therefore, the profiles above described are all 
set in a coherent way in order to address the tax measures towards the same aim 
pursued in the context of the new model. 
6.2.4 The denomination 
As seen in the previous paragraphs, the design of the new model includes a 
series of qualifying elements which are mainly focused on the functional 
dimension and on the category of social tax incentives. 
                                                             
795 The category of micro, small and medium-sized enterprises (‘SMEs’) is made up of 
enterprises which employ fewer than 250 persons and which have an annual turnover 
not exceeding EUR 50 million, and/or an annual balance sheet total not exceeding EUR 
43 million (see Commission Regulation (EU) No. 651/2014 of 17 June 2014, Annex 1, 
Art. 2(1)). 
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In particular, a profile which clearly emerges from this design is related to the 
possible implementation of the new model in the context of the social cohesion 
policies targeted to low-income individuals which reside in the disadvantaged 
areas of the Union. 
On these premises, the new model will be defined from now onwards as “Social 
Cohesion Zone” in order to stress its functional dimension and its possible 
implementation for the development of new social cohesion policies within the 
EU framework. 
The choice of such a denomination is justified under many profiles. First of all, 
the wording “social” refers to the aim pursued by the related tax measures, 
involving the social inclusion of vulnerable group of individuals which reside in 
disadvantaged areas of the EU with high unemployment rates. Then, the 
wording “cohesion” refers to the possibility of implementing the same model in 
the context of the cohesion policy to solve the issues related to the disparities 
between high-income and low-income areas of the Union. In this sense, the 
cohesion policy is generally set to address such regional disparities and to bring 
structural changes to the most disadvantaged areas. 
Therefore, social policy and cohesion policy are addressed in the same direction 
and assume a unified dimension in the new model of the Social Cohesion Zone; 
in this sense, in fact, it seems possible to identify a common area of influence 
where the objectives of social policy, such as, for example, the improvement of 
the employment rate, interact with the classic objectives of cohesion policy (e.g. 
reduction of regional disparities). 
6.3 Analysis of the variables in the EU law framework 
In the previous paragraphs, the design of the Social Cohesion Zone has been 
defined according to scope of the research question regardless of any 
assessment with reference to its compatibility with the EU law framework. 
In other words, the first stage of the research process has merely been focus on 
the identification of a model which could be suitable for the aim pursued, 
namely the development of social cohesion policies addressed to the 
disadvantaged areas of the Member States. This has been done in ideal terms 
without a concrete assessment of the multitude of implications and limits 
deriving from the application of EU law. 
Therefore, at this point, the design of the new model needs to be tested with 
respect to the variables of the EU law framework following the coordinates 
described in Chapter 3, with regard to State aid rules, the fundamental 
freedoms, and harmful tax competition. 
The research process, in fact, has now to be oriented towards the following 
step: to verify whether and how the design of the Social Cohesion Zone, as 
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defined under the above paragraphs, can be compatible with EU law and, 
therefore, can be used as a new implementing model in the Member States. 
Accordingly, the next paragraphs are dedicated to follow this research path, 
exploring the possibilities offered by the EU law framework and the related 
limits, with the aim to find an answer to the research question formulated at the 
beginning of this chapter.  
6.3.1 State aid rules 
State aid rules are the first variable to be considered for testing the design of the 
Social Cohesion Zone within the EU law framework. 
For this purpose, it is necessary to clarify that the territorial dimension, as 
outlined in the design of the new model, does not assume any relevance in this 
part of the research process; this is because the geographical delimitation 
through a conventional line - instead of through an artificial or a natural barrier 
- is a neutral factor with respect to the discipline of State aid and, as a 
consequence, the analysis does not require any investigation about the different 
profiles of the territorial dimension. 
On the contrary, as far as the structural dimension is concerned, State aid rules 
become a serious issue; in this sense, a measure on direct taxation for the Social 
Cohesion Zone, such as a subtractive regime with tax credits or tax allowances, 
may be considered territorial selective as long as the tax advantages are 
exclusively granted  to the enterprises based in the zone, with potential negative 
effects on the internal market and on the trade between Member States796. 
In such a situation, the functional dimension of the new model gives evidence of 
a specific characteristic which is relevant for the analysis with respect to State 
aid rules: as seen, in fact, the use of social tax incentives under a subtractive 
regime assumes a fundamental role in the design of the Social Cohesion Zone. 
On these premises, social tax incentives become the main focus of the analysis 
for State aid rules, opening the possibility of an alternative path for the 
implementation of the Social Cohesion Zone within the EU law framework. 
Therefore, it is now necessary to test the functioning of the new model within 
State aid rules, assuming, as the starting point of the analysis, the presence of a 
set of social tax incentives granted in the form of a subtractive regime and 
specifically addressed to the economic operators based in the limited territory 
of the Social Cohesion Zone. 
Such kind of tax measures, being exclusively reserved to the economic 
operators which are based within the geographical limits of the Social 
                                                             
796 See, inter alia, Joined cases C-400/97, C-401/97 and C-402/97 Administración General del 
Estado v Juntas Generales de Guipúzcoa and Diputación Foral de Guipúzcoa, Juntas Generales 
d'Alava and Diputación Foral d'Alava and Juntas Generales de Vizcaya, [2000] ECR I-01073. 
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Cohesion Zone, are generally considered as territorial selective, falling under 
the general prohibition set by Article 107(1) TFEU; nonetheless, the same 
measures may be declared compatible with the internal market when they are 
set according to the exemptions for regional aid provided under paragraphs (a) 
and (c) of Article 107(3) TFEU  
In this regard, it should be observed that the possibilities offered by Art. 107(3) 
have already been exploited in the context of the State Aid Zone model, which 
has been identified and described in Chapter 5; the situations defined under 
paragraphs (a) and (c) are the legal background for many examples of STZs 
established in the Member States, such as in the case of Urban Tax Free Zones 
in France and in Italy or Madeira in Portugal. 
Therefore, the research must be moved out of the exemptions provided under 
Art. 107(3) TFEU, setting a focus on a different area of analysis able to offer 
more original solutions. 
On the ground of this basic framework, it is thus necessary to explore the other 
possibilities left by the Altmark criteria and by Article 106(2) TFEU (with 
specific reference to the Commission Decision 2012/21/EU), approaching the 
following research sub-question: 
 
Research sub-question No. 2.1  
Can a tax measure of a social character addressed to a limited area of a Member State 
be considered compatible with the internal market and be exempt from the 
notification obligation under State aid rules? 
 
In this direction, the presence of social tax incentives offers the opportunity to 
begin a new research path outside the exemptions for regional aid set by Article 
107(3) TFEU. The objective, in fact, is to verify the space left by State aid rules 
for the implementation of the Social Cohesion Zone, assuming a different 
perspective of analysis focused on the discipline of Social Services of General 
Interest (SSGIs).  
6.3.1.1 Social tax incentives and SSGIs 
The discipline of SSGIs opens a new room of study in coherence with the 
objectives of a social character pursued under the design of the Social Cohesion 
Zone. The new model, in fact, has to be tested with respect to State aid rules, 
focusing on the relationship between its functional dimension and the concept 
of SSGIs. 
In this direction, it seems possible to establish a strict connection between the 
concept of SSGIs and the concept of social tax incentives, addressing the 
research process related to State aid rules towards the core of the functional 
dimension.  
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Both concepts, in fact, become overlapping when the beneficiaries of the social 
tax incentives are also the same providers of SSGIs; in other words, in such 
situations, social tax incentives are granted to the entities which are directly 
involved in the provision of SSGIs. On the background of these concepts there 
is the domain of social cohesion policies within which the design of the new 
model has been shaped according to the research question formulated at the 
beginning of the present chapter. 
SSGIs include a broad set of services which are addressed to disadvantaged 
groups of individuals; the pursued objective is to improve the living conditions 
by providing accessible services and, in particular, by achieving high levels of 
employment, human health protection and social cohesion in general. In 
particular, these services play a prevention and social cohesion role with 
customized assistance to facilitate social inclusion and safeguard fundamental 
rights. 
In this regard, it is important to remember that SSGIs, as well as Services of 
General Economic Interest (SGEIs), are a sub-set of the macro-category of 
Services of General Interest (SGIs), which covers all those services that public 
authorities classify as being of general interest and, therefore, are subject to 
specific public service obligations. 
In particular, as already seen under Chapter 3, measures constituting SSGIs are 
generally subject to the same rules applicable to SGEIs; according to the 
Commission, in fact, “almost all services offered in the social field can be 
considered economic activities”797. In other words, the fact that the aim 
pursued by the provision of such services is not economic but rather social 
doesn’t preclude that the activity carried out is economic in nature, especially 
when the same activity is carried out by an economic operator involved in the 
provision of goods or services on the market. 
For these reasons, in the next paragraphs, the references made to the discipline 
of SGEIs must also be deemed valid for SSGIs, considering that the recipient 
undertakings within the Social Cohesion Zone Model are always economic 
operators active in the market. 
6.3.1.2 Outcomes under the Altmark criteria 
According to the above premises, the analysis of State aid rules must start from 
the criteria identified in the Altmark case to consider a measure of 
compensation for a public service as falling outside the notion of State aid set 
by Article 107(1) TFEU. In first approximation, in fact, the social tax incentives 
797 See Communication from the Commission of 26 April 2006, Implementing the 
Community Lisbon programme: Social services of general interest in the European Union, 
COM (2006) No. 177 final, paragraph 2.1. 
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provided under the new model could represent a form of compensation for the 
economic operator involved in the provision of a public service related to the 
objectives of a social character which are pursued in the context of the Social 
Cohesion Zone. 
In this regard, the ECJ identifies four cumulative criteria to be fulfilled in order 
for such a measure to be considered out of the scope of State aid rules and, 
therefore, exempt from the notification requirement provided by Article 
108(3) TFEU. 
First, the beneficiary must have a clearly defined public service obligation to 
discharge according to the definition of a SGEI set by Article 106(2) TFEU. 
Second, the parameters on which compensation is calculated must be 
established in advance in an objective and transparent manner to avoid 
overcompensation which may confer economic advantage to the recipient. 
Third, the compensation cannot exceed what is necessary to cover all costs 
incurred in the discharge of the public service in question, taking into account 
the relevant receipts and a reasonable profit for the undertaking. 
Fourth, the undertaking must be selected pursuant to a public procurement 
procedure or, in alternative, the compensation to the beneficiary must not 
exceed that of a typical well-run undertaking which meets all the necessary 
public service requirements. 
Given the above, it is now necessary to test the design of the Social Cohesion 
Zone with reference to each of the above criteria; the objective, in fact, is to 
verify whether or not the related tax measures, which consist in the 
introduction of social tax incentives, can fall outside the scope of application of 
State aid rules and, thus, not be subject to the notification requirement set by 
Article 108 TFEU. 
 
First criterion (clearly defined public service obligation to discharge) 
The first Altmark criterion involves the nature and the scope of the activity 
carried out by the beneficiary of the tax measure, establishing a clearly defined 
public obligation to discharge. 
In this regard, the concept of public service obligation corresponds to the 
concept of an SSGI as referred to in Article 106(2) TFEU; nevertheless, it is not 
possible to identify a clear and precise regulatory definition of the concept of an 
SSGI within the EU law framework798.  
Consequently, it follows from the case law that Member States have a wide 
discretion to define what they regard as SSGIs and to determine the nature and 
                                                             
798 M. KLASSE, The Impact of Altmark: The European Commission Case Law Responses, in E. 
SZYZYCZAK, J.W. VAN DE GRONDEN, Financing Services of General Economic Interest, TMC 
Asser Press, The Hague, 2013, p. 39. 
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scope of an SSGI mission within the meaning of the Treaty799.  
The same flexible approach is confirmed in the Communication within the 
Almunia package where the Commission clarifies that Member States have a 
wide margin of discretion in defining a service as a SSGI and in granting 
compensation to the service provider, since the Commission’s competence in 
this respect is essentially limited to manifest errors800. 
One more aspect of the first Altmark criterion is related to the entrustment act 
which is associated to the SSGI mission; in this sense, in fact, the Commission 
always requires an official act having binding legal force under national law able 
to establish an obligation over the operator to provide the services in 
question801. 
Moving from these premises on the first Altmark criterion, the analysis must 
now clarify whether or not the beneficiary of social tax incentives can assume a 
clearly defined public service obligation to discharge in the context of the Social 
Cohesion Zone, namely whether or not the beneficiary is carrying out an SSGI 
in the same terms defined under EU law. 
As already seen, the design of the Social Cohesion Zone provides evidence of a 
series of strict conditions to be fulfilled by the beneficiary to ensure the pursuit 
of the objectives of a social character. For example, the hiring of a minimum 
number of new employees resident in the zone, as well as the purchase of a 
minimum volume of goods and/or services from local suppliers are both 
obligations assumed in the general interest; the creation of new jobs in 
disadvantaged areas, in fact, represents an initiative for social cohesion and, in 
particular, for work integration of low-income individuals, with an important 
outcome with respect to the general interest.  
From these considerations, it seems possible to configure the activities of the 
recipient undertakings of social tax incentives as SSGIs as long as they are 
based on the fulfilment of a set of conditions in the public interest, instead of in 
the interest of the same economic operator. 
In this perspective, the granting of social tax incentives becomes a form of 
compensation in favour of the economic operator for the obligations related to 
the minimum number of new employees to be hired or the minimum volume of 
                                                             
799 Case T-289/03 British United Provident Association Ltd (BUPA), BUPA Insurance Ltd and 
BUPA Ireland Ltd v Commission of the European Communities, [2005] ECR II-741, 
paragraph 167. 
800 See Case T-17/02 Fred Olsen v Commission, [2005] ECR II-2031, paragraph 216. 
801 Commission staff working document, Guide to the application of the European Union rules 
on state aid, public procurement and the internal market to services of general economic interest, 
and in particular to social services of general interest, Brussels, 2013, SWD(2013) 53 final/2, 
p. 21; see also M. KLASSE, op. cit., in E. SZYZYCZAK, J.W. VAN DE GRONDEN, Financing 
Services of General Economic Interest, TMC Asser Press, The Hague, 2013, p. 41. 
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purchases to be made from local suppliers. 
Therefore, the entrustment act is the document which summarizes the same 
perspective, establishing the granting of social tax incentives, on one part, and 
the obligations assumed in the general interest, on the other. 
Further arguments can support the configuration as SSGIs of the work 
integration activities carried out by the recipient of the tax measures in the 
Social Cohesion Zone. 
First of all, it should be noted that, when the obligation defined in the 
entrustment act is referred to the hiring of a minimum number of new 
employees resident in the area, the activity of the enterprise, involving a real 
work integration service, cannot be considered as carried out for the mere 
purpose of making profits; in such cases, in fact, the activity of the enterprises is 
aimed to the fulfillment of the obligations assumed in the same entrustment act 
and, therefore, the same activity finally results as carried out according to a 
social objective in the general interest of the society. 
Second, once the entrustment act is signed and the obligation is assumed, the 
statutory goals of the undertaking – even when related to the scope of making 
profits - remain on the background, while the sole aspect to be considered 
becomes the object of the obligation assumed by the enterprise within the same 
entrustment act; therefore, any time the object of that obligation is of a clear 
social nature, the activities carried out should be considered as a genuine SSGI 
for the purposes of the first Altmark criterion. 
According to these considerations, the first Altmark criterion does not involve 
any specific requirement for what regards the legal form and the size of the 
economic operator which is the beneficiary of the social tax incentives; in this 
sense, the Social Cohesion Zone may offer its incentives both to large 
enterprises and social enterprises, as long as the same recipient undertakings 
provide work integration services under a specific obligation assumed towards 
the public authority, thus confirming the same approach used at the beginning 
of this chapter for the definition of the design of the new model. In this sense, 
the only requirement is that in both cases the recipient undertakings are 
involved in a work integration service – as their main activity or even as an 
additional activity - and fulfill the obligations defined under the Social 
Cohesion Zone Model, regarding the minimum number of new resident 
employees and the minimum volume of purchases from the local suppliers. 
However, it is worth to note that the social character of the obligations assumed 
in the entrustment act could be further valorized as far as social enterprises 
become the beneficiary of the social tax incentives. 
In this case, in fact, not only the object of the obligations in the entrustment act, 
but also the statutory goals defined in the articles of association are able to 
provide evidence of the existence of a genuine SSGI within the Social Cohesion 
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Zone. Social enterprises, in fact, according to Article 2(1) of Regulation (EU) 
No. 1296/2013, have as primary objective the achievement of social goals and 
are characterized by the prevalence of the social goals over profits and by 
specific social criteria enshrined in the existence of an explicit social purpose. 
These considerations offer the opportunity to recognize social enterprises as 
the most defendable solution for the selection of the provider of SSGIs. In this 
case, in fact, the existence of a “genuine and correctly defined” SSGI can also be 
supported by the statutory goals of social enterprises with respect to the 
activities effectively carried out; thus, it seems clear that, under this framework, 
the services provided by social enterprises perfectly fulfil the first Altmark 
criterion, considering that not only the object of the obligation assumed in the 
entrustment act, but also the statutory goals are specifically addressed to aims 
of a social character which are pursued in the public interest. 
In summary, the analysis of the first Altmark criterion with respect to the design 
of the new model gives evidence of the possibility of identifying a public service 
obligation and, therefore, a genuine SSGI, any time the content of the 
obligations assumed by the economic operator is defined through an 
entrustment act with the identification of a set of clear conditions to be fulfilled 
related to objectives of a social character. Within this framework, large 
enterprises and social enterprises can both be identified, in principle, as the 
beneficiaries of the social tax incentives granted in the Social Cohesion Zone as 
long as the object of the obligation assumed is the only parameter to be 
considered to identify the existence of genuine SSGIs. Nevertheless, it is 
important to note that the adoption of a narrow approach focused on the 
statutory goals of the economic operator would produce more limitations, 
considering that in such a case, only social enterprises would be selected as legal 
entities eligible for the social tax incentives. 
In any case, it is worth to point out that, since Member States have a wide 
margin of discretion in defining a service as a SSGI, not only the EU 
framework, but also the national legislation should allow the identification of a 
genuine SSGI as long as the obligations assumed by the economic operator are 
related to objectives of a social character in the terms above descrived.  
The logical consequence is that, regardless of the aspects of compatibility with 
EU law, the identification of a genuine SSGI also requires a national legal order 
with provisions suitable for such a purpose; in other words, the introduction of 
national norms able to include such kind of work integration services under the 
concept of SSGI becomes a fundamental issue for the practical implementation 
of the new model in the light of the first Altmark criterion. 
 
Second criterion (objective parameters) 
The second Altmark criterion requires that the parameters for calculating the 
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compensation are established in advance and in an objective and transparent 
manner.  
This excludes the possibility of changing ex post the parameters of the 
calculation of the compensation. In this regard, it should be noted that the 
requirement refers to the ex ante establishment of the parameters and does not 
necessarily encompass the establishment of the amount of compensation802. In 
the decisions of the Commission, the criterion is found to be satisfied, for 
example, in cases concerning public service compensation for regional 
passenger transport in which the compensation is calculated on the basis of a 
price per kilometre and the total number of kilometres provided for in the 
contract803. Similarly, a compensation based on the number of users meets the 
second requirement804. In other cases, the Commission accepts that a multi-
annual budget planning fulfils the second requirement where this budget is 
based on data and hypotheses which are reasonable and sufficiently detailed805. 
On these bases, in the case of the Social Cohesion Zone, the parameters for 
calculating the compensation should be referred to the number of new 
employees hired and the monetary value of the purchases made from local 
suppliers. For this purpose, the content of the entrustment act must be 
valorized in order to ensure the fulfilment of the second Altmark criterion, with 
a detailed description of each of the parameters used to calculate the maximum 
amount of the compensation. 
In summary, the parameters defined ex ante in the entrustment act must ensure 
the possibility of a precise calculation ex post of the total value of the 
compensation granted to the economic operators, with the indication of the 
exact value of the tax expenditure with reference to each operator in the year of 
activity. 
 
Third criterion: avoiding overcompensation (necessity) 
Under the third Altmark criterion it is necessary to establish whether the 
compensation (i.e. the value of social tax incentives) does not exceed the costs 
related to the public service mission. This involves an ex post assessment of the 
costs effectively borne and a comparison with the tax expenditure value of the 
compensation measures for the public services carried out by the beneficiaries. 
                                                             
802 M. KLASSE, op. cit., in E. SZYZYCZAK, J.W. VAN DE GRONDEN, Financing Services of General 
Economic Interest, TMC Asser Press, The Hague, 2013, p. 42. 
803 Commission Decision of 26 November 2008 (State Aid C 16/2007 Postbus AG) O.J. 
2009, L 306, p. 26, paragraph 72 et seq. 
804 Communication from the Commission of 16 May 2006 (State Aid No. 604/2005 
Busverkehr Landkreis Wittenberg) O.J. 2006, C 207, p. 2, et. seq. 
805 Commission Decision of 24 February 2010 (State aid C 41/08 DSB) O.J. 2011, L 7, p. 1 
et seq., paragraph 281. 
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The Commission practice is generally based on Article 6 of the Decision which 
provides some guidance on how this criterion may be concretely fulfilled. 
In particular, the amount of compensation must not exceed what is necessary to 
cover the net cost incurred in discharging the public service obligations, 
including a reasonable profit806. In this regard, the costs to be taken into 
consideration shall include all the costs incurred in operating the service of 
general interest.  
Thus, within the new model, it will be necessary to calculate the difference 
between the entire revenue earned from the SSGI and all the costs incurred in 
operating the same SSGI. 
In this regard, when the beneficiary of the social tax incentives is a large 
enterprise carrying out activities falling both inside and outside the scope of the 
social service of general interest, the internal accounts shall separately show the 
costs and receipts associated with the SSGI and those of other services, as well 
as the parameters for allocating costs and revenues. No compensation shall be 
granted in respect of these costs807. 
This point assumes a specific relevance in the context of the Social Cohesion 
Zone Model as long as large enterprises are included among the recipient 
undertakings; here, in fact, it is necessary to consider only the costs related to 
the SSGI, namely those referred to the gross wages paid for the new employees 
hired or those deriving from the purchases made from the local suppliers of the 
area. All the other costs, as long as they are related to activities falling outside 
the SSGI will not be taken into consideration. Nevertheless, in such cases, the 
costs linked to investments, notably concerning infrastructures (e.g. offices for 
the new employees and other instrumental goods), may be taken into account 
when necessary for the operation of the SSGI808. 
Within the third Altmark criterion, the ECJ also clarifies that for any 
compensation to fall outside Article 107(1) TFEU the compensation may not 
only cover the costs of the public service but also a reasonable profit.  
In this regard, the Commission in its case law applies not only sales-based (such 
as EBITDA809) profitability indicators, but also capital-based (such as 
                                                             
806 M. KLASSE, op. cit., in E. SZYZYCZAK, J.W. VAN DE GRONDEN, Financing Services of General 
Economic Interest, TMC Asser Press, The Hague, 2013, p. 43. 
807 See Commission Decision 2012/21/EU of 20 December 2011 on the application of 
Article 106(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to State aid in the 
form of public service compensation granted to certain undertakings entrusted with the 
operation of services of general economic interest, O.J. 2012, L 7, p. 3–10, Article 5(9). 
808 Ibid., Article 5(3)(d). 
809 A company's earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization (EBITDA) is 
an accounting measure calculated using company net earnings, before interest expenses, 
taxes, depreciation, and amortization are subtracted, as a proxy for a company current 
operating profitability. 
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ROCE810) indicators. For instance, in the French broadband infrastructure case 
Pyrénées-Atlantiques the Commission comes to the conclusion that a ROCE of 
approximately 11% is reasonable for the sector811. Then, in Southern Moravia 
Bus Companies, the Commission considers a margin of close to 8% as 
reasonable for the passenger transport in question812, while in a case of public 
passenger transport service compensation (Anhalt-Bitterfeld), the Commission 
considers that the proposed margin cap of 5% (turnover margin) over the costs 
of providing the service allows for a reasonable margin813. Furthermore, in 
DSB, the Commission accepts that the reasonable profit varies between 6% and 
12% (return on equity), with an annual cap set at 10% over 3 years, to take 
account of the efficiency gains and/or the improvement in the quality of the rail 
passenger services to be provided by the company DSB814. 
On these bases, in order to fulfil the third Altmark criterion, the reasonable 
profits for the recipient undertakings of the Social Cohesion Zone should be 
set with reference to one of the above indicators, giving precedence to the most 
practical solution. 
 
Fourth criterion: competitive tendering or efficient undertaking comparator 
Under the forth Altmark criterion the undertaking must be selected pursuant to 
a public procurement procedure or, in alternative, the compensation to the 
beneficiary must not exceed that of a typical well-run undertaking which meets 
all the necessary public service requirements. 
In particular, for what regards the public procurement procedure, the forth 
Altmark criterion requires to verify whether the procedure has resulted in 
genuinely competitive tendering, and, in particular, whether the SSGI is 
assigned to the undertaking requesting the lowest level of compensation. Under 
the relevant case law, “qualitative” tenders, where the undertaking is selected on 
the basis of the most advantageous bid and not on the basis of the lowest level 
of compensation, are generally considered as not able to avoid the risk of 
                                                             
810 Return on capital employed (ROCE) is a financial ratio that measures a company 
profitability and the efficiency with which its capital is employed. ROCE is calculated as: 
ROCE = Earnings Before Interest and Tax (EBIT) / Capital Employed. 
811 Communication from the Commission of 16 November 2004 (State Aid No. 381/2004 
Broadband Infrastructure Project Pyrénées-Atlantiques) COM (2004) No. 4343 final, 
paragraph 82. 
812 Commission Decision of 26 November 2008 (State aid C 3/08 Southern Moravia Bus 
Companies) O.J. 2009, L 97, p. 14, paragraph 71. 
813 Communication from the Commission of 15 September 2009 (State aid No 206/2009 
Financing of the public transport services in district of Anhalt-Bitterfeld) COM (2009) No. 
6777 final, paragraph 46. 
814 Commission Decision of 24 February 2010 (State aid C 41/08 DSB) O.J. 2011, L 7, p. 1 
et seq., paragraph 359. 
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overcompensation. In the same direction, the Commission recommends the 
adoption of an open, transparent  and  non-discriminatory  public  procurement  
procedure with award criteria based on the lowest level of compensation, while 
the “most economically advantageous tender” is deemed sufficient only where 
“the award criteria  are  closely  related  to  the  subject-matter  […]  and  allow  for  
the  most economically  advantageous  offer  to  match  the  value  of  the  market”815.  
Where the undertaking is not chosen pursuant to a public procurement 
procedure, the forth Altmark criterion requires that the level of compensation is 
determined on the basis of an analysis of the costs that a typical well-run 
undertaking would have incurred in the same situation. This is an alternative 
test based on the efficiency of the provider of the service and on the least cost 
for the community. The benchmark is the would-be price referred to the 
situation of the same public service assigned by way of a competitive tender816. 
However, the application of the alternative test involves a high degree of legal 
uncertainty with unpredictability of the results because of a lack of comparable 
undertakings to be used as benchmarks817. 
Given the above, it is possible to conclude that, within the design of the new 
model, the economic operator which benefits from the social tax incentives, 
should always be selected through an  open,  transparent  and  non-
discriminatory  public procurement procedure. Otherwise, the alternative test, 
which is based  on the costs of a well-run business, does not offer sufficient 
guarantees for its practical implementation considering the lack of objective 
parameters. 
Furthermore, the public procurement procedure adopted for the selection of 
the beneficiaries in the Social Cohesion Zone should always involve awarding 
criteria based on the lowest level of compensation in order to avoid the risk of 
overcompensation in conformity with the views of the ECJ and the 
Commission818. 
 
At the end of the analysis of the Altmark criteria, it is necessary to summarize 
the main outcomes and, in particular, to verify whether the design of the Social 
Cohesion Zone, as outlined at the beginning of this chapter, can be adapted 
                                                             
815 Communication from  the  Commission of 11 January 2012  on  the  application  of  the  
European  Union  State  aid  rules  to compensation  granted  for  the  provision  of  
services  of  general  economic  interest, O.J. 2012, C 8, pp. 4-14, paragraph 67. 
816 Commission Decision of 26 November 2008 (State aid C 3/08 Southern Moravia Bus 
Companies) O.J. 2009, L 97, p. 14, paragraph 83. 
817 See Opinion by the State Aid Group of EAGCP, Services of general economic interest, 
29 June 2006, p. 7, available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/legislation/sgei.pdf 
818 For practical solutions regarding the implementation of the public procurement 
procedure and the selection of economic operators in the context of social tax incentives 
see infra paragraph 7.5.2.2. 
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within the EU law framework as far as the variable of State aid rules is 
considered. 
The research process has been addressed to investigate the possibility of tax 
measures -  in the form of social tax incentives - which could fall outside the 
scope of application of State aid rules and, thus, not be subject to the 
notification requirement set by Article 108 TFEU. 
For this purpose, the results of the analysis outline the possibility of a Social 
Cohesion Zone with a set of social tax incentives defined out of the scope of the 
State aid discipline – and, therefore, not constituting State aid under the notion 
of Article 107(1) TFEU – as long as some specific requirements are fulfilled on 
the ground of the Altmark criteria. 
First of all, the economic operators which benefit from the social tax incentives 
granted in the zone must be selected through an  open, transparent  and  non-
discriminatory  public procurement procedure, with awarding criteria based on 
the lowest level of compensation. In particular, the call for tenders should 
anticipate the content of the obligations and the conditions which will be 
included in the entrustment act and, at the same time, it should specify a set of 
eligibility requirements for the applications of the economic operators. 
In this context, the entrustment act, which represents the conclusion of the 
public procurement procedure, assumes a critical role for the admissibility of 
the tax measures under the Altmark criteria. This document, in fact, should 
precisely define the duration and the content of the obligations assumed by the 
recipient undertakings involved in a work integration service, both in the case 
of social enterprises (where the work integration service is the main statutory 
activity) and in the case of large enterprises (where work integration is a mere 
additional service besides the other main statutory goals). The same document 
should also include a description of the compensation mechanism (with the use 
of tax exemptions and tax credits) and, in particular, the parameters for 
calculating, controlling, and reviewing the compensation, including the 
indicator used to establish the reasonable profit. 
In conclusion, the outcome of the analysis of the Altmark criteria gives evidence 
of a Social Cohesion Zone Model which can be designed in a form compatible 
with the internal market from the perspective of State aid rules; in particular, it 
has been demonstrated that, as long as the use of the public procurement 
procedure and the entrustment act are set according to the requirements above 
described, the tax measures granted in the Social Cohesion Zone can be 
considered as not constituting State aid under the notion of Article 107(1) and, 
therefore, be exempt from the notification requirement. 
6.3.1.3 Outcomes under Art. 106(2) TFEU 
The second part of the analysis of State aid rules must be focused on those 
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situations where the recipient undertaking is unable to comply with all the 
Altmark criteria. 
This could happen, for example, when the beneficiary is selected without an 
open, transparent and non-discriminatory public procurement procedure, or 
when the parameters for calculating the compensation are not established in 
advance.  
In such cases, the tax measures granted within the Social Cohesion Zone will be 
considered as State aid according to the notion of Article 107(1) TFEU; 
nevertheless, when a tax measure addressed to a SSGI fails to comply with the 
Altmark criteria, it is still possible to find a space left within Article 106(2) 
TFEU in order to consider such a measure as a State aid compatible with the 
internal market. 
Being this the case, the general consequence is that the tax measures have to be 
previously notified pursuant to Article 108(3) TFEU with an assessment from 
the Commission based on the conditions of compatibility set by Article 106(2). 
Nevertheless, even in this context, the Commission Decision 2012/21/EU, 
which is part of the Almunia package, still offers some possibilities for the 
introduction of tax measures exempt from the notification obligation, giving 
evidence of one more field of investigation for the purposes of the research 
question. The Decision, in fact, provides a sort of block exemption according to 
which State aid in the form of public service compensation meeting a series of 
specific conditions are automatically compatible with the internal market and 
exempt from the prior notification obligation provided for in Article 108(3) 
TFEU. 
Therefore, also in this case, the conditions set by the same Decision assume a 
fundamental relevance in order to verify the space left for the autonomous 
initiatives of the Member States for the implementation of the Social Cohesion 
Zone Model within the EU law framework. 
By the analysis of this instrument, it first entails that the tax measures adopted 
in the context of the Social Cohesion Zone can effectively be covered by the 
scope of the Decision; the reference to the “social inclusion of vulnerable 
groups”, in fact, underlines the possibility for Member States to include various 
social services within a flexible concept, with the consequent exemption from 
the notification requirement when the related tax measures are addressed to 
objectives of social policies819. Accordingly, as far as the design of the Social 
Cohesion Zone is concerned, it seems possible to include under the concept of 
“social inclusion of vulnerable groups” all the objectives of a social character 
associated with the work integration of the low-income individuals resident in 
the area. This means that the social tax incentives provided in the new model 
819 See Commission Decision 2012/21/EU of 20 December 2011, Article 2(1)(c). 
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can be qualified as a form of public service compensation in favour of the 
economic operators which are involved in the provision of work integration 
services in favour of vulnerable groups of individuals. By this way, the tax 
measures adopted in the Social Cohesion Zone, even though considered as 
State aid pursuant to Article 107(1)TFEU, may in principle become block 
exempted from the notification requirement according to the provisions of the 
Decision. 
The Decision also provides that the exemption is subject to the existence of an 
entrustment act through which the beneficiary is specifically entrusted by the 
public authority. In particular, the entrustment act must include the content and 
the duration of the public service obligation (maximum ten years), the 
undertaking and the territory concerned, the nature of any exclusive or special 
rights assigned to the undertaking by the granting authority, a description of the 
compensation mechanism, the parameters for calculating, controlling and 
reviewing the compensation, and a specific reference to the same Decision. In 
more details, the duration  of  the  period  of  entrustment  must  be justified  by  
reference  to  objective  criteria,  such  as  the  need to  amortize  non-
transferable  fixed  assets; in  principle, the duration  of  the  period  of  
entrustment  must  not  exceed the  period  required  for  the  depreciation  of  
the  most significant  assets  required  to  provide  the  SSGI820. 
Further conditions provided by the Decision concern the control of 
overcompensation. Also in this case, in fact, the amount of compensation must 
not exceed what is necessary to cover the net cost incurred in discharging the 
public service obligations, including a reasonable profit. The net cost is 
calculated as the difference between the costs incurred in operating the SSGI 
and the revenues; In particular, where the undertaking also carries out activities 
falling outside the scope of the SSGI, only the costs related to the SSGI will be 
taken into consideration, while the cost linked with investments may be taken 
into account only when necessary for the operation of the SSGI821. 
The Decision also contains some further guidance for what regards the concept 
of “reasonable profit”; in this sense, reasonable profit means the rate of return 
on capital that would be required by a typical undertaking considering whether 
or not to provide the SSGI for the whole period of entrustment, taking into 
account the level of risk822. Where, by reasons of specific circumstances, it is 
                                                             
820 Communication  from  the  Commission on  the  application  of  the  European  Union  
State  aid  rules  to compensation  granted  for  the  provision  of  services  of  general  
economic  interest, O.J. 2012, C 8, pp. 4-14, paragraph 17. 
821 Ibid., paragraph 31 
822 In more details, the Decision provides that a rate of return on capital that does not exceed 
the relevant swap rate plus a premium of 100 basis points shall be regarded as reasonable 
in any event. 
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not appropriate to use the rate of return on capital, Member States may rely on 
profit level indicators other than the rate of return on capital to determine what 
the reasonable profit should be, such as the average return on equity, return on 
capital employed, return on assets or return on sales823. Furthermore, where an 
undertaking carries out activities falling both inside and outside the scope of the 
SSGI, according to the Decision the internal accounts must show separately the 
costs and receipts associated with the SSGI and those of other services, as well 
as the parameters for allocating costs and revenues824. 
Finally, it is important to observe that in the recitals of the Decision it is 
expressly provided that the exemption at issue has to be applied without 
prejudice to the Union provisions in the field of public procurement825. This 
basically means that, regardless of the forth Altmark criterion, the obligation to 
follow a public procurement procedure has become, in the eyes of the 
Commission, a standard requirement for contracts related to SSGIs.  
In definitive, if the tax measures provided within the Social Cohesion Zone  
fulfil  the  conditions laid  down  in  the  Decision,  then  the  measures are 
considered to be compatible with the internal market and exempt from the 
notification requirement set by Article 108(3) TFEU.  
Otherwise, where the Decision  is  not  applicable,  the  tax measures  can  still in 
principle be evaluated under Article 106(2) TFEU according to the criteria 
specifically defined in the Framework included in the Almunia package. 
Nevertheless, being this the case, the tax measures will need the approval of the  
Commission after notification pursuant to Article 108(3) of the TFEU and, 
therefore, it will not be possible to identify a space left for the autonomous 
initiatives of the Member States.  
Therefore, the evaluation of the tax measures of the Social Cohesion Zone 
under the criteria defined in the Framework must be excluded from the scope of 
the present analysis since it would involve a perspective not in line with the 
object of the research question (which is related to the possibility of tax 
measures not only compatible with the internal market, but also exempt from 
the notification requirement). 
At the same time, the perspective of the SGEI de minimis regulation cannot be 
considered;  the  de  minimis  rule, in fact, which  provides  that  an  aid  below 
EUR 500.000  on  a  three  year  period  does not have  the  characteristic  of  
distorting competition, is not sufficient from the point of view of the 
expenditure value since it essentially reproduces a mechanism which is already 
                                                             
823 Communication  from  the  Commission on  the  application  of  the  European  Union  
State  aid  rules  to compensation  granted  for  the  provision  of  services  of  general  
economic  interest, O.J. 2012, C 8, pp. 4-14, paragraph 34. 
824 Commission Decision 2012/21/EU of 20 December 2011, Article 5(9). 
825 Ibid., recital 29. 
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used in the context of the current regional aid policy. Therefore, the analysis of 
any eventual perspective offered by the SGEI de minimis regulation would 
finally re-propose the dimension of the State Aid Zone model, excluding the 
possibility of original results from the development of the research question.  
In summary, on the ground of the above considerations, the analysis of the 
scope and the conditions of the Commission Decision is finally able to define 
one more space left for the Social Cohesion Zone under the perspective of 
Article 106(2) TFEU in addition to the outcomes resulting from the analysis of 
the Altmark criteria. 
In this regard, it is necessary to verify whether the same space is wider than that 
provided under the Altmark criteria through a comparison of the different 
outcomes with reference to the design of the new model. 
For what regards the first Altmark criterion, it seems that the scope of the 
Decision, which refers to the social inclusion of vulnerable groups of people, 
essentially re-proposes the same substance of the principles defined under 
Altmark. In both cases, in fact, it is necessary that the SSGI is clearly defined 
and, at the same time, Member States join a wide margin of discretion in 
defining what they considered as a SSGI. 
The second and the third Altmark criteria find the same evidence in the 
outcomes from the analysis of the Decision. In this sense, Articles 4 and 5 of the 
Decision, respectively dedicated to “entrustment” and “compensation”, contain 
references to the same principles developed under Altmark; for example, the 
entrustment act under the Decision must include the parameters for calculating 
the compensation, in line with the substance of the second Altmark criterion. 
Furthermore, also Article 5 of the Decision refers to the prohibition of 
overcompensation and to the concept of reasonable profits in a way which is 
analogous to the third Altmark criterion. 
On the contrary, important differences emerge as far as the fourth Altmark 
criterion is considered. In this case, in fact, the Decision does not specifically 
provide any condition related to the use of a public procurement procedure for 
awarding contracts.  
On the ground of this outcome, it is possible to conclude that the space left to 
Member States for the implementation of the Social Cohesion Zone is wider in 
the case of the Commission Decision than in the case of Altmark; in the former 
case, in fact, it seems possible to grant the tax incentives within the Social 
Cohesion Zone without a prior selection of the beneficiaries though a public 
procurement procedure. 
Nevertheless, the practical effects of such conclusion should be mitigated by a 
basic consideration.  
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As stated in the same recital of the Decision826, in fact, the exemption at issue 
has to be applied without prejudice to the Union provisions in the field of 
public procurement. This basically means that Member States have to comply 
with public procurement EU rules, regardless of the scope of State aid rules. As 
a consequence, it is hard to believe that, from the practical point of view, the 
implementation of the Social Cohesion Zone under the Decision could lead to 
more flexible outcomes than under the Altmark criteria, since in both cases, the 
compliance with public procurement EU rules seems to be a fundamental 
aspect to be considered. 
This conclusion is coherent with the position of the case law considering that in 
several cases it is possible to note a certain similarity between the conditions for 
the application of Article 106(2) TFEU and the aspects of the Altmark 
criteria827. 
6.3.2 Fundamental freedoms 
The fundamental freedoms are the second variable to be considered for the 
analysis of the design of the Social Cohesion Zone within the EU law 
framework. 
As already seen, the fundamental freedoms play a relevant role in this field, 
considering that the introduction of tax incentives for a limited area of a 
Member State generally determines a differentiated tax treatment between 
resident and non-resident entities. 
The design of the new model is characterized by the presence of tax measures 
of a social character addressed to recipient undertakings which are considered 
as based in the territory of the zone according to the criterion of the permanent 
establishment828. 
Nonetheless, the same undertakings must comply with a set of conditions 
concerning the hiring of a minimum number of resident employees or the 
purchaising of a minimum volume of services and goods from the local 
suppliers. 
                                                             
826 Ibid. 
827 See, inter alia, Case T-289/03 BUPA and others v Commission [2008] ECR II-00081, 
paragraphs 160, 162 and 224. 
828 For what regards the territorial dimension of the new model, the permanent 
establishment is here assumed as a minimum requirement to ensure a sufficient link 
between the place of business and a specific geographic point, as well as a certain degree 
of permanence within the area concerned (see supra paragraph 6.2.1.3). This means that, 
under the same territorial dimension, a business can also operate in the zone through 
more structured forms of organization, such as a subsidiary company. In all these cases, in 
fact, there will be a sufficient link between the place of business and the territory of the 
zone. 
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On these premises, the variable of the fundamental freedoms involves two 
different levels of analysis related to the free movement of persons: first, the 
position of the undertakings which are the direct recipient of tax advantages 
granted through the package of social tax incentives (with respect to the 
freedom of establishment); second, the employees and the suppliers resident in 
the zone which indirectly benefit from the tax measures adopted in the context 
of the Social Cohesion Zone, enjoying the positive effects generated by the 
fulfillment of the obligations assumed by the recipient undertakings (with 
respect to the free movement of workers and the freedom of establishment). 
On these premises, it is now necessary to test the Social Cohesion Zone under 
the same variable, approaching the following research sub-question: 
 
Research sub-question No. 2.2  
Can a tax measure of a social character addressed to a limited area of a Member State, 
including conditions also based on the residence of the actors involved, be considered 
compatibile with the free movement of persons? 
 
Therefore, the next paragraphs will be dedicated to the analysis of the issues 
related to the above research sub-question, exploring first the position of the 
recipient undertakings and then the position of the employees and suppliers 
resident in the area which represent the ultimate target of the tax policy carried 
out under the Social Cohesion Zone. 
6.3.2.1 The situation of the recipient undertakings 
In the design of the Social Cohesion Zone, the territorial dimension has been 
shaped assuming the permanent establishment as the connecting factor for 
considering an undertaking as based within the perimeter of the zone. 
Accordingly, the social tax incentives defined under the new model may be 
granted not only to resident undertakings but also to permanent establishment 
of non-resident undertakings, expanding the set of recipients which are eligible 
for the same tax measures. 
The analysis of the EU law framework confirms this possibility as a 
comfortable solution to exclude the presence of a discriminatory treatment or a 
restriction for what concerns the freedom of establishment. 
In such cases, in fact, the terms of comparison are between a non-resident 
company with a permanent establishment in the STZ territory, on one part, 
and a resident company based in the same STZ, on the other; here, it is evident 
that the permanent establishment of the non-resident company is generally in a 
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comparable situation with the resident company and, thus, both situations have 
to be treated in the same manner829. 
Consequently, the identification of the permanent establishment as the 
territorial connecting factor is an element which ensures the freedom of 
establishment in the context of the Social Cohesion Zone, at least for what 
regards the situation of the recipient undertakings based within the perimeter 
of the zone. 
These conclusions are in line with the settled case law reviewed in the context of 
Chapter 3; it has already been stated, in fact, that the attribution of tax 
incentives only to undertakings having their registered office in the territory of 
the Social Cohesion Zone and not to non-resident companies with a 
permanent establishment in the same territory may determine a discrimination 
against the non-resident company with the consequent infringement of the 
freedom of establishment830. In particular, in the case Avoir Fiscal the ECJ 
comes to the conclusion that the permanent establishment of a non-resident 
company and a resident company are in comparable situations as the national 
tax law does not distinguish between resident companies and permanent 
establishment of non-resident companies for the purpose of tax liability. Both 
entities, in fact, are subject to corporate income tax and, consequently, they are 
on the same footing under national law for the purposes of direct taxation. The 
different treatment of the two comparable situations, therefore, constitutes 
discrimination; thus, the permanent establishment of a non-resident company 
has to be treated in the same manner as resident companies. 
On the ground of these consideration, it is possible to conclude that the 
situation of the non-resident undertakings in the new model does not involve 
any issue related to the freedom of establishment and the principle of tax non-
discrimination. This is because, as long as the territorial connecting factor is 
defined with reference to the permanent establishment, any concern about a 
differentiated tax treatment does not emerge; in other words, the extension of 
the set of recipients, with the inclusion of the permanent establishment of non-
resident entities, is able to set aside any discussion about  the discrimination or 
the restriction of the freedom of establishment. 
                                                             
829 K. DZIURDZ, C. MARCHGRABER, Non-Discrimination in European and Tax Treaty Law, 
Series on International Tax Law, Michael Lang (ed.), Wien, 2015, p. 52. 
830 Case C-270/83 Commission of the European Communities v French Republic (Avoir fiscale), 
[1986] ECR 273; Joined cases C-400/97, C-401/97 and C-402/97 Administración 
General del Estado v Juntas Generales de Guipúzcoa and Diputación Foral de Guipúzcoa, 
Juntas Generales d'Alava and Diputación Foral d'Alava and Juntas Generales de Vizcaya, 
[2000] ECR I-01073. 
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Therefore, from the point of view of the recipient undertakings, the Social 
Cohesion Zone Model can pass the test of compatibility within the variable of 
the freedom of establishment without any further investigation. 
6.3.2.2 The situation of the employees 
The tax measures provided under the Social Cohesion Zone Model are 
characterized by a series of conditions to be fulfilled by the recipient 
undertaking which regard, among the others, the hiring of a minimum number 
of new employees resident in the area. 
In the resulting framework the recipient undertakings are the beneficiaries of the 
tax incentives with a favouring effect consisting in the reduction of their tax 
burden, while the new hired employees become the real ultimate target of the 
initiatives assumed by the Member State within the domain of social cohesion 
policy. 
In such a situation, some concerns may arise with reference to the free 
movement of workers and the issues related to the discrimination or the 
restriction against the individuals which do not have their residence in the same 
area. 
Within the design of the new model, in fact, the terms of comparison may be set 
between the situation of the employees resident of the zone and the employees 
non-resident of the same zone; furthermore, for what regards the second 
situation, it is also possible to make one more distinction between the workers 
which are resident of the hosting Member State and the workers which are 
non-resident with respect to the hosting Member State. 
As long as these situations are considered as comparable, the tax incentives 
provided under the Social Cohesion Zone Model could be seen as a 
discriminatory measure with respect to the position of the workers not resident 
in the same area. 
Before any further analysis based on the judgement of discrimination, it should 
first be noted that the design of the new model offers some important 
arguments to refuse, in principle, the above doubts. 
First of all, the discriminatory content of a tax measure is usually measured with 
regard to the position of the recipient of the tax advantages, namely the 
undertaking which benefits from the reduction of the tax burden. In this case, as 
far as the perspective is shifted to the employees, the tax measures at issue do 
not determine any favourable effect with reference to their tax liability. In such 
situations, in fact, the factual evidence is only characterized by an indirect effect 
which is not of a fiscal nature as it merely consists in the increase of the 
employment offers available in the job market of the area. 
Therefore, it seems not possible to expand the scope of the judgement of 
discrimination on the indirect effects of the tax measures, especially when the 
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indirect effects do not include a reduction of the tax liability of the same 
employees. 
Then, the second argument is that the employees resident in the Social 
Cohesion Zone are not in a comparable situation with respect to all the other 
employees which reside outside the territory of the zone. In this regard, in fact, 
it is important to remember that the crucial element for the decision of 
establishing a Social Cohesion Zone in a limited area of the Member State is 
always related to the disadvantaged conditions of a specific territory with 
respect to the national average or the EU average. In this sense, in fact, the 
social tax incentives provided under the Social Cohesion Zone regime are 
specifically tailored to improve the living conditions of low-income individuals 
in the light of the disadvantaged geographical position of the territory in which 
they reside. Consequently, it is clear that the employees which reside in more 
competitive territories of the Member States cannot claim to be within a 
comparable situation with respect to the employees based in the Social 
Cohesion Zone. 
On the ground of these considerations, it should be hard to suppose an 
infringement of the free movement of workers following the adoption of the 
tax measures provided within the Social Cohesion Zone Model; the situation of 
the new employees hired by the recipient undertaking, in fact, seems to be set 
outside the perimeter of any judgement of discrimination which should be 
limited to the direct effects of the related tax measures and the consequent 
reduction of the tax burden. 
However, the scope of the present analysis is also intended to consider the case 
where the ECJ would challenge these conclusions, assuming a more invasive 
approach with the extension of the scope of the judgement of discrimination to 
the situations of the employees which indirectly benefit from the tax measures at 
issue. 
Being this the case, it is now necessary to analyze the situation of the new 
employees hired by the recipient undertakings following the steps of the 
judgement of discrimination. 
Comparability test 
The first aspect to be considered under the judgement of discrimination is 
related to the comparability of the two situations. 
In this case, the terms of the comparison are set between the situation of the 
workers which have their residence in the zone and the other workers which 
have their residence out of the perimeter of the same zone. 
On these premises, the analysis should be carried out according to the overall 
comparison approach which has been consolidated since the Schumacker 
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case831. In this sense, the comparability between residents and non-residents 
exists only when there is an equivalence between residents and non-residents 
with respect to the overall ability to pay; in other words, the relevant factor for 
comparability is identified in the evaluation of the general situation of the 
taxpayer, with specific reference to the Member State where the overall income 
(or, at least, the most part of the income) is produced. Therefore, in the Social 
Cohesion Zone Model, the comparability will be detected only as long as the 
non-resident produces at least the most part of his/her income within the 
perimeter of the STZ832. 
As a consequence, the comparability between the situations of the resident and 
non-resident of the Social Cohesion Zone will be generally excluded, 
considering the usual presence of important elements of differentiation for 
what regards the place where the income is produced; however, such general 
rule may be subject to relevant deviations, with the consequent formulation of a 
judgement of non-discrimination, if it is possible to identify an equivalence 
between residents and non-residents with reference to the overall ability to pay 
and the area where their income is produced. 
This could happen, for example, in the case of the workers which have their 
residence in the areas immediately outside the external perimeter of the zone833 
and, at the same time, which produce the most part of their income in the Social 
Cohesion Zone, since they are hired by undertakings or permanent 
establishments of undertakings based within the perimeter of the same zone. 
Being that the case, it is necessary to proceed with the next steps of the 
judgement of discrimination in order to verify the eventual infringement of the 
free movement of workers. 
 
Discrimination test 
The second step of the judgement of discrimination involves the verification of 
the existence of a national rule with a discriminatory content, with a differential 
treatment of the two comparable situations. 
For the purposes of the discriminatory test, it is first necessary to make a 
distinction; the focus, in fact, can be set on the differentiated treatment between 
the resident employees of the Social Cohesion Zone and the other workers 
which are resident of the same hosting Member State or on the differentiated 
treatment between the same resident employees of the zone and the workers 
which have their residence in another Member State. 
This distinction is important since Article 45 TFEU does not apply to a “wholly 
internal” situation, such as in the case of the workers which are non-resident 
                                                             
831 Case C-279/93 Finanzamt Köln-Altstadt v Roland Schumacker, [1995] ECR I-225. 
832 Ibid., paragraph 38. 
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with respect to the Social Cohesion Zone but, at the same time, have their 
residence in another area of the same hosting Member State834. 
In such cases, in fact, it is possible to identify a situation of “reverse 
discrimination”, where national workers cannot claim in their own Member 
States the rights which can instead be claimed by the workers who reside in 
another Member State. As expressly stated in Saunders, a resident of a Member 
State cannot rely on Article 45 TFEU in his or her own Member State to 
challenge a restriction on the free movement of persons, since there is no factor 
connecting the situation with Union law835. In other words, the residents of a 
Member State who have never exercised the right to the free movement of 
persons within the Union, have no rights to be invoked under Union law836; this 
is because a worker can rely on Article 45 TFEU against his or her own state 
only where that worker has been employed in another Member State837. 
On the ground of the above considerations, it is finally clear that it is not 
possible to identify any discriminatory measure as long as the terms of 
comparison are between the resident employees of the Social Cohesion Zone 
and the other workers which are resident of the same hosting Member State. In 
such cases, in fact, the absence of a cross-border factor determines, under the 
views of the ECJ, the impossibility of invoking the free movement of persons 
against the hosting Member State. 
Differently, a discriminatory treatment relevant under the judgement of 
discrimination may exist when the comparison is between the same resident 
employees of the zone and the workers which have their residence in another 
Member State. 
For example, such a situation may occur in case of a Social Cohesion Zone 
located close to the border of a Member State; in such case, in fact, the workers 
which have their residence in the other Member State, in the areas immediately 
outside the external perimeter of the zone, could be affected by a discriminatory 
treatment as long as they produce the most part of their income in the Social 
Cohesion Zone. 
Justification test 
Within the limits of relevance set by the comparability test and the 
discrimination test, it is now necessary to verify the tax measures of the Social 
Cohesion Zone under the third step of the judgement of discrimination; in this 
834 P. CRAIG, G. DE BÚRCA, EU Law: Text, Cases, and Materials, Sixt Edition, Oxford 
University Press, New York, 2015, pp. 762-763. 
835 Case C-178/78 R v Sanders, [1979] ECR 1129. 
836 Joined Cases C-35/83 and C-36/83 Morson and Jhanjan v Netherlands, [1982] ECR 3723. 
837 Case C-18/95 FC Terhoeve v Inspecteur van de Belastingdienst Particulieren/Onderneminen 
Buitenland, [1999] ECR I-345. 
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case, the aim is the identification of possible objective grounds for justifying a 
discriminatory rule based on the residence of the workers. 
Within the EU framework, the free movement of workers may be subject to 
limitations on grounds of public policy, public security or public health as 
provided by Article 45 TFEU; in particular, as regards the public policy exception, 
the ECJ states that Member States retain a certain margin of discretion since “the 
particular circumstances justifying recourse to the concept of public policy may 
vary from one country to another and from one period to another”838. 
In addition to the grounds explicitly mentioned in the TFEU, the ECJ, since the 
Cassis de Dijon judgment, states that the infringement of the fundamental 
freedoms may also be justified by general grounds of public interest839.  
However, the case law of the ECJ does not provide a comprehensive definition 
of public interest, limiting its decisions to the description of a series of examples 
of situations that are relevant under such notion. 
The lack of a systematic approach is mainly justified by the need of flexibility 
which usually characterizes the measures of social policy adopted at the 
national level, while no uniform code of values can be imposed by EU law840; 
for example, in the case of the United Kingdom, the Joint Committee on 
Privacy and Injunctions assumes the same approach stating that “the decision of 
where the public interest lies in a particular case is a matter of judgment, and is best 
taken by the courts in privacy cases”841. In other words, the general opinion is that 
a non-exhaustive list of public interest matters is more appropriate and useful 
than a strict definition of public interest842. 
Therefore, the ECJ always leaves open the list of public interests, on the ground 
of the fact that the choice of public interests which a Member State wishes to 
promote by granting tax incentives is a matter of its own discretion843. 
                                                             
838 Case C-41/74, Yvonne van Duyn v Home Office, [1974] ECR 01337. 
839 Case C-120/78 Rewe-Zentral AG v Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwein, [1979] ECR 
00649. 
840 Case C-268/99 Aldona Malgorzata Jany and Others v Staatssecretaris van Justitie, [2001] 
ECR I-08615. 
841 HOUSE OF LORDS – JOINT COMMITTEE ON PRIVACY AND INJUNCTIONS, Paper No. 273, 
House of Commons Paper No. 1443, Session 2010–12, 2012, p. 19. 
842 For example, the Australian Press Council defines public interest as “involving a matter 
capable of affecting the people at large so they might be legitimately interested in, or concerned 
about, what is going on, or what may happen to them or to others” (See Australian Press 
Council, General Statement of Principles, 2011, available at http://www.presscouncil.org.au/ 
uploads/52321/ufiles/APC_General_Statement_of_Principles.pdf). 
843 See E. TRAVERSA, op. cit., in World Tax Journal, 2014, p. 339. See also G. BIZIOLI, Impact of 
the freedom of establishment on tax law, in EC Tax Review, 1998, No. 4, pp. 239-247, where 
the author stresses the relativity of concepts such as public policy or public security (often 
used by the ECJ to refer to the general concept of public interest) “because they change in 
time, national usage, and geographic location”.  
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In particular, as far as the scope of the public interests is concerned, the ECJ 
puts in evidence that both the EU and the Member States are required to 
respect fundamental rights, considering that “the protection of those rights is a 
legitimate interest which, in principle, justifies a restriction of the obligations 
imposed by EU law, even under a fundamental freedom guaranteed by the 
Treaty”844. In the light of these general grounds of public interest, the ECJ 
sometimes accepts the cohesion of the tax system as justification845, as well as 
the territoriality argument846, the effectiveness of fiscal supervision847 or the 
need to safeguard the balanced allocation of taxing rights848. Nonetheless, such 
cases, which belong to the tax law field, do not offer any support to valorize the 
social element which characterizes the new model of STZs here developed. 
However, the ECJ also explores other situations where the concept of social 
protection is better addressed for the purposes of the present analysis. 
According to the ECJ, in fact, overriding reasons relating to the public interest 
capable of justifying a restriction on the free movement of persons include the 
protection of workers849, the fight against undeclared work, as well as the 
protection of the financial balance of social security systems850. 
On these bases, it is possible to conclude that the tax measures provided under 
the Social Cohesion Zone should be allowed under a public interest 
justification, as long as they are univocally addressed to the work integration 
and the social inclusion of low-income groups of individuals in the 
disadvantaged areas of the Member States within the domain of a social policy 
initiative851. 
In this direction, the individual rights defined on the ground of the fundamental 
freedoms can be counterbalanced by social considerations and public interests, 
within a broader conception of the internal market, including social 
protection852. 
Within the Social Cohesion Zone Model, the specific conditions to be fulfilled 
                                                             
844 Case C-112/00 Eugen Schmidberger, Internationale Transporte und Planzüge v Republik 
Österreich, [2003] ECR I-05659. 
845 Case C-204/90 Bachmann, [1992] ECR I-249. 
846 Case C-250/95 Futura Participations, [1997] ECR I-2471. 
847 Ibid. 
848 Case C-446/03 Marks & Spencer, [2005] ECR I-10837. 
849 Case C-515/08 Dos Santos Palhota and Others, [2010] ECR I-09133, paragraph 47. See 
also Case C-445/03 Commission v Luxembourg [2004] ECR I-10191, paragraph 29. 
850 See Case C-346/06 Dirk Rüffert v Land Niedersachsen, [2008] ECR I-01989, 
paragraph 42. 
851 Ibid. 
852 See P. CRAIG, The Evolution of the Single Market, in C. BARNARD & J. SCOTT, The law of the 
Single European Market - unpacking the Premises, Hart Publishing, Oxford and Portland, 
2002, p. 32. 
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by the recipient undertakings give evidence of a public interest which can be 
defined according to principles already stated by the ECJ in the relevant case 
law. In this regard, in fact, the hiring of a minimum number of new employees is 
an obligation evidently assumed in the public interest, being addressed to the 
protection of the employment in the most disadvantaged areas of the Member 
States. 
 
Proportionality test 
The last step of the analysis regarding the situation of the employees involves 
the application of the principle of proportionality. 
When a ground of justification exists, in fact, it is always necessary to verify the 
proportionality of the same measure with respect to the objective pursued. 
According to the ECJ, tax incentives always must be proportionate to the 
legitimate objective of the national provisions on the ground of the public 
interest defined by the State at its own discretion853. 
The ECJ has to interpret the principle of proportionality in the light of the 
Member State’s values, considering also public policy justifications which 
determine a margin of discretion within the limits imposed by the Treaty. 
In the proportionality test there are usually three stages concerning the 
suitability, the necessity, and the proportionality stricto sensu of a tax 
measure854.  
The suitability of the tax measure deals with the relationship between the 
means and the end: the question asked is whether the chosen measure is 
suitable or appropriate to achieve the given aim proposed. In this regard, the 
assessment of suitability is strongly related to the facts and circumstances of the 
case and, therefore, the same assessment is usually left to the relevant national 
authorities or, in preliminary proceedings, to the national courts855. 
In the second stage the measure’s proportionality is assessed under the profile 
of its necessity; here, the Court assesses whether the chosen measure is 
necessary to achieve the proposed goal. In many cases, the ECJ interprets the 
“necessity” strictly in a variety of different ways according to the different areas 
of law and according to the substance of the conflicting interests at stake. In 
particular, the “least restrictive alternative” usually represents the basic concept 
                                                             
853 See, inter alia, Case C-406/04 Gérald De Cuyper v Office National de l'emploi, [2006] I-
06947, paragraph 40; Case C-192/05 K. Tas-Hagen and R. A. Tas v Raadskamer WUBO van 
de Pensioen- en Uitkeringsraad, [2006] I-10451, paragraph 33; Case C-499/06 Halina 
Nerkowska v Zakład Ubezpieczeń Społecznych Oddział w Koszalinie, [2008] ECR I-03993. 
854 T.I. HARBO, The function of the Proportionality Principle in EU Law, in European Law 
Journal, 2010, Vol. 16, No. 2, p. 165. 
855 See in this regard Case C-145/88 Torfaen Borough Council v B&Q plc, [1989] ECR I-
3815; Case C-169/91 Stoke-on-Trent CC v B&Q plc, [1992] ECR I-6457. 
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around which such interpretation is carried out856; the Court sets strict 
requirements for necessity in the sense that the measure must be “indispensable 
for attaining the objective pursued if the situation is such that the free 
movement of persons is greatly restricted”857. In this sense, the focus of the 
necessity test is “the examination of whether there are less restrictive 
alternatives available to achieve the objective pursued”858.  
Finally, the test of proportionality involves the so-called “proportionality stricto 
sensu”, meaning that a measure is disproportionate if it imposes an excessive 
burden on the individual859; in this regard, the Court usually determines the 
interests served by the contested measure or decision, checking if the balance of 
all the interests is opportunely defined. 
On these methodological premises, the design of the new model has to be 
tested pursuant to the principle of proportionality. 
For what regards the first stage – i.e. the suitability of the tax measures - it 
should be noted that the social tax incentives are granted to the recipient 
undertakings provided that a specific set of conditions are fulfilled; therefore, in 
order to verify the suitability of the tax measure it is necessary to verify whether 
or not the effective fulfilment of these conditions determines the establishment 
of a fruitful relationship between the means and the ends. 
In this case, the hiring of a minimum number of employees has been identified 
as the proper mean to pursue the objective of the Social Cohesion Zone; by the 
obligation assumed by the recipient undertaking, in fact, it is possible to 
improve the number of jobs available in the disadvantaged area, supporting the 
development of the employment factor. Thus, it seems that the proportionality 
of the tax measures is ensured under the criterion of suitability, considering that 
the condition of the minimum number of new employees hired is univocally 
aimed to the effective pursuit of the social goals of the Social Cohesion Zone. 
                                                             
856 See, ex multis, Case C-312/89 and C-332/89 Union départementale des syndicats CGT de 
l'Aisne v SIDEF Conforama, Société Arts et Meubles and Société Jima, [1991] ECR I-00997, 
(Opinion of the Advocate General Van Gerven) paragraph 14. See also T.I. HARBO, op. 
cit., in European Law Journal, 2010, Vol. 16, No. 2, p. 172. 
857 D. WEBER, Tax avoidance and the EC treaty freedoms: a study of the limitations under 
European law to the prevention of tax avoidance, in Eucotax series on European taxation 11, 
The Hague, Kluwer law international, 2005, p. 209. See Case C-101/94 Commission of the 
European Communities v Italian Republic, [1996] ECR I-02691. 
858 Ibid. It is also worth to remember that, in some cases, the requirement of “necessity” has 
been interpreted in a weaker form by the ECJ, using as a parameter the “manifestly 
inappropriateness” of a tax measure (see Case C-331/88 The Queen v Minister of 
Agriculture, Fisheries and Food and Secretary of State for Health, ex parte: Fedesa and Others, 
[1990] ECR I-04023). 
859 R. ALEXY, A Theory of Constitutional Rights, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2002, p. 66. 
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Then, as far as the necessity of the tax measure is concerned (second stage of the 
proportionality test), the question is whether the social tax incentives granted to 
the recipient undertakings are necessary to achieve the improvement of the 
living conditions of the residents of the Social Cohesion Zone.  
In this case, the parameter of “fiscal residue”860 - which will be better discussed 
with some examples in next chapter861 - can be used to confirm the necessity of 
the Social Cohesion Zone, even when the “least restrictive alternative” 
becomes the concept adopted to carry out the same assessment. 
The fiscal residue, in fact, is able to identify the ratio between the tax burden set 
in a region and the value of the public services available in the same region; thus, 
it can be used as a parameter to manage the allocation of tax expenditures 
among different areas of a Member State and to carry out an evaluation on the 
necessity of the Social Cohesion Zone862. 
More precisely, the introduction of social tax incentives under the new model 
will become necessary as far as the parameter of the fiscal residue gives 
evidence of a negative ratio between the tax burden on undertakings based in 
the area (excessively high) and the value of the public services received by the 
same undertakings (excessively low). Accordingly, the Social Cohesion Zone 
may become the least restrictive alternative, especially when the previous 
policies adopted for the area have not achieved the expected results with 
reference to the localization choices of the undertakings and the improvement 
of the employment factor.  
The last stage of the analysis deals with the proportionality stricto sensu. In this 
regard, the proportionality of the tax incentives granted in the Social Cohesion 
Zone can easily be confirmed, assuming that it is not possible to identify an 
excessive burden on the workers which do not reside in the zone; in this sense, 
in fact, for the non-resident workers the standard tax treatment provided at the 
level of the hosting Member State will be ensured. Furthermore, in the 
disadvantaged territory of the Social Cohesion Zone the employment factor 
remains the prevailing interest to be defended in the context of a social 
cohesion policy, in contrast with the position of the residents of high-income 
areas of the same Member State. 
In summary, on the ground of the above analysis, it is possible to conclude that 
the proportionality test can be positively carried out with reference to the tax 
measures adopted under the Social Cohesion Zone Model; the specific 
                                                             
860 For an explanation of the concept of fiscal residue see B. MORO, Incentivi fiscali e politiche 
di sviluppo economico regionale in Europa, in Moneta e Credito, 2001, Vol. 52, pp. 343-388. 
861 See infra paragraph 7.4. 
862 Ibid., p. 383; P. MUSGRAVE, Interjurisdictional coordination of taxes on capital income, in S. 
CNOSSEN, Tax Coordination in the EC, Kluwer Law International, Deventer, 1987, pp. 
218-235. 
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conditions to be fulfilled by the recipient undertakings represent the 
fundamental element to be considered for achieving a positive outcome under 
the same test. In any case, it will also be necessary to pay specific attention to the 
selection of the eligible areas according to the parameter of the fiscal residue to 
ensure the necessity of the tax measures. 
6.3.2.3 The situation of the suppliers 
Among the conditions to be fulfilled by the recipient undertaking, the design of 
the Social Cohesion Zone also includes the purchase of a minimum annual 
volume of goods and/or services from local suppliers (i.e. small and medium-
sized enterprises registered in the zone). 
Also in this case, the suppliers are the real ultimate target of the social cohesion 
policy; the objective of the Social Cohesion Zone, in fact, is essentially focused 
on the improvement of the living conditions not only of the resident employees, 
but also of the other categories requiring more protection, including, for 
example, the owners of the self-employed activities based in the same territory. 
In such a situation, it is necessary to verify whether the freedom of 
establishment set by Article 49 TFEU may be invoked by the non-residents in 
order to access to economic activities under the same conditions defined for the 
SMEs registered in the territory of the Social Cohesion Zone. 
In this regard, it seems possible to call-up the same doubts and considerations 
already developed for the free movement of workers. 
Also in this case, in fact, it is evident that there are no tax measures able to 
directly affect the tax liability of the suppliers with a reduction of the related tax 
burden; as a consequence, it seems not possible to identify a tax measure of a 
discriminatory content with reference to the position of the suppliers. This is 
because the set of social tax incentives is exclusively granted to the recipient 
undertakings and not directly to the local suppliers. 
On these premises, it is hard to conceive an expansion of the scope of the 
judgement of discrimination on the suppliers, considering that the tax 
incentives of the Social Cohesion Zone do not involve any form of reduction of 
their tax liability. Consequently, it seems that not only the situations of the 
employees but also the situations of the suppliers are outside the perimeter of 
the judgement of discrimination regarding the tax measures adopted in the new 
model. 
With these serious concerns in mind, as far as the perspective is however 
focused on the steps of the judgement of discrimination, the terms of the 
comparison should be set on the situation of the economic activities carried out 
by SMEs registered in the zone, on one part, and the economic activities carried 
out by SMEs with no registered office in the same territory, on the other. Being 
this the case, it would be difficult to suppose the comparability of such 
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situations considering that SMEs with a registered office out of the zone are 
usually characterized by better results in terms of economic and financial 
indicators.  
Furthermore, even when the two situations would be comparable863, a 
discriminatory treatment for the purposes of freedom of establishment cannot 
be identified with reference to the situation of the SMEs having a registered 
office in another area of the hosting Member State. In such a situation, in fact, 
Article 49 cannot be invoked as long as it not possible to identify a cross-border 
element. By this way, it is evident that a violation of the freedom of 
establishment under the Social Cohesion Zone Model might be identified only 
in a limited number of cases where the terms of comparison involve a SME 
with its registered office in another Member State. 
In that case, as already seen for the employees, any eventual discrimination 
could be set under the public interest exception according to the possibilities 
offered by the recent case law of the ECJ864, especially as far as the protection of 
the employment factor is considered as a general ground of public interest; in 
particular, this is evident in the case of the owners of self-employed activities 
which usually meet the same difficulties of the employees, considering the low 
level of their income in the disadvantaged areas of the Union. 
Finally, the situation of the suppliers should however involve the application of 
the principle of proportionality under the last step of the judgement of 
discrimination. 
In this regard, the suitability of the tax measures can easily be confirmed; 
through the obligations assumed by the recipient undertaking, in fact, it is 
possible to ensure an increase of the volume of purchases from the local 
suppliers and, therefore, an improvement of the financial and economic 
situation of SMEs based in the same zone. The result is the increase of the 
annual revenue in consideration of the higher volume of the orders, with 
subsequent positive effects on the living conditions of the owners of these 
activities. Furthermore, the necessity and the proportionality stricto sensu of the 
tax measures can be ensured by the application of the parameter of the fiscal 
residue according to the same approach already described for the situation of 
the employees.  
                                                             
863 For example, that is the case of a individual entrepreneur residing in a Member State in 
proximity of the external limit of a Social Cohesion Zone which is part of another 
Member State, provided that the same entrepreneur earns the (almost) entire income in 
the territory of the Social Cohesion Zone. 
864 Case C-515/08 Dos Santos Palhota and Others, [2010] ECR I-09133, paragraph 47. See, 
also Case C-346/06 Dirk Rüffert v Land Niedersachsen, [2008] ECR I-01989, 
paragraph 42. 
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6.3.3 The Code of Conduct for business taxation 
The Code of Conduct for business taxation is the third and last variable to be 
considered for the analysis of the new model. 
This document is a legally non-binding political commitment between Member 
States and it embodies a soft law process strategy designed to circumvent the 
Member States’ propensity to disagree about taxation865. 
The scope of the Code of Conduct is to contrast the harmful tax measures 
which affect or may affect in a significant way the location of business activities 
in the EU territory and which provide for a significantly lower level of taxation 
than the standard one applied in the Member State concerned. 
In this direction, social tax incentives have to be scrutinized under the criteria of 
the Code of Conduct in order to verify the eventual presence of harmful tax 
measures within the Social Cohesion Zone Model. 
Given the above, it is necessary to test the Social Cohesion Zone for the 
purposes of the Code of Conduct, approaching the following research sub-
question: 
Research sub-question No. 2.3 
Can a tax measure of a social character addressed to a limited area of a Member State 
be considered acceptable under the criteria of the Code of Conduct for business 
taxation?  
On these bases, the next paragraphs will approach the analysis of the above 
research sub-question, with a review of the design of the Social Cohesion Zone 
under the criteria of the Code of Conduct for business taxation, including the 
circumstances described in the recent Guidance on tax privileges related to 
STZs866. 
6.3.3.1 The Code of Conduct criteria 
The provisions of the Code of Conduct essentially focus on the position of the 
foreign investor and on the tax measures able to influence the capital allocation 
choices in consideration of a preferential lower tax charge. On these premises, 
the practical implementation of the Code of Conduct should not usually 
involve situations where national governments implement a tax measure – such 
865 W.W. BRATTON, J. A. MC CAHERY, Tax Coordination and Tax Competition in the European 
Union: Evaluating the Code of Conduct on Business Taxation, in Internal market Law Review, 
2001, No. 3, pp. 677–718. 
866 Guidance of the Code of Conduct Group (Business Taxation) on tax privileges related to 
special economic zones of 19 June 2017, Council of the European Union, Brussels, 
document No. 10487/17. 
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as those provided under the Social Cohesion Zone – with the exclusive aim of 
developing a social policy. 
Nonetheless, this starting assumption must be verified with reference to each 
single criterion provided under the Code of Conduct for the identification of a 
harmful tax measure. 
The first criterion (availability of the tax advantage only for non-residents, or 
for transactions with non-residents) has clearly to be excluded from the scope 
of the Social Cohesion Zone Model. It is evident, in fact, that the social tax 
incentives are here addressed in the opposite sense, limiting the related 
advantages to the recipient undertakings which are resident, or at least, 
established in the territory of the zone. 
The second criterion is the ring-fencing, namely the protection of the domestic 
market so that the measure does not erode the domestic tax base of the State 
concerned. In this regard, the tax measures adopted under the Social Cohesion 
Zone Model are characterized by the reduction of the tax burden of all the 
eligible undertakings with a permanent establishment in the area regardless of 
their nationality; accordingly, the subsequent erosion of the tax base may 
indifferently affect the domestic tax base or non-domestic tax base, considering 
the absence of specific conditions related to the nationality of the eligible 
undertakings. 
The third criterion refers to the lack of substance and real economic activity. In 
the Social Cohesion Zone Model, the substance is ensured by the fulfillment of 
the conditions of the hiring of a minimum number of new resident employees 
and a minimum volume of purchases from the local suppliers; as far as the 
recipient undertaking complies with these obligations, there will be a real 
economic activity carried out in the zone. 
The fourth criterion, which concerns the lack of the arm’s length dealing, might 
involve the transactions between the recipient undertaking, as the customer, on 
one part, and SMEs having the registered office in the zone, as suppliers, on the 
other. In this regard, the tax measures granted under the Social Cohesion Zone 
Model could be evaluated as harmful in the case of a prior relationship existing 
between the customer and the suppliers with a possible collusion between the 
same parties of the business relationship. For this reason, the design of the new 
model must be shaped ensuring that both the recipient undertakings and the 
local suppliers are acting in their own interest and that neither party is being 
pressured by the other party to go ahead with the transaction. These conditions 
can be ensured paying attention to the content of the entrustment act between 
the public authority and the recipient undertaking providing that it contains a 
specific clause in order to exclude from the calculation of the minimum volume 
of purchases the orders made between parties with a prior different 
relationship (for example, an employee which starts a self-employed activity 
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establishing a trade with his previous employer). 
The fifth and last criterion is focused on non-transparency with particular 
reference to unpublished advance rulings and negotiability of the tax burden. 
With this in mind, the design of the Social Cohesion Zone must be conceived as 
the result of a legal background completely defined under national law, 
excluding the setting of differentiated conditions following a ruling made for a 
specific case; in other terms, the content of the entrustment act, with particular 
reference to the size of the tax incentives granted and the object of the 
obligations assumed by the recipient undertaking, must merely implement the 
provisions set by the national law in a transparent manner. Differently, in fact, 
the entrustment act would offer a space for the negotiability of the tax burden, 
giving evidence of the harmful character of the related tax measure. 
On the ground of this analysis, it finally results that the Code of Conduct for 
business taxation is a relevant variable under the Social Cohesion Zone Model 
as far as the position of the recipient undertaking is concerned. 
As seen, in fact, while the first, the second and the third criterion do not 
determine any specific correction to the design of the model as resulting from 
the previous stages of the analysis, on the contrary, the forth and the fifth 
criterion suggest to pay attention to some aspects in the implementation of the 
Social Cohesion Zone Model in the Member States. In this sense, in fact, the 
exclusion from the eligible costs of the purchases made between non-
independent parties, as well as the transparency and non-negotiability with 
reference to the tax benefits and the obligation assumed in the entrustment act, 
become further essential qualifying features of the model resulting from the 
present analysis. 
6.3.3.2 The Guidance on tax privileges related to SEZs 
For the purpose of the Code of Conduct and the implementation of the related 
criteria, the analysis must also include the content of the recent Guidance of tax 
privileges related to Special Economic Zones867. 
This document issued by the Code of Conduct Group (business taxation) 
better defines a series of circumstances under which the tax measures adopted 
in a Special Economic Zone – this is the term here adopted – will be scrutinized 
by the Code of Conduct Group. 
These circumstances essentially reproduce the five criteria analyzed in the 
previous paragraph, with some further specifications which can be useful for 
the assessment of the related tax measures. 
867 Guidance of the Code of Conduct Group (Business Taxation) on tax privileges related to 
special economic zones of 19 June 2017, Council of the European Union, Bruxelles, 
document No. 10487/17. 
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Among the same circumstances, it is interesting to note that the Guidance 
specifically sets the focus on the tax privileges available also for highly mobile 
activities, considering this factor as an indicator of possible harmful tax 
measures. 
With reference to the movable activities, in fact, a question emerges about the 
possibility of including, between the eligible undertakings for the tax incentives 
granted in the Social Cohesion Zone, the economic operators active in the 
banking and insurance industry or in the information technology sector. In this 
regard, it is important to defend such a possibility, considering the strategic role 
of highly mobile activities in the improvement of the employment factor as 
demonstrated in many successful experiences throughout the world (e.g. 
companies of the IT sector based in the Silicon Valley in California). 
On these premises, the conclusion must be assumed in consideration of the 
practical role of this Guidance; the circumstances there described, in fact, 
merely suggest the existence of a harmful tax measure, while the final scrutiny 
has always to be carried out with exclusive reference to the five criteria defined 
under the Code of Conduct. This basically means that a tax measure, even when 
it is also available for highly mobile activities, must be assessed under the third 
criterion of the Code of Conduct which refers to the lack of substance, intended 
as a broader concept related to the existence of a real economic activity. 
Therefore, on these bases, the final outcome will be positive as long as the 
undertakings carrying out a highly mobile activity assume the obligation of 
hiring a minimum number of employees in the zone and of purchasing a 
minimum volume of goods and services from local suppliers; through the 
fulfillment of these conditions, in fact, the substance of a real economic activity 
will however be ensured even in case of highly mobile activities, excluding the 
harmful character of the related tax measure. 
Finally, it should be mentioned that, under the Guidance, one more 
circumstance deals with the lack of regular tax audits aimed at verifying that the 
profits accruing in the zone are associated to the activities allocated therein. 
This point suggests to include in the Social Cohesion Zone Model the provision 
of a periodical monitoring and control from the public authority on the 
effective connection between the profits and the activities from which the same 
profits are supposed to be generated. In this sense, it will be for the national 
legislator to define the terms and the conditions of the supervision activity. 
6.4 Summary of the results 
On the ground of the analysis of the EU law framework, it is finally possible to 
summarize the results of the research process carried out in the present chapter. 
The starting idea has been identified in an instrument to be used at the Member 
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States level for the development of social cohesion policies for the most 
disadvantaged areas of the Union in coherence with the scope of the research 
question. 
The first stage of the research process has thus been focused on the 
identification of a design which could be suitable for the aim pursued, in ideal 
terms, without the assessment of the variables resulting from the application of 
EU law. 
Accordingly, the initial version of the new model has been structured in 
accordance with the same idea, assuming a set of characteristics under the 
territorial, the structural, and the functional dimension all addressed to the 
same objective of a social nature. 
The second stage of the research process has instead been addressed to test the 
same model with respect to the variables of the EU law framework following 
the coordinates described in Chapter 3, with regard to State aid rules, the 
fundamental freedoms, and harmful tax competition. 
At the end of this process of analysis, it is necessary to proceed with a summary 
of the corresponding results. 
The first variable of State aid rules has given evidence of a double track which 
can be followed in order to shape the tax advantages of the Social Cohesion 
Zone Model in a form compatible with the internal market and exempt from 
the notification obligation of State aid. 
The first track is the most ambitious and is aimed at setting the social tax 
incentives out of the scope of the State aid discipline, as not constituting State 
aid under the notion of Article 107(1) TFEU. For this purpose, the tax 
measures must comply with the Altmark criteria and, therefore, must first be 
designed as a compensation for the recipient undertakings involved in the 
provision of a SSGI. 
In in this regard, the possibility has been considered of including large 
enterprises among the beneficiaries of the related tax measures. By the analysis 
of the substance of SSGIs, it seems that a solution in positive or negative sense 
should be linked to the parameter used for the identification of a genuine SSGI; 
the idea, in fact, is that, when the parameter is the object of the obligation 
assumed from the undertaking, large enterprises might be included among the 
possible recipients of the advantages, considering the social character of the 
conditions to be fulfilled under the Social Cohesion Zone Model (e.g. 
minimum number of employees to be hired); otherwise, as far as the parameter 
is instead focused on the statutory goals of the undertaking, then only social 
enterprises seem to provide a SSGI eligible for the tax incentives of the Social 
Cohesion Zone. Nevertheless, through the analysis of the EU law framework, it 
has not been possible to identify any common reference or limit for this 
parameter (except for the case of a manifest error), considering that Member 
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States continue to enjoy a wide margin of discretion in deciding what to 
consider as a SSGI. On these premises, there is then a space left for Member 
States in order to include not only social enterprises, but also large enterprises 
among the eligible undertakings within the Social Cohesion Zone Model. 
In any case, the economic operators which benefit from the social tax incentives 
granted in the zone must be selected through an open, transparent and non-
discriminatory public procurement procedure, with awarding criteria based on 
the lowest level of compensation; the call for tenders must define the content of 
the obligations and the conditions under which the tax benefits will be granted, 
as well as the eligibility requirements for the economic operators. Furthermore, 
the entrustment act, which represents the conclusion of the public procurement 
procedure, must precisely define the duration and the content of the social 
obligations for the economic operators, concerning the minimum number of 
resident employees to be hired and the minimum annual volume of purchases 
from local suppliers. The same document must also include a description of the 
compensation mechanism and, in particular, the parameters for calculating, 
controlling, and reviewing the compensation, including the indicators used to 
establish the reasonable profit. 
The second track is instead based on the exemption defined under Article 
106(2) TFEU, assuming that the tax measures at issue fail to comply with the 
Altmark criteria and, therefore, must be considered as State aid under the 
notion of Article 107(1) TFEU. 
In this case, the analysis defines, at least at first sight, a wider space left to 
Member States for the implementation of the Social Cohesion Zone, in 
consideration of the block exemption provided by the Commission Decision in 
order to consider a tax measure as a State aid compatible with the internal 
market and exempt from  the notification obligation. This is because the prior 
selection of the beneficiaries through a public procurement procedure is not 
expressly mentioned by the Decision among the requirements for enjoying this 
exemption. 
Nevertheless, it has been underlined that, beyond the formal absence of this 
requirement, Member State always have to comply with public procurement 
EU rules, regardless of the scope of State aid rules; therefore, even within this 
second track, the compliance with public procurement EU rules cannot be 
excluded from the horizon of the Social Cohesion Zone Model. 
The second variable of the fundamental freedoms assumes different outcomes 
as far as the perspectives of the recipient undertakings, the employees and the 
suppliers are separately considered. 
For what regards the recipient undertakings, any issue related to the possible 
infringement of the freedom of establishment can be set apart as long as the 
territorial connecting factor of the new model is defined allowing the eligibility 
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of the tax incentives also for the permanent establishment of a non-resident 
undertaking. 
The same results have been substantially achieved for the situations of the 
employees and the suppliers, even through a more complex process of analysis 
also involving the various steps of the judgement of discrimination.  
In these cases, it has first been observed that the tax measures at issue do not 
determine any favourable effect with reference to the tax liability of the 
employees and the suppliers. In such situations, in fact, the factual evidence is 
only characterized by an indirect effect which is not of a fiscal nature as it 
merely consists in the increase of the job offers and of the purchasing orders in 
the area concerned. The conclusion is thus in the sense that it seems not 
possible to expand the scope of the judgement of discrimination to the indirect 
effects of the tax measures.  
However, regardless of these first conclusions, the absence of discrimination or 
a restriction with reference to the free movement of workers or the freedom of 
establishment has also been confirmed following the analysis of each step of the 
judgement of discrimination. In particular, it has not been possible to identify 
any discriminatory measure as long as the terms of comparison are between the 
resident employees of the Social Cohesion Zone and the other workers which 
are resident of the same hosting Member State; in such cases, in fact, the 
absence of a cross-border dimension determines, according to the views of the 
ECJ, the impossibility of invoking against the hosting Member State the right 
of free movement under EU law. In any case, the residual situations which 
could be negatively evaluated under the comparability test and the 
discrimination test may finally be resolved under the justification test and the 
proportionality test; this is because the tax measures provided under the Social 
Cohesion Zone Model may be allowed under a public interest justification, as 
long as they are univocally addressed to the protection of the employment 
factor in the disadvantaged areas of the Member States. Moreover, as seen, the 
analysis of the specific conditions to be fulfilled by the recipient undertakings 
offers the opportunity to confirm the proportionality of the related tax 
measures on the ground of the parameter of the fiscal residue. 
The third and last variable of the EU law framework deals with the Code of 
Conduct for business taxation. 
In this regard, the fourth and the fifth criterion for considering a tax measure as 
harmful suggest to exclude from the eligible costs the purchases made between 
non-independent parties, as well as to ensure the transparency and non-
negotiability through the introduction of specific provisions. Moreover, as far 
as highly mobile activities are concerned, it is possible to confirm the real 
economic substance of the activity carried out by the recipient undertaking in 
consideration of the object of the obligations defined in the entrustment act, 
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namely the minimum number of new employees to be hired and the minimum 
volume of purchases from local suppliers. Finally, the analysis of the recent 
Guidance issued by the Code of Conduct Group suggests to provide 
monitoring activities from the public authorities addressed to verify the 
effective connection between the activities carried out within the Social 
Cohesion Zone and the profits generated. 
6.5 Synthesis of the model 
The outcomes of the present research are able to support a positive answer to 
the research question formulated at the beginning of this chapter.  
The results illustrated in the previous paragraph, in fact, offer the opportunity 
to outline a synthesis of the new model of the Social Cohesion Zone according 
to its territorial, structural and functional dimension. 
6.5.1 Territorial dimension 
For what regards the territorial dimension, the analysis of the EU law 
framework which is relevant for direct taxation does not involve any 
requirement or condition for the profile of the geographical delimitation. The 
ring-fencing of STZs, in fact, becomes a requirement only in the case of the 
Free Zones of the Union Customs Code which exclusively cover the different 
field of indirect taxation. 
Therefore, it is possible to confirm the value set within the initial design of the 
Social Cohesion Zone corresponding to a conventional limitation of the area 
through a line on the map; by this way, in fact, it is possible to guarantee a 
flexible solution which is also suitable for ensuring the continuity and the 
accessibility of urban areas.  
One more profile which has been considered in the context of the territorial 
dimension is the reference framework. In the new model, as well as in all the 
other implementing models described in Chapter 5, the reference framework 
basically corresponds to the territory of the Member State which is responsible 
for the external relations of the zone as stated by Article 355 TFEU. 
Beside the geographical delimitation and the reference framework, also the  
territorial connecting factor has been considered in the context of the territorial 
dimension. For this purpose, the analysis of the variable of the free movement 
of persons has given evidence of the compatibility of the original solution 
outlined in the initial design. As seen, in fact, as far as the tax incentives are 
extended to the permanent establishment of a non-resident undertaking, the 
infringement of the freedom of establishment must be excluded. 
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6.5.2 Structural dimension 
The initial design of the new model has been characterized by a structural 
dimension focused on the use of tax incentives limited to direct taxation. 
In this regard, it is important to note that the Social Cohesion Zone, as resulting 
from the analysis of the EU law framework, may cover all the typologies of 
direct taxes since under this profile the variables of EU law do not set any 
limitation. The main point is that direct taxes are not harmonized at the EU 
level, except for what regards some marginal aspects of cross-border situations; 
therefore, the structural dimension of the new model, for what concerns the 
types of direct taxes involved, can be freely developed through the autonomous 
initiative of the Member States which retain an exclusive competence in the 
field of direct taxation. 
Under the initial design, the same tax incentives have been structured in the 
form of a subtractive regime and, in particular, through the introduction of tax 
allowances and tax credits. This is a choice of opportunity since, in both 
situations, it is possible to clearly set the value of the tax expenditures by 
reference to the number of new employees hired and the amount of the eligible 
costs incurred for purchases from local suppliers. In any case, from the analysis 
of the EU law framework no limitation against the same choice has been 
identified; in fact, the definition of such aspect of the structural dimension 
remains a matter of exclusive competence of the Member States which are in 
principle free of determining the most suitable solution for the objectives 
pursued. 
Nevertheless, the results of the analysis carried out in the present chapter have 
identified some further requirements to be fulfilled under the structural 
dimension in order to adapt the design of the Social Cohesion Zone Model to 
the current EU law framework. 
First, the undertakings which benefit from the social tax incentives available in 
the zone must be selected through an  open,  transparent  and  non-
discriminatory  public procurement procedure, with awarding criteria based on 
the lowest level of compensation (i.e. the value of the tax expenditure). In 
particular, it is necessary to pay attention to the content of the call for tenders 
which must define the obligations and the conditions under which the tax 
benefits will be granted, as well as the eligibility requirements for the economic 
operators. 
Second, the entrustment act, which represents the conclusion of the public 
procurement procedure, must precisely define the duration and the content of 
the obligations for the economic operators. The same document must also 
include a description of the compensation mechanism (i.e. tax credits and tax 
allowances) and, in particular, the parameters for calculating, controlling, and 
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reviewing the compensation, including the indicators used to establish the 
reasonable profit. In this sense, the parameter for compensation will be set 
making reference, for example, to a certain fixed amount of tax credit or tax 
allowance for each new employee or to a tax credit or a tax allowance 
corresponding to a percentage of the costs incurred for the purchases made 
from local suppliers. 
All these requirements, which emerge from the analysis of the Altmark criteria, 
must then be provided within the structural dimension of the Social Cohesion 
Zone Model in order to ensure its compatibility with EU law, considering also 
the relevant rules on public procurement. 
The structural dimension of the new model is finally completed by provisions 
addressed to exclude from the eligible costs the purchases made between non-
independent parties and to ensure monitoring activities from the public 
authorities, as well as to guarantee the transparency and the non-negotiability 
of the related tax measures. 
6.5.3 Functional dimension 
The starting idea of the Social Cohesion Zone has been focused on the 
development of social cohesion policies aimed at reducing the differences in the 
living conditions between low-income areas and high-income areas of Member 
States. 
For this purpose, the main target has been set on the employment factor and, 
consequently, on the low-income individuals which reside in the most 
disadvantaged areas. 
Accordingly, the tax measures of the Social Cohesion Zone Model have been 
designed, from the functional point of view, as social tax incentives in the terms 
defined under the general legal theory of STZs. 
Following the analysis of the first Altmark criterion, social tax incentives in the 
new model must be designed as a compensation for the recipient undertakings 
involved in the provision of a SSGI in order to be set out of the scope of State 
aid rules. Therefore, it is crucial to clearly define the objects of the obligations 
assumed by the undertakings through the signature of the entrustment act, 
establishing a solid link between means and ends in order to give evidence of 
the social character of the tax measure. By this way, in fact, the economic 
activity carried out by the economic operator will be deemed to be a genuine 
SSGI, as long as the obligations are specifically targeted to the public interest 
(i.e. involving government functions related to employment under the welfare 
domain, such as in the case of work integration services) and not to the mere 
pursuit of making profits. 
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These aspects must be valorized in the context of the entrustment act with clear 
written evidence of the public interest justification which is referred to the 
protection of the employment factor in the disadvantaged areas of the Member 
States. Moreover, public authorities will provide evidence of the reasons under 
the selection of a specific area of the Member State as a Social Cohesion Zone; 
in this regard, a reference will be made to the parameter of the fiscal residue in 
order to allow a comprehensive assessment of the related tax measures also for 
what regards their proportionality. 
Furthermore, in order to ensure the effective pursuit of the same objectives, a 
set of specific conditions has been outlined to be fulfilled by the economic 
operators which intend to benefit from the tax incentives granted in the area.  
The first sub-set of these conditions refers to the minimum number of new 
employees to be hired by the recipient undertaking in the first year of activity, 
as well as the residence of the same employees, the minimum duration of the 
employment contract and the qualification of the new employees in order to 
guarantee the hiring of a balanced number of units of high-qualified employees 
and low-qualified employees. 
The second sub-set of conditions concerns the minimum volume of purchases 
to be made by the recipient undertaking from the local suppliers, namely SMEs 
having their registered office in the territory of the Social Cohesion Zone. 
Beside this set of conditions, the functional dimension of the new model has 
been characterized by the provision of some specific eligibility requirements for 
the recipient undertakings which intend to benefit from the tax incentives 
available in the zone. In this regard, in fact, one more choice of opportunity is in 
the sense of limiting the tax incentives to entities, such as social enterprises and 
large enterprises, which can provide enough guarantees for what concerns their 
statutory social goals or their economical and financial strength.  
6.6 Final remarks 
In conclusion, the outcomes of the analysis carried out in the present chapter 
give evidence of a new implementing model, the Social Cohesion Zone, which 
can be set within the general legal theory of STZs and beside the other existing 
models recognized in the factual experience (i.e. Free Zone, State Aid Zone, 
and Extra-Territorial Zone). 
The set of characteristics described under the territorial, the structural and the 
functional dimension confirms the possibility of a positive answer to the second 
research question, offering support for the conclusions of the thesis which will 
be presented in Chapter 8.  
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CHAPTER 7 
DISCUSSION OF THE RESULTS AND POSSIBLE 
IMPLEMENTATIONS 
7.1 Introduction 
After the analysis of the results with reference to each research question, it is 
now necessary to discuss the main outcomes and the possible implementations. 
In the previous chapters, the possibility has been demonstrated of a general 
legal theory of Special Tax Zones able to explain under a common reading key 
not only the EU law framework on the topic, but also the factual experience of 
the Member States. This result has been achieved setting a focus on three main 
aspects: the concept of STZs with its territorial, structural, and functional 
dimension, the definition of STZs as a comprehensive macro-category and, 
finally, the implementing models of STZs identified on the basis of the 
experience of the Member States. 
On the ground of this systematic perspective, the possibility has been 
demonstrated of a new model of STZs within the EU law framework to be 
implemented beside the Free Zone, the State Aid Zone, and the Extra-
Territorial Zone. The Social Cohesion Zone, in fact, exploits the space left for 
the Member States within the negative limits of EU law, addressing its tax 
measures to the development of social cohesion policies for the most 
disadvantaged areas of the Union. 
Starting from these findings, the following paragraphs will first proceed with a 
comparison between the new model of the Social Cohesion Zone and the other 
implementing models identified under the general legal theory of STZs; the 
objective is to find a motivation for the Social Cohesion Zone, highlighting the 
opportunity aspects for giving precedence to this instrument for the 
development of social cohesion policies. 
Then, the idea of the Social Cohesion Zone will be discussed as an innovative 
instrument for the Commission in the context of the EU cohesion policy 
outlining a possible solution for its governance; in this sense, in fact, the 
assumption according to which Member States are free to take autonomous 
initiatives for the establishment of the Social Cohesion Zone does not exclude 
the EU competence in the adoption of supporting, coordinating or 
complementary actions.  
Furthermore, the discussion will cover the issues related to protectionism with 
particular reference to the parameter used to verify the proportionality of the 
tax measures. In this regard, the fiscal residue will be proposed as the parameter 
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to measure the legitimacy of the Social Cohesion Zone in order to avoid the 
establishment of protectionist measures with restrictive effects on the internal 
market and the consequent infringement of the free movement of persons. 
At the end of this chapter, a practical example of a package of tax incentives for 
the establishment of Social Cohesion Zones will be outlined, with the 
description of a set of qualifying features developed on the ground of the results 
of the research. 
7.2 Comparison of the models under the general legal theory 
of STZs 
The new model of the Social Cohesion Zone has been developed as an 
instrument for social cohesion policies; the related tax measures, in fact, being 
configured as social tax incentives, are univocally addressed to improve the 
living conditions of the individuals which reside in the most disadvantages areas 
of the EU.  
The improvement of the employment factor in these areas is the ultimate target 
of the tax incentives granted to the recipient undertakings; in this regard, the 
starting assumption is the necessity of reducing the disparities between low-
income and high-income areas of the Union through a series of public 
initiatives concretely aimed at changing the conditions of the employment 
market in the disadvantaged areas. 
Given the above, the overview of the EU law framework confirms that the 
other existing models of STZs do not offer sufficient support for the 
development of such kind of policies. 
In the case of Free Zones, the tax benefits belong to the category of economic 
tax incentives; such zones, in fact, represent an instrument focused on the 
import/export process where it is usually not possible to identify any important 
effect on the employment factor for the individuals resident in the area. 
Extra-Territorial Zones are always established on the ground of specific 
historical privileges and, therefore, also in this case, the corresponding model of 
STZs cannot be used as a general instrument for the management of social 
cohesion policies; in particular, the model is not easily replicable in absence of 
historical privileges and, in any case, it would require important amendments to 
the EU law with a different definition of the boundaries of the Customs Union 
or of the VAT and the excise duty common area. 
Differently, as far as State Aid Zones are concerned, some possibilities for 
social cohesion policies can emerge from the exemptions for regional aid set by 
paragraphs (a) and (c) of Article 107(3) TFEU. In the both situations, in fact, tax 
incentives may be used for favouring the development of certain economic 
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areas where the standard of living is abnormally low with respect to the 
national average or with reference to the EU level. 
Nonetheless, the analysis of the experience of the Member States points out the 
presence of important limits for the introduction of social tax incentives under 
the State Aid Zone model. The system of prior authorizations and the criteria 
for the assessment carried out by the Commission determine a situation where 
the initiatives of the Member States often limit their objectives, especially for 
what regards the size of the tax expenditures and the consequent effectiveness 
of the related measures.  
Despite the recent openings of the Commission and a more relaxed control on 
regional aid in the context of the State aid modernization process, it is a matter 
of fact that today the conditions and tests for the evaluation of the compatibility 
of a tax measure under such exemptions remain very strict. For instance, the 
guidelines on regional State aid set a maximum aid intensity868 and require that 
the measures are limited to the minimum necessary in order to avoid any 
potential distortion on competition and trade869. Therefore, it is evident that 
the approach of the Commission for the purposes of State aid rules is still 
consistently based on the defence of the internal market. 
As a consequence, Member States can only assume minor initiatives for the 
development of social cohesion policies. In this regard, in fact, according to the 
General Block Exemption Regulation (GBER), investment aid are compatible 
with the internal market and exempt from the notification obligation as long as 
they are in compliance with the map for regional aid approved by the 
Commission, considering a maximum aid intensity defined as a percentage of 
the eligible costs870. Furthermore, under the de minimis regulation, the measures 
become exempt from the notification requirement when they are in compliance 
with specific conditions, such as those concerning the total amount of the aid 
not exceeding EUR 200.000871 (for each enterprise over a period of three 
years), the method of calculation and the method of control.  
In definitive, the quantitative limits set by EU law for regional aid, both for what 
concerns the maximum aid intensity and the notification threshold, represent 
an important obstacle for the development of social cohesion policies at the 
                                                             
868 See Communication from the Commission - Guidelines on regional State aid for 2014-
2020, O.J. 2013, C 209, paragraph 3.6. 
869 Ibid., paragraph 3.7. 
870 See Article 14(12), Commission Regulation (EU) No. 651/2014 of 17 June 2014 
declaring certain categories of aid compatible with the internal market in application of 
Article 107 and 107 of the Treaty, O.J. 2014, L 187, pp. 1-78. 
871 Commission Regulation (EU) No. 1407/2013 of 18 December 2013 on the application 
of Articles 107 and 108 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to de 
minimis ad, O.J. 2013, L 352, pp. 1-8 
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national level. For example, the recent experience of Urban Tax-Free Zones in 
Italy gives evidence of the insufficiency of regional aid designed under the 
exemptions of Article 107(3) TFEU872; the same quantitative limits, in fact, 
undermine the attractiveness of the related tax measures, especially for the 
allocation choices of large enterprises, while the effects are generally limited to 
small and medium enterprises which do not have enough financial strength to 
support a real improvement of the employment factor in the area. 
Therefore, the result is that today Member States are not able to assume 
relevant initiatives for their disadvantaged regions, considering the limits set in 
terms of maximum aid intensity, the notification threshold, and all the other 
strict conditions laid down in the guidelines on regional State aid. 
Also when the State Aid Zone is implemented through an “infra-State body” 
there are evident difficulties in the development of social cohesion policies 
through the adoption of this instrument.  
The infra-State body, in fact, needs to be set in accordance with a specific 
constitutional framework at the national level, with the fulfilment of the 
requirements of the institutional, procedural and financial autonomy; in this 
regard, the experience of the Member States does not give evidence of many 
examples able to comply with such requirements, with the practical 
impossibility of implementing the same model of STZs in absence of important 
amendments to the constitutional environment of the hosting State; therefore, 
the option of the infra-State body cannot represent a concrete track in the EU 
for the improvement of the living conditions of the most disadvantaged 
areas873. 
On these premises, it is possible to conclude that there is enough motivation 
and need for the Social Cohesion Zone Model as developed in the present 
study. 
In this case, in fact, the measures consisting of social tax incentives may offer the 
opportunity of more incisive initiatives, being not subject to the limit of the 
maximum aid intensity and to the notification thresholds provided for regional 
State aid. In the situation of the Social Cohesion Zone, the maximum value of 
the tax expenditures may cover the total amount of the eligible costs and not a 
mere percentage (in terms of maximum aid intensity) as it happens for the 
regional aid covered by the GBER874. Moreover, the value of tax expenditures in 
the Social Cohesion Zone may also cover a reasonable profit, thus improving 
                                                             
872 See supra note 511. 
873 For instance, it is not possible to implement the model of the infra-State body in Italy, 
considering that the constitutional framework is there not able to fulfil the requirements 
set by the ECJ, especially because of the transfers of funds existing between the central 
government and local institutions. 
874 See supra paragraph 3.2.2.1. 
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the attractiveness of the related tax measures for the economic operators which 
are interested in investing in the zone. Within these new parameters, the value of 
the tax expenditures will thus be determined in a way able to cover the entire or, 
at least, the most part of the investments made by the recipient undertakings, 
plus a percentage for the reasonable profit, without being subject to the 
maximum aid intensity limits or to the notification thresholds established by the 
GBER. 
At the same time, from a different perspective, it is worth to observe that the 
fulfillment of the Altmark criteria will exclude any potential distortive effect on 
the internal market and the trade between Member States, supporting the 
establishment of the new model in a more relaxed framework focused on the 
social character of the tax measures without the strict limits for regional aid. 
On these conceptual bases, the Social Cohesion Zone Model can fulfill an 
important gap in the EU law framework, allowing the use of a more effective 
instrument for the development of social cohesion policies, with a set of tax 
measures able to support more incisive actions. 
By this way, the Social Cohesion Zone can become a new instrument able to 
overcome the quantitative limits of the State Aid Zone model, opening a space 
for future initiatives addressed to influence the allocation choices of large 
enterprises and to improve the employment factor in the most disadvantaged 
areas of the Union. 
7.3 The Social Cohesion Zone: an opportunity for EU cohesion 
policy? 
The new model of the Social Cohesion Zone is based on a fundamental 
assumption: Member States are in principle free to assume autonomous 
initiatives for the establishment of social tax incentives for a limited area of their 
territory as long as a set of specific conditions is fulfilled, including, for example, 
the compliance with all the four Altmark criteria. 
Nevertheless, the present research is not intended to support the idea of a weak 
European Union where the Member States are the exclusive players in the 
definition of their own social cohesion policies; in this sense, it is necessary to 
guarantee a coordination between the Member States, defining the essential 
features of a multi-level framework where the objectives are set according to a 
vision of territorial cohesion developed at the EU level. 
Therefore, on the ground of the above thoughts, the Social Cohesion Zone can 
represent a serious opportunity also for the EU Cohesion Policy managed by 
the Commission, offering an innovative instrument for the introduction of 
territorial tax incentives of a social character. 
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On these premises, the discussion will here be focused on the possibility to 
reconcile the tax sovereignty of the Member States with a supporting and 
coordinating role of the EU institutions, thus ensuring the achievement of the 
same goals in the most effective form. 
7.3.1 General aspects 
In general, the EU cohesion policy is set to address regional disparities and to 
bring structural changes to the economies of European regions. The idea of the 
EU cohesion policy starts along with the Treaty of Rome in 1957875 and is 
intended to enhance socio-economic cohesion among regions of the Member 
States by supporting the development of the poorest areas of the Union.  
Today, the EU cohesion policy is organized under the guidance of three different 
policy threads following different aims and involving different European actors: 
(i) the cohesion policy in a strict sense, under the responsibility of the EU 
Directorate-General for Regional Affairs, (ii) the Europe 2020 Strategy 
consisting of strategic agendas under the joint responsibility of the EU Council 
and EU Commission, and (iii) the EU State aid control under the responsibility 
of the EU Directorate-General Competition876. 
The first thread – namely EU cohesion policy in a strict sense - has its legal basis 
in Article 174 TFEU and is thus committed to the goals of promoting a 
harmonious development, strengthening economic, social, and territorial 
cohesion, and reducing disparities between regions under the principles of 
multi-annual programming, coordination and additionality; its main 
instruments are the Structural Funds877 and a number of EU initiatives878. The 
Structural Funds provide a mechanism for re-distributing an element of the EU 
budget and are all allocated on a territorial basis, except the Objective 3 that 
regards the whole territory of the Union879. 
875 In this sense, according to Article 2 of the EEC Treaty one of the objectives of the EU is 
to achieve “a harmonious, balanced and sustainable development of economic activities” 
throughout the Union. 
876 For more details about the past and present organization of the EU cohesion policy, see 
C. KRIEGER-BODEN, EU cohesion policy, past and present: Sustaining a prospering and fair 
European Union?, Kiel Institute for the World Economy, Kiel Working Paper, No. 2037, 
2016. 
877 Today, among the most important Structural Funds, there are the European Regional 
Development Fund (ERDF), the European Social Fund (ESF), the European Agricultural 
Guidance and Guarantee Fund (EAGGF) and the Financial Instrument for Fisheries 
(FIFG). 
878 The main EU initiatives in the field are named as follows: INTERREG, URBAN, 
EQUAL and LEADER. 
879 See G. STAHL, D. LLUNA, A Cohesion Policy for the Future, in Intereconomics, 2003, Vol. 38, 
No. 6, pp. 295-305. 
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Differently, the Europe 2020 Strategy focuses on strategic agendas for definite 
periods, drawing up a vision of the European future and setting out a 
framework for joint and coordinated reforms and investments within the EU as 
a whole and its Member States. The current Europe 2020 Strategy, officially 
constituted by the Conclusions of the European Council in 2010 for the period 
2010-2020880, is thus supposed to be a growth strategy for the Union; its three 
priorities – smart, sustainable, and inclusive growth – are substantiated by five 
targets on employment, research and development, environment, education 
and social inclusion.   
Finally, State Aid Control, as the third policy thread, concerns the control of 
State aid by the EU Directorate-General Competition aimed at safeguarding 
undistorted competition between economic operators in the EU.  
Thus, the framework above described is characterized by the fundamental role 
of the Commission who is responsible for the management of a set of different 
actions all aimed at the objective of social cohesion within the Union. 
In this context, the results of the present study suggest to move towards the 
development of one more thread in the context of the EU cohesion policy with 
a new line of intervention based on the implementation of the Social Cohesion 
Zone. The Social Cohesion Zone, in fact, can be a valuable instrument for the 
improvement of a series of economic indicators, such as the employment 
factor, which are all already set among the main objectives of the EU cohesion 
policy of the Commission; in this sense, in fact, social tax incentives introduced 
in the Social Cohesion Zone are always functional to the achievement of 
objectives of territorial cohesion, thus favouring the convergence between 
underdeveloped and developed regions of the Union. 
Therefore, beside the cohesion policy in a strict sense, the Europe 2020 strategy 
and the State aid control policy, the Social Cohesion Zone can become the 
fourth line of action within the general EU cohesion policy, offering a new tool 
to the Commission for the implementation of better targeted initiatives. 
7.3.2 Legal background 
The idea of including the new model within the EU cohesion policy can be 
supported by the valorization of some fundamental values of the Treaties. The 
principles of solidarity and equality, for example, are strictly related to the 
development of the EU cohesion policy, as they are both able to counterbalance 
other policies which are exclusively aimed to the defense of the internal market. 
In detail, Article 2 TEU identifies solidarity and equality as bases of the 
European society and founding values common to the Member States; even 
                                                             
880 Conclusions of the European Council of 25/26 March 2010, EUCO 7/10, available at 
http://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?l=EN&f=ST%207%202010%20INIT 
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though these principles are very general, they represent the fundamentals over 
which the EU cohesion policy has to be developed, leaving the doors open to 
the implementation of all those instruments – such as the Social Cohesion 
Zone – whose final aim is the reduction of the social disparities between high-
income and low-income regions. 
Then, Article 3(3) TEU offers one more supporting argument since it 
univocally identifies the promotion of social and territorial cohesion and 
solidarity as specific objectives of the Union. 
Moreover, other reasons for the implementation of the Social Cohesion Zone 
in the context of the EU cohesion policy can also be recognized in the TFEU; 
according to Article 174 TFEU, in fact, “the Union shall aim at reducing disparities 
between the levels of development of the various regions and the backwardness of the 
least favoured regions. Among the regions concerned, particular attention shall be 
paid to rural areas, areas affected by industrial transition, and regions which suffer 
from severe and permanent natural or demographic handicaps such as the 
northernmost regions with very low population density and islands, cross-border and 
mountain regions”.  
On these bases, the idea of implementing the Social Cohesion Zone within the 
EU cohesion policy is coherent with the resulting framework, finding its legal 
supporting arguments in a comprehensive set of norms belonging to EU 
primary law.  
Furthermore, it is important to observe that the same values of solidarity and 
social cohesion are strongly considered also in the constitutional tradition of 
Member States, with the aim of refusing any unilateral approach based on the 
mere defense of the internal market881. The constitutional orders of Member 
States, in fact, already contain a set of fundamental principles which operate as 
“checks and balances” for the defense of the values of solidarity and social 
cohesion; according to the ECJ, in fact, such principles can allow important 
derogations from EU law when a public interest to be pursued is recognized882. 
On the ground of these ideas, it is possible to conclude that the implementation 
of the Social Cohesion Zone within the EU cohesion policy finds its supporting 
arguments not only in a set of norms belonging to EU primary law, but also in 
881 In this sense, see F. GALLO, Le ragioni del fisco. Etica e giustizia nella tassatione, 2th Edition, 
Il Mulino, Bologna, 2011, pp. 134 et seq.; G. MOSCHETTI, Diniego di detrazione per 
consapevolezza nel contrasto alle frodi Iva, alla luce dei principi di certezza del diritto e 
proporzionalità, CEDAM, Padova, 2013, p. 174. 
882 See, inter alia, Case C-386/04 Centro di Musicologia Walter Stauffer, [2006] ECR I-8203, 
paragraph 39; Case C-406/04 Gérald De Cuyper v Office National de l'emploi, [2006] ECR 
I-6947, paragraph 40; Case C-192/05 K. Tas-Hagen and R. A. Tas v Raadskamer WUBO van 
de Pensioen- en Uitkeringsraad, [2006] I-10451, paragraph 33; Case C-499/06 Halina 
Nerkowska v Zakład Ubezpieczeń Społecznych Oddział w Koszalinie, [2008] ECR I-03993. 
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the constitutional tradition common to Member States; in this regard, the 
position recently held by the ECJ around the concept of public interest883 opens 
a new space for the valorization of the principles of solidarity and cohesion, 
pointing out the urgent need of new instruments for the development of a 
social cohesion policy in line with the common constitutional tradition of the 
Member States. 
7.3.3 The EU governance of the Social Cohesion Zone 
As far as the Social Cohesion Zone becomes a new line of action within the EU 
cohesion policy, it is then necessary to identify the level of government at which 
the various aspects must be defined, finding out the best way to set up a 
favourable legal environment for the implementation of the new model. 
In this direction, the discussion has to focus on the governance of the Social 
Cohesion Zone, identifying a valuable solution where the EU and Member 
States can share their different role, with a set of coordinated actions aimed at 
maximizing the results and at improving the social cohesion between different 
areas of the Union. 
As already seen, the Social Cohesion Zone is a measure defined in the context 
of a social cohesion policy, namely an area where Member States are always 
reluctant to confer their competence to the Union884; in particular, at the 
present stage of the integration process, the field of social and cohesion policy is 
still primarily within the domain of the Member States according to the 
principle of subsidiarity, even if forming part of the shared competences885. 
The widespread idea, in fact, is that such policies are implemented more 
effectively at the national level than at the European level and, thus, the role of 
EU institutions is limited to the support and the coordination of the activities of 
the same Member States. 
Moreover, when the perspective changes from the functional to the structural 
dimension, it is worth to note that the model of the Social Cohesion Zone 
exclusively involves the area of direct taxation, namely an area where Member 
States conserve their prerogatives and their autonomous tax systems. 
On these bases, as far as the new model is concerned, it is not feasible to reserve 
an active role for the EU Institutions in the hard-law making process, since both 
                                                             
883 Case C-287/10 Tankreederei I SA v Directeur de l’administration des contributions directes, 
[2010] ECR I-14233, paragraph 27; Case C-192/05 K. Tas-Hagen and R. A. Tas v 
Raadskamer WUBO van de Pensioen- en Uitkeringsraad) [2006] I-10451, paragraph 33 and 
35. 
884 W. STREECK, Neo-Voluntarism: A New European Social Policy Regime?, in European Law 
Journal, 1995, No. 1, pp. 31–59. 
885 See Article 4(2)(b) TFEU. 
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social policy and direct taxation are areas of competence of the Member States 
pursuant to the principle of subsidiarity. 
Nonetheless, the inclusion of the Social Cohesion Zone within the EU 
cohesion policy presupposes a coordination and a supervision at the EU level, 
with the definition of strategic objectives and general principles; in other words, 
the objective of social cohesion between different areas of the EU necessarily 
requires a coordination at the EU level886. 
On the ground of the above ideas, the system of governance should be defined 
according to the principle of subsidiarity with a dialogue between regulatory 
norms (Member States level) and general principles (EU level). In this sense, 
while, on one part, the statutory planning of the Social Cohesion Zone is 
reserved to the national governments, EU institutions, on the other, should be 
responsible for different tasks, such as the formulation of general policies and 
overall territorial strategies887. 
This objective may be achieved through the adoption of the so-called “Open 
Method of Coordination” (hereinafter OMC), thus ensuring a role for the EU 
institutions in supporting the establishment of the Social Cohesion Zone in the 
most disadvantaged areas of the EU. 
The OMC is a form of EU governance based on a soft law approach; the 
objective deals with the reinforcement of the pillar of European integration 
through a set of new measures able to complement - rather than substitute - the 
Member States’ action in areas with a limited scope for EU law888. The 
legitimacy of the OMC within the EU framework is based on the provision of 
Article 2(5) TFEU; beside the first and the second category of exclusive and 
shared competence, in fact, the OMC falls within a third category, namely of 
“supporting, coordination and supplementing” competence889. The OMC 
involves various mechanisms of coordination, such as guidelines, quantitative 
and qualitative indicators and benchmarks, and national and regional targets, 
backed by periodic evaluations and peer reviews, all finalized to provide a 
concrete help to Member States in learning from one another and consequently 
886 J. RIVOLIN, A. FALUDI, The hidden face of European spatial planning: Innovations in 
governance, in European Planning Studies, 2005, Vol. 13, No. 2, pp. 195-215. 
887 U. J. RIVOLIN, Cohesion and subsidiarity Towards good territorial governance in Europe, in 
Town Planning Review, 2005, Vol. 76, No. 1. 
888 For a brief analysis of the main features of the Open Method of Coordination see 
EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, MEMBER’S RESEARCH SERVICE, The Open Method of 
Coordination, European Parliament Publications,  2014. 
889 K. AMSTRONG, The Open Method of Coordination – Obstinate or Obsolete?, University of 
Cambridge Faculty of Law, Research Paper No. 45/2016, available at https:// papers. 
ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2839840 
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improve their domestic policies890. 
In the case of the Social Cohesion Zone, a model of governance based on OMC 
does not preclude the possibility for each Member State to adapt that general 
framework to the features of its economy and society, with the full exercise of 
its legislative competence in the regulation of the detailed tax measures to be 
implemented in the context of the Social Cohesion Zone. 
In particular, the OMC should include a series of coordinated actions at the EU 
level with the adoption of instruments of soft law focused on the definition of 
the concept of Social Cohesion Zone, on the criteria for the selection of the 
eligible areas, and on the monitoring of the various examples of Social 
Cohesion Zones established across the EU, with the introduction of a set of 
mechanisms of evaluation and peer review at the EU level. 
Within such lines of intervention, the set of general principles defined at the EU 
level may be translated to the national level into the development of initiatives 
aimed at the establishment of the Social Cohesion Zone according to the 
principle of subsidiarity; at that point, as far as the role of the national 
government is concerned, EU institutions must remain excluded by the 
definition of statutory regulations, such as those concerning the type of tax 
benefits to be granted (e.g. deduction, tax credit) or the specific direct tax 
involved.  
In conclusion, the resulting model of governance of the Social Cohesion Zone 
includes a “politics of strategies”, where the development of ideas takes place at 
the EU level, and a “politics of reaction”, where the national governments 
decode the guidelines according to national differences, implement policies in 
line with the principle of subsidiarity, and provide feedback891. In these terms, 
EU institutions can assume a fundamental role of impulse, with the definition 
of a favourable environment for the implementation of the Social Cohesion 
Zone within the EU cohesion policy. 
7.4 The Social Cohesion Zone and the fiscal residue  
The tax measures adopted in the Social Cohesion Zone for the recipient 
undertakings produce an indirect effect in favour of resident employees and 
resident suppliers, consisting in the improvement of the opportunities on the 
local market. 
In this regard, as seen in the previous chapter, when the situations of a resident 
                                                             
890 See C. DE LA PORTE, Good Governance via the OMC? The Cases of Employment and Social 
Inclusion, in European Journal of Legal Studies, 2007, Vol. 1, No. 1. 
891 See in this sense G. PAGOULATOS, M. STASINOPOULOU, D.A. SOTIROPOULOS, Governance 
in EU Social and Employment Policy: A Survey, Athens University of Economics and 
Business, available at http://www.eliamep.gr/wp-content/uploads/2009/01/r-cwowe1.pdf 
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and of a non-resident are comparable, the tax measures of the Social Cohesion 
Zone may determine a discriminatory or a restrictive tax treatment of the non-
residents. In such a case, in order to avoid the adoption of protectionist 
measures, it is then necessary to verify whether an overriding reason of public 
interest exists and, finally, whether the same tax measure does not go beyond 
what it is necessary to attain the objective pursued. 
For these purposes, the proportionality test is usually carried out under three 
different stages concerning the suitability, the necessity, and the proportionality 
stricto sensu of a tax measure892.  
The first stage, which is based on the suitability, does not require particular 
attention in the case of the Social Cohesion Zone, considering that the 
obligations assumed by the recipient undertakings are clearly addressed to the 
achievement of objectives of a social character, especially for what regards the 
minimum number of new employees to be hired in the first year of activity. 
More complicated are the issues related to the second and third stage where the 
measure’s proportionality is respectively assessed under the profile of its 
necessity and its “proportionality stricto sensu”. In both cases, in fact, it seems 
that the judgements of the ECJ are characterized by a wide discretionality; in 
particular, as far as the necessity is concerned, the review of the national 
measure by the ECJ is generally based on the “least restrictive alternative”, a 
concept which leads to uncertainty as regards the norm to be applied893.  . 
For these purposes, it is now necessary to discuss a possible option to limit such 
a discretionality, introducing the concept of “fiscal residue” and allowing an 
assessment based on a more objective parameter. 
The so-called “fiscal residue” is generally referred to as the “net benefits from 
tax-expenditure programme, i.e. the benefits from expenditure minus disutility 
from tax payment”894; in this sense, the fiscal residue is a parameter able to 
identify the ratio between the tax burden set in a region and the value of the 
public services available in the same region895. The same concept is strictly 
related to the allocation of tax expenditures among different areas of a State 
even through a differentiated tax treatment on a regional basis.  
892 T.I. HARBO, The function of the Proportionality Principle in EU Law, in European Law 
Journal, 2010, Vol. 16, No. 2, p. 165. 
893 D. WEBER, Tax avoidance and the EC treaty freedoms: a study of the limitations under 
European law to the prevention of tax avoidance, in Eucotax series on European taxation 11, 
The Hague, Kluwer law international, 2005, p. 210. 
894 J. M. BUCHANAN, Federalism and Fiscal Equity, in American Eco. Review, Volume 40 ,No. 4, 
1950, pp. 583-599. 
895 See B. MORO, Incentivi fiscali e politiche di sviluppo economico regionale in Europa, in Moneta 
e Credito, 2001, Vol. 52, pp. 343-388. 
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The parameter of the fiscal residue finds a theoretical support in the concept of 
fair tax competition which is essentially linked to the proportion existing 
between the total tax burden in an area and the value of the public services 
available in the same area. 
Accordingly, Member States should modulate the extent of the tax burden at 
the territorial level on the ground of the public services locally available in order 
to achieve a neutral value of the fiscal residue and the horizontal fiscal balance 
across the different areas of the national territory. By this way, “high tax-high 
spend” zones could perfectly coexist along with “low tax–low spend” zones896, 
without any negative effect on the internal market. 
The neutralization of the fiscal residue leads to the rationalization of public 
expenditures, moving resources towards objectives related to the improvement 
of the living and social conditions in the most disadvantaged areas. As far as it is 
possible to set differentiated tax rates among different areas, residents are able 
to get access to public services at a fair price on the ground of the proportional 
relation existing between the tax burden and the value of the public services 
available. 
The concept of fiscal residue can also be valorized on the ground of the  
principle of tax equity. Tax equity is generally associated with the fundamental 
right of every taxpayer to claim tax justice with the proper destination of public 
resources897. This principle, in fact, is generally intended as equity among 
taxpayers (taxpayer equity), assuming that taxpayers who are in the same 
economic position should be treated in the same way for tax purposes; in other 
words, the equity of a tax system concerns whether the tax burden is distributed 
fairly among the population and, therefore, the principle of tax equity implies 
that all the productive members of society should contribute to the public 
finance and should pay their fair share through taxation898. In particular, the 
content of the principle of tax equity can be defined according to the benefit 
principle899. In this sense, the benefit principle is based on the equitable 
measure of economic distribution and on the rule according to which the entire 
tax burden should be distributed in the same proportion as it occurs in the case 
                                                             
896 A. STEICHEN, Tax competition in Europe or the taming of Leviathan, in VV.AA., Tax 
Competition in  Europe,  IBFD - International  Bureau  of  Fiscal  Documentation,  
Amsterdam,  2003, p. 49. 
897 P. MUSGRAVE, Harmonization of direct business taxes: a case study, in C.S. SHOUP, Fiscal 
Harmonization in Internal markets, Vol. II, Columbia University Press, New York, 1967, 
pp. 211-32; Ibid., US Taxation of Foreign Investment and Income: Issues and Arguments, 
Harvard Law School, Cambridge, 1969. 
898 G. L. SALIS, A Brief Introduction to the Principle of Tax Equity, 2007, available at 
http://aafm.us/article1967.html?id=214, 2007. 
899 J. RICE STEVEN, Introduction to Taxation: a decision-making approach, Dame Publishing, 
Dublin, 1996, pp. 15-17. 
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of benefits granted by the State900. Therefore, a differentiated allocation of tax 
expenditures finds its justification in the lower value of the public services 
available in the area and in the mentioned rule according to which the tax 
burden has to be set in proportion to the benefits granted by the State. 
Given the above, the parameter of fiscal residue may represent the instrument 
to be used for the assessment of the proportionality of a tax measure. 
In this case, in fact, the tax measures at issue will be considered as the “least 
restrictive alternative” – and, therefore, as necessary to achieve the 
improvement of the living conditions of the residents of the Social Cohesion 
Zone – as long as they are addressed to the neutralization of the fiscal residue 
and to the achievement of the horizontal fiscal balance between the various 
areas of a Member State. In this sense, in fact, when the Social Cohesion Zone 
covers a territory characterized by a low value of the public services available 
compared to the tax burden applied to the residents of the same area, then the 
fiscal residue will assume a negative value and, consequently, the related tax 
measures will be the “least restrictive alternative” until the negative value of the 
fiscal residue is neutralized. The necessity, in fact, will be identified in the lack of 
an alternative to the legislative choice, given the absence of other equally 
effective means to achieve the neutralization of the fiscal residue; in this regard, 
in fact, it is important to observe that the only alternative track for the 
neutralization of the fiscal residue, which is the improvement of the value of the 
public services available in the area (e.g. construction of new roads or new 
hospitals), is not usually a feasible solution considering the strict limits of State 
resources as generally defined by the public budget. 
The parameter of fiscal residue may also assume a role in the third and last stage 
of the proportionality test which is focused on the “proportionality stricto 
sensu”. In this case, in fact, the balance between the different interests involved, 
namely those of the residents of the zone, on one part, and of the non-residents 
of the zone, on the other, will be achieved through a process of neutralization of 
the fiscal residue; in other words, until the value of the fiscal residue is negative, 
the interests of the residents of the Social Cohesion Zone will be considered 
prevalent with respect to the interests of the non-residents. 
In summary, the proportionality of the tax measures introduced in the Social 
Cohesion Zone should be founded on an assessment based on the parameter of 
the fiscal residue, considering not only the relevance of the tax burden in the 
area, but also the value of the public services there available. By this way, it 
seems possible to definitely overcome the discretionary element of the ECJ in 
the proportionality test, with an evaluation of the necessity and the 
900 D.G. DUFF, Benefit taxes and user fees in theory and practice, in The University of Toronto Law 
Journal, 2004, No. 54, pp. 435-446. 
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proportionality stricto sensu of a measure carried out on the ground of an 
objective parameter. 
At the same time, the parameter of the fiscal residue will ensure the 
implementation of the Social Cohesion Zone in the proper areas, without any 
detrimental effect on the surrounding territories of the same Member State; in 
this sense, in fact, as long as the fiscal residue is defined according to the EU 
average, the horizontal fiscal balance resulting from its application will be able 
to guarantee a fair taxation to all the citizens irrespective of the territory of 
residence. 
On these bases, it is evident that a differentiated allocation of tax expenditures 
within a Member State – with the establishment of the Social Cohesion Zone - 
finds its justification in a negative value of the fiscal residue of the same area; 
accordingly, the proportionality of the related tax measures will be ensured 
until the same parameter of the fiscal residue is completely neutralized. In 
principle, this mechanism should imply that, where the value of the public 
services available in the area would eventually increase, the same tax incentives 
will be lowered in order to keep a neutral value for the parameter of the fiscal 
residue. 
In conclusion, as far as the Social Cohesion Zone is based on the neutralization 
of the fiscal residue, the overriding reasons relating to the public interest will be 
considered as proportional, overcoming any issue of protectionism in the 
context of the present discussion. 
7.5 The Social Cohesion Zone: the practical implementation 
The last part of the discussion must now be addressed to the outline of the 
substantial and procedural aspects in the practical implementation of the Social 
Cohesion Zone Model in the EU context, as resulting from the analysis of the 
findings and from the issues approached in the present chapter. 
7.5.1 Substantial aspects 
The substantial aspects of the implementation process include relevant 
provisions concerning the eligibility conditions of the recipient undertakings, 
the content and the mechanism of the tax incentives, and the obligations to be 
assumed by the same recipient undertakings. 
7.5.1.1 Eligibility conditions 
The eligibility conditions deal with the situation of the recipient undertakings 
which intend to qualify for the favouring tax measures. 
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A first group of eligibility conditions must focus on the legal status of the 
recipient undertaking. In this regard, the eligible undertaking must be identified 
in an enterprise, namely a legal entity engaged in an economic activity, 
irrespective of its legal form, possessing the right to conduct business on its 
own and, thus, to enter into contracts, own property, and incur liabilities. In line 
with the results achieved by the analysis of the EU law framework, the eligibility 
must be extended to the permanent establishment of a non-resident enterprise 
which is defined under Article 5 of the OECD Model Tax Convention, as “a 
fixed place of business, through which the business of an enterprise is wholly or 
partly carried on”. 
A second group of eligibility conditions must instead focus on the size and on 
the statutory goals of the recipient undertakings, with the outline of two 
alternative situations both eligible for the tax incentives, namely those of large 
enterprises, on one part, and social enterprises, on the other. 
In the first situation the eligibility is reserved to large enterprises having certain 
size requirements (irrespective of their statutory goals) in order to ensure 
sufficient financial and economic strength for the fulfilment of the obligations 
assumed in the context of the Social Cohesion Zone regime. In this case, large 
enterprises must be identified as enterprises other than micro, small or medium 
enterprises within the meaning of Annex I to the Commission Regulation (EU) 
No. 651/2014 of 17 June 2014 declaring certain categories of aid compatible 
with the internal market in application of Articles 107 and 108 TFEU. On these 
bases, the eligibility conditions will require that the enterprise, based on the 
data of the last approved accounting period, meets one of the following criteria: 
a) it employs 250 or more employees; b) it employs fewer that 250 employees 
but the enteprise’s balance sheet total exceeds EUR 43 million or the total 
annual turnover exceeds EUR 50 million901. 
Otherwise, in the second situation, the eligibility is reserved to social 
enterprises having statutory goals of a social character, irrespective of any size 
requirement, according to the definition set out by Article 2(1) of Regulation 
(EU) No. 1296/2013. In this case, in fact, social enterprises are eligible for the 
tax incentives not in consideration of their size, but in consideration of their 
statutory goals which are univocally addressed to the pursuit of a social 
objective. 
In other words, while in the case of large enterprises the reasons for the 
eligibility must be identified in their economic and financial strengths – which 
are able to ensure the fulfilment of the obligations assumed under the Social 
Cohesion Zone regime – differently, in the case of social enterprises, the 
justification for the same eligibility must be found in the clearness of the 
                                                             
901 See Commission Regulation (EU) No. 651/2014 of 17 June 2014, Annex 1, Art. 2(1). 
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statutory goals which generally ensure the prevalence of social objectives over 
profits, regardless of any size requirement. 
7.5.1.2 Tax incentive mechanism 
The tax incentives must exclusively be granted in the area of direct taxation with 
measures specifically addressed to income tax. As seen, in fact, the process of 
harmonization of indirect taxes, such as customs duties, VAT and excise duty 
does not allow autonomous initiatives of the Member States and, therefore, the 
tax measures related to indirect taxes have to be excluded from the horizon of 
the Social Cohesion Zone. 
In this case, the tax incentives on income tax have to be granted in the form of 
tax allowances or tax credits considering that, in both cases, the choice of such 
subtractive regimes allows to calculate in advance the value of the tax 
expenditures starting from the amount of the eligible items. Therefore, the 
identification of the eligible items becomes a fundamental aspect of the tax 
incentives mechanism, since it determines a connection between the tax 
advantages granted and the specific expenses supported by objectives of a social 
policy (i.e. wages for new employees and costs for purchase orders sent to local 
suppliers). 
In a first variable, the tax incentives have to be set in form of tax allowances 
allowing the deduction from the gross income (gross tax base) of a monetary 
value related to the following eligible items: (i) the number of new employees 
hired, (ii) the volume of the purchase orders of goods and services sent to local 
suppliers, and (iii) a reasonable profit.  
On these bases, the amount of the deductible items will be calculated as follow:  
(i)  a fixed amount for each new employee hired in the tax year; 
(ii)  a variable amount corresponding to the costs incurred in the tax year for 
purchase orders of goods and services sent to local suppliers; 
(iii) a variable amount corresponding to the reasonable profit defined on the 
ground of an objective parameter (e.g. ROCE). 
In a second variable the tax incentives have to be granted in form of tax credits 
with the deduction from the gross tax due of a monetary value (tax credit) 
related to the same items, namely: (i) the number of new employees hired, (ii) 
the volume of the purchase orders of goods or services sent to local suppliers, 
and (iii) a reasonable profit. 
On these bases, the amount of the tax credit will be calculated as follow:  
(i)  a fixed amount for each new employee hired in the tax year; 
(ii)  a variable amount corresponding to a percentage of the costs incurred in 
the tax year for purchase orders of goods and services sent to local 
suppliers; 
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(iii) a variable amount corresponding to a percentage of the reasonable profit 
defined on the ground of an objective parameter (e.g. ROCE). 
The tax incentive mechanism here described represents one of the main 
substantial aspects and offers a concrete idea of the incisiveness of the Social 
Cohesion Zone compared to the other implementing models of STZs 
recognized in the experience of the Member States. In this case, in fact, it is 
evident that the amount of the deductible items and of the tax credits may be 
determined without any external limit; while in the case of the State Aid Zone, 
for instance, the value of the tax expenditures finds a cap in the fixed threshold 
under the de minimis regulation or in the maximum aid intensity provided by the 
regional aid map under the GBER, in the case of the Social Cohesion Zone the 
same cap is established only by internal limits which are exclusively associated 
to the investments made by the recipient undertaking, without any maximum 
aid intensity or fixed threshold. 
7.5.1.3 Obligations of the recipient undertakings 
The tax regime of the Social Cohesion Zone includes a series of obligations to 
be fulfilled by the recipient undertaking. 
The first obligation concerns the minimum number of employees to be hired in 
the first year of activity.  
In particular, the new employees must be resident of the zone since a minimum 
period of time before the beginning of the employment contract and must 
maintain their residence in the area concerned for the entire period of the 
labour contract; by this way, in fact, it is possible to avoid abusive practices, 
such as in the case of a temporary residence registered only for tax purposes, 
ensuring that the tax advantages are granted only to the economic operators 
which effectively respond to the substantial scope of the tax measure.  
Furthermore, the new employees must be hired with a long-term contract or 
other contractual forms able to guarantee a certain stability to the employment 
relation; this is necessary to avoid the abuse of short-term contracts which 
could undermine the objectives set under the establishment of such zones. 
Finally, the hiring mechanism must ensure the numerical balance between high-
qualified employees and low-qualified employees, thus extending the effects of 
social tax incentives to a broader audience of individuals which reside in the 
disadvantaged areas of the Member States. In this sense, the obligation assumed 
by the recipient undertaking will also involve the hiring of a minimum 
percentage of high-qualified workers in respect to the total number of 
employees hired in the same tax period902. 
                                                             
902 The possibility of limiting the obligation to the hiring of new employees belonging to the 
low-income and the middle-income class should also be considered. For example, the 
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The second obligation is focused on the minimum volume of the purchase 
orders of goods and services to be sent to the small and medium-sized 
enterprises based in the zone903. The idea, in fact, is to limit the social tax 
incentives only to those undertakings which are able to guarantee a minimum 
annual volume of purchases of goods or services from local suppliers, thus 
maximizing the positive effects of such tax measures with the creation of a 
virtuous circle in the productive and distributive chain.  
By the provision of these obligations, the social character of the tax measures 
granted in favour of the eligible undertakings will be ensured, establishing a 
strong link between means and ends; consequently, it will be possible to qualify 
the economic activity of the recipient undertakings as a work integration service 
carried out in the general interest and, therefore, as a genuine social service of 
general interest where the social goals prevail over the profit. 
7.5.2 Procedural aspects 
In this implementation process, the establishment of a Social Cohesion Zone 
involves some important procedural aspects. 
In particular, it is possible to identify three different chronological stages which 
characterize the relationship between public authorities and recipient 
undertakings within the implementation process of a Social Cohesion Zone. 
7.5.2.1 Selection of the eligible areas 
The first stage of the implementation process is focused on the selection of the 
eligible areas for the establishment of a Social Cohesion Zone. 
In this regard, the parameter of the fiscal residue assumes a fundamental role, 
being able to identify the ratio between the tax burden set in a region and the 
value of the public services available in the same region. 
By this way, the outcome of the process of selection is the identification of the 
areas where the parameter of the fiscal residue assumes a negative value with 
respect to the EU average ratio, considering the presence of a high tax burden 
                                                                                                                                               
obligation could be fulfilled by the hiring of new employees with a salary under a certain 
threshold; by this way, the tax measures would be better addressed to their scope, 
consisting in the improvement of the employment factor, especially with reference to the 
most disadvantaged individuals which reside in the zone. 
903 The category of micro, small and medium-sized enterprises (‘SMEs’) is made up of 
enterprises which employ fewer than 250 persons and which have an annual turnover 
not exceeding EUR 50 million, and/or an annual balance sheet total not exceeding EUR 
43 million (see Commission Regulation (EU) No. 651/2014 of 17 June 2014, Annex 1, 
Art. 2(1)). 
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and, at the same time, a low-quality level of the public services available in these 
areas. 
Therefore, the eligible areas will be the areas with a negative value of the 
parameter of the fiscal residue; in such cases, in fact, the establishment of a 
Social Cohesion Zone is a necessary instrument of social cohesion policy to be 
used to neutralize the parameter of the fiscal residue (from a negative value to a 
neutral value). 
The process of detection of the parameter of the fiscal residue in respect to the 
EU average and the corresponding identification of the eligible areas in the 
Member States should lead to the definition of  a mapping at the EU level. In 
this sense, there is a space for a significant role of the EU institutions, through 
the adoption of the Open Method of Coordination for supporting the 
establishment of the Social Cohesion Zone according to objective criteria. In 
particular, among the various actions, the OMC should first provide an 
instrument to define the criteria for the identification of the value of the public 
services in an area for the purposes of the fiscal residue, making reference to a 
set of factors, such as the presence of transport connections, hospitals, schools, 
etc. with the measurement of their respective quality level according to a series 
of ranking parameters. Moreover, the same OMC should involve the detection 
of the EU average of the fiscal residue, the mapping process of the eligible areas 
where the values are negative with respect to the same average, and the 
periodical update of the database in order to eventually amend the maps 
defined at the EU level with the inclusion of new eligible areas or the exclusion 
of the old eligible areas. 
Through this process, it is possible to ensure the coordination role of the EU 
institutions, improving the performance and the coherence of the initiatives 
assumed at the Member States level; in this regard, in fact, the use of an 
objective criterion for the selection of the eligible areas, such as the fiscal 
residue, represents a guarantee for the proportionality of the tax measures 
assumed in the context of a Social Cohesion Zone. 
7.5.2.2 Public procurement procedure 
Following the selection of the eligible areas with a mapping at the EU level, the 
second stage of the implementation process deals with the public procurement 
procedures for the selection of the eligible undertakings. 
In any case, in fact, the economic operators which benefit from the social tax 
incentives of the Social Cohesion Zone must be selected through an open,  
transparent  and  non-discriminatory public procurement procedure, with 
awarding criteria based on the lowest level of compensation. 
The first step of the public procurement procedure involves the publishing of 
the call for tenders whose content must include, among others, the eligibility 
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conditions, the tax benefit mechanism with the indication of the cap for 
deductible items and tax credits, and the object of the obligations which will be 
assumed by the awarded undertakings. Furthermore, the same call for tenders 
should include detailed information about the awarding criteria making 
reference to the lowest level of compensation intended as a percentage of the 
total amount of the investment; in this sense, the participants should set their 
offers presenting a business plan about the work integration service to be 
provided, with the indication of their best discount, in terms of a percentage, on 
the total amount of the eligible items, including a reasonable profit. 
The second step deals with the entrustment act to be signed between the public 
authority and the awarded undertakings; the document will essentially 
reproduce the content of the clauses of the call for tenders, with a specific focus 
on the description of the compensation mechanism and, in particular, on the 
parameters for calculating, controlling and reviewing the compensation, 
including the indicators used to establish the reasonable profit. 
7.5.2.3 Monitoring 
The last procedural aspect to be considered is related to the control ex post of 
the activities carried out by the recipient undertakings and of the results 
obtained with reference to the employment factor. 
Also in this case, the EU institutions can assume a fundamental role of 
coordination and support through the Open Method of Coordination; EU 
institutions, in fact, may define a set of mechanisms of evaluation and peer 
review, best practices, and benchmarks for the monitoring of the various 
examples of Social Cohesion Zones established across the EU. 
By this way, it is possible to improve the quantity and the quality of the 
statistical data available with a process of continuous update, allowing the 
Member States to better set and achieve their short, medium, and long-term 
goals.  
7.6 Final remarks 
The outcomes of the discussion highlight the possibility of a practical 
implementation of the results achieved at the end of the present research. 
The model of the Social Cohesion Zone can finally be presented as a concrete 
instrument which exploits the space left for Member States in areas of 
competence still not harmonized at the EU level; moreover, the tax incentives 
granted on direct taxation are defined in a form compatible with EU primary 
law, including the critical variables of State aid rules and free movement of 
persons. 
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Therefore, the Social Cohesion Zone Model becomes one more implementing 
model beside the Free Zone, the Extra-Territorial Zone, and the State Aid 
Zone, assuming its qualifying features within the general legal theory of STZs. 
On these premises, the use of the Social Cohesion Zone Model in the context 
of the EU cohesion policy has been discussed, focusing on the possible 
reconciliation between the role of the EU institutions, on one part, and the 
Member States, on the other. For this purpose, the opportunity of an action of 
support and coordination from the EU institutions has emerged, through 
instruments of soft law able to define objective parameters, strategies, and best 
practices. 
Furthermore, the discussion has led to the introduction of the fiscal residue as 
an essential parameter for the selection of the eligible areas; in this sense, in fact, 
as long as the neutralization of the fiscal residue becomes the target of such 
initiatives, it is still possible to ensure the proportionality of the tax measures of 
the Social Cohesion Zone, overcoming any issue related to the infringement of 
the free movement of persons.  
In conclusion, the resulting framework assumes a concrete dimension with the 
definition of a practical instrument for social cohesion policies addressed to the 
most disadvantaged areas of the Union. 
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CHAPTER 8 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
8.1 Summary of the research process 
The aim of this study has been addressed to the definition of a general legal 
theory of STZs within European tax law and to the identification of a new 
implementing model for the development of social cohesion policies for the 
most disadvantaged areas of the Union. 
In this direction, the objective has first been focused on the development of a 
theoretical concept able to work as a reading key of the factual experience of the 
Member States, allowing a deeper understanding of the phenomenon in the 
context of legal studies; the starting point, in fact, is the disorganic approach of 
the previous works and the lack of a systematic perspective from the point of 
view of tax law. 
At the same time, further motivation has been found starting from the 
presumption that the existing models of STZs are not able to face the economic 
issues of the disadvantaged areas of the Union. On these bases, the consequent 
assumption is the need of creating a new instrument of policy action to tackle 
the issues of the low-income areas of the Union, with particular reference to the 
high rate of unemployment; in this sense, the focus has been set on the need to 
contrast, through new suitable tax measures, the continuous growth of 
population in the most developed areas of the EU, on one part, and the 
corresponding depopulation of the underdeveloped areas characterized by lack 
of employment, on the other.  
On these premises, it is necessary to start this conclusion chapter with a brief 
overview of the contents of the thesis, summarizing the results achieved with 
reference to each research question. 
The first stage of the study, which covers the content of Chapter 2, has involved 
the review of the literature on the topic with the outline of the corresponding 
legal dimension of STZs, especially for what concerns the different views of the 
scholars about the concepts, the definitions and the denominations used in the 
various national and international contexts.  
The content of Chapter 3 has been focused on the EU law framework with the 
review of the instruments of hard law and soft law which influence the 
phenomenon of STZs. In this case, the different perspective from the field of 
indirect taxation and direct taxation has emerged together with the the different 
role which primary law and secondary law may assume in the same fields; 
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furthermore, the review has underlined for direct taxation the crucial role of the 
Commission for interpreting the relevant provisions of State aid rules. 
Chapter 4 has been dedicated to the review of the factual experience of the 
Member States with the description of the situations which correspond to the 
phenomenon of STZs. 
The first result of the research process has been outlined in Chapter 5 and 
consists in the development of a general legal theory of STZs on the ground of 
three main pillars: the concept of STZs with its territorial, structural and 
functional dimension, the definition of STZs in terms of a comprehensive 
macro-category, and, finally, the implementing models of STZs as resulting 
from the experience of the Member States.  
In particular, for what regards the concept of STZs, the relevance of the 
functional dimension has been underlined, with the opening of a new room for 
the analysis of the phenomenon under a different perspective; in this regard, in 
fact, the functional dimension highlights the objectives pursued by the 
government through the establishment of STZs and the distinction between 
measures constituting economic tax incentives, on one part, and measures 
constituting social tax incentives, on the other. 
The general legal theory has then been enriched by the inclusion of a 
comprehensive definition of STZs able to summarize the key features and by 
the identification of a series of implementing models as resulting from the 
factual experience.  
The second result of the research, which is outlined in Chapter 6, deals with the 
development of a new model of STZs corresponding and addressed as the 
Social Cohesion Zone Model.  
The new model is here developed starting from the presumption that the 
existing models of STZs are not able to tackle the economic hardships of the 
most disadvatanged areas of the Union, with the consequent assumption that 
an additional model for STZs is needed. 
In this case, the analysis of the variables of EU law has given evidence of the 
possibility of shaping the tax measures of the Social Cohesion Zone Model in a 
form compatible with the internal market and exempt from the notification 
obligation under State aid rules. 
For this purpose, a design has been considered characterized by the 
introduction of social tax incentives in compliance with the Altmark criteria or, 
as an alternative, with the criteria of Article 106(2) TFEU as defined by the 
Commission Decision under the Almunia package. In this regard, attention has 
been paid to configure the tax incentives as a compensation in favour of the 
recipient undertakings for the provision of a social service of general interest, 
focusing the attention on the social character of the obligations assumed by the 
same undertakings. In particular, the analysis has put in evidence the possibility 
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of a broad interpretation of the concept of SSGIs allowing the inclusion of large 
enterprises among the eligible undertakings as long as they assume the 
obligation of providing work integration services even if outside of their 
general statutory goals; otherwise, a narrow interpretation of the same concept 
would limit the eligible undertakings to the category of social enterprises where 
the obligation of providing work integration services is already assumed in 
coherence with the statutory goals. In any case, the use of a public procurement 
procedure for the selection of the recipient undertakings, as well as the 
signature of an entrustment act of a specific content, have been resulted as 
fundamental aspects for ensuring the compliance of the Social Cohesion Zone 
with the EU law framework. 
Furthermore, when the variable of the free movement of persons is considered, 
the results of the study have put the opportunity in evidence to extend the tax 
incentives available in the Social Cohesion Zone Model to the permanent 
establishments of non-resident undertakings. At the same time, as far as the 
position of the resident employees and the local suppliers are concerned, the 
analysis of the ECJ case law has offered many arguments to exclude the 
infringement of the free movement of persons; in this sense, in fact, even when 
a tax measure would result in a discriminatory or restrictive treatment with 
reference to the situation of the non-resident, the tax measures provided under 
the Social Cohesion Zone Model may be allowed under a public interest 
justification, as long as they are univocally addressed to the protection of the 
employment factor in the disadvantaged areas of the Member States, while the 
proportionality of the same tax measures would be ensured through the 
application of the parameter of the fiscal residue. 
Also in the case of the Code of Conduct Group for business taxation, the Social 
Cohesion Zone Model has not presented any negative outlook as long as 
certain requirements are fulfilled; in this sense, in fact, it is sufficient to exclude 
among the eligible costs the purchases made between non-independent parties 
and, at the same time, to ensure the transparency and non-negotiability through 
the introduction of specific provisions.  
Finally, in Chapter 7, the discussion of the findings has offered more support 
for the use of the Social Cohesion Zone Model in the context of the EU 
cohesion policy, suggesting an action of coordination from the EU institutions 
through instruments of soft law able to define objectives parameters, strategies 
and best practices. In this regard, the parameter of the fiscal residue has been 
proposed as the proper instrument for the selection of the eligible areas in 
order to progressively achieve the horizontal fiscal balance across the Union 
and, at the same time, in order to ensure the proportionality of the related tax 
measures. 
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8.2 Answers to the research questions and conclusions 
After the summary of the main findings, it is finally possible to answer the 
research questions formulated at the beginning of the thesis, with the 
enunciation of the conclusion statements in the light of the results achieved. 
8.2.1 The general legal theory of STZs (research question No. 1) 
In the introductory chapter the first research question has been outlined in the 
following terms: 
Research question No. 1  
In the context of European tax law, is it possible to develop a general legal theory of 
STZs able to explain the different experiences of territorial tax incentives in the 
Member States?   
At the end of the research process, the results achieved confirm the possibility 
of a positive answer to the first research question. 
Through the analysis of the collected material, in fact, it is possible to define a 
general legal theory of STZs based on three fundamental pillars: the concept of 
STZs, the definition, and the implementing models. 
This theory is a general theory in the sense that it offers a common reading key 
for a comprehensive understanding of the phenomenon within the EU law 
framework and within the experience of the Member States; in this sense, the 
territorial, the structural and the functional dimensions are able to highlight the 
common characteristics of each example of STZs recognized in the Member 
States. 
This general theory is also a legal theory as it is specifically developed within the 
field of European tax law. In fact, the selection of the relevant material over 
which the theory has been worked out is focused on legal sources of the EU law 
framework, including primary law and secondary law, with specific references 
to the instruments related to the phenomenon of taxation, both for what 
regards indirect taxes and direct taxes. 
The general theory is also a comprehensive theory, being able to encompass 
under its umbrella all the different experiences of STZs in the Member States. In 
this sense, in fact, STZs have been defined in a broad sense as “areas delimited by 
a natural, artificial or conventional border where entities and goods, selected 
through a territorial connecting factor provided by the law, can benefit from a 
favouring tax treatment which deviates, under an exclusion regime or a 
subtractive regime, from the standard tax treatment applied in the rest of the 
hosting State on the ground of objectives of an economic or social character 
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defined within a specific government function”. Furthermore, the general theory 
includes the identification of three different models which are able to explain the 
different situations of territorial tax incentives in the EU context, namely the 
Free Zone, the State Aid Zone, and the Extra-Territorial Zone. 
In conclusion, it is possible to answer in a positive sense to the first research 
question, considering the results achieved and the general legal theory here 
developed in the context of European tax law.  
By this way, the resulting theory can fill the gap of knowledge recognized at the 
beginning of the present study in consideration of the lack of a systematic 
perspective of the topic, especially as far as the field of tax law is concerned. In 
this sense, in fact, the reviewed literature gives evidence of a disorganic 
approach to the phenomenon which is essentially based on the specific 
characteristics of the national context in which each single research is carried 
out, with different denominations, definitions, and classifications. 
Therefore, the new theory is an original result of the research process as it 
definitely overcomes all the issues involved and sensibly changes the systematic 
perspective, offering new categories for a deeper understanding of the 
phenomenon; the new reading key, in fact, which is based on the territorial, the 
structural and the functional dimension, is finally able to highlight the 
substantial aspects of STZs opening a new room of study within the field of 
European tax law. In particular, one of the main findings is that under the 
functional dimension, the distinction between the category of economic tax 
incentives and the category of social tax incentives seriously influences the way 
in which the variables of the EU legal framework work. Only in case of social 
tax incentives, in fact, it is possible to support the introduction of an incentive 
programme on the ground of the discipline provided for SSGIs, including the 
Altmark criteria and Article 106(2) TFEU.  
In conclusion, the general theory which has been developed under the present 
study is an original result, considering that the literature review does not 
provide any evidence of similar systematic efforts as far as the area of European 
tax law is concerned. 
8.2.2 The new model of the Social Cohesion Zone (research 
question No. 2) 
The second research question, which involves the development of a new model 
of STZs for social cohesion policies, has been outlined as follows: 
 
Research question No. 2  
Is it possible to identify a new implementing model of STZs within the EU law 
framework addressed to the development of social cohesion policies for the most 
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disadvantaged areas of the Union? 
The new model has been developed starting from the presumption that the 
existing STZs are not able to face the economic issues of the most 
disadvantages areas of the Union, with the consequent assumption that a new 
model of STZs is needed at the current stage of European integration. 
At the end of the research process, the results of the analysis under the variables 
of EU law provide sufficient support for a positive answer to the research 
question. 
In this sense, it is possible to conclude that, as far as direct taxation is concerned, 
there is a space left for Member States to assume autonomous initiatives for the 
development of social cohesion policies within the strict limits set by EU law. 
Nonetheless, the resulting model of the Social Cohesion Zone requires to pay a 
special attention to the definition of the related tax regime in consideration of 
the outer limits of EU law; in this sense, in fact, State aid rules, the free 
movement of persons and harmful tax competition set some important 
boundaries to the design of the new model which result in a series of strict 
requirements and conditions to be fulfilled in order to establish a Social 
Cohesion Zone Model compatible with EU law. 
For example, the tax measures must comply with the Altmark criteria – or, as an 
alternative, with the conditions set by the Commission Decision of the Almunia 
package - and, therefore, must first be configured as a compensation for the 
recipient undertakings involved in the provision of a SSGI; the eligible 
undertakings must be limited to social enterprises and large enterprises (in the 
latter case as long as a broad interpretation of the concept of SSGI is adopted), 
while the related measures must exclusively include tax incentives of a genuine 
social character (i.e. social tax incentives). Furthermore, the use of a public 
procurement procedure and the signature of the entrustment act assume a 
fundamental role in the process of selection of the recipient undertakings, with 
the consequent need for Member States to adapt their internal rules to the 
framework resulting from the variables of EU law. Then, among the various 
conditions to be fulfilled, also the territorial connecting factor influences the 
design of the new model with the need of a choice including, within the eligible 
undertakings, the permanent establishments of non-resident undertakings. 
In the context of the new model, the research puts in evidence the fact that the 
obligations assumed by the recipient undertakings, with reference to the hiring 
of a minimum number of resident employees, may be positively assessed under 
a general public interest justification, thus excluding any form of illegitimate 
discrimination or restriction with respect to the free movement of persons.  
Nevertheless, the same measures must also be proportional to the objectives 
pursued in the sense that they do not go beyond what is necessary to achieve the 
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same objectives. For what regards this specific profile, the research brings new 
insights to the discussion setting a focus on the concept of fiscal residue. As 
seen, in fact, the fiscal residue can be used as a parameter to measure the 
proportionality of a tax measure as far as it identifies the ratio between the tax 
burden in a certain area and the corresponding value of the public services there 
available;  in other words, the same parameter determines the possibility to 
identify the areas with a negative ratio where the establishment of a Social 
Cohesion Zone is a necessary measure to achieve the objectives set in the 
context of a social cohesion policy. This is a new perspective that can be used to 
approach the issue of proportionality under the judgment of discrimination, 
addressing the tax measures for a certain area to the neutralization of the fiscal 
residue and to the consequent achievement of a horizontal fiscal balance across 
the various regions of the Union; in this context, in fact, the fiscal residue 
becomes an objective parameter to be used for considering the tax measures as 
proportional, thus overcoming the broad discretionality which generally 
characterizes the proportionality test  in the case law of the ECJ. 
Therefore, the findings which result from the development of this second 
research question allow some important considerations with respect to the 
starting background and the ideas generally spread in the EU law framework. 
First, the results of the research give evidence of the possibility of overcoming 
the negative outlook traditionally assumed by the tax measures reserved to a 
limited area of the national territory; in this sense, the issue of the territorial 
selectivity of the tax measures and the concerns related to possible negative 
effects on the internal market may finally be set apart as far as the design of the 
Social Cohesion Zone is shaped on the ground of the Altmark criteria or of the 
Commission Decision of the Almunia package. The valorization of the 
functional perspective of the Social Cohesion Zone, in fact, offers the 
opportunity of assuming a different track for the development of the related tax 
measures, even out of the scope of State aid rules. The new track here 
developed is then an original finding of the present research, being based on the 
idea of designing the tax measures reserved for a limited area of a Member State 
in the form of compensation measures addressed to a social service of general 
interest (i.e. a work integration service carried out by the eligible undertakings). 
Second, at the current stage of EU law, it is a matter of fact that the assessment 
of the discriminatory or restrictive character of a tax measure, including those 
introduced within the Social Cohesion zone, is still left to the broad 
discretionality of the ECJ; the proportionality test, in fact, generally involves the 
use of a parameter based on the “least restrictive measure”, with consequent 
difficulties in predicting the decision of the ECJ, especially when there is a lack 
of objective terms of comparison. In this regard, one more original outcome 
which derives from the discussion of the same findings is the possibility of a 
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new approach to the proportionality test based on the parameter of the fiscal 
residue; in this sense, in fact, the innovative perspective is addressed to the 
selection of the eligible areas according to an objective parameter, the fiscal 
residue, which is associated to the idea of a horizontal fiscal balance to be 
achieved between the various areas of the Union. In other words, the idea of 
neutralizing the fiscal residue in a certain area can provide support for 
configuring the establishment of the Social Cohesion Zone as the least 
restrictive measure in order to achieve the same objective in a proportional 
manner. 
Thanks to these new findings, it is then possible to conclude that the Social 
Cohesion Zone, as the innovative result of the research process, is a new 
implementing model of STZs in compliance with the EU law framework which 
can be used for the development of social cohesion policies for the most 
disadvantaged areas of the Union, provided that certain specific conditions are 
fulfilled. Therefore, the research fills one more gap in the existing EU 
framework, providing a new instrument for social cohesion policies and a new 
model of STZs beside the Free Zone, the State Aid Zone, and the Extra-
Territorial Zone.  
8.3 Recommendations for future EU initiatives 
At the current stage of development of the EU law framework the Social 
Cohesion Zone Model is a hidden instrument, considering the lack of explicit 
references both in the context of hard law and soft law. 
The present research discloses the fundamentals of the new model through an 
intense process of analysis where the variables of EU law are deeply scrutinized 
in order to find the space left for the autonomous initiatives of the Member 
States. 
On these premises, the recommendations resulting from this study are 
addressed to the adoption of a soft law tool able to give evidence of the Social 
Cohesion Zone within the area of European tax law, presenting it as a visible 
instrument in the context of the EU cohesion policy; for this purpose, a new 
communication from the Commission could represent an interesting option 
for releasing the potential of the Social Cohesion Zone in all its qualifying 
features. 
Different orders of reasons are set on the ground of this choice.  
First, as long as the answers to the research questions are positive, it is not 
necessary to intervene through hard law tools since it has been demonstrated 
that the current EU law framework already offers some space for the initiatives 
of the Member States in the area of direct taxation. 
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Second, a soft law tool is able to improve the EU framework from the point of 
view of legal certainty, allowing Member States to take actions in a legal 
environment with well-defined limits; in this regard, there is a need to definitely 
overcome the case-by-case approach of the Commission and the broad 
discretionality in interpreting the interactions between social tax incentives and 
the main EU law variables, such as in the case of State aid rules, free movement 
of persons, or harmful tax competition. 
Third, a soft law tool seems to be the appropriate solution from the perspective 
of the EU cohesion policy in order to guarantee a continuous progress in the 
development of social cohesion in the most disadvantaged areas of the Union; 
in this sense, in fact, a communication including guidelines, best practices and 
benchmarks can offer a support to the actions of the Member States while, at 
the same time, they remain free to exercise their legislative competence in the 
field of direct taxation. 
In more details, the communication from the Commission should present the 
Social Cohesion Zone Model as an instrument defined on the track of the 
Altmark criteria, clarifying in which terms the concept of social tax incentives 
can be associated to the concept of social services of a general interest. 
For this purpose, there is a need of a clear statement about the role of work 
integration services within the first Almark criterion and, in particular, about 
the possibility of identifying a genuine SSGI any time an enterprise assumes the 
obligation of providing such kind of services, irrespective of the statutory goals; 
only by this way, in fact, it is possible to extend the package of social tax 
incentives to large enterprises, as long as they are entrusted with a public service 
obligation consisting in a work integration service in favour of resident 
employees and local suppliers. 
Then, the content of the communication should also involve more aspects 
concerning the parameters and the calculation mechanism for the maximum 
amount of the compensation, the content of the entrustment act and the public 
procurement procedure to be used for the selection of the recipient 
undertakings. 
Furthermore, the communication should deal with the criteria for the selection 
of the eligible areas. In this regard, it is first necessary to illustrate the factors 
which determine the fiscal residue, with the identification of the mechanism for 
calculating the tax burden and the value of the public services in the area 
concerned; this part of the communication should include a set of rules for the 
detection of the EU average value of the fiscal residue, for the mapping of the 
territory of the Member States and for the periodical update of the same maps. 
Then, the range of negative values under which Social Cohesion Zones may be 
established for a certain period of time should also be defined; in this direction, 
in fact, the communication should establish a methodology for the classification 
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of the eligible areas starting from the detection of a negative value for the 
parameter of the fiscal residue, with a distinction in categories according to a 
specific range of the corresponding value. 
Finally, it is recommended that the same communication includes monitoring 
instruments, with the definition of a set of mechanisms of evaluation and peer 
review at the EU level, as well as mutual learning processes between the 
Member States for achieving short, medium, and long-term goals. 
8.4 Areas for future research 
Despite the originality of the results achieved, there are also some important 
limitations embodied in this work which are able to highlight the corresponding 
areas for future research. 
The first limit regards the resources reviewed and analysed under the research 
process; as far as legislation is concerned, in fact, the phenomenon of STZs has 
been explored with exclusive reference to European tax law, on one part, and to 
the national tax legislation of the Member States, on the other. 
As a consequence, there are no references to other important variables such as 
international tax treaties, WTO commercial policies or the BEPS actions of the 
OECD, which remain out of the field of investigation of the present study. This 
concretely means that the results achieved should require to also be tested with 
respect to such external resources in order to assume a validity in the field of 
international tax law. 
The second limit is external to the field of legal studies and regards the 
econometric evaluation of the effects of the related tax measures.  
Questions related to the efficiency or the effectiveness of STZs, including the 
new model of the Social Cohesion Zone, remain open, as they are linked to the 
definition of valuable instruments of econometric evaluation. In particular, the 
value of the tax expenditures, the duration of the programme, the instruments 
and parameters used to evaluate the performance are all aspects that would 
require further studies in the context of economics; in this sense, the 
establishment of a dialogue between the field of legal studies and the field of 
economics would improve the results not only from the point of view of the 
legitimacy under the EU law framework, but also from the point of view of the 
efficiency and effectiveness of a tax incentive programme at the territorial level. 
Therefore, the conclusion is that many crucial aspects for the success or a 
failure of a program based on the Social Cohesion Zone Model are outside the 
field of legal studies, being related to the field of economic studies aimed to the 
definition of a set of parameters and methods for monitoring the results 
achieved. 
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On the ground of the above considerations, it is finally possible to identify the 
areas for future research which are related to the scope of the present study. 
International tax law, including tax treaties, WTO commercial policies and the 
BEPS actions of the OECD, is the first area where the results of this research 
should be carefully tested to verify whether or not the general legal theory of 
STZs and the Social Cohesion Zone Model may be confirmed as scientific 
categories of international value. 
Then, the field of economics is the second area for future research where the 
Social Cohesion Zone Model should require to be deeply assessed from the 
point of view of its efficiency and effectiveness. 
8.5 Final conclusions 
At the end of this study, the phenomenon of STZs assumes an autonomous 
value in the context of European tax law thanks to a new outlook based on a set 
of original findings. 
The research process has given evidence of a general legal theory able to explain 
the different variables of STZs from the perspective of tax law studies, through 
the valorization of the territorial, the structural and the functional dimension. 
This first point of arrival fills an important gap of knowledge in the field; the 
theory here developed, in fact, offers new insights for a better understanding of 
the phenomenon focusing on a comprehensive concept able to encompass all 
the various experiences of STZs within the EU. 
The corresponding effect is that the various examples of STZs across the EU 
now find, for the first time, a theoretical framework within the field of tax law 
studies, with a more consistent legal approach to the topic. 
Nonetheless, the ideas resulting from the present research are not merely based 
on systematic considerations related to the development of a general legal 
theory; the further step here made, in fact, is wider in perspective and covers 
relevant issues in the context of social cohesion policy. 
In this sense, it has been demonstrated that there is still a space left for Member 
States for autonomous initiatives through the Social Cohesion Zone Model as 
long as the tax measures exclusively deal with direct taxation and fulfill a 
specific set of requirements.  
The results achieved are associated to the most important challenges of the 
future of the Union, especially for what regards the issues of the most 
disadvantaged territories which are affected by serious delays and 
unemployment. 
In the last years, social and economic disparities have dramatically increased in 
most Member States, on the ground of the economic crisis started in 2008 and 
the emerging scepticism against the process of European integration. 
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As a response to these negative feedbacks, the results of this study promote a 
renewed image of the Union offering support to the adoption of a new 
instrument for the development of social cohesion policies addressed to the 
low-income areas; the Social Cohesion Zone Model, in fact, opens a new 
perspective where the values of solidarity and social cohesion finally become 
the main engine for the neutralization of the fiscal residue and the achievement 
of the horizontal fiscal balance between the different territories of the Union.  
In this new context, the Social Cohesion Zone Model becomes a strategic 
instrument for the future of the process of European integration and for 
tackling the issues related to the overpopulation and the underpopulation 
which respectively affect high-income and low-income areas of the EU. In this 
regard, in fact, the significant movement of European citizens from low-income 
to high-income areas of the Union and the continuous growth of the population 
in the most developed regions of the EU are leading to many issues in 
consideration of the limited resources of the public services there available. 
On the ground of these considerations, the general legal theory of STZs, 
together with the new model of the Social Cohesion Zone, represents an 
original contribution to the knowledge in the field of European tax law in the 
light of the future challenges of the Union.  
In this context, the final message of the present study is addressed to the 
implementation of the Social Cohesion Zone Model for supporting the track 
towards the realization of a Social Europe. In this sense, EU institutions should 
definitely change their route towards a more comprehensive idea of Europe 
aimed not only at the defense of the principles of the internal market, but also to 
the valorization of the constitutional traditions common to the various 
Member States, including the value of social cohesion at the territorial level.  
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SUMMARY 
Special Tax Zones (STZs) do not have a clear identity in the context of 
European tax law, as they cover a multitude of situations characterized by 
different legal frameworks and different purposes. 
As far as the EU legal system is concerned, there are still many doubts about the 
legitimacy of this instrument, since the tax measures related to these zones are 
generally considered as selective or discriminatory and, thus, able to negatively 
affect the internal market; State aid rules for regional aid, for example, do not 
offer a wide margin for the implementation of such initiatives at the national 
level, pointing out some strict limits, such as those dealing with the amount of 
the maximum aid intensity or the threshold set by the de minimis regulation. 
Nonetheless, the experience of Member States offers many examples of Special 
Tax Zones, with the presence of various types of territorial tax measures on 
direct and indirect taxation, including, in some cases, benefits on non-
harmonized taxes. 
The current vision of regional aid, as well as the absence of a systematic 
approach to the topic, severely limit the results of these experiences; today, in 
fact, Special Tax Zones are unable to produce the expected outcomes for what 
concerns the objectives of social cohesion in the most disadvantaged areas of 
the Union. 
Given the above, the objective of the present work is to overcome the same 
limits through a new systematic approach, verifying the space left for 
autonomous initiatives of the Member States aimed at the establishment of 
Special Tax Zones in compliance with EU law. 
On these premises, this study first focuses on the legal dimension of STZs on 
the ground of the existing literature with the outline of the state of knowledge 
of the phenomenon among the scholars. 
The next step is the description of the EU law framework of STZs, involving 
not only the EU treaties provisions and the EU secondary legislation, but also 
the case law of the ECJ and various documents issued by the Commission in the 
context of soft law. Here, the EU law framework is reviewed under the 
variables of State aid law, internal market law and harmful tax competition. 
Furthermore, the study includes the review of the factual experience of the 
Member States, with the identification of the various examples of STZs and the 
description of the tax regimes available. 
On the ground of the conceptual analysis of the material collected, the study 
then develops a general legal theory of STZs, based on three different pillars, 
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with the objective of covering all the different experiences of territorial tax 
incentives in the EU and explaining their relevant variables. 
The first pillar deals with the theoretical concept of Special Tax Zones where 
the territorial, the structural and the functional dimensions become the 
essential key elements that influence the variables of the same phenomenon. In 
this case, the functional dimension assumes a particular relevance with a focus 
set on the objectives of the tax policy defined under the establishment of such 
zones; here, the distinction between the category of economic tax incentives, on 
one part, and the category of social tax incentives, on the other, represents a 
crucial point of investigation.  
The second pillar involves the research of a comprehensive definition of Special 
Tax Zones, able to encompass under its umbrella all the different experiences of 
STZs in the Member States highlighting the key-features of the territorial, 
structural and functional dimension.  
The third and last pillar concerns the identification of a set of implementing 
models as resulting from the factual experience of the Member States.  Under 
this approach, the first model, the “Free Zone”, is set on ground of the 
provisions of the Union Customs Code where Free Zones are defined as a 
customs special procedure of storage according to which the charge of customs 
duties and other indirect charges is suspended under a regime of deferral; the 
second model, namely the “State Aid Zone”, is developed, on one part, on the 
ground of State aid rules in the form of regional aid and as an exemption to the 
general State aid prohibition, or, on the other, in the form of an infra-State 
body with sufficient autonomy, where the tax advantages granted are not 
considered as territorial selective; finally, the third and last model, namely the 
“Extra Territorial Zone”, includes tax benefits that are the mere consequence of 
the exclusion of the same zone from the territorial scope of one or more taxes. 
Following the definition of a general legal theory on the topic, the study then 
outlines the basics of a new implementing model of STZs – the “Social 
Cohesion Zone” – characterized by the presence of tax advantages in the form 
of social tax incentives.  
The basic idea deals with an instrument to be used at the Member States level 
for the development of social cohesion policies targeted to reduce the 
disparities between high-income and low-income areas of the Union. 
For this purpose, the first stage of the research process is focused on the 
identification of a design which could be suitable for the aim pursued, in ideal 
terms, without the assessment of the variables resulting from the application of 
EU law. 
The second stage of the research process is instead addressed to test the same 
model with respect to the variables of the EU law framework, namely State aid 
rules, free movement of persons, and harmful tax competition. 
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In particular, the first variable of State aid rules gives evidence of a double track 
which can be followed in order to shape the tax advantages of the Social 
Cohesion Zone in a form compatible with the internal market and exempt from 
the notification obligation. 
The first track is aimed at setting the social tax incentives out of the scope of the 
State aid discipline, as not constituting State aid under the notion of Article 
107(1) TFEU. For this purpose, the tax measures must comply with the 
Altmark criteria and, therefore, must first be designed as a compensation for the 
recipient undertakings involved in the provision of a Social Service of General 
Interest (SSGI). 
The second track is instead based on the exemption defined under Article 
106(2) TFEU, assuming that the tax measures at issue fail to comply with the 
Altmark criteria and, therefore, must be considered as State aid under the 
notion of Article 107(1) TFEU. In this case, the analysis defines one more space 
left to Member States for the implementation of the Social Cohesion Zone in 
consideration of the block exemption provided by the Commission Decision in 
order to consider a tax measure as a State aid compatible with the internal 
market and exempt from  the notification obligation.  
The second variable of the free movement of persons involves the perspectives 
of the recipient undertakings, the employees and the suppliers. 
For what regards the recipient undertakings any issue related to the possible 
infringement of the freedom of establishment can be set apart as long as the 
territorial connecting factor of the new model is defined allowing the eligibility 
of the tax incentives also for permanent establishments of non-resident 
undertakings. The same results are substantially achieved for the situations of 
the employees and the suppliers, even through a more complex process of 
analysis also involving the various steps of the judgement of discrimination.  
The third and last variable of the EU law framework deals with the Code of 
Conduct for business taxation. In this regard, the forth and the fifth criterion of 
the Code suggest to pay attention to the purchases made between non-
independent parties and to the lack of transparency, as well as to focus on the 
real economic substance of the activities, especially in the case of highly mobile 
activities. 
The discussion of the results achieved starts with a comparison between the 
new model of the Social Cohesion Zone and the other implementing models 
identified under the general legal theory of STZs; the same discussion includes 
some considerations on the idea of the Social Cohesion Zone as an innovative 
instrument for the EU cohesion policy, on the issues related to protectionism, 
and on the proportionality of the tax measures on the ground of the concept of 
“fiscal residue”, with the outline of a package of tax incentives for the 
establishment of Social Cohesion Zones in the Member States. In particular, 
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some remarks are here developed around the best option for the EU 
governance of the Social Cohesion Zone, with the definition of the framework 
of responsibilities belonging to EU institutions and Member States. 
Finally, the conclusions and the recommendations are presented, with overall 
insights about the results achieved. In this sense, the phenomenon of STZs 
assumes an autonomous value in the context of European tax law thanks to a 
new outlook based on a set of original findings: first, a general legal theory able 
to explain the different variables of STZs from the perspective of tax law 
studies; second, a space left for Member States for autonomous initiatives 
through the Social Cohesion Zone as long as the tax measures exclusively deal 
with direct taxation and fulfil a specific set of requirements.  
On these premises, the recommendations resulting from this study are 
addressed to the adoption of a soft law tool, such as a communication from the 
Commission, able to give evidence of the Social Cohesion Zone as a visible 
instrument in the context of the EU cohesion policy. 
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SAMENVATTING 
Speciale belastingzones (Special Tax Zones, STZ) hebben geen duidelijk 
omschreven vaste definitie in de context van Europese belastingwetgeving, 
omdat ze betrekking hebben op een veelheid aan regionaal bepaalde situaties 
die worden gekenmerkt door verschillende nationale wettelijke kaders en 
verschillende doeleinden. 
Wat het rechtsstelsel van de Europese Unie betreft, zijn er nog steeds veel 
twijfels over de legitimiteit van dergelijke belastingzones, aangezien de daarmee 
verband houdende belastingmaatregelen over het algemeen als selectief of 
discriminerend worden beschouwd en daardoor de interne markt negatief 
kunnen beïnvloeden. De regels voor regionale staatssteun bieden daarenboven 
geen ruime marge voor de toepassing van dergelijke initiatieven op nationaal 
niveau, en zijn tevens gebonden aan een aantal strikte limieten, zoals die welke 
betrekking hebben op het bedrag van de maximale steun of de drempel zoals 
opgenomen in de Europese de minimis-verordening. 
Desalniettemin zijn in een aantal lidstaten van de Europese Unie diverse 
voorbeelden te vinden van speciale belastingzones, die resulteren in 
verschillende soorten territoriale belastingmaatregelen op het gebied van 
directe en indirecte belastingen, waaronder in sommige gevallen voordelen 
aangaande niet-geharmoniseerde belastingen. 
De huidige visie op het gebied van regionale steun, evenals de afwezigheid van 
een systematische benadering van het onderwerp, beperken de resultaten en 
mogelijkheden van deze speciale belastingzones in ernstige mate. Heden ten 
dage zijn de bestaande speciale belastingzones niet in staat om de door 
(regionale) overheden gewenste resultaten te bereiken voor wat betreft de 
doelstellingen van sociale cohesie in de meest achtergestelde gebieden van de 
Europese Unie. 
Gezien het bovenstaande is het doel van dit onderzoek om deze grenzen te 
overschrijden door middel van een nieuwe, systematische aanpak, waarbij 
wordt nagegaan hoeveel ruimte er nog overblijft voor autonome nieuwe 
initiatieven van de lidstaten met het oog op de instelling van speciale 
belastingzones in overeenstemming met het EU-recht. 
Op basis van deze vooronderstellingen, richt deze studie zich allereerst op een 
onderzoek naar de juridische dimensie van STZ’s gebaseerd op de bestaande 
literatuur met een schets van de huidige stand van zaken in de wetenschap. 
De volgende stap is de beschrijving van het EU-rechtskader van STZ’s, waarbij 
niet alleen de EU-verdragen en de secundaire EU-wetgeving in de beschouwing 
worden betrokken, maar ook de jurisprudentie van het HvJ EU en verschillende 
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documenten zoals aanbevelingen die door de Europese Commissie in het kader 
van ‘soft law’ zijn gedaan. Daarbij wordt het EU-wetgevingskader getoetst aan 
de hand van de regelgeving op het gebied van staatssteun, het interne-
marktrecht en regels aangaande schadelijke belastingconcurrentie. 
Bovendien omvat de studie een volledige inventarisatie van alle STZ’s zoals 
deze thans in de Europese Unie bestaan, alsmede een beschrijving van de 
terzake van toepassing zijnde belastingvoordelen. 
Op basis van de conceptuele analyse van het verzamelde onderzoeksmateriaal, 
ontwikkelt de studie vervolgens een algemene juridische theorie aangaande 
STZ’s, gebaseerd op drie verschillende pijlers. 
De eerste pijler behandelt het theoretische concept van STZ’s waarbij de 
territoriale, de structurele en de functionele dimensies de essentiële elementen 
zijn die de variabelen van dit fenomeen bepalen. De functionele dimensie heeft 
een bijzondere relevantie met een nadruk op de doelstellingen van het 
belastingbeleid zoals vastgesteld bij de oprichting van dergelijke zones. Hier 
vormt het onderscheid tussen de categorie economische belastingincentives 
enerzijds en de categorie sociale belastingincentives anderzijds een cruciaal 
element van onderzoek. 
De tweede pijler omvat het onderzoek naar een alomvattende definitie van 
speciale belastingzones, die onder haar paraplu alle verschillende vormen van 
STZ's in de lidstaten kan omvatten, met aandacht voor de belangrijkste 
kenmerken van de territoriale, structurele en functionele dimensie. 
De derde en laatste pijler betreft de categorisering van alle in de Europese Unie 
thans bestaande STZ’s. Volgens deze benadering wordt het eerste model 
genaamd de "vrije zone" (Free Zone), vastgesteld op grond van de bepalingen 
van het douanewetboek van de Europese Unie waarin vrije zones worden 
gedefinieerd als een speciale douaneregeling voor opslag van goederen volgens 
welke de heffing van douanerechten en andere indirecte belastingen is 
geschorst door middel van een regime van uitstel van belastingheffing. Het 
tweede model, genaamd de "staatssteunzone" (State Aid Zone), wordt enerzijds 
ontwikkeld op grond van staatssteunregels in de vorm van regionale steun en 
kan worden gezien als een uitzondering op het algemene staatssteunverbod, en 
anderzijds in de vorm van een orgaan van de staat met voldoende autonomie, 
waarbij de verleende belastingvoordelen niet als territoriaal selectief worden 
beschouwd. Ten slotte omvat het derde en laatste model, namelijk de "extra-
territoriale zone" (Extra Territorial Zone), belastingvoordelen die het loutere 
gevolg zijn van de uitsluiting van de betreffende zone van de territoriale 
reikwijdte van een of meer belastingen in de desbetreffende lidstaat. 
Na de vaststelling van een algemene juridische theorie over het onderwerp, 
schetst de studie vervolgens de basis van een nieuw implementatiemodel van 
STZ's - de "Sociale Cohesiezone" (Social Cohesion Zone) - gekenmerkt door de 
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aanwezigheid van belastingvoordelen in de vorm van sociale belasting-
incentives. 
Het basisidee heeft betrekking op een instrument dat op het niveau van de 
lidstaten kan worden gebruikt voor de ontwikkeling van sociaal cohesiebeleid 
dat gericht is op het verkleinen van de verschillen tussen regio's met hoge 
inkomens en lage inkomens in de Europese Unie. 
Met dit doel is de eerste fase van het onderzoeksproces gericht op de 
identificatie van een ontwerp (nieuw model) dat geschikt zou kunnen zijn voor 
het nagestreefde doel, in ideale termen, zonder overtreding van de 
voorwaarden die voortvloeien uit de toepassing van het EU-recht. 
De tweede fase van het onderzoeksproces is vervolgens gericht op het testen 
van dit nieuwe model aan de voorwaarden van het EU-wetgevingskader, 
namelijk de regels voor staatssteun, het vrij verkeer van personen en schadelijke 
belastingconcurrentie. 
Met name de eerste voorwaarde inzake de staatssteunregels geeft blijk van een 
dubbel spoor dat kan worden gevolgd om de belastingvoordelen van de Sociale 
Cohesiezone vorm te geven op een wijze die zowel verenigbaar is met de 
interne markt en tevens vrijgesteld is van de meldingsplicht voor staatssteun. 
Het eerste spoor is erop gericht de sociale belastingincentives buiten het 
toepassingsbereik van de staatssteundiscipline te plaatsen, zodat het geen 
staatssteun vormt in de zin van artikel 107, lid 1, VWEU. Hiertoe moeten de 
belastingmaatregelen in overeenstemming zijn met de Altmark-criteria. 
Het tweede spoor is in plaats daarvan gebaseerd op de vrijstelling die is 
gedefinieerd in artikel 106, lid 2, VWEU, ervan uitgaande dat de 
belastingmaatregelen in kwestie niet voldoen aan de Altmark-criteria en 
derhalve als staatssteun moeten worden beschouwd in de zin van artikel 107, 
lid 1 VWEU. In dit geval wordt in de analyse nog één mogelijkheid aan de 
lidstaten voor de uitvoering van de Sociale Cohesiezone gelaten, rekening 
houdend met de groepsvrijstelling van de Europese Commissie om een 
belastingmaatregel als staatssteun verenigbaar te achten met de interne markt 
die is vrijgesteld van de meldingsplicht. 
De tweede variabele aangaande het vrije verkeer van personen betreft de 
perspectieven van de begunstigde ondernemingen, de werknemers en de 
leveranciers. 
Wat betreft de ondernemingen die de belastingvoordelen genieten, kan een 
mogelijke inbreuk op de vrijheid van vestiging worden voorkomen indien vaste 
inrichtingen van niet-ingezeten ondernemingen eveneens in aanmerking 
komen voor de betreffende fiscale stimuleringsmaatregelen. Dezelfde 
resultaten (geen inbreuk op de verdragsvrijheden) worden inhoudelijk bereikt 
voor de situatie van de werknemers en de leveranciers, door een meer complex 
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analyseproces dat ook de verschillende stappen van het beoordelingskader voor 
discriminatie omvat. 
De derde en laatste variabele van het EU-rechtskader behandelt de 
Gedragscode voor de belastingheffing op ondernemingen (Code of Conduct). In 
dit verband schrijven  het vierde en vijfde criterium van de Gedragscode voor 
om aandacht te schenken aan de aankopen die gedaan worden tussen niet-
onafhankelijke partijen en aan het gebrek aan transparantie, alsook om zich te 
concentreren op de echte economische realiteit van de activiteiten, vooral in de 
geval van zeer mobiele activiteiten. De Sociale Cohesiezone moet zodanig zijn 
vormgegeven dat deze niet in strijd komt met voornoemde Gedragscode. 
De bespreking van de met dit onderzoek gegenereerde resultaten begint met 
een vergelijking tussen het nieuwe model van de Sociale Cohesiezone en de 
andere bestaande speciale belastingzones geïdentificeerd in het kader van de 
algemene juridische theorie van STZ’s. Deze analyse omvat ook enkele 
overwegingen over het idee van de Sociale Cohesiezone als een innovatief 
instrument voor het sociale cohesiebeleid van de Europese Unie, over kwesties 
in verband met protectionisme en over de evenredigheid van de belasting-
maatregelen op grond van het concept van het "fiscale residu", met de 
contouren van een pakket van fiscale incentives voor de oprichting van Sociale 
Cohesiezones in de lidstaten van de Europese Unie. In het bijzonder worden 
hier enkele opmerkingen gemaakt over de beste optie voor de EU-governance 
van de Sociale Cohesiezone, met een definitie van het kader van verantwoor-
delijkheden van de EU-instellingen en de lidstaten in dit verband. 
Ten slotte worden de conclusies en aanbevelingen gepresenteerd, met een 
uiteenzetting van de algemene inzichten aangaande de behaalde resultaten.  
In die zin neemt het fenomeen STZ's een autonome waarde aan in het kader 
van de Europese belastingwetgeving dankzij een nieuwe kijk op een reeks 
originele bevindingen: ten eerste een algemene juridische theorie die de 
verschillende variabelen van STZ’s beziet vanuit het perspectief van 
belastingwetgeving; ten tweede, ruimte voor de lidstaten voor autonome 
nieuwe initiatieven via de op basis van dit onderzoek ontwikkelde Sociale 
Cohesiezone, zolang de maatregelen voor belastingmaatregelen uitsluitend 
betrekking hebben op directe belastingen en aan een specifieke reeks vereisten 
voldoen. 
In dit verband zijn de aanbevelingen die voortvloeien uit deze studie gericht op 
de goedkeuring van de Sociale Cohesiezone via een Europees soft law-
instrument, zoals een mededeling van de Europese Commissie, die de Sociale 
Cohesiezone als een zichtbaar instrument in de context van het EU-
cohesiebeleid kan verwoorden. 
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Special Tax Zones (STZs) do not have a clear identity in the context of 
European tax law, since they cover a multitude of situations characterized by 
different denominations and different purposes.
Despite the lack of a systematic framework, STZs can still represent an 
important line of action in the context of the EU cohesion policy; the future 
success of the EU, in fact, is strictly conditional upon the adoption of the 
proper measures to reduce the disparities between high-income and low-
income areas of the Union, including the use of territorial tax advantages at 
the sub-State level.
On these premises, the first objective of the present study is to define a new 
approach to the topic with the development of a general legal theory of STZs 
in the context of European tax law, with the identification of a comprehensive 
concept and a set of implementing models on the ground of the experience of 
the Member States.
Thanks to the support of a new theoretical framework, the study then outlines 
the basics of a new implementing model of STZs – the “Social Cohesion 
Zone” – characterized by the introduction of tax advantages in the form of 
social tax incentives. In this regard, the original findings presented in this work 
give evidence of a space left for autonomous initiatives of the Members States, 
opening a new room for the development of social cohesion policies targeted 
to the most disadvantaged areas of the Union.
At the end of this study, the phenomenon of STZs assumes a new outlook in 
the context of European tax law with a sensible improvement of the systematic 
perspective and a consistent theoretical support for future initiatives at the EU 
and Member State level.
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